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Criminologists researching migration and border control have documented how, in recent 
years, the police, courts and prisons in England and Wales have been reshaped and 
transformed as they have been injected with practices of immigration enforcement. In this 
thesis I suggest that alongside such overt changes, the border might also be permeating the 
criminal justice system in a more subtle and insidious way. Specifically, I focus on the 
racialised narratives circulated by the United Kingdom government and media in the 
contemporary era, which problematise non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants and justify 
their targeting by the direct activities of border enforcement: we can understand these as 
dominant or hegemonic narratives of bordering. In the thesis, I explore how these dominant, 
racialised narratives are being tapped into and appealed to by legal professionals involved in 
one specific stage of the court process: the practice of the sentencing hearing. 
 
Through Crown Court observations, I show how racialised narratives of bordering are being 
mobilised in the individual narratives delivered during sentencing hearings, to portray non-
white and ‘not quite white’ migrants as inherently suspect and deviant, to fix them as 
undesirable in themselves – in order to help produce them as punishable. Conversely, I also 
demonstrate how these racialised narratives are being negotiated and negated in various ways 
to insist that defendants are not intrinsically bad and deviant but, in fact, are naturally good 
and deserving migrants – in order to assert that they can be sanctioned less severely. I argue, 
therefore, that in sentencing hearings for these ‘unwanted’ migrants, dominant, racialised 
narratives of bordering are being deployed and countered as part of the construction and 
negotiation of defendants’ punishability. In uncovering how these racialised narratives are 
being utilised in sentencing hearings my research contributes to the rapidly expanding 
criminological sub-field of ‘border criminology’, as it aids our understanding of the ways in 
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which border control is imprinting itself on the contemporary criminal justice system. At the 
same time, the thesis can be situated in relation to the literature on racism, the courts and 
sentencing, as it demonstrates how racial demarcation and racist expression facilitate and 
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I write the introduction to this thesis just over a month after the United Kingdom (UK) has – 
following a referendum held in June 2016 – formally left the European Union (EU). In the 
aftermath of the vote to leave there was a tendency within the liberal press to frame ‘Brexit’, 
as the UK’s departure from the EU has come to be known, as a dramatic shift in our 
contemporary history, an unexpected turn of events that could not have been foreseen. Thus, 
writing in the Guardian the day after the referendum vote, Jonathan Freedland (2016) opined: 
‘We have woken up in a different country’. In the same paper Suzanne Moore wrote, ‘This 
country is not what many thought it was and now we will find out what we are really made 
of’, and Polly Toynbee likewise lamented that ‘Britain has turned its back on the world’ (The 
Guardian, 2016). Yet, far from signifying change, Brexit actually represents perfect 
continuity with the recent past: for several decades now, the UK has been ‘turning its back on 
the world’. Since the late 1980s and the beginnings of the current era of mass mobility, as 
migration across national territories has become an increasingly normal feature of human life, 
the UK – like other Western nation-states – has been pushing back against this development 
by cultivating different ways to fortify its borders. Brexit, therefore – which, following the 
completion of the current ‘transition period’ at the end of December 2020, will  end ‘free 
movement’ for European Economic Area (EEA) nationals1 coming to the UK (Home Office, 
2020) – can simply be seen as the latest measure designed to restrict the entry of ‘unwanted’ 
outsiders into the country. Similarly, the stigmatising depictions of migrants that were 
persistently circulated during the referendum campaign (Moore and Ramsay, 2017), which 
 
1 The European Economic Area (EEA) includes the 28 EU member states and also Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway. Though Switzerland is neither a member of the EU nor the EEA, it is part of the single market, which 
means that Swiss citizens have the same rights as EEA nationals. At present, while the Brexit transition period is 
ongoing, rights of free movement for EEA nationals coming to the UK are still in operation – meaning that they 
can live and work here without obtaining a visa. Following the end of the transition period, however, on 31st 
December 2020, these rights will come to an end (although not for Irish nationals) (Home Office, 2020).   
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were aimed at justifying and ensuring the UK’s departure from the EU, should be understood 
not in terms of a descent into ‘anti-foreigner sentiment … [that is] unprecedented in our 
lifetime’ (Toynbee, 2016). Rather, the portrayals disseminated by politicians and large 
sections of the media in the run-up to the vote demonstrated a striking continuity with those 
mobilised at other points in the recent past (Burnett, 2016). Consequently, the negative 
representations of migrants that dominated during the Brexit campaign can be viewed more 
accurately through the lens of consolidation and intensification; that is, as the reinvigorating 
and re-energising of present-day anti-immigration narratives.2  
As border control has solidified as a contemporary obsession for the UK – just as, as I 
have suggested, it also has for other Western nation-states – criminologists have increasingly 
paid attention to these developments. In particular, scholars within criminology have focused 
on the growing entanglements between immigration enforcement and the criminal justice 
system, and the changing nature of criminal justice under conditions of mass migration and 
its control. Indeed, during the seven years that I have been researching and writing this thesis, 
‘border criminology’, as this new area of criminological study has come to be known, has 
really come of age. A significant literature now exists, which has thus far taken in an array of 
empirical developments and conceptual concerns, and covered a range of national 
jurisdictions. In the most recent edition of the Oxford Handbook of Criminology, border 
criminology, for the first time, has been assigned its own chapter (Bosworth, 2017) – and a 
number of UK universities, including the university at which I am studying, now offer 
criminological courses on migration and border control. Even as the study of border 
criminology has developed significantly, however, little sustained attention has been paid 
 
2 In identifying continuity between the negative depictions of migrants disseminated during the Brexit 
referendum campaign and those circulated at various other points in the recent past, I should make it clear that I 
do not mean to downplay or minimise the effects of Brexit’s consolidation and reinvigoration of anti-
immigration narratives. As I go on to explain in this introduction, anti-migrant depictions should be understood 
through the lens of race and racism – and, as the Institute for Race Relations has documented (Burnett, 2016), 
there was a surge in racist attacks in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum, which targeted people 
who had migrated to the UK as well as British citizens from racially minoritised groups. 
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within the existing literature to anti-immigration narratives – despite the fact that, as the 
example of Brexit indicates, these depictions are an integral element of the machinery of 
present-day border enforcement. That is, they function to legitimise and make possible the 
restrictions and exclusions of actual immigration control. In this thesis, therefore, I attempt to 
start filling this gap in the literature. Thus, I centre the anti-immigration narratives that are 
disseminated by the UK government and media in my analysis, and I ask how these might be 
percolating and permeating into one particular aspect of the criminal justice process: the 
practice of the sentencing hearing. In doing so, my research works to uncover and reveal 
some of the more subtle effects that the current obsession with migration control might be 
having on England and Wales’ criminal justice system.  
Race and racism are also central to this thesis. As Coretta Phillips and colleagues have 
recently argued, criminology as a discipline remains ‘analytically white’ (2019, p.13): almost 
twenty years on from Phillips and Bowling’s (2003) proposal for the formulation of minority 
perspectives in criminology, it is still the case that race is ‘typically relegated to the periphery 
of the discipline’ (Phillips et al., 2019, p.4). Criminology’s neglect and marginalisation of 
race and racism has been inherited by border criminology. Although some of the more recent 
interventions within this new sub-field have begun to challenge criminology’s ‘silence of 
race’ (Parmar, 2016b, p.61), in many of the earlier and foundational contributions to 
criminological scholarship on migration and border control considerations of race were 
‘usually implicit but seldom explicit’ (Garner, 2015, p.202; see also Phillips et al., 2019; 
Parmar, 2018a; Bowling, 2013). Outside of the academy, indeed, there has also been a 
persistent reluctance to centralise race in the understanding of the anti-immigration narratives 
circulated by the government and media in the contemporary era, and to name these 
specifically as racist depictions. During the so-called refugee ‘crisis’3 in 2015, for example, 
 
3 I explain in Chapter One why I refer to the significant increase in the number of refugees making their way to 
Europe in 2015 as a so-called ‘crisis’. 
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leading non-governmental organisations censured the UK government for its ‘de-humanising 
language’ (Refugee Council, 2015) and ‘nasty rhetoric’ (Amnesty International UK, 2015) in 
describing the refugees trying to make their way to Europe. It was noticeable, however, that 
within these critiques the term ‘racist’ was never explicitly used. 
 Yet, as I explain in the thesis, it is almost only ever people migrating from the Global 
South, most of whom are not white, as well as those from Southern and Eastern Europe, who 
have often been deemed to be ‘not quite white’, who are targeted by these problematising 
narratives. Moreover, anti-immigration depictions disparage and stigmatise those whom they 
target in a very particular way: that is, by racialising them, by constituting them through the 
socially constructed category of race – in order to insist that they are inherently different and 
deviant (Garner and Selod, 2015; Murji and Solomos, 2005). Recognising the specifically 
racialising properties of these narratives, and how they essentialise and fix non-white and ‘not 
quite white’4 migrants as intrinsically deviant, is critical for then understanding how these 
depictions – which, as I show, can be detected in sentencing proceedings – are being put to 
work in this particular context. As I demonstrate, racialised narratives about ‘unwanted’ 
migrants are being mobilised during sentencing hearings in order to frame non-white and ‘not 
quite white’ migrant defendants as naturally suspect and as problematic in themselves – and, 
through this, to help produce them as punishable.  
 
Overview of chapters 
The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, I lay out the conceptual foundations for 
my research. Thus, I begin in Chapter One by situating my thesis in relation to the existing 
 
4 I use the terms ‘non-white’ and ‘not quite white’ throughout the thesis, as a convenient way of demarcating 
which migrants, specifically, racialised narratives of bordering target and stigmatise – and which migrants, 
therefore, my research is concerned with and focused on. As I use the term ‘non-white’, however, I fully 
recognise its problematic nature: that it ‘brings with it a suggestion of something lacking, and of a deficiency’ 
(Eddo-Lodge, 2017, p.xvi), and reinforces whiteness as the norm. I recognise, too, that the term ‘not quite 
white’ is also problematic.   
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literature in border criminology. As I explain, in tracing the effects of immigration 
enforcement on the established criminal justice system, criminologists have typically 
imagined border control as a series of policies and legislative measures and focused on the 
overt changes wrought on the police, courts and prisons by the literal activities of 
immigration control. By looking outside of criminology, however, towards the literature on 
‘everyday bordering’, I argue that we can start to conceptualise border enforcement in a more 
expansive manner. Specifically, I suggest that we can begin to understand the anti-
immigration narratives circulated by the UK government and media in the current era as 
themselves a form of bordering practice – that these depictions can be seen to constitute 
‘bordering work’ (Johnson et al., 2011, p.61). From this perspective, therefore, if we are 
interested in how the contemporary criminal justice system is being touched and marked by 
immigration enforcement, we should also be paying attention to its potential penetration by 
these narratives – which, I suggest, we can understand as dominant or hegemonic narratives 
of bordering. This chapter also begins to address the ‘silence of race’ that has marked much 
of the criminological literature on migration and border control. As I explain, from their very 
inception the literal immigration controls implemented by the UK have been structured by 
racism. It seems clear, then, that – as some of the more recent contributions to border 
criminology have set out – race should provide a central analytical frame for criminologists 
researching borders and bordering. 
In Chapter Two, I proceed to map some of the key dominant narratives of bordering 
disseminated by the UK government and media in the contemporary period. Following on 
from my emphasis on the centrality of race to research on borders and bordering in Chapter 
One, I demonstrate how these narratives can be most fully understood through the framework 
of racism. As I highlighted above, therefore, these narratives almost only ever target people 
from the Global South, most of whom are not white, and those from Southern and Eastern 
Europe, who have often been deemed to be ‘not quite white’. Crucially, moreover, the way 
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that they stigmatise these ‘unwanted’ migrants is by racialising them – that is, by constituting 
them specifically in terms of racial ‘otherness’ and difference. Importantly, though, as these 
narratives do this they never utilise the overt language of race; even when they are 
problematising people with darker skin they never categorise and disparage through reference 
to biological or somatic difference. Instead, I document how narratives of bordering fix 
unwanted migrants as racially deviant using more coded language. Sometimes, then, they 
achieve this through ideas about ‘culture’, or via the register of nationality – as well as by 
means of a more ‘abstract’ (Garner, 2013, p.504) racialising process, which essentialises and 
homogenises non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants as ‘a group with similar pathological 
characteristics’ (2013, p.508). Drawing on David Goldberg’s (2015) work, I suggest that one 
way of understanding the more muted and sanitised nature of these racialised depictions is 
through the lens of post-raciality.   
In Chapter Three, I introduce the final layer of my conceptual foundations by turning 
my attention to the specific stage of the criminal justice process on which my research is 
focused: the practice of the sentencing hearing. In the first half of the chapter, I suggest that 
by continuing to use the framework of narrative we can develop an understanding of what is 
going on during sentencing proceedings. Thus, by approaching the accounts delivered by 
legal professionals during the hearing as individual narratives, we can start to see that these 
are not straightforwardly factual or representational. Rather, we can understand them as 
plotted, purposive versions of the incident being dealt with by the court, each of which is 
concerned with what I refer to as the defendant’s punishability.  
In the second half of the chapter, I connect racialised narratives of bordering and the 
sentencing process, arguing that by approaching individual sentencing narratives from a 
sociological perspective and understanding them as ‘social acts’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, 
p.197) it is possible to see how dominant depictions of unwanted migrants might be seeping 
into them. I then theorise how, specifically, these hegemonic representations might be being 
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put to work in the particular context of sentencing proceedings. Thus, I explain that from the 
existing literature on gendered and racialised narratives in the trial, it seems likely that 
racialised narratives of bordering will be mobilised to produce defendants as inherently bad 
and deviant, and so as problematic in themselves – in order to help construct them as 
punishable. And, conversely, it also seems likely that these racialised narratives will be 
negotiated, and negated, to insist that defendants are not intrinsically bad and deviant but 
rather that they are good and deserving migrants – in order to assert that they can be 
sanctioned less severely. I argue, therefore, that in sentencing hearings for non-white and ‘not 
quite white’ migrants, racialised narratives of bordering are likely to be mobilised and 
navigated by legal professionals as part of the construction and negotiation of defendants’ 
punishability.  
In the second part of the thesis, I move from conceptual foundations to my empirical 
data: the sentencing hearings that I observed in three Crown Courts in London – Isleworth, 
Southwark and Wood Green – across a two-year period. I begin, in Chapter Four, by giving 
an account of how I conducted my observations, and the methodological, epistemological and 
ethical issues that I encountered. One of the most significant issues that I faced during my 
fieldwork was identifying relevant sentencing hearings to observe. At the time that I was 
carrying out my observations, the criminal courts were not routinely identifying and 
recording the nationality of defendants.5 So, there was no clear way to ascertain prior to a 
specific hearing if it was for someone originally from the Global South or Southern and 
Eastern Europe, who are the focus of my research. As I explain, I initially resisted relying on 
racialised and stereotyped assumptions – for instance, selecting hearings on the basis that an 
interpreter had been requested, and/or because the defendant’s name ‘sounded foreign’ – in 
my efforts to ‘find foreigners’ (Kaufman, 2012, p.701). Ultimately, however, practical issues 
 
5 As I explain in Chapter One, this has now changed. Following the implementation of the Policing and Crime 
Act 2017, defendants are now required to state their nationality at their first court appearance. 
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that arose – including the volume of data I was beginning to collect and the need to complete 
my fieldwork within a ‘reasonable’ period of time – meant that I did end up adopting this 
approach.  
Another critical issue considered in this chapter is the impact of my privileged racial 
identity on my research. As I explain, during the research process I have received important 
reminders about how my position as someone who is white and British, and who has 
therefore never experienced racist discrimination, is influencing and indeed limiting my 
investigation of racism in the courts against migrants who are deemed unwelcome. In 
exploring this in this chapter, then, my aim is not to ‘solve’ the impact of my social 
positioning simply by acknowledging or ‘confessing’ it (Phillips and Earle, 2010). Rather, I 
attempt to take its effects seriously and to think through carefully how it will have shaped the 
knowledge that I have produced. 
I also explain in Chapter Four that across the two years I was conducting 
observations, I watched 25 sentencing hearings for people originally from countries in the 
Global South or Southern and Eastern Europe – and that in 16 of these hearings, it was 
possible to detect racialised narratives of bordering. In Chapter Five, I begin my analysis of 
the 16 hearings where narratives of bordering could be traced. Thus, I focus in this chapter on 
13 hearings where two of the key dominant narratives of bordering – that of the abusive 
immigration cheat who manipulates the UK’s immigration system, and that of the parasitical 
scrounger who exploits the welfare benefits system – came through. As I show, the pattern 
theorised in Chapter Three about how these racialised depictions might be being put to work 
in sentencing proceedings was detectable. Across these hearings, then, defendants were 
framed through the narrative of the immigration cheat, or the parasitical scrounger, in order to 
essentialise them as recognisably and inherently deviant and so to help produce them as 
punishable. They were also negotiated and negated as intrinsically problematic like this in 
various ways, in order to insist that they were good and deserving migrants and so that they 
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could be afforded leniency. I highlight, too, that in a number of hearings what I refer to as 
narratives of limited inclusion came through. In particular, the narrative of migrants who 
‘work hard’, ‘pay taxes’ and ‘contribute to the UK’ – which has been disseminated by the 
government to separate limited numbers of unwanted migrants from the figure of the 
scrounger – was mobilised in several hearings. This functioned as another way of insisting on 
defendants as worthy and desirable in themselves, and so asserting that they could be 
punished less severely.  
Alongside this overarching pattern I also document some smaller patterns and 
routines across these hearings – including when, or in what sort of circumstances, racialised 
narratives of bordering tended to be deployed. As I explain, ideas of inherent deviance often 
seemed to be appealed to by the prosecution, or the judge, in quite particular circumstances. 
Specifically, then, such ideas often seemed to be mobilised when a defendant’s presence in 
court appeared to be based on questionable charges, or when a severe sanction was being 
pushed for or imposed; thus, on occasions when more than legal legitimation for the 
punishment seemed to be needed. Against this pattern of specificity and context, however, I 
also saw a series of hearings where defence barristers worked to insist that their client was 
not a parasitical scrounger simply as a matter of course. So, they countered this racialised 
narrative even though there had been no suggestion that the defendant might be viewed in 
this way. From these hearings, therefore, it seemed that distancing the defendant from the 
figure of the scrounger might be emerging as a standard feature of mitigating pleas in non-
white and ‘not quite white’ migrant sentencing proceedings. That is, contesting this 
dominant, racialised narrative appeared to be developing as a staple way of constructing these 
defendants as less punishable. 
In Chapter Six, I turn my attention to defence barristers and defendants’ practices of 
resistance. As I explain in Chapter Five, when defence barristers contested the framing of 
their clients as abusive immigration cheats, or parasitical scroungers, they typically did this 
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by negating or inverting these racialised narratives, or by appealing to narratives of limited 
inclusion. In this way, then, they inadvertently reinforced the racist framework of narratives 
of bordering. As they insisted that their individual clients were good and deserving migrants, 
they implicitly upheld the legitimacy of the idea of inherently bad and deviant migrants – and 
so they acknowledged that abusive immigration cheats and freeloading spongers definitely 
exist. In the three remaining hearings where narratives of bordering could be detected, 
however, which I examine in this chapter, I traced something different. Thus, in two of these 
hearings, I saw defence barristers take a more oppositional approach, as they challenged the 
construction of their clients through such racialised depictions more radically and 
subversively than I witnessed in other proceedings. In the third hearing, I saw the defendant 
himself behave in a resistant manner, as – in spite of the routine marginalisation of 
defendants during court proceedings – he appeared to refuse legal professionals’ racialised 
portrayal of him through his non-verbal reactions and behaviour. As I explain in this chapter, 
it is important not to romanticise or overplay the effects of the resistance displayed by the 
defence barristers and defendant during these hearings. Nonetheless, in all three hearings 
there was some disruption to the process of sanctioning the defendants. That is, as the 
framing of these defendants through racialised and ‘othering’ depictions was more clearly 
unsettled and challenged by the more resistant interventions that were detectable in these 
hearings, the imposition of punishment on them began to seem less natural and inevitable. 
I bring the thesis to a close in the Conclusion by asking: what is the significance of 
what I have conceptualised and traced across the previous six chapters? What do my research 
findings actually mean? In one sense, as I set out from the very start of the thesis, my 
research builds on the knowledge that has thus far been produced by border criminologists. 
So, by uncovering how racialised narratives of bordering are being deployed during 
sentencing hearings, my research aids our understanding of the ways in which immigration 
control is imprinting itself on the contemporary criminal justice system.  
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Alongside this, what I have traced might also be viewed in relation to other fields of 
criminological research: specifically, to the literature on racism and the criminal justice 
system – and, in particular, to research that has examined racist discrimination in the courts 
and sentencing. As I explain in the Conclusion, over the past few decades quantitative 
analyses of racism in sentencing decision-making have produced mixed findings. My 
qualitative approach, then, and focus on sentencing proceedings, might be understood as 
examining and revealing racism in sentencing in a different way. As my research 
demonstrates how racialised narratives of bordering were mobilised and countered as part of 
the construction and negotiation of defendants’ punishability, indeed, it can be seen how – in 
those hearings where these narratives were detectable – racial demarcation and racist 
expression played a significant role. That is, in these hearings, racialised depictions of 
unwanted migrants were appealed to and navigated by legal professionals to help facilitate 
the proceedings and keep them moving.   
Finally, I argue that what I have documented in sentencing hearings has consequences 
that reach beyond the confines of the criminal justice system. As narratives of bordering are 
mobilised during sentencing proceedings, what is playing out is more than simply the court’s 
reproduction and repetition of these racialised ideas. Rather, through this the court has 
become part of ‘the constitution of its own context’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p.211). In other 
words, criminal courts can be understood as sites where notions of the racial difference and 
inferiority of non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants are being produced and sustained – 
and, therefore, courts can be seen as participating in the wider normalisation and 
naturalisation of the racist border. Yet, as I also emphasise, resistance to these racialised 
ideas can sometimes be detected in sentencing proceedings. As defence barristers and 
defendants challenge narratives of bordering, then, they do not simply disrupt the practice of 
the sentencing hearing. They also dispute the reality of racially different ‘unwanted’ 
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migrants, and so refuse the inevitability of the racist border. In doing so, they point towards 

































Setting the Scene: Centring Narratives and Race in Border Criminology 
 
Introduction 
We live in an age of mass migration. According to the United Nations (2017), almost 260 
million people currently live outside the countries they were born in. As the sociologist Les 
Back has noted, in the twenty-first century, ‘The human population is more mobile than at 
any point in its history’ (2007, p.31). And yet, as he also highlights, ‘there remains profound 
anxiety about the global movement of persons’ (2007, p.38). Though the movement of people 
across national territories is a defining characteristic of the contemporary era, claims that we 
now inhabit a borderless world are obviously misplaced (Johnson et al., 2011; Garner and 
Moran, 2006). As human migration has become commonplace and normal, Western nation-
states have increasingly taken steps to shore up and secure their borders. 
While the prominence of the border in the current age has been identified and 
scrutinised by scholars across a range of academic disciplines, criminologists, as Katja 
Franko Aas and Mary Bosworth point out, have been ‘relatively slow’ (2013, p.vii) to turn 
their attention this way. In recent years, however, the initially sparse criminological literature 
on mass migration and its control has transformed into a rapidly expanding sub-field, marked 
out in its earlier stages as the ‘criminology of mobility’ (Pickering, Bosworth and Aas, 2014; 
Aas and Bosworth, 2013) but now more often referred to as ‘border criminology’ (Bosworth, 
Parmar and Vázquez, 2018; Bosworth, 2017, 2016). Seeking to ‘bring migration and borders 
to the criminological home front’ (Aas and Bosworth, 2013, p.viii), critics working in this 
field have drawn attention to the growing convergence between immigration enforcement and 
the criminal justice system in the present era and the way that mass mobility and its control is 
reconfiguring and reshaping criminal justice (Aliverti and Bosworth, 2017; Bosworth, 2016). 
On the one hand, as border criminologists have highlighted, criminal justice practices and 
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powers now reach beyond their traditional realms and functions, as they are being deployed 
in immigration systems. The ‘coercive and intrusive powers’ (Weber and Bowling, 2004, 
p.207) that were previously the preserve of the police, for instance, have been extended to 
immigration officers and border agents (see also Bowling, 2013) and the prison, in the form 
of the ‘new carceral space’ (Bosworth, 2017, p.374) of the immigration detention centre, is 
being used to effect expulsion (see also Bosworth and Turnbull, 2015; Bosworth and 
Kaufman, 2011; Bosworth, 2008). At the same time, it has been documented how the core 
agencies and institutions of the established criminal justice system – including the police, 
courts and prisons – have been altered and transformed, as they have been injected with 
policies and practices of border control. 
It is the second trend identified here that provides the starting point for my thesis: the 
changing shape and contours of traditional criminal justice agencies and institutions under 
conditions of mass migration and its control. In this opening chapter, then, I survey the 
literature that has developed in this area, focusing specifically on analysis of the impact of 
border enforcement on the criminal justice system in England and Wales, and I situate my 
own research in relation to this. As I explain, in tracing the effects of border control on 
criminal justice agencies and institutions, criminologists have typically imagined border 
enforcement primarily in terms of policies and legislation and as contained within the literal 
activities of immigration control. I suggest, however, that by conceptualising border control 
more expansively, it is possible to think about further, more insidious ways in which the 
contemporary fixation with immigration regulation might be marking and permeating the 
established criminal justice system.  
Alongside this, I distinguish my approach in this thesis from much of the existing 
criminological research on migration and borders in one other key way. Although critics in 
this field have not ignored issues of race and racism, it is nonetheless the case that, as Alpa 
Parmar puts it, race has often been positioned at ‘the borders of border scholarship’ (2018b, 
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p.187). In line with some of the more recent interventions in border criminology my analysis 
emphasises, conversely, that race runs through and is integral to the project of migration 
control. In this thesis, therefore, I take the position that in criminological research on borders 
and bordering, race and racism must provide a central analytical frame (Parmar, 2018a; 
Garner, 2015; Bowling, 2013). 
 
The changing contours of the criminal justice system under mass migration and its control       
A growing literature within the recently established criminological sub-field of border 
criminology has, as I suggested above, drawn attention to the changing contours of the 
traditional criminal justice system in England and Wales in the contemporary era and the way 
that it is being altered and reshaped by the border. Within this, one of the key developments 
that has been pointed to is how, through a raft of immigration-focused policies and 
legislation, criminal justice agencies and institutions are increasingly moving away from 
conventional imperatives in their dealings with non-British citizens and are being ‘redirected 
toward the project of migration control’ (Kaufman and Bosworth, 2013, p.177). The prison, 
arguably, has undergone the most significant changes in this respect and offers the clearest 
example of this shift. Thus, I begin, somewhat counter-intuitively, with the institution that 
functions as the endpoint of the criminal justice system and the research that has documented 
its changing function in recent years. 
 
The prison and immigration enforcement 
Prisons in England and Wales have, in fact, long been linked to border control. Before the 
development of a separate immigration detention estate, for instance – which began in earnest 
during the 1990s as the number of asylum applications in the UK started to increase 
significantly – the relatively small number of people locked up under immigration powers at 
this point were generally held in prison (Bosworth, 2014; Kaufman and Bosworth, 2013). 
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Alongside this, legislation that ties imprisonment for a criminal offence to being expelled 
from the UK has been in place for some time. The 1971 Immigration Act introduced 
‘conducive’ deportation, giving the Home Secretary the power to deport a non-British citizen 
where it is deemed to be ‘conducive to the public good’ – a provision that has often been used 
against people convicted of criminal offences and especially those imprisoned as a result 
(Dubinsky, 2012; Cheney, 1993; Gordon, 1983b). Research conducted during the 1990s and 
early 2000s also documented associated developments in prison policy and practice, 
including restrictions on day release and transfer to open conditions for non-citizens, which 
were aimed at facilitating the expulsion of these prisoners from the UK (HM Inspectorate of 
Prisons, 2006; Cheney, 1993; Tarzi and Hedges, 1990). 
While links between the prison and the border go back over decades, then, in more 
recent years they have intensified considerably and become much more formalised. In April 
2006 the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, was forced to reveal that over the preceding 
seven years around 1,000 non-British citizens had been released from prison without being 
considered for deportation. The foreign national prisoner ‘crisis’, as it came to be known, 
resulted in Clarke’s resignation and ‘catalysed legislative and policy shifts’ (Kaufman and 
Bosworth, 2013, p.174) which saw the prison explicitly oriented towards border control. 
Soon after the so-called ‘crisis’ hit the then Labour government introduced legislation 
which meant that the pursuit of deportation when a non-citizen is sent to prison shifted from a 
discretionary decision to, in many instances, a mandatory requirement. Under ‘automatic’ 
deportation – a measure which is contained in the UK Borders Act 2007, and which came 
into force in 2008 – deportation must be pursued in all cases where a non-British citizen is 
sent to prison for 12 months or more, ‘unless certain exemptions or exceptions are made out’ 
(Dubinsky, 2012, p.70). These exceptions include if deportation would breach the person’s 
rights under the European Convention on Human Rights or the Refugee Convention, or if it 
would breach their rights under EU treaties. According to Laura Dubinsky, this latter 
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exception means that ‘arguably, it is never lawful to make an “automatic” deportation order 
against an EEA national’ (2012, p.75). While they are not subject to automatic deportation, 
however, EEA nationals do not escape the threat or actuality of ejection from the UK. 
European law – which, at the time of writing this thesis at least, continues to govern their 
deportation1 – simply means that a slightly higher threshold has typically been applied in 
these cases, with the Home Office2 normally pursuing expulsion where an EEA national is 
sent to prison for two years or more (Bosworth, 2017, 2016).3 The legislative change of 
automatic deportation was coupled with an increased focus on deporting foreign prisoners 
generally: following the 2006 ‘crisis’ the Criminal Casework Directorate, which is the Home 
Office unit responsible for the deportation of imprisoned non-citizens, ‘grew to thirty-five 
times its original size’ (Kaufman, 2015, p.89). Alongside this, in 2009 a new prison policy 
was also introduced. This policy, known as ‘hubs and spokes’, was implemented with the aim 
of identifying all foreign nationals in prison and ensuring that any prisoner liable to 
deportation would be ejected from the UK (Kaufman, 2015, 2013). 
In her research on the ‘new purpose of the prison’ (2015, p.iii), Emma Kaufman 
documents how this policy has played out. Under ‘hubs and spokes’, the prison estate in 
England and Wales has been ‘reorganized … around the concept of foreignness’ (2015, 
 
1 As I highlighted in the Introduction, following a referendum that was held in June 2016 the UK formally left 
the EU at the end of January 2020. However, at the time of writing this thesis the Brexit transition period is still 
ongoing; thus, the UK will remain subject to EU law until 1st January 2021. 
2 In April 2013 the executive agency responsible for border control, the UK Border Agency (UKBA), was 
abolished by the then Conservative Home Secretary, Theresa May, and immigration functions were brought 
back into the central government department of the Home Office. Currently, two separate Home Office 
divisions, UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) and UK Immigration Enforcement (UKIE), deal with all 
immigration matters. To avoid confusion, I simply refer to the ‘Home Office’ throughout the thesis (rather than 
to the specific agencies and divisions involved in immigration control at various points over the years) as the 
Home Office has always retained overall responsibility for immigration matters. I also sometimes refer to ‘the 
immigration authorities’, or simply to ‘immigration’. 
3 In fact, the Home Office has also applied thresholds lower than two years’ custody in the deportation of EEA 
nationals. From April 2009 Home Office policy was to consider deportation where an EEA national received 
one year or more in prison for a sexual, violent or drug-related offence; in January 2014, this one-year threshold 
was broadened out and applied to all convictions. More recently, from October 2015 Home Office policy has 
required that all EEA nationals convicted of a criminal offence – whether they receive a custodial sentence or 
not – are referred for consideration of deportation (Home Office, 2019b). It is important to note, too, that even if 
a non-EEA national who has been convicted of an offence does not meet the criteria for automatic deportation, 
they will still be considered for deportation under the ‘conducive to the public good’ provisions of the 1971 
Immigration Act (Home Office, 2015c).    
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p.89); thus, non-citizens have been concentrated in specific prisons, known as ‘hubs’, which 
include some prisons designated as ‘foreign national-only’. In each ‘hub’, there are 
immigration staff who work there permanently; these staff members liaise regularly with 
immigration ‘case owners’, based in the Criminal Casework Directorate, who are responsible 
for taking decisions on prisoners’ immigration cases. Prisons marked out as ‘spokes’ hold 
smaller numbers of non-citizens, and although immigration staff have not become a regular 
part of their workforce immigration officers nevertheless visit these prisons. Indeed, in both 
hubs and spokes immigration staff routinely hold ‘surgeries’ during which they carry out 
tasks to ‘progress’ prisoners’ immigration cases, such as fingerprinting and photographing 
them, as well as interviewing them to ascertain, for example, their nationality (see also 
Kaufman, 2013). 
Alongside the increasing presence of immigration staff in prisons, the prison’s 
traditional workforce has also been co-opted to perform immigration-focused duties. In 
prisons where immigration officers are not ‘embedded’ permanently, for instance, prison staff 
are expected to identify all non-British citizens received into custody and refer them to 
immigration. More broadly, in both hubs and spokes prison officers are also regularly 
required to carry out tasks such as collecting prisoners’ travel documents, searching 
prisoners’ cells for passports, contacting embassies, serving legal notices to prisoners on 
behalf of the Home Office and promoting ‘voluntary departure’ programmes, such as the 
Facilitated Return Scheme (Kaufman, 2015, 2013). As Kaufman explains, then: ‘It is 
simplifying only slightly to say that the policy has recast Prison Service staff as quasi-
immigration officers’ (2015, pp.94–95). Under the hubs and spokes policy prisons, moreover, 
are also required to help ‘maximize’ (2015, p.91) the capacity of the immigration detention 
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estate by continuing to hold foreign nationals even after they have completed their criminal 
sentences, who are being detained under immigration powers only.4 
Through this policy, then, as well as the legislative changes already traced, Kaufman 
contends that prisons in England and Wales have been ‘transformed … into sites for border 
control’ (2015, p.7). As she acknowledges, foreign nationals are, overall, a minority within 
prison5 – and, thus, ‘[f]or many people concerns about citizenship, nationality, and expulsion 
may never enter into prison life’. Nevertheless, as she argues, ‘for a significant group of 
prisoners, penal institutions now serve as detention centres, staff are basically border agents, 
and the end of the criminal sentence is “removal” from the United Kingdom’ (2015, p.111). 
Indeed, following the introduction of automatic deportation and the hubs and spokes policy 
there has been a five-fold increase in the number of foreign prisoners expelled from the UK.6  
Analysing this ‘new kind of prison’ (Kaufman, 2015, p.111) against the goals and 
objectives to which imprisonment has traditionally worked, some border criminologists have 
contrasted the increasing emphasis on containment and expulsion in the present era with the 
prison’s conventional focus on rehabilitation and reintegration. Bosworth and Kaufman, for 
instance, have argued that the new purpose we see emerging in the prison ‘marks a notable 
shift away from the post-Enlightenment use of imprisonment as a tool to correct and 
ultimately return citizens to the polity’ (2011, p.453).7 As other scholars have suggested, 
 
4 As Kaufman highlights, the practice of keeping non-citizens in prison following the end of their sentence 
under immigration powers is not a new one. The hubs and spokes policy did not introduce this practice, then; 
rather, it ‘condones it in explicit terms’ (2015, p.91). A report by the charity Bail for Immigration Detainees 
(2014) highlighted that at the end of 2013 over 1,000 people were being held as immigration detainees in prison. 
More recently, however, this number has dropped. At the end of September 2019, for instance, there were 304 
people detained under immigration powers in prison (Home Office, 2019d).  
5 Foreign nationals currently make up about 11% of the prison population in England and Wales (Prison Reform 
Trust, 2019).  
6 In 2005, prior to the foreign prisoner ‘crisis’, around 1,000 non-citizen prisoners were deported from the UK 
(Fekete and Webber, 2010); the annual figure now hovers between 5,000 and 6,000 (Migration Observatory, 
2019). 
7 As critics writing from a postcolonial perspective have emphasised, although ‘within the metropole throughout 
most of the twentieth century the dominant penal discourse was reformative with a focus on social inclusion … 
in the colonial context state punishment was predominantly exclusionary’ (Moore, 2014, p.36). Thus, the focus 
on exclusion and incapacitation that, as I note below, has been identified as now more characteristic of 
imprisonment in England and Wales can be seen not as ‘a reactionary departure from a previously civilising and 
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however, Foucault’s (1977) classic conception of the prison as a site of training and reform 
now looks rather outdated. With its extended modes of confinement, and its ‘warehousing’ of 
prisoners, locked up in their cells for much of the day, the prison today functions more often 
as a ‘circuit of exclusion’ (Rose, 2000, p.333) or a ‘death-world’ (Lamble, 2013, p.244) for 
those held within it. Even if we reject the idea of the general purpose of the contemporary 
prison as rehabilitation and reintegration, however, it can still be argued that, in its dealings 
with non-citizens, imprisonment has shifted away from conventional imperatives. As 
immigration-focused policies and practices have been injected into them, prisons, for non-
citizens, have become less linked to sanctioning for a criminal offence, ‘less tied to 
punishment and to the terms of the criminal law’ (Kaufman, 2015, p.111), and more focused 
on securing the border. 
 
The police and the border 
Other branches of the criminal justice system in England and Wales have also found 
themselves increasingly geared towards border control – take, for instance, the police. As 
with the prison it is, first of all, important to highlight that police involvement in immigration 
enforcement ‘is not a new phenomenon’ (Parmar, 2018a, p.121) and that this also goes back a 
long way. Bowling and Phillips note, for example, how research conducted during the 1960s 
and 70s ‘uncovered evidence that ordinary policing often involved checking immigration 
status, such as asking for passports, for instance, when people from ethnic minorities reported 
crimes of which they had been victims’ (2002, p.130; see also Chigwada, 1991). This is a 
practice which continues, albeit in a slightly different form, in the present day. A 2018 BBC 
investigation found that more than half of UK police forces said they referred victims and 
 
progressive social history’. Rather, it can be understood as a continuation of the British state’s ‘long history of 
penal excess’ (Moore, 2014, p.31; see also Fonseca, 2018). 
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witnesses of crime to the Home Office for immigration checks (Nye, Bloomer and Jeraj, 
2018).8  
Alongside these ‘opportunistic’ practices, during the 1970s and 80s the police were 
also involved in immigration enforcement in a ‘more systematic’ (Weber and Bowling, 2004, 
p.204) way. The Metropolitan Police’s Illegal Immigration Intelligence Unit, for instance, 
carried out major immigration raids on workplaces as well as on people’s homes (Weber and 
Bowling, 2004; Gordon, 1983b). Additionally, until the early 1990s the Metropolitan Police 
operated the Alien Deportation Group which, as its name indicates, carried out forced 
deportations. It was only following the attempted deportation of Joy Gardner in July 1993, 
and her death as a result of the restraint the police used on her,9 that this unit was disbanded 
(Bowling and Phillips, 2002; Weber, 2002). While the police’s earlier links to border control 
were by no means negligible, then, in recent years – as with the prison – these have 
intensified and formalised, and immigration activities have become more clearly embedded 
as ‘part and parcel of everyday police work’ (Aliverti, 2015, p.218; see also Parmar, 2018a; 
Bowling, 2013). 
Increasingly central to the police’s involvement in migration control is Operation 
Nexus, an initiative that was first introduced in London in 2012 and has subsequently been 
rolled out by police forces in other parts of England and Wales, including the Midlands and 
Greater Manchester (Parmar, 2018a). As Parmar explains, Operation Nexus ‘formally 
partners the police with immigration control’; its basic premise is that ‘immigration officers 
are now stationed at police custody suites … in a bid to identify foreign national offenders 
 
8 Following the BBC investigation new guidance was issued to the police to apparently halt this practice. 
However, the ‘revised’ policy continued to permit the referral of victims of crime to the immigration authorities 
(National Police Chiefs’ Council, 2018). The campaign groups Liberty and Southall Black Sisters have now 
lodged a ‘super complaint’ against this practice (Grierson, 2019), and have also issued legal proceedings 
specifically against the Metropolitan Police (Townsend, 2019).   
9 Bowling and Phillips describe what happened to Joy Gardner in the following way: ‘Joy Gardner, a black 
woman of Jamaican origin, had overstayed her visa and was visited by the Alien Deportation Group. Her wrists 
were handcuffed to a leather strap around her waist, bound by a second belt around her thighs and a third one 
around her ankles. As she lay on the floor, 13 feet of adhesive tape was wound around her head and face. Mrs 
Gardner collapsed and died in hospital a few hours later’ (2002, p.131). 
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more swiftly and arrange their detention pending removal from the UK’ (2018a, pp.111–
112). Within this overarching approach, there are two distinct ‘strands’ (Home Office, 2017, 
p.4) to the scheme. Under the first strand, ‘Nexus Custody’, the police work alongside 
immigration officers in custody suites to identify foreign nationals, conduct immigration 
checks on them and, if they do not have valid leave to remain, ensure their expulsion via 
administrative removal10 from the UK. A report by the Chief Inspector of Borders and 
Immigration into how Operation Nexus was operating two years after it had been introduced 
pointed to the significant rise in removal rates following contact with the police as a result of 
this aspect of the scheme. In 2011-12, when the Metropolitan Police were still relying on an 
immigration ‘callout service’ – that is, immigration officers could be contacted to attend 
police custody but were not permanently stationed there – 418 non-citizens were removed 
from the UK after originally being encountered in London by the police. In 2013-14, 
however, after Operation Nexus had been introduced, there were 1,077 of these removals – 
an increase of 158% (ICIBI, 2014). 
Under the second strand of the scheme, ‘Nexus High Harm’, the police and 
immigration work together on the deportation of foreign nationals who have criminal 
convictions. Those who have had contact with the police but have not been convicted of 
anything are also targeted under this strand – so, deportation is pursued on the basis of police 
‘intelligence’ (Home Office, 2017; Webber, 2015). The Chief Inspector of Borders and 
 
10 Legally, administrative removal is a different category of expulsion to deportation. Removal is used when 
someone has breached the UK’s immigration regulations and legislation – for instance, if they have ‘overstayed’ 
a visa, or if they entered the UK without permission and so had no leave to remain in the first place (as I explain 
in the following section, many of these immigration breaches are also now criminal offences). Deportation is 
used when someone has been convicted of a criminal offence – or, as I document below, when they have not 
actually been convicted of an offence but it is claimed there is other evidence of their ‘criminality’. As Bosworth 
explains, however, while removal and deportation are distinct legally, in practical terms they both ‘have the 
same effect, banishing individuals and restricting their return within a period of time’ (2017, p.384). It is worth 
highlighting, though, that while removal and deportation both come with bans on re-entry to the UK, usually for 
a period of 10 years (Right to Remain, 2019), if you are deported from the UK you will also be subject to a 
deportation order. This means that, even once the 10-year re-entry ban period has passed, you cannot re-enter 
the UK until the deportation order has been revoked. Moreover, the revocation of a deportation order is, 
ultimately, at the discretion of the Home Office (Dubinsky, 2012). Thus, a deportation order effectively 
constitutes an indefinite ban on re-entering the UK.    
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Immigration has highlighted that, although some people dealt with under ‘Nexus High Harm’ 
are identified while they are in police custody, ‘the majority of referrals will be generated by 
the police examining historic records’ (2014, p.9). In fact, the legal charity the AIRE Centre, 
which brought a legal challenge against Operation Nexus in 2016, has emphasised that people 
targeted for deportation in this way include those whose criminal convictions are very old, 
who have not been re-convicted of an offence recently (Mogan, 2016). Under ‘Nexus High 
Harm’ foreign nationals without valid leave to remain may be targeted for deportation, rather 
than administrative removal, to enact a more robust form of ejection; deportation, unlike 
removal, comes with an indefinite ban on re-entry to the UK.11 Significantly, moreover, this 
strand is also being used to eject non-citizens who have leave to remain, including those who 
are permanent residents, as well as EEA nationals (Home Office, 2017) – who, for the 
moment at least, continue to have free movement rights and are permitted to enter and live in 
the UK. 
As can be seen in the name it has been given, this aspect of Operation Nexus has been 
framed not so much in terms of immigration enforcement but as in keeping with the 
conventional activities and remit of the police – that is, as concerned with public protection 
and crime control. Indeed, the official guidance on the scheme emphasises that ‘Nexus High 
Harm’ is focused on ‘foreign national offenders’ whose ‘conduct incurs significant adverse 
impact, whether physical, emotional or financial, upon individuals or the wider community’ 
(Home Office, 2017, p.5). Yet, the low threshold adopted by this strand of the scheme – as I 
have highlighted, people can be targeted for deportation because of very old convictions or 
even when they have no convictions at all – should alert us to how little, in fact, concerns 
about addressing and preventing ‘adverse impact’ underpins its pursuit of expulsion. The 
cases of people actually targeted for deportation under ‘Nexus High Harm’ demonstrate this, 
 
11 See the explanation of the difference between administrative removal and deportation in Footnote 10, above. 
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as well. Melanie Griffiths highlights that during her observations of Nexus-related appeals, 
one of the hearings she saw was for ‘a 20-year-old facing deportation to a country he left 
aged 5. He had four small convictions; for possession of a knife and failing to surrender to the 
police. His longest prison sentence was just eight weeks and he justified the knife as wanting 
protection after being victim of a stabbing for the third time’ (2017, p.537). 
I would suggest, then, that rather than accepting the official line on its crime 
prevention aims, ‘Nexus High Harm’ can be more accurately understood in terms of the 
growing density of the UK’s border controls. In one of the earlier contributions to border 
criminology, Leanne Weber and Ben Bowling (2004) highlighted the increasingly diffuse 
nature of the border in the present period; that is, how border control no longer simply 
happens at the point of entry into the UK but is enacted through internal mechanisms, as well. 
They situated the police’s involvement in immigration activities in terms of the expanding 
network of internal controls, alongside measures such as the recently introduced requirement, 
at that time, for employers to verify prospective employees’ immigration status. As such, 
Weber and Bowling argued that police and employers’ immigration checks could be seen as 
part of a ‘second line of defence’ (2004, p.199) against those who had managed to get past 
the UK’s external border and into the country.  
I say more about what has now been identified as ‘everyday bordering’ (Yuval-Davis, 
Wemyss and Cassidy, 2018), and connect the growing literature in this area with the 
criminological research on migration control, later in the chapter. At this point, however, 
understanding how the border has spread in the current era, and utilising the lens of a ‘second 
line of defence’, helps us to see how initiatives like ‘Nexus High Harm’ function as part of 
the UK’s network of internal immigration controls. Using any form of ‘criminality’ – no 
matter how old, trivial or even unproven – to justify expulsion significantly expands the 
opportunities for ejecting people who have managed to get into the UK. Indeed, as it often 
targets people with valid immigration status, ‘Nexus High Harm’ might be seen as providing 
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a ‘third line of defence’. That is, even for those who have entered the country legitimately 
and have secured the right to stay permanently there is, nevertheless, the possibility of using 
ideas of criminality and supposed threat or harm as a way of later ejecting them. 
 
The courts and immigration control 
Migration control has also made its way into the branch of the criminal justice system that 
this thesis is focused on: the courts. In her analysis of immigration ‘crimes’ – that is, border 
violations which have also been converted into criminal offences – Ana Aliverti (2013a) 
highlights that immigration breaches have been part of the criminal law for a long time. From 
the mid-1990s, however, as the number of asylum applications in the UK started to increase, 
the number of immigration offences legislated for also grew significantly – and, alongside 
this, there was ‘an enhanced and more systematic enforcement of such crimes’ (2013a, p.37). 
While it remains the case that the majority of immigration breaches are not prosecuted, but 
are dealt with through immigration processes instead, since about 2000 onwards the courts 
have, therefore, been dealing with immigration offences on a much more regular basis. 
Aliverti highlights that, as they oversee immigration-related hearings and sanction 
people who plead guilty to or are convicted of these offences, magistrates and judges never 
question the legality of immigration ‘crimes’ and in fact often refer to the need to maintain 
the integrity of the UK’s border controls in their sentencing remarks. In this way, she argues, 
they can be understood as essentially participating in border enforcement themselves. As she 
explains: ‘In practice, the embracing of these policies by judges and magistrates has the effect 
of extending the exercise of immigration controls onto them’ (2013a, p.116). Indeed, her 
research reveals how judges and magistrates participate in border control not simply by 
overseeing and upholding the prosecution of immigration offences – but also by actively 
working to eject those being sanctioned for these offences from the UK, through the specific 
punishments they choose to impose. As Aliverti (2013b) sets out, immigration status and 
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whether someone is ‘removable’ from the UK12 are factors that are formally irrelevant to 
criminal sentencing. In practice, however, people being sanctioned for immigration offences 
who have leave to remain, or who are not removable from the UK, typically receive 
suspended prison sentences; those who do not have valid immigration status and who are 
removable, on the other hand, are generally sent to prison. She argues, therefore, that in the 
latter type of cases, immediate custody is imposed by sentencers in order to facilitate 
immigration processes and help ensure the defendant’s expulsion from the UK (see also 
Canton and Hammond, 2012). 
More recently, Aliverti’s research has looked beyond the prosecution of immigration 
‘offenders’ towards the treatment of non-citizens more broadly, and other ways in which 
immigration enforcement has made ‘significant inroads into the courthouse’ (2016, p.77). 
Just as with the prison, the introduction of automatic deportation has bound border control to 
the courts in a more sustained and systematic way. While previously magistrates and judges 
had a discretionary power to recommend expulsion (Dubinsky, 2012), the ‘automatic’ 
provision means the pursuit of deportation is now mandatory whenever the courts impose a 
custodial sentence of a year or more on a non-citizen.13 Alongside this, as Aliverti highlights, 
processes have also been introduced to ensure that defendants given sentences which mean 
they are facing deportation are, ultimately, ejected from the UK. Thus, courts are now 
‘obliged to inform the Home Office about the sentences passed against foreign nationals, and 
their systems have been adapted accordingly to ensure the smooth routing of this 
information’ (2016, p.77). Following the introduction of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, 
 
12 There are a number of reasons why someone might not be ‘removable’ from the UK. To give just a few 
examples: they may not have a valid travel document and may be a national of a country which typically takes 
long periods to issue passports; they may be stateless; or they may be the national of a country to which the UK 
is not legally allowed to forcibly remove people, because of the dangers faced by people who are ‘returned’. 
13 As I highlighted earlier, EEA nationals are not subject to automatic deportation. However, as I also noted, 
since there has been a greater focus overall on the deportation of foreign prisoners the Home Office has 
typically pursued deportation in cases where EEA nationals are sentenced to two years or more in custody – and, 
in fact, more recently this threshold has been lowered. Thus, while EEA nationals are not formally subject to 
automatic deportation, the increased emphasis on the deportation of foreign ‘offenders’ in recent years has in 
practice led to a tighter link between the punishments imposed by the courts and expulsion from the UK. 
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moreover, defendants must now state their nationality at their first court appearance (Aliverti, 
2017).14 Through this requirement, then, court processes have been reorganised around 
‘finding foreigners’ (Kaufman, 2012, p.701) – and the courts, therefore, have been more 
explicitly oriented towards border control in their dealings with non-citizens. 
Aliverti notes that – just as some of the prison officers who Kaufman interviewed for 
her research insisted that immigration issues were, in fact, ‘outside the scope of the prison’ 
(2015, p.109) – court staff to whom she spoke were ‘keen to emphasize the strict division of 
labour between criminal adjudication and immigration enforcement’ (2016, p.77). In one of 
the sentencing hearings that I observed (which I explore in greater depth later in the thesis, as 
part of the analysis of my empirical data) the judge presiding over the hearing seemed at one 
point to be doing something quite similar. That is, he seemed to be insisting on a clear 
separation between the practices of the criminal court and border control. As I explain in 
Chapter Five, where I begin the examination of my empirical material, I actually saw very 
few hearings where it was specified by the judge that the defendant was also likely to be 
deported after serving their sentence. In this particular hearing, however, the judge did 
explain that the sentence he had passed crossed the threshold for automatic deportation. As he 
did this, though, he seemed also to be emphasising that what happened in the end was outside 
his jurisdiction – that any immigration action subsequently taken was nothing to do with him.  
Thus, the judge told the defendant: ‘The sentence I have passed means that you are 
subject to the deportation provision of the UK Borders Act, but what actually happens is a 
matter between you and the immigration authorities’ (Hearing 8, Isleworth, 2015). What the 
judge set out in this hearing was technically correct: the decision to deport lies, ultimately, 
with the Home Office. Yet, I would suggest that his formulation here also worked to situate 
immigration enforcement at a distance from the court – to obscure the way in which any 
 
14 As I explain in Chapter Four, where I write about my research methods and how I conducted observations of 
sentencing hearings, this requirement was introduced after I had completed my fieldwork. 
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subsequent deportation would, in fact, be a direct result of the sentence he passed. The 
insistence by judges, and other staff, on border enforcement as separate from the practices of 
the court does not provide an accurate assessment of how things actually are, of course. 
Rather, it functions ‘to deny how the criminal court has changed under conditions of mass 
migration and its control’ (Aliverti, 2016, p.78; see also Kaufman, 2015).  
 
Immigration enforcement and the changing nature of punishment for non-citizens 
Alongside analyses identifying the shift towards migration control within the police, courts 
and prisons in the current era, some border criminologists have emphasised how, even as 
immigration-focused measures have increasingly made their way into the criminal justice 
system, its agencies and institutions have nevertheless persisted with their traditional 
functions as they deal with non-citizens. Against Kaufman’s argument, for instance, that for 
foreign nationals, imprisonment in England and Wales has become less linked to sanctioning 
for an offence, ‘less tied to punishment and to the terms of the criminal law’ (2015, p.111), 
others have emphasised how these prisoners continue to serve their sentences, handed to them 
by the courts. The punishment of them for criminal infractions, therefore, undoubtedly 
continues. Importantly, however, as immigration policies and practices have been injected 
into the prison, the criminal sentences served by non-citizens have started to look different. 
Their sanctioning, then, is being inflected and reshaped by border control. 
In their analysis of ‘the carceral trajectories of foreign national prisoners’ (2017, 
p.135), Sarah Turnbull and Ines Hasselberg explore how, in the contemporary prison, border 
control measures are intersecting and coalescing with criminal sentences – and, consequently, 
the nature of confinement and punishment for non-British citizens is changing considerably. 
As they explain, for instance, foreign nationals facing deportation are usually kept in higher 
security prisons and are rarely transferred to open conditions, even as they progress through 
and come towards the end of their criminal sentences (see also Bhui, 2007). As highlighted 
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earlier, moreover, when their prison sentences come to an end they are generally not released 
but remain locked up, as they are detained post-sentence under immigration powers. Finally, 
when non-citizen prisoners are eventually released, this often takes the form of expulsion – 
with an indefinite ban on re-entry – from the UK. As Turnbull and Hasselberg emphasise, the 
immigration measures applied to non-citizens are not ‘official penal sanctions’ (2017, p.147). 
Yet, being kept in more restrictive prison conditions, the indefinite extension of confinement 
– there is no time limit on detention under immigration powers in the UK – and exile from 
family, friends and the lives that they have built are nonetheless experienced by those 
subjected to them as punitive. Thus, as immigration enforcement bleeds into and blends with 
the criminal sentence, a harsher, aggravated form of sanctioning, which Turnbull and 
Hasselberg identify as ‘double punishment’ (2017, p.143; see also Phillips, 2012; Fekete and 
Webber, 2010), is produced. In many instances, in fact, border control alters and exacerbates 
criminal sanctioning to create something rather more than ‘double punishment’. Reports by 
advocacy groups and inspection bodies are littered with cases of people detained post-
sentence under immigration powers for much longer than the criminal sentence that was 
initially imposed on them (Bail for Immigration Detainees, 2019; HM Inspectorate of Prisons 
and ICIBI, 2012; Detention Action, 2009).15  
While, as I have highlighted, Turnbull and Hasselberg explain that deportation is not 
an ‘official penal sanction’, others have suggested that – more than simply exacerbating the 
punishment imposed on a non-citizen for a criminal offence – expulsion is, in fact, coming to 
constitute a form of sanctioning in itself (Aas, 2014; see also Bowling, 2013). Indeed, in 
contrast with the sentencing hearing that I referred to earlier, where the judge framed the 
expulsion of the defendant as entirely a matter for the Home Office and separate from the 
practices of the court, in another hearing I observed the judge seemed to suggest deportation 
 
15 In one particularly shocking case, the Prisons Inspectorate discovered a man who had been detained for a 
further nine years following the end of his criminal sentence during an inspection of Lincoln Prison in 2012 
(HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2012). 
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as another intervention available to him. That is, he appeared to present ejection from the UK 
as a punishment that he could impose directly himself. Passing a sentence of six months’ 
imprisonment, the judge told the defendant that if he had received a sentence of 12 months’ 
custody or more he would have been subject to automatic deportation.16 The judge then said, 
using a phrase more commonly deployed by judges to warn defendants that they had 
narrowly avoided the sanction of being sent to prison, ‘You’re getting a second chance today’ 
(Hearing 1, Wood Green, 2014). The insertion of border control measures into the criminal 
justice system might be seen, therefore, to be resulting in entirely new forms of penal 
intervention, which are much harsher and more exclusionary than the penalties and disposals 
that have conventionally been imposed (Aas, 2014). 
Border criminologists, then, have pointed to a striking set of changes to the criminal 
justice system in England and Wales in the current era, effected by mass migration and its 
control. On the one hand the police, courts and prisons have increasingly begun to look like 
agencies and institutions concerned with immigration regulation, as they have been injected 
with policies and practices focused on border enforcement. At the same time, however, it can 
also be seen how the prison, for instance, continues with its traditional function of 
punishment as it deals with non-citizens – and yet the punishment it inflicts on them now 
looks different, as their criminal sentences have been reshaped and aggravated by processes 
of immigration control. As I now go on to explain, alongside the overt shifts that have thus 
far been documented, it might also be possible to detect more subtle changes to the criminal 
justice system as a consequence of immigration enforcement. By thinking beyond policies 
and legislation and imagining border enforcement more expansively, we might be able to 
 
16 As the defendant was originally from Poland and thus an EEA national, what the judge said to him at this 
point was in fact legally incorrect. However, although EEA nationals are not subject to automatic deportation, 
the judge was nonetheless right to suggest that if the defendant had received a sentence of a year or more in 
prison the Home Office would probably have tried to deport him. This sentencing hearing took place in 2014 – 
and, as I highlighted earlier, from January 2014 Home Office policy was to pursue deportation in all cases 
where an EEA national received a custodial sentence of a year or more. 
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trace the mark of immigration control on contemporary criminal justice in a more covert and 
insidious way.  
 
Narratives of bordering, and pushing back the boundaries of border criminology 
I noted in the previous section that in one of the earlier contributions to border criminology, 
Weber and Bowling (2004) drew attention to the increasingly diffuse nature of the border in 
the current era, and situated the police’s involvement in immigration activities in terms of a 
wider network of internal, ‘in-country’ border controls. Indeed, there now exists a growing 
literature on the proliferation of the internal border in the UK in the contemporary period: 
research in this area has identified the increasing range of in-country immigration 
enforcement practices in terms of ‘everyday bordering’ (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, 
2018; see also Johnson and Jones, 2014). The idea of ‘everyday bordering’ might seem to 
particularly emphasise the temporal prevalence of the border in the current age; that is, the 
way that people now come into contact with immigration controls on a much more frequent 
basis than they did previously (Johnson and Jones, 2014). Alongside this, though, the 
literature in this area also draws attention to the spatial spread and ubiquity of the border in 
the present day. Thus, it highlights how border control has ‘root[ed] itself in the everyday 
existence of people as they negotiate their way around state and quasi-state institutions and 
agencies in their local communities’ (Flynn, 2016, p.64). Reflecting this aspect more fully, 
Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy have also referred to the increasing density and reach of 
internal immigration controls as ‘everyday/everywhere bordering’ (2018, p.239).  
 The growth of internal immigration controls in the UK has intensified in recent years 
since the announcement of the Conservatives’ ‘hostile environment’ policy in 2012 (Kirkup 
and Winnett, 2012) and the subsequent introduction of the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts 
(Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, 2018).Following this, it is now the case that border 
checks are not only a staple part of getting a job (as I noted earlier, Weber and Bowling’s 
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2004 analysis highlighted the requirement for employers to verify prospective employees’ 
immigration status as a relatively recent development. Thus, such employment checks have 
been in place for some time). Checks on immigration status are also now part of renting 
accommodation from a private landlord, opening a bank account and having a driving 
licence, as well as accessing public services such as the NHS (Griffiths and Yeo, 2021; 
Potter, 2018; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, 2018, 2016; Flynn, 2016). Within recent 
analyses of internal bordering mechanisms in the UK, the injection of immigration control 
measures into the agencies and institutions of the established criminal justice system has not 
often been identified as a further example of the spread of ‘everyday/everywhere bordering’. 
Yet, as Weber and Bowling’s earlier analysis indicates, it might be situated in this way. That 
is, the increasing involvement of the police, courts and prisons in immigration enforcement 
practices might be viewed not solely in terms of how criminologists have generally framed it 
– as demonstrating the contemporary convergence between criminal justice and border 
control. From the perspective of ‘everyday/everywhere bordering’ and the widening reach of 
in-country immigration regulation, the insertion of immigration measures into law 
enforcement bodies and institutions might also be understood as yet another instance of the 
proliferation and intensification of the border across people’s lives and existences broadly 
(see Griffiths and Yeo, 2021; Johnson and Jones, 2014). 
There is a connection, therefore, between the criminological research on migration 
control and the literature on everyday bordering. Yet, there is also a notable divergence – and 
this divergence, I would suggest, can help us to think differently, and more expansively, 
about the impact of border enforcement on the criminal justice system and to consider further 
and more subtle ways in which the mark of immigration control might be detected and traced. 
As I documented in the previous section, in their examination of the changing contours of the 
criminal justice system in the current era criminologists have typically conceptualised border 
enforcement as a series of policies and legislative measures and as contained within the direct 
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practices of immigration control. In analyses focused on everyday bordering, on the other 
hand, the proliferation and pervasiveness of immigration regulation in the present period has 
been identified not only in terms of it being encountered more frequently, across many 
different areas of life. Some scholars have also highlighted that the everyday/everywhere 
nature of contemporary border control can be seen through its materialisation via multiple 
practices and forms. Thus border enforcement, some research from this perspective has 
emphasised, appears and is enacted in numerous and varying ways (Wemyss and Cassidy, 
2017; Johnson and Jones, 2014; Johnson et al., 2011).  
Within this more extensive imagining, a key materialisation of border enforcement 
beyond the literal practices of immigration control that has been identified by critics is 
‘bordering discourses’ or ‘border narratives’ (Wemyss and Cassidy, 2017, p.1136–1137). 
That is, the negative narratives that are circulated by Western governments and the media in 
the contemporary era, which function to problematise migrants and justify their targeting by 
the direct activities of immigration control, have been recognised as ‘bordering processes’ 
(Wemyss and Cassidy, 2017, p.1136) or ‘bordering work’ (Johnson et al., 2011, p.61) in 
themselves. Thus, starting from Étienne Balibar’s assertion that ‘borders are everywhere’ 
(1988, cited by Johnson et al., 2011, p.61), Corey Johnson and colleagues have identified 
‘exclusionary narratives in media and popular culture’ as one form of present day ‘bordering 
work that marks some bodies as legitimate and others as out of place’ (2011, p.61). Similarly, 
Georgie Wemyss and Kathryn Cassidy have argued that, when ‘transitional controls’ aimed 
at reducing the number of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants arriving in the UK ended in 
January 2014, stigmatising and racialised political and media narratives about these migrants 
nonetheless ‘extended [the transitional controls’] reach’ (2017, p.1136). Wemyss and Cassidy 
contend, therefore, that ‘the discourses of politicians, amplified via news media contributes to 
the extension of state bordering practices’ (2017, p.1133; emphasis mine).      
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Border criminologists, it should be noted, have drawn attention to these government 
and media narratives and acknowledged their significance: that, by stigmatising and vilifying 
migrants, they legitimise and make possible increasingly restrictive legislation and policies 
on immigration control (Bowling, 2013; Gerard and Pickering, 2013; Bosworth and Guild, 
2008). At the same time, however, these negative narratives have rarely been foregrounded in 
criminological analyses. Thus they have been approached and presented, I would suggest, 
more as an accompanying or subsidiary practice, in contrast to the ‘main event’ of the actual 
activities of border control. Analyses from the perspective of everyday bordering, conversely, 
have positioned government and media narratives about migrants more centrally. In 
identifying ‘border narratives’ as an extension of transitional controls, Wemyss and Cassidy 
do not assert a clear hierarchy between these disparaging depictions and the direct 
immigration enforcement practices implemented to reduce the number of Romanian and 
Bulgarian migrants arriving in the UK. Likewise, as Johnson et al. refer both to ‘exclusionary 
narratives’ and literal border control activities, including ‘immigration raids’, as forms of 
‘bordering work’ (2011, p.61), the latter is not obviously prioritised over the former. 
From this perspective, then, if we are concerned with the changing contours of the 
criminal justice system in the current era and the way that it is being touched and marked by 
border enforcement, we should be paying attention not simply to the explicit changes 
wrought by policies and legislation and the literal practices of immigration control. We 
should be thinking, as well, about how negative government and media narratives about 
migrants, which I suggest we can understand as narratives of bordering, 17 might also be 
reaching into criminal justice agencies and institutions – about how these narratives might be 
 
17 As I highlight in Chapter Two, alongside negative narratives of bordering there are also some apparently 
different government and media depictions, which mark out some migrants as desirable and thus as acceptable 
to let in. Yet, as I also explain, although such representations are ostensibly more positive and inclusive, they in 
fact function as an integral part of the bordering regime. By specifying that only a minority of migrants are 
suitable for entry to the UK, these narratives – which I identify as narratives of limited inclusion – insist that the 
general rule of exclusion and bordering must remain firmly in place. 
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percolating through. In this thesis I am specifically concerned with how stigmatising 
narratives about migrants, disseminated by the UK government and media, might be seeping 
into the courtroom and, more particularly, the endpoint of the court process, the practice of 
the sentencing hearing. My research is focused, therefore, on how contemporary narratives of 
bordering might be marking and permeating sentencing hearing proceedings: that is, on how 
these narratives might be penetrating the process during which criminal punishments are 
allocated to and imposed on migrants and non-citizens. 
I map out what contemporary narratives of bordering look like, and analyse how they 
operate – how they problematise migrants, to legitimise actual immigration enforcement 
against them – in Chapter Two. Here, however, I want to consider in more detail why I have 
chosen to refer to them specifically as ‘narratives of bordering’, and to explore what the use 
of this particular phrase captures and draws out. As indicated in my discussion above, 
Wemyss and Cassidy (2017) have identified negative government and media depictions of 
migrants in similar ways, referring to them, for example, as ‘bordering discourses’ and 
‘border narratives’. In my framing, I have chosen to emphasise these representations 
precisely as ‘narratives of bordering’ because, in the first place, I think that the latter part of 
this formulation helps to suggest their ‘active’ nature. That is, it reflects government and 
media depictions as actually engaged in the practice of bordering. In line with my argument 
over the previous pages, therefore, it does not portray them merely as a passive 
accompaniment to the ‘main’ or ‘real’ activities of literal immigration enforcement. Rather, it 
pinpoints these demeaning representations of migrants as centrally involved in delineating 
and upholding the border; it marks them out as, in themselves, a form of bordering work. 
Why, then, might these representations be understood specifically as ‘narratives of 
bordering’? Critics within border criminology, as well as those focused on everyday 
bordering – and, indeed, scholars outside these literatures – have referred to government and 
media representations of migrants both as ‘narratives’, and as ‘discourses’. Often, in fact – as 
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seen, for instance, in Wemyss and Cassidy’s analysis – these terms have been used relatively 
interchangeably. Political and media depictions of migrants can, certainly, be viewed through 
the lens of discourse. Describing them like this serves to frame them in terms of Foucault’s 
conception of the inextricable relationship between power, knowledge and truth (Mills, 
2004). In their identification as ‘discourses’, therefore, stigmatising depictions of migrants 
are underlined as a form of knowledge that has been designated and accepted as true – that 
has come to function as part of contemporary society’s ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1980, 
p.131). Moreover, the ‘effects of power’ (Foucault, 1980, p.133) induced by such accepted 
‘truths’, or dominant discourses, are emphasised. Thus, the ‘truth status’ of vilifying 
representations of migrants means that the severity of the UK’s actual immigration controls 
appears as entirely legitimate and reasonable. In other words, the circulation of negative 
government and media discourses makes it thinkable, and possible, to subject migrants to 
harsh and exclusionary immigration policies (see also Foucault, 1978; Said, 1978).  
‘Narratives’ have sometimes been emphasised as resistant and subversive. Within the 
‘narrative turn’ that took place within legal scholarship, therefore, some critics highlighted 
the potential of individual stories, told by people in marginalised social positions, to disrupt 
established ways of seeing as they ‘re-present experience’ and ‘introduce imagination and 
new points of view’ (Scheppele, 1989, p.2075; see also Delgado, 1989). The oppositional 
possibilities of individual stories have also been explored by narrative criminology, which 
has emerged as a criminological sub-field over the past decade (Fleetwood et al., 2019) and 
focuses, primarily, on ‘the role the telling and sharing of stories play in committing, 
upholding and effecting desistance from crime and other harmful acts’ (Sandberg and 
Ugelvik, 2016, p.129; see also Presser, 2016; Presser and Sandberg, 2015).18 Recent research 
 
18 It is important to note that, as Jennifer Fleetwood and colleagues explain, while narrative criminology was 
‘originally explicitly centred on the narratives of offenders’, more recently some research within it has explored 
the ‘narrative lives of professionals working in the social control professions’ (2019, p.5). However, as I also 
indicate above, a defining feature of narrative criminology is that it ‘takes a constitutive view of stories’ 
(Presser, 2016, p.139). That is, as Lois Presser has emphasised: ‘Narrative criminologists are interested in what 
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by Sveinung Sandberg and Sarah Colvin, for example, investigates how young Muslims in 
Norway tell individual stories that reject ‘dominant cultural narratives’ (2020, p.1587) about 
the inherent aggression and violence of Islam. In line with the particular concerns of narrative 
criminology, Sandberg and Colvin argue that such individually resistant narratives function to 
‘constrain or reduce harm’ (2020, p.1586) in two key ways. In the first place, they contend 
that these stories operate as a repudiation of violent practices of ‘religious extremism’ (2020, 
p.1585). Secondly, they frame them as a ‘“storied rejection” of mainstream prejudices about 
Muslims and Islam’, which therefore have the potential to ‘constrai[n] harm perpetrated 
against Muslims’ (2020, p.1586).     
As Sandberg and Colvin’s identification of ‘dominant cultural narratives’ about Islam  
indicates, however, stories are not always tied to opposition and subversion. Thus, they 
explain that some narratives ‘can achieve a type of “master status”’ (2020, p.1587). Similarly, 
some sociologically-oriented investigations have emphasised that narratives can be dominant 
or hegemonic, functioning to naturalise existing social arrangements and uphold systems of 
oppression and exclusion (Ewick and Silbey, 1995; Richardson, 1990). It is possible, then, to 
understand negative government and media depictions of migrants through either lens: both 
as ‘discourses’, and as ‘narratives’. Yet, I would suggest that identifying them as dominant or 
hegemonic narratives is particularly appropriate: that is, that viewing these representations 
through the framework of narrative helps to capture and reflect some of their specific aspects 
and features.  
Referring to them as dominant narratives, for instance, suggests how, as some critics 
have highlighted, government and media representations of migrants typically centre on 
 
stories do – specifically, how they affect crime and other harm’ (2016, p.139). Thus, in Chapter Three, where I 
explore the individual accounts delivered by legal professionals during the sentencing hearing through the 
framework of narrative, I do not make use of the now quite significant literature within narrative criminology. 
Instead, I draw on other critical enquiries into the nature of stories and storytelling that are more directly 
relevant and useful to my research. These enquiries include Ewick and Silbey’s much-cited 1995 article 
‘Subversive stories and hegemonic tales: Towards a sociology of narrative’, which explores ‘the ways in which 
narratives operate in social life, in particular in legal settings’ (1995, pp.199–200; emphasis mine). 
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certain key figures or ‘characters’ (Kundnani, 2001, p.48) – including, as I document in 
Chapter Two, the abusive immigration cheat and the parasitical welfare scrounger – who 
follow clearly defined and well-known ‘plotlines’ (Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2012, 
p.686). As soon as a particular protagonist is invoked, we often already have a strong sense of 
what it is they do. The language of ‘narrative’ evokes, as well, how government depictions 
often resort to anecdotes, and media reporting frequently relies on individual instances and 
stories, in order to support the negative claims that they make about migrants broadly. Again, 
I trace this pattern in Chapter Two.  
Identifying contemporary representations of migrants as narratives, or stories, might, 
moreover, be seen to particularly connote the often misleading and sometimes completely 
invented nature of the ideas that are disseminated by the government and media. The range of 
related terms that has been utilised by scholars writing about these depictions, indeed, 
including ‘folklore’ (Fekete and Webber, 2010, p.2) and, more often, ‘myth’ (Philo, Briant 
and Donald, 2013, p.4; see also Alia and Bull, 2005; Kundnani, 2004; Buchanan, Grillo and 
Threadgold, 2003; Coole, 2002) clearly intimates a sense that government and media 
representations of migrants are fabricated and fictitious. In framing them like this, it could be 
understood that I am reversing my contention, above, that hegemonic depictions of migrants 
might also be viewed through the lens of ‘discourse’, as well as ‘narrative’. By presenting 
them in terms of distortion and fabrication, I might be understood as positioning these 
representations in opposition to the existence of absolute or objective ‘truths’ – a proposition 
that Foucault’s theorisation of discourse contested (Foucault, 1980). Rather than making such 
a claim, however, I am trying to suggest how – while all ‘truths’ can be understood as 
socially constructed – there are nonetheless some that are produced from more partial and 
blinkered perspectives, and are therefore less credible and reliable, than others (Haraway, 
1988). I document some of the obfuscations, and at times clear falsifications, of government 
and media representations of migrants in Chapter Two.   
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I would suggest, finally, that identifying government and media depictions of 
migrants specifically as narratives directs our attention towards the act of narration. In this 
way, we can think about some of the mechanisms by which such fictional, fabricated ideas 
about migrants come to be believed – how they come to be accepted and established as truth. 
In The Practice of Everyday Life Michel De Certeau describes how, in modern society, we 
are surrounded by the nonstop narrations of the media and of politicians speaking in the 
media, how ‘narrations about what’s-going-on constitute our orthodoxy’ (1984, p.185). As he 
explains further: 
 
Narrated reality constantly tells us what must be believed and what must be done 
… From morning to night, narrations constantly haunt streets and buildings … 
Captured by the radio (the voice is the law) as soon as he awakens, the listener 
walks all day long through the forest of narrativities from journalism, advertising, 
and television, narrativities that still find time, as he is getting ready for bed, to 
slip a few final messages under the portals of sleep (1984, p.186). 
 
While De Certeau is very focused on the verbal narrations of the broadcast media, the 
perpetual narrations of the present might be understood as extending, also, to the written 
narrations of print and online media. Thus, his idea of the ‘forest of narrativities’ might be 
seen to capture how, as the same negative ideas about migrants are endlessly narrated and 
repeated, and as we are enveloped and surrounded by them, they come to be accepted and 
believed. De Certeau sets out, then, that ‘Our society has become a recited society, in three 
senses: it is defined by stories (récits, the fables constituted by our advertising and 
informational media), by citations of stories, and by the interminable recitation of stories’ 
(1984, p.186). As well as drawing out the constant narrations of the present, and the way that 
negative representations of migrants have become embedded and accepted as they are 
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circulated continually, the citation and recitation he points to here also gets at the repetition 
and recycling that runs through government and media narratives.  
As I will show in Chapter Two, since the beginnings of mass migration in the late 
1980s successive UK governments – despite the shift from a Conservative administration, to 
New Labour, and then back to the Conservatives once more – have consistently recited the 
same tropes, claims and phrases about migrants. Moreover, government and media narratives 
have also repeatedly borrowed from and repeated each other, consolidating and reinforcing 
one other as they do. Indeed, the government and media narratives of the present have also 
borrowed from and recycled the stories disseminated about migrants historically, repeating 
ideas and claims that can be traced back over decades. As I will demonstrate in Chapter Two, 
however, as I draw out the specifically racialised nature of contemporary depictions of 
migrants, in remobilising these older ideas government and media portrayals have 
reformulated them, stripping them of overtly racist articulation. In this way, therefore, they 
have coded and sanitised them, and reworked them into a more socially acceptable form.  
Before moving onto the final section of this chapter I want to briefly consider the 
relationship between the government and the media as they produce and disseminate negative 
narratives about migrants. I also want to explore how the circulation of these dominant 
portrayals connects with public opinion on immigration. Firstly, the relationship between the 
government and the media as they disseminate problematising narratives about migrants; as 
critics writing in this area have suggested, this relationship is not straightforward or one-way. 
It is undoubtedly the case that large sections of the media have supported the exclusionary 
response to mass migration by successive UK governments, and have repeated and amplified 
their negative representations and claims. Yet, as Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy set out, it 
would be inaccurate to characterise the media as ‘simply an uncritical mouthpiece for public 
policy’ (2012, p.685). On numerous occasions, indeed, media claims about migrants have 
42 
 
catalysed the government to go further, to take an even more restrictive approach to 
immigration (Wemyss and Cassidy, 2017; Back, 2007).  
Acknowledging this, however, should not mean an equally simplistic insistence upon 
the media as the primary instigator, generating negative depictions of migrants and forcing 
the government to adopt increasingly hard-line policies (Kushner, 2003). Since the onset of 
mass migration UK governments have been actively involved in problematising and 
stigmatising migrants, as they have worked to justify the severe measures that they have 
decided upon and introduced. I would suggest, ultimately, that more important than pinning 
down the precise dynamics of this relationship is identifying the overarching homogeneity of 
the representations that the government and the media produce. As I suggested above, 
government and media narratives constantly borrow from, repeat and consolidate one 
another. Thus, they can be understood as working alongside each other to vilify migrants and 
justify the UK’s policies on immigration control. 
How, then, do the stigmatising narratives about migrants that are circulated by the 
government and media connect with public opinion on immigration? I suggested above that 
De Certeau’s identification of the nonstop political and media narrations of the present offers 
an insight into one of the possible mechanisms by which dominant depictions of migrants 
come to be widely accepted and believed. Surveys over the past three decades, indeed, 
demonstrate a hardening of public attitudes towards immigration since the mid-1990s (Ford 
and Heath, 2014; Ford, Morrell and Heath, 2012; Lewis, 2005).19 Research conducted in the 
early 2000s, for example, highlighted increasingly negative public views about people 
seeking asylum, including that they were often perceived as cynically targeting the UK in 
order to access welfare benefits (Lewis, 2005; Finney and Peach, 2004). More recently, such 
 
19 This is not to suggest that prior to the mid-1990s public attitudes towards immigration were positive. As Ford, 
Morrell and Heath explain: ‘Ever since social surveys and opinion polls began to ask questions on the topic in 
the 1960s, the British public has always favoured a reduction in the numbers of immigrants’ (2012, p.27). As 
they also note, however, the already high levels of public opposition to immigration recorded in the mid-1990s 
had increased sharply by the early 2000s.  
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attitudes have continued. An Ipsos MORI poll on the so-called refugee ‘crisis’ of 201520 
found a majority of respondents in agreement that most refugees were not ‘genuine’ but in 
fact were ‘economic migrants’, who were trying to get to the UK to ‘take advantage’ of the 
benefits system (Ipsos MORI, 2017). These negative public views extend beyond asylum 
seekers to immigration more broadly. Surveys have documented a widespread perception that 
migrants come to the UK in order to claim benefits (Ford and Lowles, 2016; Ford and Heath, 
2014), as well as a belief that increased immigration leads to more crime (Page, 2009). Since 
the mid-1990s, it has consistently been the case that over 60% of the population has 
supported a reduction in immigration (Duffy et al., 2017; Ford, Morrell and Heath, 2012) – 
and, in 2013, this figure reached a striking 77% (Ford and Heath, 2014).  
It is important to note, however, that within these overwhelmingly negative attitudes, 
some forms of migration attract greater public support. According to a 2017 survey, for 
instance, just 10% of respondents said that no one from Australia should be allowed to 
migrate to the UK, and only 14% opposed any migration from France. Opposition to 
migration from the other countries asked about was higher, with the proportion of 
respondents saying that no one from Poland, Romania, Pakistan or Nigeria should be able to 
come to the UK standing, respectively, at 21%, 34%, 36%, and 37% (Migration Observatory, 
2020). These findings resonate with previous research that has identified lower levels of 
opposition to migration from ‘Old’ Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand, as well as Western Europe (Ford, 2011b). As Robert Ford explains, the greater 
support for migration from these countries provides ‘strong evidence of a racial division in 
public attitudes to immigration’ (2011b, p.1020).  
As we will see in Chapter Two, where I map the key narratives of bordering 
circulated by the government and media in the present era, the types of negative views that 
 
20 I explain in a footnote in the final section of this chapter why I refer to it as a so-called ‘crisis’. 
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have been expressed by the UK public about immigration correlate clearly with these 
dominant portrayals. The ‘racial division’ that has been identified within public attitudes, 
moreover, links – as I also document in Chapter Two – to how the government and media 
have targeted these dominant narratives; that is, to which groups of migrants such 
stigmatising representations have predominantly been attached. Alongside De Certeau’s 
identification of the nonstop political and media narrations of the present, Stuart Hall and 
colleagues’ seminal account of public opinion formation in their 1978 book Policing the 
Crisis provides another means of understanding how negative government and media 
depictions of migrants have come to organise and shape the public consciousness. Examining 
the moral panic around ‘mugging’ in the early 1970s, Hall et al. explain: ‘“Public opinion” 
about crime does not simply form up at random. It exhibits a shape and structure. It follows a 
sequence. It is a social process, not a mystery’ (2013, p.135; emphasis mine).  
Thus, as those who operate as the ‘primary definers’ (Hall et al., 2013, p.60) of a 
situation – in the case of the immigration ‘problem’, I would contend, the government and the 
media21 – repeatedly circulate their explanation and interpretation of ‘what is happening’, 
‘lay public attitudes’ (2013, p.136) emerge within this context. The views expressed by the 
public are, as Hall et al. argue, ‘not socially innocent’ (2013, p.135). Rather, ‘[t]he more … 
an issue passes into the public domain … the more it is structured by … dominant ideologies 
… It is these which form the infrastructure of any public debate’ (2013, pp.135–6). What is 
articulated by the public, then, is ‘constrained by the available frameworks of understanding 
and interpretation’ (2013, p.136). As Hall and colleagues set out, therefore, supposedly ‘lay 
attitudes’ are, in fact, ‘structured in dominance’ (2013, pp.136–7). 
 
21 I recognise that in Hall et al.’s analysis the media are positioned as ‘secondary definers’, since they 
‘reproduce the definitions of the powerful’ (2013, p.60). More in line with the argument I make above, however, 
that in their dissemination of narratives of bordering the government and media can be understood as working 
alongside each other to justify the UK’s policies on immigration control, I understand both the government and 
media as primary definers. 
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Utilising Hall et al.’s ideas to think through the hardening of public attitudes towards 
welfare over the past decade, Tracey Jensen and Imogen Tyler have emphasised the centrality 
of certain key characters, or ‘revolting subjects’ (2015, p.479), to the contemporary ‘cultural 
and political crafting of anti-welfare commonsense’ (2015, p.470). As they argue, the ‘benefit 
brood’ family – in which parents allegedly have as many children as possible, to maximise 
their entitlement to welfare benefits – has become a central character that is repeatedly 
circulated across political and media sites, to illustrate the supposed problem of ‘dependency’ 
on the benefits system.22 Such ‘repetitive mediations’ of the ‘benefit brood’ family in 
political speeches, as well as across newspaper articles, magazine exposés and television 
programmes, operate as a ‘central mechanism’ (2015, p.479) to organise and shape 
increasingly negative public perceptions of welfare. Jensen and Tyler’s emphasis on the key 
role of ‘repetitive mediations’ of certain stigmatised characters connects back, I would 
suggest, to some of the core features of dominant narratives of bordering that I identified 
previously in this section. Through this lens, then, it is possible to understand how these 
specific features of narratives of bordering function in the crafting and procuring of hardened 
public views on immigration.    
As I argued earlier, the government and media’s negative depictions of migrants can 
be understood specifically as narratives partly because they centre on certain key figures or 
‘characters’ – including that of the abusive immigration cheat, and the parasitical welfare 
scrounger. We can trace the ‘repetitive mediation’ of these key characters, moreover, in broad 
terms, through the continual dissemination of narratives of bordering – but also at a more 
micro-level, in terms of some of the particular tools, or devices, on which government and 
media portrayals of migrants often rely. Thus, I noted above that government depictions often 
 
22 As I explain further in Chapter Two, the idea of dependency on the welfare benefits system, and additional 
characters such as the individual figure of the ‘scrounger’, have long been used to disparage the working class. 
However, as I also document, ideas of a workshy nature and an appetite for unemployment support have a 
significant history as a racialising trope, too – which precedes the mobilisation of the narrative of the parasitical 
scrounger as a core contemporary narrative of bordering, to demonise and vilify migrants. 
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resort to anecdotes, and media reports frequently make use of individual instances and 
stories, to support the negative claims that they make about migrants broadly. Through such 
means, therefore, we can see how, as Jensen and Tyler put it, key stigmatised figures are 
‘constituted and repetitively accumulated’ (2015, p.479; emphasis mine) across political and 
media sites. As we will see in Chapter Two, figures such as the abusive immigration cheat 
materialise incessantly and repetitively via anecdotes in government documents and political 
speeches, and through the numerous individual cases and stories on which the media reports. 
This process of accumulation and repetition works to fuel and orchestrate public hostility 
towards the groups of migrants who are targeted by government and media narratives. In this 
way, public consent for restrictive immigration policies is secured (see Jensen and Tyler, 
2015; see also Jensen, 2018). 
Finally, and importantly, Hall and colleagues’ account of public opinion formation in 
Policing the Crisis helps us not only to understand how ‘lay attitudes’ about immigration are 
politically and culturally crafted – but also how these orchestrations of public opinion help, in 
turn, to support and maintain government and media narratives. In their examination of 
newspaper readers’ ‘letters to the editor’ about mugging, Hall et al. explain that, as such 
expressions of ‘lay attitudes’ are incited and ‘awaken[ed]’, they work to ‘underpin and 
support the viewpoints already in circulation’. In doing so, they ‘help to close the consensual 
circle, providing the lynch-pin of legitimation’ (2013, p.136; emphasis mine). Building on 
this observation, in their analysis Jensen and Tyler (2015) highlight how in the present era it 
is not only in newspaper letters pages where ‘lay’ support for and public legitimation of the 
dominant ideas already in circulation materialises. What appear to be ‘spontaneous’ (Hall et 
al., 2013, p.136) articulations of public opinion appear, too, in online comment sections of 
newspapers, and online message boards – as well as via opinion polls and social attitudes 
surveys (see also Jensen, 2018). As Jensen and Tyler emphasise, such manifestations and 
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orchestrations of ‘lay attitudes’ function to provide support ‘for an already-circulating 
commonsense ideology’ (2015, p.479).  
Writing in the early 2000s about government, media and public reactions to people 
seeking asylum, Tony Kushner argued: ‘In Britain at the start of the twenty-first century, the 
government, state, media and public have intertwined in a mutually reinforcing and 
reassuring process to problematize and often stigmatize asylum-seekers’ (2003, p.261). To 
some extent, the idea of the government, media and public ‘intertwining’ and ‘mutually 
reinforcing and reassuring’ one other as they demonise and vilify migrants captures the 
nature of the process described above. Yet, in emphasising the links between the government, 
media and public in the dissemination and maintenance of negative narratives about migrants, 
it is important not to erase the hierarchical dynamics of this process. That is, as Hall and 
colleagues emphasise, the expressions of ‘public opinion’ that operate to legitimise and 
reinforce ideas which are already in circulation are ‘subject … to the shaping power of … 
institutional forces’ (2013, p.136). We might push back, therefore, at the ‘mutuality’ that 
Kushner identifies in the relationship between the government, media and public. Rather, 
what unfolds in the dissemination and perpetuation of narratives of bordering can be more 
accurately understood as – in the words of the introduction to the second edition of Policing 
the Crisis – the primary definers ‘win[ing] society to their “definition of the situation”’ (Hall 
et al., 2013, p.xii).    
 
Moving past the language of ‘migrants’ and ‘non-citizens’: The centrality of race to 
research on borders and bordering   
Throughout this opening chapter, I have set out that it is ‘migrants’, ‘foreign nationals’ and 
‘non-citizens’ who are affected by the UK’s immigration regime. Somewhat belatedly, I now 
want to qualify this assertion. As some parts of my analysis have begun to indicate, it is in 
fact the case that the UK’s border controls – like those of other Western nation-states – work 
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to problematise the mobility of certain migrants, foreign nationals and non-citizens. 
Specifically, they seek predominantly to immobilise and exclude people coming from 
countries in the Global South, most of whom are not white, as well as, to some extent, those 
from Southern and Eastern Europe, who are ostensibly white but are often deemed to 
represent ‘a contingent and degraded form of whiteness’ (Anderson, 2013, p.45). The UK’s 
border regime, therefore, is structured by racism. 
As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, border criminologists have not 
ignored issues of race and racism. As Parmar has pointed out, however, scholarship in this 
area has rarely utilised race as a central analytical frame (2018a, 2018b; see also Garner, 
2015). It should be acknowledged, of course, that the unequal effects of the UK’s border 
controls might be understood in other ways. Most obviously, perhaps, their overwhelming 
targeting of people originally from countries in Africa, the Middle East, South and South East 
Asia, Central and South America, and Southern and Eastern Europe, might be seen primarily 
in terms of global class inequality. That is, the border is the means by which rich Western 
countries maintain their economically privileged status, as they work to keep out the world’s 
poor (Aas, 2014, 2013; Webber, 2004). Yet, although class undoubtedly runs through the 
contemporary border regime, it is important to recognise that, from their very inception, the 
UK’s immigration controls have been shaped by racism (Parmar, 2018a). While the controls 
of the current era may effect this discrimination in more complex ways than those that 
preceded them (Garner, 2018, 2017), the exclusion of those deemed to be racially different, 
as some of the more recent interventions within border criminology have emphasised, 
continues to lie at their core (Bosworth, Parmar and Vázquez, 2018; Parmar, 2018a; Bhui, 
2016; Bowling, 2013). 
The idea of ‘race’ has always been central to the Western nation-state. As Alana and 
Ronit Lentin have argued, it was with the birth and development of the modern nation-state 
that the ideas perpetuated by racial science became important politically, as a way of binding 
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together individuals within the national territory in terms of ‘a common heritage and shared 
destiny’ (2006, p.5). Since they were first introduced, immigration controls in the UK have 
been ‘deeply implicated’ (Anderson, 2013, p.47) in the project of making and maintaining the 
‘race nation’. This is immediately evident from, for instance, the immigration controls that 
were eventually implemented following the Second World War, which functioned to curtail 
non-white migration coming from the British colonies and former colonies. John Solomos 
(2003) has explained that, in the period leading up the introduction of this legislation, the 
majority of migrants coming to the UK to fill the significant post-war labour shortages were 
actually from the Irish Republic, ‘Old’ Commonwealth countries such as Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, and Europe. The number of people migrating from colonised countries – 
who, as British subjects, were legally entitled to enter and settle in the UK – was, by 
comparison, quite small. Yet, ‘almost as soon as they began to arrive they were perceived as 
a problem’ (2003, p.52). 
Following years of problematisation of non-white immigration by politicians, as well 
as the media, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was brought in. Under this, all 
holders of Commonwealth passports – unless they had been born in the UK, or held a British 
passport issued by the British government – were now subject to immigration controls. 
While, as Solomos notes, this meant that the Act formally also targeted white Commonwealth 
citizens, it was clear from the parliamentary debates and media coverage preceding its 
introduction that it was implemented primarily to reduce the migration of people with darker 
skin (see also Bhambra, 2016). Legislation introduced following the 1962 Act worked to 
further reduce non-white migration. The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, for instance, 
was brought in to reduce the number of Kenyan Asians arriving in the UK (Anderson, 2013; 
Solomos, 2003). The 1971 Immigration Act introduced a distinction between ‘patrials’, who 
had the right of abode in Britain, and ‘non-patrials’, who did not. ‘Patrials’ included 
Commonwealth citizens who had British parents or grandparents; and, therefore, patriality 
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‘served as a mechanism to facilitate the entry of white Australians, Canadians, and New 
Zealanders but not other Commonwealth citizens’ (Anderson, 2013, p.40; see also Aliverti, 
2013a; Solomos, 2003). 
It is important to acknowledge that, in recent decades, imaginings of British national 
identity have become more complicated. Ben Pitcher has observed that: ‘The state’s 
antagonism towards those marked out as racially different has been transformed into an 
awkward embrace, such that the title of Paul Gilroy’s classic survey of the field of 1980s race 
politics no longer rings quite true: in contemporary Britain there does indeed seem to be 
Black in the Union Jack’ (2009, p.33; see also Back, Sinha and Bryan, 2012). And yet, when 
it comes to immigration, the idea of the whiteness of the nation still appears to hold; in the 
contemporary era, migration continues to be restricted racially (Back, 2007; Lentin and 
Lentin, 2006). One of the clearest ways that, since the beginnings of the current period of 
mass mobility, successive governments have impeded non-white immigration to the UK is 
through asylum policies and legislation.  
Although a significant proportion of people seeking protection in the UK from the late 
1980s onwards were from Eastern Europe – a point I return to later on – many also came 
from countries in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia (Schuster, 2003a). As the number 
of asylum applications in the UK started to increase, the then Conservative government began 
introducing visa restrictions on nationals of countries ‘considered to be the main “producers” 
of asylum seekers’ (Aliverti, 2013a, p.32). First, then, visa restrictions were introduced for 
nationals of Sri Lanka, in 1985, and following this for nationals of Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan, Nigeria and Ghana (see also Webber, 2004). Further measures to strengthen these 
entry restrictions were subsequently introduced, including carriers’ liability – that is, fines for 
airlines and shipping companies for carrying people with false documents or without 
documentation at all (Webber, 2004; Bloch, 2000). As I noted earlier in the chapter, 
moreover, it was also in the context of the rising number of asylum applications that more 
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immigration ‘crimes’ began to be introduced, as a way of ‘backing up’ and strengthening 
immigration legislation (Aliverti, 2013a). 
Reflecting the increasingly diffuse nature of the border in the current era, a series of 
internal controls on asylum applicants were implemented by New Labour following their 
election in 1997, aimed at making life hard for those who had managed to get to the UK and 
forcing them to leave the country. These included mandatory dispersal out of London for 
anyone going through the asylum process, limited levels of financial support and a 
prohibition on working, and an increasing use of immigration detention (Schuster and 
Solomos, 2004). The framework put in place from the 1980s onwards to reduce asylum 
applications in the UK has been successful: as Victoria Canning notes, ‘applications for 
asylum have decreased significantly, even as the need for sanctuary relating to the Refugee 
Convention has increased’ (2017, p.17). Indeed, the effectiveness of asylum policies and 
legislation in preventing non-white migration to the UK can be seen through the relative lack 
of rise in asylum applications during the recent so-called refugee ‘crisis’.23 During the ‘crisis’ 
the number of refugees arriving in Europe, who were coming predominantly from countries 
in the Global South, jumped dramatically, from approximately 280,000 in 2014 to more than 
a million the following year (BBC News, 2016a). Despite this, however, the number of 
 
23 As I set out below, there was a dramatic increase in the number of refugees arriving in Europe in 2015. And 
yet, there are a number of reasons to challenge the dominant framing of this increase in numbers as a ‘crisis’. 
For instance, as Canning, who refers to it as a ‘so-called crisis’, notes: ‘A crisis is unforeseeable or 
unpredictable. The events unfolding at Europe’s borders have been wholly predictable: conflict, country 
occupation and economic dismantlement of any given region creates influxes in migration, and Greece and 
Turkey had already been experiencing significant increases in refugee populations since the 1990s’ (2017, p.9). 
Moreover, as Gholam Khiabany highlights, the vast majority of refugees do not make it to Europe but, in fact, 
‘are hosted in developing countries … The staggering numbers of … those taking refuge in developing countries 
puts the “refugee crisis” in Europe in perspective’ (2016, pp.756–757). Additionally, as Neske Baerwaldt (2018) 
points out, in framing the increasing numbers of refugees arriving in Europe as a ‘crisis’, governments and 
politicians have typically insisted that the crisis is for Europe, and have foregrounded the alleged problems for 
‘us’ as a result of rising levels of forced migration. The significant harms experienced by those forced from their 
countries, on the other hand, including the thousands of people who have drowned in the Mediterranean, have 
rarely been referred to or understood as part of the ‘crisis’. As Baerwaldt explains, ‘despite border deaths 
permeating the refugee crisis’ imagery, the vast majority of such deaths are positioned outside of its frame of 
reference’. We might not entirely reject the term ‘crisis’, then, to describe rising levels of forced migration to 




asylum applications in the UK rose by just 20 per cent across this period, from 32,344 to 
38,878 (Canning, 2017). 
Another key policy that has blocked non-white migration to the UK in the 
contemporary era is ‘managed migration’. In the early 2000s, the then Labour government 
adopted a ‘managed migration’ approach to employment visas by introducing the Highly 
Skilled Migrants’ Programme for people from outside the EU. Alongside the increasingly 
restrictive asylum regime, therefore, this worked to limit immigration from the Global South, 
as well as Southern and Eastern Europe, as only the most educated and skilled people from 
these parts of the world were able to get in (Fekete, 2001). Then, in 2004, EU enlargement 
took place: the 15 original Western European member states were joined by eight Eastern 
European countries, including Poland, meaning that nationals of these ‘A8’ states acquired 
rights of free movement within the EU. Following this, the Labour government published 
plans for a new ‘points-based’ immigration system for non-EU nationals: the proposed new 
system continued with the ‘managed migration’ approach, as it included employment routes 
for ‘highly skilled’ and ‘skilled’ migrants (Home Office, 2005). Labour’s plans did also 
include a further employment route, for ‘low skilled’ non-EU migrants – but it was indicated 
that EU enlargement and so the availability of labour from the new ‘A8’ member states 
meant that such a route would be phased out over time. In fact, although the points-based 
system for non-EU nationals has been in place since 2008, the low skilled employment route 
has never been implemented (Gower, 2018; Anderson, 2013). As Steve Garner (2007a) has 
noted, therefore, the outcome of the ‘managed migration’ approach has been the privileging 
of white European labour, and the limiting of opportunities for entry to the UK for non-white 
non-EU nationals, unless they have particular skills. 
Thus, as Bridget Anderson observes, while policies such as ‘managed migration’ are 
framed officially in terms of economic status – and so are unashamedly about class – their 
apparently ‘raceless’ nature is entirely contradicted by their actual consequences: in terms of 
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their practical effects, they are ‘unavoidably “race-ful”’ (2013, p.46). We see something 
similar, indeed, through the system of ‘visa’ and ‘non-visa’ nationals. I highlighted above that 
from the mid-1980s onwards, in order to prevent people seeking asylum from coming to the 
UK, the then Conservative government started to introduce visa restrictions on nationals of 
certain countries. In fact, as Aliverti (2013a) notes, visa restrictions are now in place for 
citizens of over 100 countries worldwide – most of which are in the Global South. Nationals 
of some non-EU countries, however, are not required to apply for a visa before travelling to 
the UK; predictably, these ‘non-visa’ nationals include citizens of the United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand (Home Office, 2019c). The ‘visa’ and ‘non-visa’ national system 
is officially ‘raceless’, therefore, framed as it is in terms of nationality. Yet, as it effects a 
divide between people from countries in the Global South, most of whom are not white, and 
people from non-EU countries in the Global North, many of whom are white, its 
consequences are wholly ‘race-ful’ (Anderson, 2013; see also Parmar, 2018a). 
I noted earlier that, as asylum applications in the UK started to rise from the late 
1980s onwards, many of those seeking asylum were from Eastern Europe, fleeing political 
upheaval and conflict there. As some critics have highlighted, the fact that many of those 
seeking protection during this period had lighter skin was used to deny the racism of asylum 
policies and legislation (Kushner, 2005). Yet, as Liza Schuster (2003a) explains, such denials 
ignore who, specifically, was being targeted: that is, that it was only certain groups of white 
people being prevented from entering the UK – people who, despite their skin pigmentation, 
have often been treated as ‘not quite white’ and racially different. Indeed, there is a long 
history within the UK’s immigration controls of excluding white minority groups from the 
country. The first major piece of immigration legislation in the UK, the 1905 Aliens Act, was 
introduced to prevent the entry of Jewish people fleeing Eastern Europe (Kushner 2005). 
Similarly, in the post-war period, while Eastern European refugees were brought to the UK as 
‘European Volunteer Workers’, Jewish people were explicitly excluded from this scheme 
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(Bhambra, 2016; Kushner, 2005). As scholars have explained, people who are ostensibly 
white have often been deemed to be racially undesirable in cultural terms – that is, ‘by 
reference to cultural rather than phenotypical difference’ (Garner, 2013, p.507; see also 
Anderson, 2013; Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2012).24   
With the enlargement of the EU in 2004 some Eastern Europeans – including some of 
those who had previously been prevented from entering the UK by asylum policies and 
legislation – acquired rights of free movement. This demonstrates how groups who have been 
deemed to represent a ‘degenerate’ (Anderson, 2013, p.45) form of whiteness can, at points, 
be elevated out of racial undesirability (Anderson, 2013; Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2012; 
Garner, 2007b). Against the post-2004 backdrop of EU enlargement and free movement for 
many Eastern Europeans, however, it is important to remember that nationals of some 
Southern European countries, including Albania and Turkey, are subject to the non-EU 
immigration regime – and, indeed, Albanians and Turks are classified as ‘visa’ nationals 
(Home Office, 2019c). When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, moreover, the 
UK imposed transitional controls on their citizens, which – as I indicated earlier in this 
chapter – were only lifted in 2014 (Gower and Hawkins, 2013). 
Alongside this, some Eastern European EU nationals have had their formal rights of 
free movement in the UK curtailed by specific policies. For instance, until quite recently the 
Home Office was operating a programme which targeted EU nationals who were street 
homeless for administrative removal from the UK, on the basis that they were ‘misusing’ 
their free movement rights. Formally the policy applied to all EU citizens; yet, by focusing its 
expulsion efforts on some of the most socially marginalised, the programme was inevitably 
tilted towards Eastern Europeans (Jones, 2017).25 The deportation of EU nationals caught up 
 
24 I explain further in Chapter Two how the assignment of ‘cultural difference’ functions to constitute people as 
racially undesirable.  
25 Following a legal challenge brought by the Public Interest Law Unit and North East London Migrant Action, 
this policy was ruled unlawful in 2017 (Taylor, 2017b).  
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in the criminal justice system can be understood as another way in which free movement 
rights are being cut through for Eastern Europeans. Again, reflecting their broader social 
marginalisation, people from Poland and Romania make up the two largest groups of EU 
nationals in prison (Sturge, 2019b), so a policy that is apparently not specifically targeted is 
actually inevitably skewed towards them. Indeed, the policy of deporting foreign nationals in 
the criminal justice system more broadly can be seen as another key way in which successive 
UK governments have controlled and restricted non-white and ‘not quite white’ migration. 
Formally, this policy is ‘raceless’, applying to all non-citizens. In practice, however, their 
social exclusion – alongside the institutional racism of criminal justice agencies and 
institutions – means that people originally from countries in the Global South and Southern 
and Eastern Europe are the non-citizens who are most often criminalised. Thus, the effects of 
injecting border control measures into the criminal justice system are entirely ‘race-ful’ – or, 
we might more explicitly say, wholly racist. 
It is important to emphasise, of course, that while the UK’s contemporary 
immigration regime has targeted both people who are not white and those who are deemed to 
be ‘not quite white’, there are distinct differences in their treatment. As highlighted earlier, 
for example, at the point of EU enlargement ‘low skilled’ workers from Eastern Europe were 
clearly elevated above those from the Global South. Indeed, the current division between EU 
and non-EU migration in the UK’s border control system means that people who are not 
white are, overall, subjected to a far more exclusionary regime (Back, 2007). Thus, drawing 
on Garner’s identification that the race-inflected immigration policies of EU member states 
operate according to a ‘three-part division’ (2017, p.201), I would suggest that the UK’s 
current migration system might be seen as racially differentiating in the following way.  
At the top of the immigration hierarchy is white migration from Western Europe, 
North America and Australasia, which is rarely deemed to be problematic and is not broadly 
targeted by specific policies. If individual white people from these countries do get caught up 
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in the UK’s immigration controls, their treatment often receives negative media attention and 
is condemned by politicians (see, for instance, Burrows, 2016; Cockcroft and Duell, 2016) – 
and, in many instances, the Home Office reverses its original decision.26 Below this comes 
‘not quite white’ migration from Southern and Eastern Europe, which is often deemed to be 
problematic and is targeted and curtailed by immigration policies in certain ways. Finally, at 
the bottom of the hierarchy comes non-white migration from the Global South, which is 
almost always held to be problematic and is restricted and blocked through a wide range of 
policies and legislation. It is worth highlighting that, following the Brexit referendum and the 
UK’s departure from the EU, plans for a new immigration system – to be implemented from 
the end of the transition period, and so from January 2021 – have recently been set out. In a 
policy statement issued in February 2020, the current Conservative government insisted that 
this new system will be fairer than the present one, as it will ensure that ‘EU and non-EU 
citizens will be treated equally’ (Home Office, 2020). Yet, as Frances Webber (2019) has 
argued,27 what the government has proposed seems merely to reproduce the racial hierarchies 
that are currently in place. 
Identifying race and racism as central to the UK’s immigration regime is critical for 
thinking about and understanding contemporary narratives of bordering. As I will 
demonstrate in the following chapter, these government and media narratives are almost only 
ever attached to people from countries in the Global South and Southern and Eastern Europe; 
white migrants from Western Europe, North America and Australasia rarely, if ever, make an 
appearance (Back, Sinha and Bryan, 2012). Crucially, moreover, we will see that it is through 
racialisation that narratives of bordering stigmatise the ‘unwanted’ migrants on whom they 
 
26 In contrast to this, while people of colour who are citizens of countries in Western Europe, North America or 
Australasia are not targeted by the UK’s immigration controls at a structural or policy level, they are frequently 
problematised individually – for instance, during interactions with immigration officials at the border.  
27 Webber’s analysis is actually focused on a White Paper published in December 2018, The UK’s Future Skills-
based Immigration System (Home Office, 2018). However, what has subsequently been proposed by the 
government in the February 2020 policy statement is, broadly, the same. 
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focus and justify their exclusion. That is, these narratives problematise ‘unwanted’ migrants 
by constituting them in racial terms – by disparaging them, specifically, as racially inferior 
and deviant (Garner and Selod, 2015; Murji and Solomos, 2005).  
Importantly, however, as I will show, even when they are problematising people with 
darker skin dominant narratives of bordering do not use the overt language of race; they do 
not categorise and inferiorise in terms of biological or somatic difference. Rather, they 
problematise racially in more coded ways. So, they utilise the ‘indirect, subtle’ (Phillips and 
Webster, 2014, p.7) language of culture, for instance, to which I have already referred, as 
well as the register of nationality. They also engage in a more ‘abstract’ (Garner, 2013, 
p.504) racialising process, through which non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants are 
essentialised and homogenised as ‘a group with similar pathological characteristics’ (2013, 
p.508). As I suggested earlier, therefore, present-day government and media depictions of 
unwanted migrants draw on earlier negative narratives about immigration, but render them 
more acceptable for the current era. Thus, as I now go on to map out and analyse the core 
narratives of bordering of the present period, I will show how they racialise and ‘other’ 
migrants who are unwelcome in a distinctly contemporary and, in fact, ‘post-racial’ way.  
      
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have situated my research in relation to the existing criminological literature 
on migration and border control. Firstly, building on the scholarship that has documented the 
overt changes to the police, courts and prisons in the current era as they have been injected 
with practices of immigration enforcement, I have suggested that we might also be able to 
detect the mark of border control on criminal justice in further, more subtle ways. 
Specifically, I have set out my interest in the narratives disseminated by the UK government 
and media in the present period, which problematise migrants and justify their targeting by 
the direct activities of border enforcement; and in how these narratives of bordering might be 
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percolating into one stage of the court process – the practice of the sentencing hearing. 
Alongside this, against the tendency of some of the earlier contributions to border 
criminology to sideline the significance of race, I have demonstrated how – as some of the 
more recent interventions in the field have emphasised – racism runs through and structures 
the UK’s immigration regime. Thus, as I now proceed in Chapter Two to trace and explore 
the most prominent narratives of bordering of the contemporary era, I centralise this frame of 
analysis, and show that approaching depictions of unwanted migrants specifically in terms of 








In this chapter, I turn my attention to the narratives disseminated by the UK government and 
media in the contemporary era that problematise ‘unwanted’ migrants and justify their 
targeting by border enforcement. As I suggested in Chapter One, although criminologists 
have not ignored these dominant narratives, they have not centralised them in their analyses, 
either; in this way, they have been presented as more of a subsidiary practice, alongside the 
‘main event’ of the direct activities of immigration control. Moreover, when criminologists 
have focused on these narratives, they have often identified them as functioning through a 
criminalised imagery. Thus it has been explained that – reflecting the growing convergence 
between immigration enforcement and criminal justice in the current era – government and 
media depictions present migrants as disorderly and dangerous, as ‘shadowy figures’ 
(Bosworth and Guild, 2008, p.707) and criminals, in order to justify their exclusion (see also 
Gerard and Pickering, 2013; Bosworth, 2008; Weber and Bowling, 2004; Weber, 2002). 
Undoubtedly, the negative representations of migrants that are dominant in the current era 
can be seen as operating in this way. Yet, as I began to set out in the previous chapter, I 
would suggest that they can be more fully understood through the framework of race and 
racism.  
We will see in this chapter, therefore, how – in line with the UK’s actual border 
controls – contemporary narratives of bordering focus on people from countries in the Global 
South and Southern and Eastern Europe. The significant number of white migrants who come 
to the UK from Western Europe, North America and Australasia rarely, if ever, make an 
appearance. Crucially, moreover, it is through racialisation that narratives of bordering 
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problematise the unwanted migrants on whom they focus and legitimise their exclusion; so, 
by constructing and classifying them in racial terms, by demeaning them, specifically, as 
racially different and deviant. There is a clear continuity, then, between the narratives of 
bordering of the present and the racist narratives about immigration of the past. As I indicated 
in Chapter One, indeed, the narratives that have become entrenched in the current period 
often draw on the stories disseminated about unwanted migrants historically, recycling the 
same tropes and claims about them that have gone before. At the same time, however, the 
narratives that are dominant now also look very different to those that preceded them: the 
racialisation of unwanted migrants in present-day government and media depictions plays out 
in a distinctly contemporary way. Critics writing about race have pointed to the ‘coding’ 
(Phillips and Webster, 2014; Murji and Solomos, 2005; Solomos and Back, 1996) of 
racialised expression in the current era, as explicit racism has become socially unacceptable 
and taboo – and, as I will draw out, such coding is precisely what we see in contemporary 
portrayals of unwanted migrants. The narratives that I trace in this chapter do not deploy the 
overt language of race: they do not categorise and stigmatise in terms of biological or 
phenotypical difference. Rather, they racialise and ‘other’ migrants who are unwelcome in a 
range of more subtle and sanitised ways – and, through this, they obscure and disguise their 
racism. 
Building on this, we might also understand the coded, muted racialisation of 
contemporary narratives of bordering in an additional way. Parmar (2016a) has suggested 
that the racialisation of unwanted migrants through the ‘safe mode of expression’ of 
nationality – a register that I trace running through narratives of bordering later in the chapter 
– might be seen as ‘a continuation of raciological articulation in post-racial times’. This idea 
– of the coded articulations of race in the present as distinctly ‘post-racial’ modes of 
expression – is a very useful way of conceptualising them. Goldberg (2015) has set out that 
rather than representing the overcoming or end of race, what characterises the ‘post-racial’ 
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present is in fact the denial and dismissal of racism as an ongoing mode of oppression, even 
as it clearly continues to structure and order our societies. Coded modes of articulation, then 
– expressions that are not racially explicit and thus are stripped of ‘the stain of the racial’ 
(2015, p.55) – facilitate this denial (see also Parmar, 2019). Later in his analysis, comparing 
the post-racial with the post-colonial, Goldberg also identifies what is specifically ‘post’ 
about post-raciality in the following way: ‘Racisms reprise at the very moment of racial 
erasure – only now unmarked, less seen and recognizable. So just as the “post-” in the 
postcolonial is not the end but the afterlife of the colonial, so too the “post” in postraciality: 
the afterlife, the ghostly haunting by the racial of the social supposedly rid of the racial’ 
(2015, pp.154–155). There is something here, I think, about Goldberg’s particular 
identification of post-racial racisms in terms of a ‘ghostly haunting’ – we might say, then, as 
there, and yet not quite there – that really captures the nature of the racialisation that we see 
in contemporary narratives of bordering. It suggests the near intangibility of their racism, 
how this can feel difficult to mark out and pin down clearly – even as they are definitely 
racially demarcating unwanted migrants, even as they are undoubtedly differentiating and 
disparaging them in this specific way. 
There are, as I started to sketch out in Chapter One, some key narratives of bordering 
in the current era, each of which centres on a specific protagonist and follows a clearly 
defined plotline. These include the narrative of the immigration cheat, who defrauds and 
abuses the UK’s immigration system, and that of the parasitical scrounger, who exploits the 
welfare benefits system as well as other public services and resources including the NHS. 
There is also a series of narratives that centre on protagonists who constitute a more overt 
threat: the criminal, the terrorist and the sexual predator. As I trace these narratives and 
analyse their racialisation of unwanted migrants, I draw attention, too, to some apparently 
different government and media depictions, which sometimes appear alongside them. 
Sukhwant Dhaliwal and Kirsten Forkert have highlighted how dominant representations of 
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migrants do not only ‘devalue’ them but also, in fact, ‘distinguish between types’ (2016, 
p.50) – so, they differentiate between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ migrants, between those 
who are good and those who are bad. Bearing this out, contemporary government and media 
narratives have indeed reclassified some of those who would normally be deemed as 
‘unwanted’ migrants as desirable, or deserving. As we will see, the elevation of some 
unwanted migrants in this way has usually unfolded along lines of further racial 
differentiation and stratification, as well as through intersections with gender, and class. 
While they are ostensibly concerned with inclusion and opening up the border, then, as they 
stratify and hierarchise unwanted migrants like this, marking out only a minority as 
acceptable to be let in, these depictions reveal themselves as very much not the converse of 
narratives of bordering. They function, instead, as an integral part of the overall regime of 
exclusion, insisting that the entry of unwanted outsiders can only ever happen on a limited or 
occasional basis – and, therefore, that the general rule of bordering must remain firmly in 
place (Sales, 2005). 
 
‘I am seeing a great growth of people abusing the system’: The narrative of the 
manipulative immigration cheat 
I begin mapping the key narratives of bordering of the contemporary era by tracing a 
narrative that was disseminated for the first time in the 1980s, although, as I will later 
suggest, its origins can be traced back further than this: the narrative of the immigration 
cheat, who defrauds and abuses the UK’s immigration system. As I will show, claims about 
the deceptiveness of unwanted migrants and their manipulation of immigration controls have 
been attached, by successive governments and the media, to a range of different groups. 
Since it first emerged, however, the narrative of the abusive immigration cheat has been most 
prominently and persistently associated with people seeking asylum. 
63 
 
Government claims about the fraudulence and ‘bogusness’ of the majority of those 
seeking asylum started to appear in the mid-1980s, and really gathered pace across the 1990s 
and 2000s, as the UK dealt with increasing numbers of applications for protection. As critics 
have noted, the idea of the asylum applicant who is in fact an ‘economic migrant’ – not 
fleeing violence, conflict or persecution, but simply in search of a more comfortable and 
prosperous life – has been central to successive governments’ claims. Nick Lynn and Susan 
Lea (2003) have highlighted how assertions about asylum seekers who are actually economic 
migrants emerged for the first time in around 1985, under Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
government, in relation to Tamils fleeing civil war in Sri Lanka. Following this, as events in 
Eastern Europe in particular, including the breakup of Yugoslavia, resulted in rising asylum 
applications in the UK across the first half of the 1990s, the Conservatives introduced the first 
pieces of primary legislation ‘dealing specifically with asylum’ (Bloch, 2000, p.30). 
Alongside this, they continued disseminating the ‘economic migrants posing as asylum 
seekers’ claim (Bloch, 2000; Kaye, 1994). In 1997 Tony Blair’s landslide general election 
victory ended almost 20 years of Conservative rule – and yet, the idea of the defrauding and 
exploitation of the asylum system by economic migrants did not disappear at this point, but 
was taken up with equal if not increased enthusiasm by New Labour. 
New Labour’s first major policy document on immigration was the 1998 White Paper 
Fairer, Faster, Firmer; this led to measures including some of the internal asylum controls 
that I documented in Chapter One, which were aimed at making life hard for people who had 
managed to get to the UK. In Fairer, Faster, Firmer, New Labour insisted upon the vital 
importance of ‘modernising our [immigration] controls’ – because of the ‘large numbers of 
economic migrants [who] are abusing the system by claiming asylum’ (Home Office, 1998, 
p.3). Later in the document, indeed, this accusation was levelled in even starker terms, as it 
was explained: ‘There is no doubt that the asylum system is being abused by those seeking to 
migrate for purely economic reasons. Many claims are simply a tissue of lies’ (1998, p.12). 
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On the day of the document’s publication Jack Straw, the then Home Secretary, supported the 
charge of widespread lying and abuse of the asylum system by pointing to Home Office 
statistics. The Times quoted him as saying, ‘We are going to get tougher. In the past ten years 
we have seen a tenfold increase in the number of people claiming asylum’ (Ford, 1998, p.41). 
Straw’s claim about the rise in asylum applications was accurate. Yet, his use of these figures 
without any sort of context or explanation – without any acknowledgement of, for instance, 
the political upheaval and conflict in Eastern Europe, and other world events, that had driven 
this increase – was deliberately misleading. We see here, therefore, a clear example of the 
fabrication and invention that, as I suggested in Chapter One, runs through government and 
media depictions of unwanted migrants, and which makes the use of the term ‘narrative’ for 
them particularly appropriate.  
Alongside this Straw utilised another tactic which, I suggested in the previous chapter 
as well, also makes understanding these dominant depictions specifically as stories or 
narratives fitting. As he insisted, ‘As a constituency MP, I am seeing a great growth of people 
abusing the asylum system simply to evade immigration control or because they are 
economic migrants to this country’ (Ford, 1998, p.41), he deployed ‘the technique of personal 
anecdote’ (Kaye, 2001, p.65) to substantiate his allegations about the routine exploitation of 
the asylum system. The need to tackle the problem of ‘abusive claimants’ (Home Office, 
1998, p.3) who were falsely making applications for protection became, during New 
Labour’s time in government, a key refrain (Schuster and Solomos, 2004; Schuster, 2003a). 
Indeed, it was also under New Labour that another assertion about the abusiveness of those 
seeking asylum became embedded – that, by making false claims, applicants were not only 
taking advantage of the asylum system but were also ‘abusing our hospitality’ (Gibson, 
2007). In this formulation the manipulation of bogus applicants is emphasised even further, 
as their abuse is directed not simply at a system but at ‘our’ generosity and kindness; the 
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cynical manoeuvring of fraudulent claimants contrasts sharply with the allegedly guileless 
welcome of the British people. 
Since the return to a Conservative government from 2010 and in response, in 
particular, to the sharp rise in refugees coming from the Global South to Europe in 2015 
during the so-called refugee ‘crisis’, the narrative of the abusive asylum applicant has been 
reinvigorated and remobilised. In her speech to the Conservative Party conference in October 
2015, for example, Theresa May, the then Home Secretary, repeatedly insisted on the 
longstanding and ongoing abuse of the UK’s asylum system. In fact, during the 14 minutes of 
her speech where she focused on asylum she referred to the ‘abuse’ or ‘manipulation’ of the 
system no fewer than 11 times (The Independent, 2015). Like Jack Straw before her, May 
pointed to the significant rise in asylum applications during the 1990s to back up her claims. 
Building on his use of de-contextualised and thus misleading data, moreover, she also 
emphasised how ‘more than half of all asylum claims fail’ – deliberately neglecting to situate 
this high refusal rate in terms of successive governments’ determination to prevent asylum 
claimants from remaining in the UK.1 She supported her allegations of fraudulence, as well, 
by setting out that the majority of people arriving in the UK and claiming asylum were not in 
fact ‘the most vulnerable’ but, rather, ‘young men’ (The Independent, 2015). The idea that 
the high proportion of men amongst those who manage to make the hazardous journey to the 
West is evidence of the falsity of many asylum claims was, predictably, disseminated under 
New Labour, too. In 2002, for instance, Lord Rooker, then Immigration Minister, ‘denigrated 
“most asylum-seekers” as “single men who have deserted their families for economic gain”’ 
(Schuster, 2003a, p.246). Throughout her speech May insisted, as per the convention, that 
most asylum claimants are in fact ‘economic migrants who simply want to live in a more 
 
1 As Alice Bloch (2000) has highlighted, at the beginning of the 1990s around one in five applications for 
asylum were refused. By 1997, however, the refusal rate on initial applications had jumped significantly, 
reaching 80%. Since then – while there have been fluctuations over the years – it has consistently been the case 
that the Home Office has rejected the majority of asylum claims. In 2018, the refusal rate on initial applications 
stood at 67% (Sturge, 2019a). 
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prosperous society’. Alongside this, she also made several references to those trying to reach 
the UK as ‘illegal’ (The Independent, 2015) – a term that was deployed routinely under New 
Labour, as well (Philo, Briant and Donald, 2013; Webber, 2004). 
The idea that many of those who seek asylum are liars who are defrauding the system 
is a claim that, since the early 1990s, has also been made consistently by significant sections 
of the UK media, both tabloids and broadsheets alike (Philo, Briant and Donald, 2013; ICAR, 
2004; Buchanan, Grillo and Threadgold, 2003; Coole, 2002; Kaye, 2001, 1998). In their 
analysis of UK press coverage of asylum issues during periods in 2006 and 2011, Philo, 
Briant and Donald highlight the frequent references to ‘bogus asylum seekers’, ‘asylum 
cheats’ and ‘frauds’, as well as to the ‘scamming’, ‘abuse’ and ‘exploitation’ (2013, p.104) of 
the asylum system. They point, too, to how the media, like successive governments, have 
repeatedly insisted that large proportions of those seeking asylum are in fact ‘economic 
migrants’, or ‘illegal’. These terms also featured heavily in the more recent coverage of the 
rising levels of forced migration to Europe in 2015 (Bhatia, 2018; Berry, Garcia-Blanco and 
Moore, 2015), as did the term ‘migrant’, as well. Importantly, as Seth Holmes and Heide 
Castañeda have highlighted, the insistence by much of the media reporting that what was 
unfolding was not a ‘refugee crisis’ but a ‘migrant crisis’, instead, ‘subtly delegitimize[d] 
calls for protection’ (2016, p.16). Through this, therefore, the duplicity of the majority of 
people forced to flee their countries and arriving in Europe was relentlessly asserted. 
Defrauding and manipulating the UK’s immigration system has, then, been very 
visibly and persistently attached to those seeking asylum. Less well-documented, perhaps, is 
how the narrative of the deceitful and abusive immigration cheat also extends beyond them. 
Back, Sinha and Bryan have pointed out how, for instance, the idea of ‘bogus students’, ‘who 
are accused of using higher learning illegitimately to gain visas’ (2012, p.142), has become 
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prominent in recent years.2 Yuval-Davis, Anthias and Kofman have also highlighted how a 
concern with ‘bogus’ or ‘sham marriages’, raised previously in the late 1970s – which 
eventually saw the introduction of the ‘primary purpose’ rule, designed by the then 
Conservative government ‘to reduce the entry of South Asian males’ (2005, p.532) –
resurfaced under New Labour. Indeed, since the re-election of the Conservatives in 2010 this 
concern has sustained. In 2011, for example, when the government published proposals on 
family migration, it announced its intention to ‘crack down on abuse of the family route’ 
(Home Office, 2011, p.3) including by ‘tackling sham marriage’ (2011, p.31). To evidence 
the need for action, the consultation document cited three individual examples – or, we might 
say, anecdotes – of ‘sham marriages’ uncovered by immigration officers. Predictably, this 
duplicitous practice was firmly attached to non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants, as two 
of the three examples given involved women from Eastern European countries in the EU 
marrying men from India and Pakistan. 
Particularly since the 2012 announcement of the Conservatives’ ‘hostile environment’ 
policy, which I touched on in Chapter One, the government has also repeatedly characterised 
those who are in the country without valid status – classified as ‘illegal immigrants’ – as 
engaged in the ‘abuse’ of the UK’s immigration system (Home Office, 2015d, 2014, 2013). 
Defrauding the system has likewise been attributed to people the government is trying to 
expel because of their criminal convictions. That ‘foreign criminals’ routinely ‘use weak 
human rights claims to dodge deportation’ (Home Office, 2012), or lodge ‘spurious’ appeals 
to ‘delay their removal’ and ‘cheat the system’ (Home Office, 2015b), have become common 
government refrains.3 During her speech at the Conservative Party conference in 2011 
 
2 Providing another example of the fabrication that runs through narratives of bordering, government claims 
about the routine exploitation of the student visa system – and, in particular, that significant numbers of those 
coming to the UK as students were not leaving when their visas expired – were found in 2017 to be completely 
invented. A report published by the Office for National Statistics (2017) set out that ‘there is no evidence of a 
major issue of non-EU students overstaying their entitlement to stay’. 
3 It is worth highlighting that, despite the government’s insistence that ‘foreign criminals’ are routinely working 
to manipulate and undermine the UK’s immigration system, the majority of appeals against deportation on the 
basis of criminal convictions are not upheld. In 2010, for instance, just 8% of appeals against deportation on the 
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Theresa May relayed a series of anecdotes to support her claims of ‘foreign criminals’ 
manipulating and cheating the immigration system, as she insisted: ‘We all know the stories 
… The violent drug dealer who cannot be sent home because his daughter, for whom he pays 
no maintenance, lives here. The robber who cannot be removed because he has a girlfriend’ 
(Politics.co.uk, 2011). Turning, in her final example, to the abuse allegedly perpetrated not 
just by those convicted of offences but within the immigration system more broadly, she 
revived a story that had first appeared in the Sunday Telegraph two years previously (Barrett, 
2009). Thus, she recounted with incredulity the case of ‘the illegal immigrant who cannot be 
deported because … he had a pet cat’. May insisted on the veracity of her anecdote, as she 
explicitly stated during the speech ‘I am not making this up’ (Politics.co.uk, 2011). Yet, it 
later transpired – in keeping with the concoction and invention which, I have suggested, run 
through government and media narratives about unwanted migrants – that she, and indeed the 
newspaper that originally ran the story, very much had.4  
The trope of the scheming ‘foreign criminal’ who plays and exploits the immigration 
system runs through media reporting, as well. Since the 2006 foreign national prisoner 
‘crisis’, which I highlighted in the previous chapter, press coverage of ‘foreign crime’ in the 
UK has increased dramatically (de Noronha, 2018b) – and, within this, individual cases or 
stories of non-citizens convicted of offences are often reported on. From a search of national 
newspapers that I conducted, for instance, covering the period 6th July 2012 to 6th July 2014, I 
was able to identify 330 articles reporting on the cases of 86 individual ‘foreign criminals’.5 
 
basis of criminal convictions were successful (Klug, 2013). Thus, we see another instance of distortion and 
falsification here: 'foreign criminals’ are not managing to ‘dodge deportation’ or ‘cheat the system’ at all. 
4 In this case, joint ownership of a cat was cited by a man facing removal from the UK to help evidence that he 
was in a long-term relationship. However, it was his relationship with his partner, and not their pet cat, that was 
the reason for him winning his appeal and not being ejected from the UK (Full Fact, 2011). As the Full Fact 
website highlights, when the case was first covered in the media the Judicial Office released a statement 
explaining that what was being reported was not true; when Theresa May made the claim two years later in her 
conference speech, the Judicial Office issued the same statement again. 
5 Using Nexis, I conducted a search of UK national newspapers covering the period 6th July 2012 to 6th July 
2014. In the first instance I conducted two separate searches, using the search terms ‘foreign criminal’ and, 
subsequently, ‘foreign national AND crime’, which returned 1,882 and 781 results respectively. Alongside 
general reports on ‘foreign criminals’ – which I touch on at later points in this chapter – many of the articles 
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Importantly, the vast majority of these reports were concerned with people who were not 
white, or those deemed to be ‘not quite white’. Eighty-four of the 86 non-citizens whose 
cases were covered were originally from countries in the Global South or Southern and 
Eastern Europe. 
Across the reports that I identified, there was often an emphasis on how a particular 
‘foreign criminal’ had supposedly managed to ‘dodge deportation’ or ‘cheat the system’. We 
see a clear example of this in an article published on the front page of the Sunday Telegraph 
in April 2013, which focused on the case of Hesham Mohammed Ali, a ‘drug dealer 
immigrant’ originally from Iraq. The article explained that Ali had avoided deportation by 
‘convinc[ing] a judge he had a “family life” which had to be respected because he had a 
“genuine” relationship with a British woman – despite already having two children by 
different women with whom he now has no contact’. It emphasised his alleged fraudulence 
and manipulation of the immigration system further as it then added another detail from his 
deportation appeal. Thus, the article stated: ‘Ali also mounted an extraordinary claim that his 
life would be in danger in his native Iraq because he was covered in tattoos, including a half-
naked Western woman – a claim which was only dismissed after exhaustive legal 
examination’ (Barrett, 2013, p.1).  
 The article quoted the Home Office as saying that the case showed further legislation 
was needed ‘to prevent foreign nationals remaining in the UK through abuse of the Human 
Rights Act’, as well as Dominic Raab, the Conservative MP, who characterised Ali as ‘a 
convicted drug dealer cheating deportation’. It then concluded by reviving the anecdote 
referred to above, about the ‘illegal immigrant’ and his cat. Thus, the article insisted: ‘The 
 
identified through these searches focused on the cases of individual non-citizens convicted of offences; I 
subsequently conducted follow-up searches on these individuals to ensure that I gathered all coverage on them 
over the time period set out above. I fully recognise the imperfections of my method: I would like to have 
conducted initial searches using a wider variety of search terms, for instance. I also recognise that, as I carried 
out this search in the earlier stages of researching my thesis, it may now seem rather out-of-date. There are 
limitations to it, then – but, in spite of this, I believe it still offers an insight into some of the core features of 
‘foreign criminal’ media coverage.  
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case raises new concerns over the arguments sometimes put forward by foreigners who are 
seeking to stay in Britain, such as the Bolivian man … [who] argued that he should not be 
deported partly because he and his boyfriend had bought a pet cat’ (Barrett, 2013, pp.1–2). 
Here, then, we see how a story that started out in the Sunday Telegraph in 2009, which was 
subsequently retold by Theresa May in 2011, was recited, once again, by the same newspaper 
in 2013. This example provides a stark illustration, therefore, of the repetition and reinforcing 
of one another that characterises government and media narratives about unwanted migrants 
– which, drawing on De Certeau’s (1984) work, I suggested in Chapter One helps to ensure 
that their fabricated claims are accepted as truth. The mobilisation of this specific anecdote 
can also be understood through the lens of the repetitive accumulation of key stigmatised 
figures, a mechanism which – making use of Jensen and Tyler’s research on the ‘cultural and 
political crafting of anti-welfare commonsense’ (2015, p.470) – I also underlined in Chapter 
One. So, as this individual case or story was repeated across political and media sites, it 
contributed to the recurrent and consistent materialisation of the problematic figure of the 
abusive and exploitative immigration cheat. Consequently, through such ‘repetitive 
mediations’ (Jensen and Tyler, 2015, p.479), disparaging ideas about unwanted migrants 
become cemented in the public consciousness and emerge as widely believed.  
 
The abusive and manipulative immigration cheat: A racialised narrative of bordering 
On one level, constructing those seeking asylum, in particular, as liars and cheats who are 
defrauding the system functions to legitimise their exclusion through, quite simply, denial.  
Such a narrative insists that the vast majority of people seeking protection do not really need 
it and we are, therefore, fully justified in keeping them out. As Kushner has highlighted, then, 
‘avoidance or denial of the existence of refugees’ (2003, p.265) has become central to 
enabling harsh policies against them. As part of this strategy, Kushner points also to the 
practice of re-labelling and reclassifying refugees – which we see clearly, of course, in the 
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government and media’s repeated claims that the majority of people seeking sanctuary are in 
fact ‘economic migrants’ or ‘illegal immigrants’. Yet, alongside avoidance and denial, 
depicting people seeking asylum and, indeed, unwanted migrants more broadly in terms of 
their persistent duping and scheming, their allegedly endless exploitation of the immigration 
system, is doing something else, as well. Specifically, it problematises and stigmatises those 
it targets through racialisation. 
As I highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, critics writing about race have 
explained how, as explicitly racist language and forms of expression have become 
increasingly socially unacceptable, ideas about racial difference have been ‘coded’ in various 
ways in order to ‘circumvent accusations of racism’ (Solomos and Back, 1996, p.18). One of 
the key forms of coding that has been pointed to in the contemporary era is the growing 
reliance on the ‘indirect, subtle’ (Phillips and Webster, 2014, p.7) language of culture (see 
also Patel and Connelly, 2019; Lentin and Titley, 2011).6 As Lentin and Titley (2011) have 
explained, those who deploy this language often insist that, since they are not referring to 
physiognomy or to phenotypical difference, it cannot be racist to speak or write in this way. 
Yet, as Lentin and Titley go on to highlight, ‘culture talk’ operates in exactly the same 
manner as the language of biological race, as undesirable cultural attributes and traits are 
assigned as ‘fixed and unchangeable’ (2011, p.63) – and as they are, moreover, attributed on 
a blanket basis, to huge swathes of people. Thus, the apparently innocent register of culture 
‘performs the work of race’ (2011, p.54); it essentialises and homogenises and, therefore, 
disparages entire groups of people. What plays out in the assignment of ‘cultural difference’, 
then, is a process of racialisation. As groups who are framed in this way are constituted as 
homogenous masses, with negative qualities and characteristics, ‘race’ is made, even as the 
 
6 As scholars including Lentin and Titley (2011) have explained, ideas about culture have in fact long been 
deployed in formulations of racial difference; thus, the positioning by some of ‘cultural racism’ as the ‘new’ 
racism is not entirely accurate. As Lentin and Titley highlight, however, the recourse to the language of culture 
in contemporary expressions of racialised difference has become increasingly prominent.  
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overt language of racial difference is never deployed (see also Garner and Selod, 2015; 
Kushner, 2005). 
The identification of the coding of race in the contemporary era, and the recognition 
that it is more sanitised registers which might be now effecting racialisation, is critical for 
understanding government and media representations of fraudulent, abusive migrants in this 
way. The explicitly racial language of biological or somatic difference is nowhere to be found 
in this dominant depiction. Nor, indeed, do we see in this instance any recourse to notions of 
culture or cultural difference – although, as I will show later in this chapter, appeals to ideas 
of their problematic cultural traits do appear in contemporary narratives about migrants who 
are unwelcome. Yet, as government and media depictions insist that ‘asylum seekers’, 
‘economic migrants’, ‘illegal immigrants’ and ‘foreign criminals’ are routinely duping and 
manipulating the immigration system, they ascribe to them a particular propensity, or natural 
tendency, to dissemble and deceive; they fix them, collectively, as inherent fraudsters and 
liars. Hence, the narrative of the immigration cheat can also be seen to ‘perform the work of 
race’. As it portrays the non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants it targets like this, it 
produces them as a homogenous bloc with undesirable qualities and traits – in order to justify 
their targeting by border practices and exclusion from the UK. In their analysis of 
racialisation, Garner and Selod answer the question ‘So what does racialization actually do?’ 
with the response ‘It draws a line around all the members of a group; instigates ‘group-ness’, 
and ascribes characteristics’ (2015, p.14) – and this is precisely what we see in the narrative 
of the immigration cheat. The distinct processes of essentialisation and homogenisation 
through which it stigmatises and inferiorises non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants means 
that they are being racialised; that is, that race-thinking and race-making run through this 
dominant narrative. 
Reading the narrative of the immigration cheat like this – uncovering the process of 
race-making, specifically, that runs through it – finds further support, indeed, from Garner’s 
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(2013) analysis of the portrayal of asylum seekers by local residents objecting to the building 
of an asylum processing centre in Portishead, near Bristol, in 2004. In his analysis Garner 
identifies how people seeking asylum, although ‘phenotypically and culturally highly 
diverse’ (2013, p.504) – or, as he puts it later, a ‘“multi-racial” group’ – were nonetheless 
constructed in the residents’ letters of objection as ‘a bounded entity’, with ‘a homogenous 
set of characteristics’ (2013, p.507). He argues, then, that as asylum seekers were 
essentialised and homogenised by the local residents’ depictions, as they were ‘transformed 
discursively into a group with similar pathological characteristics and behaviours’ (2013, 
p.508), they were produced, quite simply, as a ‘race’ (see also Hubbard, 2005). As Garner 
explains, therefore, racialisation takes place not only when people are categorised and 
problematised in terms of their physical appearance, or even – as I have explained happens 
increasingly – through reference to their culture. It can occur, too, when neither of these 
registers are present, ‘as a more abstract process of attributing innate characteristics to all 
members of a given group’ (Garner, 2013, p.504, see also Garner, 2017). 
It might be argued that the processes of essentialisation and homogenisation which are 
effected through the narrative of the immigration cheat, which work to pathologise and vilify 
non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants, can be better understood through the framework of 
xeno-racism. Writing in the early 2000s, Sivanandan theorised xeno-racism as ‘a racism that 
is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial territories, but at the 
newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted’ (2001, cited by Fekete, 
2001, p.23), including people seeking asylum from countries in Eastern Europe. Thus, he 
explained that the demonisation of asylum seekers as, for instance, a mass of liars and cheats, 
functions through the same mechanisms as ‘the old racism’, and so is ‘racism in substance’, 
because ‘it denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or expelling them’. However, 
since such vilifying depictions target unwanted white people as well, and therefore are not 
‘colour-coded’, they are ‘“xeno” in form’ – and hence should be specifically understood in 
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terms of ‘xeno-racism’ (2001, cited by Fekete, 2001, p.24). I fully recognise this argument, of 
course. I also understand, concomitantly, that describing dominant narratives that target non-
white and ‘not quite white’ migrants in terms of racism, rather than xeno-racism, might be 
viewed as problematic, since it might be seen to deny there are differences between how 
migrants of colour, and those with lighter skin, are treated.       
I do not mean to deny these differences in treatment. As I highlighted in the final 
section of Chapter One, the actual immigration controls to which migrants of colour are 
subjected have consistently been harsher and more exclusionary than those imposed on 
ostensibly white ‘unwanted’ migrants. Additionally, although I document how narratives of 
bordering often demarcate non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants as a pathological 
collective throughout this chapter, I also draw attention to the racial differentiation and 
stratification that can simultaneously be detected within these dominant representations. As 
we will see, this includes how people with darker skin have consistently been designated as 
abusive asylum cheats, whereas some groups of white ‘unwanted’ migrants have, at points, 
been elevated to the position of ‘genuine’ claimants. It also includes how black migrant men 
have been particularly prominently associated with violent and sexual offending. By framing 
the essentialising and homogenising of non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants that is 
carried out by narratives of bordering unequivocally in terms of racism, then, my aim is more 
to ensure that I do not dilute or downplay the charge that I am levelling at these dominant 
depictions. In doing so, I am following scholars like Garner who, as I have explained, 
presents derogatory narratives targeting ‘multi-racial’ migrant groups through this lens, as 
well as others who have argued for more expansive understandings of racialisation, to ensure 
that the processes at work in such depictions are not trivialised or underplayed (Schuster, 
2003a; see also McVeigh and Lentin, 2002).   
As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, the subtle and muted 
pathologisation of unwanted migrants that unfolds in the narrative of the immigration cheat 
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might be understood as a distinctly ‘post-racial’ form of racialisation. This is because its 
coded nature facilitates the denial of racism that characterises the contemporary era – but also 
because the ‘post’ in post-raciality particularly draws out the near intangibility of such 
formulations, the ‘there and yet not quite there’ quality of their racism.7 Bearing this near 
intangibility out, indeed, as I have shown, a significant body of literature has documented 
how the government and media have persistently portrayed people seeking asylum, in 
particular, as liars and cheats. Yet, this depiction has not always been clearly identified by the 
academics tracing it – often migration scholars – as racist (though for an exception see 
Schuster, 2003a). This can, undoubtedly, be situated in terms of the failure of much 
contemporary migration scholarship – like border criminology, and criminology more 
broadly – to foreground issues of race and racism (Erel, Murji and Nahaboo, 2016; Lentin, 
2014). But it is also related, I think, to the careful navigation of race that we see in the 
dominant narrative of the immigration cheat: the way that it invokes and assigns racial 
undesirability and ‘otherness’ without ever explicitly speaking its name. 
It is, additionally, important to pay attention to the various terms used to classify 
unwanted migrants, which have become closely associated with the narrative of the 
immigration cheat: as I suggested above, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘economic migrant’, ‘illegal 
immigrant’ and ‘foreign criminal’ – as well as, quite simply, ‘migrant’ and ‘immigrant’. 
Anderson has highlighted that ‘terms like “asylum seeker” are not simply descriptive of legal 
status’; rather, ‘they are value laden and negative’ (2013, p.4). Putting it more emphatically, 
Philo, Briant and Donald have suggested that ‘asylum seeker’, as well as ‘refugee’, have 
‘become generic terms for what is perceived as bad behaviour by new groups of people’ 
 
7 I recognise, of course, that by identifying a narrative that emerges in the mid-1980s as a specifically post-racial 
form of expression I might be seen to be stretching the beginnings of post-raciality somewhat; Goldberg (2015) 
suggests, for instance, that we see the emergence of the post-racial present from the late 1990s onwards. As my 
analysis indicates, however, it was really following the election of New Labour in 1997 that the narrative of the 
immigration cheat became widespread and embedded – and, therefore, recognising it as a distinctly post-racial 
depiction feels appropriate. 
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(2013, p.133); even more starkly, Arun Kundnani has argued that ‘asylum seeker’ has 
‘become little more than a term of abuse’ (2001, p.43; see also Kaye, 2001). While the 
recognition that such labels are more than technical or legal descriptions is important, I would 
suggest, however, that these analyses do not go far enough – that they do not fully capture 
what is going on here. Terms such as ‘economic migrant’, ‘illegal immigrant’ and ‘foreign 
criminal’ are not simply deprecating and derogatory. More than this, as they have been 
repeatedly tied to negative traits and essentialised deviance they have come to connote, by 
themselves, racial undesirability and ‘otherness’. In this way, then, these terms might be 
understood as now forming, on their own, a novel and euphemistic language of race – as 
having come to constitute a contemporary and covert code of racial difference and inferiority. 
Alongside its lack of overt racial reference, we might also understand the narrative of 
the abusive immigration cheat as subtle and muted in its stigmatisation of unwanted migrants 
in one further way. The idea of the fraudulent migrant, duping and deceiving the UK’s 
immigration controls and system is, as I have highlighted, very much a contemporary 
formulation, emerging from the mid-1980s onwards in response to the onset of mass 
mobility. Yet, at the same time – to borrow Eithne Luibhéid’s observation about present-day 
depictions of pregnant asylum-seeking women in Ireland – this formulation ‘did not 
materialize from thin air’ (2013, p.52). Rather, in another example of the recycling and 
repetition that characterises narratives of bordering this dominant depiction draws, I would 
suggest, on long-established ideas about the rule-breaking and criminal proclivities of 
unwanted foreigners, which have been mobilised in earlier moments to justify restricting and 
preventing their migration to the UK.  
Such ideas were deployed, for instance, in relation to Jewish refugees from Eastern 
Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century (Kushner, 2005), as well as black 
Commonwealth citizens coming to the UK following the Second World War (Schuster and 
Solomos, 2004; Solomos, 2003). As I explore later on in this chapter, ideas about the criminal 
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propensities of migrants who are unwelcome undoubtedly still exist. Yet, as I also highlight, 
in the current era they tend to be circulated most enthusiastically by certain sections of the 
media, and more explicitly right-wing (though nonetheless mainstream) politicians; they are 
relied on less centrally, I would suggest, within official government claims. We might, then, 
see the contemporary narrative of the manipulative immigration system cheat as a less 
strident reworking of the longer-standing narrative of inherent criminality – related to, but 
nonetheless sufficiently distant from this established racist trope, and thus acceptable for the 
government to routinely disseminate. 
 
Opening up the border selectively: The ‘genuine’ refugee as a narrative of limited inclusion  
I noted in the introduction to this chapter that, alongside contemporary narratives of 
bordering, the government and media also disseminate some apparently different depictions, 
in which some of those who are normally understood as ‘unwanted’ migrants are reclassified 
from bad and deviant to good and desirable – and, thus, as acceptable to be let in. A key 
example of this can be seen in relation to people seeking asylum as, alongside the dominant 
narrative of the abusive asylum cheat, the existence of some ‘genuine’ refugees has also been 
pointed to – who, it is set out, the UK should not exclude but instead actively welcome. 
Demarcating some people seeking asylum as good and desirable and letting them in has been 
integral to preserving the UK’s idea – or, perhaps, ‘myth’ (Gibson, 2007, p.160) – of itself as 
a civilised and humane country. As Sara Ahmed notes, it ‘enables the national subject to 
imagine its own generosity in welcoming some others. The nation is hospitable as it allows 
those genuine ones to stay’ (2015, p.46). And yet, even as it adheres to ideas of migrants who 
are welcome, and their inclusion, the narrative of the genuine asylum applicant functions not 
in opposition or as a challenge to the overarching regime of bordering and exclusion – but, 
rather, as an integral part of it. The insistence, always, is that genuine asylum applicants are 
small in number; in Fairer, Faster, Firmer, for instance, New Labour contrasted ‘those who 
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have fled persecution’ with the ‘large numbers of economic migrants [who] are abusing the 
system’ (Home Office, 1998, p.3; see also Sales, 2005, 2002; Kushner, 2003). Thus, the 
border is only ever to be ‘opened up very selectively’ (Yuval-Davis, Anthias and Kofman, 
2005, p.520), in an extremely narrow and limited way. The majority of unwanted migrants 
remain liars and cheats – and, therefore, the overall framework and restrictions of border 
control must be kept in place. 
The demarcation of which limited groups of people might be understood as genuine 
refugees has sometimes been carved out along gendered lines. As I documented earlier, under 
both New Labour and the current Conservative government men have often been 
characterised as fraudulent claimants. Thus, as I explained, in her 2015 party conference 
speech Theresa May insisted that the ‘young men’ who made up the majority of those who 
had managed to reach Europe during the refugee ‘crisis’ were clearly not ‘the most 
vulnerable’ (The Independent, 2015). As Marco Palillo has highlighted, we see here the 
‘feminization … of the refugee category’, as it is only the ‘passive, feminized, helpless 
subject’ (2018, pp.28–29) who is depicted as legitimately in need of protection. The 
distinction between the vast majority who are abusing the system and the small number who 
are genuine has, importantly, also been made along racial lines and involved further racial 
differentiation and stratification. As I have set out, since its emergence the narrative of the 
abusive asylum cheat has been attached both to people who are not white and those deemed 
to be ‘not quite white’. So, it has essentialised and pathologised these unwanted migrants as a 
homogenous group, whose tendency to dupe and defraud justifies their exclusion from the 
UK. Yet, when distinctions between good and bad asylum claimants have been made, 
predictably, it is often those with lighter skin who have been elevated to the position of 
genuine. 
Schuster highlights how, for instance, during a brief period in 1999 refugees from 
Kosovo were ‘welcomed in Europe’ (2003a, p.237). She contrasts their treatment with the 
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approach, a few years later, to people fleeing Zimbabwe. As she notes, then,  ‘in spite of 
discussions in the British parliament and the Commonwealth concerning the rogue 
government of Robert Mugabe and his persecution of the opposition group MDC’, it was 
only following ‘the fierce struggle of campaigning groups’ (2003a, p.237) that the UK 
government agreed to temporarily suspend deportations. More recently, during the 2015 
refugee ‘crisis’ the death of three-year-old Aylan Kurdi from Syria, whose body was washed 
ashore on a Turkish beach in September that year, prompted outraged coverage across the 
media as well as a wave of public compassion. Following this, the UK government began to 
refer to Syrian refugees as ‘genuine’ and introduced a small resettlement programme for 
them. Nadine El-Enany has drawn out the racial hierarchising that runs through the 
demarcation of people from Syria as genuine refugees. As she explains, while the image of 
Aylan Kurdi – which featured on the front pages of most UK national newspapers – was 
potent because he was so young, it was also the ‘innocence evoked by the body of a light-
skinned child’ (2016, p.13) which prompted the sympathetic response to his death.8 In 
contrast, as El-Enany observes, the thousands of people who drowned in the Mediterranean 
before him, across 2015, received very little attention: ‘The images of black African bodies 
washed up on the shores of Europe’s Mediterranean beaches … did not prompt an equivalent 
outpouring of compassion and charitable action’ (2016, p.14).  
Through such examples we see, therefore, how – even as the overt language of race 
does not appear in contemporary narratives of bordering – somatic difference nonetheless 
matters in their racialisation of unwanted migrants. Those who are, without fail, marked out 
as ‘fake’ asylum seekers, and thus as inherently fraudulent and deviant, are always people 
with darker skin. Indeed, in the more recent media mobilisations of the narrative of the 
 
8 The identification of people from Syria in this way highlights, of course, the ‘motility and contingency of 
racial categories’ (Anderson, 2013, p.37). Although people from Syria are often understood – in contrast with 
white people in Europe, for instance – as having darker skin, in this instance, they were interpreted as having a 
lighter pigmentation, compared with the darker skin of people forced to flee countries in Africa.   
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immigration cheat, during the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’, coverage of the ‘economic migrants’ and 
‘illegal immigrants’ trying to ‘sneak’ into the UK was often accompanied by images of young 
men in the ‘Jungle’9 camp at Calais, most of whom had black or brown skin (Bhatia, 2018). 
Although this demonising narrative has been attached to non-white and ‘not quite white’ 
migrants, then, and has essentialised and pathologised them as a homogenous group, there is, 
simultaneously, further racial work being done by the use of such images. As these pictures 
have routinely been included alongside media reports, the duping and cheating of 
immigration controls has, more recently, come to be strongly associated with people who 
have darker skin. 
 
‘Gold-diggers searching for an easy life’: The narrative of the parasitical scrounger 
The second narrative of bordering that I trace in this chapter very much connects to the first, 
as it explains why unwanted migrants come to the UK in the first place and want to secure the 
right to stay. Bringing the poverty of people coming from the Global South and Southern and 
Eastern Europe to the fore, it transforms this actual economic disadvantage into a much more 
stigmatising, and racialising, form. Thus, it essentialises and homogenises the unwanted 
migrants it targets as parasitical scroungers who make their way to the UK to grab hold of all 
the money and wealth ‘we’ have. That is, it pathologises them as inherently greedy and lazy 
spongers, who come here to enjoy an ‘easy’ life by exploiting the welfare benefits system, as 
well as by ‘milking’ other public services such as the NHS. 
Whereas the dominant narrative of the immigration cheat is, as I suggested in the 
previous section, very much a contemporary formulation – albeit one that draws on and 
reworks longer-standing ideas about unwanted migrants’ rule-breaking and criminal 
 
9 As Bhatia explains, although this term was initially used by the people living in the camp to highlight the 
‘squalid living conditions, powerlessness and limbo’ there, it was subsequently co-opted by the tabloid media, 
which ‘turned the “jungle” into a powerful metaphor loaded with hyper-racist, criminalised and other negative 
connotations’ (2018, p.190). 
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proclivities – the narrative of the parasitical scrounger goes back a long way. I highlighted in 
Chapter One that, prior to the introduction of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, non-
white migration to the UK was repeatedly problematised by politicians and the media. In fact, 
one of the key charges levelled at black Commonwealth citizens in the years preceding this 
legislation was their supposedly workshy nature and alleged appetite for unemployment 
support. Solomos quotes The Times in 1958, for example, as stating that the ‘causes of 
resentment against coloured inhabitants’ include that ‘they are alleged to do no work and to 
collect a rich sum from the Assistance Board’ (2003, p.55). Similarly, Dilip Hiro points to a 
commonplace view during the 1950s of West Indian migrants as ‘indolent blacks’, living off 
unemployment support, and quotes a Home Office Minister during this period as saying, 
‘They come in by air and at once begin to draw National Assistance’ (1992, p.36).  
In later decades, indeed, the idea of black people as inherently lazy and needy 
continued to be mobilised in the UK, though now in relation to black British communities. 
Writing in the mid-1980s, Bryan, Dadzie and Scafe highlighted how the relationship of black 
British women, in particular, with the welfare state was often portrayed as ‘parasitic. We are 
described by the media as “scroungers” and depicted as having a child-like dependence upon 
a benevolent caring (white) society’ (1985, p.111). Thus, while the figure of the ‘scrounger’ 
has long been deployed to vilify the working class (Hall et al., 2013; Hall and O’Shea, 2013; 
Tyler, 2013), it is important to recognise that the idea of natural indolence, and parasitical 
tendencies, has a significant history as a racialising trope, as well (see also Holzberg, Kolbe 
and Zaborowski, 2018). In its contemporary incarnation, however, inherent laziness and 
freeloading greed is never assigned to migrants who are unwelcome through explicit racial 
reference. Rather, this deviance is attributed to them through a range of more muted, ‘post-
racial’ registers. 
Since the onset of mass mobility, the narrative of unwanted migrants as parasitical 
scroungers has been prominently attached – like the narrative of the abusive immigration 
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cheat – to people seeking asylum. In portraying them like this successive governments and 
the media have built on the idea, highlighted in the previous section, that the majority of 
those seeking protection in the UK are actually ‘economic migrants’ – which, as I have 
explained, supports the racialising claim that most asylum applicants are liars who are 
defrauding the system. In the narrative of the scrounger, however, ‘economic migration’ and 
the desire for a more prosperous life have been cast, in themselves, in a more stigmatising 
way. So, it is insisted that large numbers of asylum seekers are coming to the UK in order to 
take advantage of, and lazily live off, ‘our’ welfare benefits system. Thus, from the late 1980s 
onwards the Conservative government, and subsequently New Labour, repeatedly mobilised 
the idea of fraudulent asylum applicants coming here ‘for the sake of the benefits they might 
enjoy’ (Schuster, 2003b, p.148; see also Bloch and Schuster, 2002). The media also 
consistently portrayed asylum claimants like this, referring to them as ‘scroungers’ and 
‘parasites’ who were ‘creaming off’ the benefits system (Moore, 2013; Philo, Briant and 
Donald, 2013; Matthews and Brown, 2012; Bloch and Schuster, 2002; Coole, 2002; Kaye, 
2001).  
In their analysis of media responses to the arrival in October 1997 of a relatively 
small number of Roma asylum seekers from the Czech Republic in the UK, Colin Clark and 
Elaine Campbell document some additional terms and phrases used to insist on asylum 
applicants’ freeloading, money-grabbing propensities. These included ‘gold-diggers 
searching for an easy life’, as well as ‘loose-fingered marauders’ (2000, pp.32, 40; see also 
Guy, 2003). More recently, in response to the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’ the same ideas were, 
predictably, re-deployed. Media coverage repeatedly presented people forced to flee countries 
in the Global South as attempting the perilous journey to the UK solely for the sake of 
‘welfare handouts’ and ‘lavish benefits’ (Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore, 2015, pp.40, 47).  
In this iteration, then, the narrative of the parasitical scrounger racialises in exactly the 
same way as that of the abusive immigration cheat. That is, there is no reference to the 
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physical appearance of those targeted; nor, indeed, are they problematised through appeals to 
‘culture’ which, as I have highlighted, is a more subtle racial code that has often been used to 
essentialise and homogenise groups deemed as ‘other’ in the contemporary period. Yet, as it 
insists that they are coming here to enjoy an easy life and to exploit the welfare benefits 
system, the narrative of the scrounger portrays all people seeking asylum as inherently lazy 
and greedy. In this way, therefore, it ‘instigates “group-ness”, and ascribes characteristics’ 
(Garner and Selod, 2015, p.14); it transforms the diverse group of people designated as 
‘asylum seekers’ into a homogenous bloc, with negative qualities and traits. Consequently, 
through this race-making process, ‘asylum seekers’ are disparaged and pathologised en masse 
– and, in this way, the narrative of the parasitical scrounger works to legitimise their 
exclusion from the UK. 
We see the same, more ‘abstract’ (Garner, 2013, p.504) process of race-making, or 
racialisation, indeed, in contemporary media depictions that refer not only to people seeking 
asylum but ‘migrants’ and ‘immigrants’ more broadly as collectively ‘taking advantage of’ or 
‘milking’ the benefits system. In such reporting, the ‘migrants’ and ‘immigrants’ who are 
essentialised and homogenised in this way are almost always identified as coming from 
countries in the Global South and Southern and Eastern Europe (see, for instance, Dawar, 
2015; Barrett and Goldhill, 2013; Doyle, 2013). Alongside this homogenising of non-white 
and ‘not quite white’ migrants, however, in some of the more recent mobilisations of this 
narrative the figure of the welfare scrounger has, at points, been particularly associated with 
those who are Eastern European. Thus, since the enlargement of the EU in 2004, there has 
been a recurring concern around the supposed issue of Eastern European ‘benefit tourism’. 
Taulant Guma and Rhys Dafydd Jones (2019) point to media coverage in March 2011, for 
instance, on the imminent end of the Worker Registration Scheme, which meant that 
nationals of the ‘A8’ states became entitled to access welfare benefits without any 
restrictions. In this coverage it was insisted that there were ‘New Eastern European “benefit 
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tourism” fears … because the government is being forced to scrap safeguards on receiving 
handouts’. In fact, the government appeared to endorse such ‘fears’ as the Department for 
Work and Pensions was quoted as saying, ‘It is absolutely necessary to protect the taxpayer 
and the benefit system from possible abuse’ (Hough and Whitehead, 2011; see also Doyle, 
2011; Ford, 2011a; Hall, 2011). More recently, during the 2016 Brexit referendum campaign, 
which was fought overwhelmingly on the issue of immigration, media coverage repeatedly 
claimed that people from Eastern Europe were coming to the UK to exploit the benefits 
system, and often designated them specifically as ‘benefit tourists’ (Moore and Ramsay, 
2017). 
In the portrayal of people from Eastern Europe as benefit scroungers and welfare 
cheats, we see the mobilisation of this narrative of bordering through different racial 
registers. Some media depictions, for instance, have framed Eastern Europeans’ supposedly 
parasitical tendencies specifically in terms of cultural difference (Fox, Moroşanu and 
Szilassy, 2012) – a register which, as I have explained, is now well-recognised as a code for 
race. At points, this dominant narrative has also operated through a form of racialised 
expression that has, perhaps, been less well documented: the language of nationality. In her 
research on Operation Nexus and the police’s increasing involvement in immigration 
enforcement, which I highlighted in Chapter One, Parmar (2016a) draws attention to the use 
of this language by the police officers she observed, noting that they never used ‘explicitly 
racist terminology’ when talking about non-UK nationals brought into custody. Rather, she 
describes how the police talked about groups in ‘stereotyped, homogenized ways’ through 
their nationality. So, Parmar explains: ‘I overheard “Afghans”, or “Eritreans” being talked 
about as “likely to be genuinely seeking asylum” whereas “Albanians” were usually “caught 
up in something criminal”.’ As she puts it, therefore, ‘nationality was coopted as a safe mode 
of expression … This way of talking about groups – as engaged in types of behaviour through 
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their nationality in a racialized way, was somehow acceptable, discussed openly and 
presumably not regarded as racist’ (see also Parmar, 2018a).  
The deployment of this ‘safe mode of expression’ – which, as I noted at the beginning 
of this chapter, Parmar also suggests might be seen as ‘a continuation of raciological 
articulation in post-racial times’ (2016a) – can be traced in some of the media coverage of 
Eastern Europeans as exploiters of the benefits system. At the end of 2013, for instance, as 
the end of transitional controls on nationals of the ‘A2’ states, Romania and Bulgaria, 
approached, a flurry of articles reported on how people from these countries were planning to 
come to the UK to live off benefits. In these articles, the alleged scrounging behaviour of 
these migrants was often presented through the apparently innocent register of nationality. On 
31st December, for example, the day before the transitional controls came to an end, The 
Sun’s front page carried a picture of people in Romania boarding a UK-bound coach, under 
the headline ‘Cheeky beggars’. The racialisation of these migrants through the language of 
nationality emerged clearly as the report went on to set out, ‘The first coachload of Romanian 
migrants left for the UK yesterday – with some boasting of plans to beg and steal from 
‘“generous” Brits’ (Flynn, 2013, p.1). Similarly, the paper’s editorial for the same day opened 
with alleged quotations from those travelling on the coach – ‘“I want to go to Britain to beg.” 
“I don’t like work.” “We’ll steal scrap metal and claim benefits”’ – before it was then 
explained: ‘These are Romanians on a bus from Transylvania, en route to London, free to 
make their lives here from midnight tonight … These newcomers aim to fleece “rich” Brits 
and abuse a benefits system that has so far escaped lightly from the demands of EU migrants’ 
(The Sun, 2013, p.6). 
As well as casting them as exploiters of the benefits system, the narrative of the 
parasitical scrounger has also insisted that migrants who are unwanted come to the UK to 
greedily ‘milk’ other public services and resources. In recent years, there has been a clear 
focus on the alleged abuse of the NHS. Like the claim of benefit scrounging, this accusation 
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goes back, in fact, over decades. Paul Gordon (1983a) has highlighted how, during the 1950s 
and 60s, non-white Commonwealth citizens were marked out by overtly racist political and 
media depictions as unsanitary and bringers of disease. As he explains, it was argued that as a 
result of this they would act as a significant ‘drain’ or ‘burden’ on the UK’s health services. 
In contemporary portrayals a similar idea has been circulated, though, of course, in more 
racially coded ways. In their analysis of press coverage of the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’, for 
example, Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore point to an article which appeared in the Daily 
Mail under the headline ‘Immigrants, HIV and the true cost to the NHS’ (2015, p.40). The 
article set out that more than 60% of the 7,000 new HIV cases diagnosed in the UK each year 
were among people who were ‘born abroad’, and listed those represented within this as 
coming from countries including Russia, Brazil and Romania, as well as ‘particularly from 
Africa’. It then assigned freeloading tendencies to these ‘migrants’ and ‘asylum seekers’, 
insisting that they were ‘specifically target[ing] Britain’ as ‘health tourists’, in order to 
‘guarantee themselves a lifetime of free drugs and medical care, courtesy of the NHS’ (2015, 
p.40; see also Guma and Jones, 2019; Philo, Briant and Donald, 2013; Hayes, 2002). 
Once more, therefore, as it is asserted that people from countries in the Global South 
and Southern and Eastern Europe are collectively taking advantage of and exploiting the 
UK’s health services, we see the more ‘abstract’ process of racialisation that I have 
documented across this chapter playing out. Through such depictions, non-white and ‘not 
quite white’ ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘migrants’ are essentialised and pathologised as a group of 
naturally deviant scammers and scroungers; they are constituted through the category of race, 
as they are produced as ‘a homogenous mass with specific characteristics’ (Garner, 2017, 
p.213). At the same time, however, there also appears to be some hierarchising within such 
portrayals: it is notable, I think, that in the Daily Mail article new HIV diagnoses in the UK 
were identified as being among migrants ‘particularly from Africa’. We see here, then, 
another example of how – even as they do not categorise racially through reference to 
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physical appearance – phenotypic difference nonetheless matters in narratives of bordering. 
Some of the earlier, explicitly racist narratives to which I referred above seemed to be alluded 
to and evoked as people with darker skin were more clearly demarcated as the ‘foreign’ 
carriers of ill-health and disease. 
Some of the features that I suggested in Chapter One make understanding dominant 
depictions of unwanted migrants as narratives particularly fitting are evident in the portrayal 
of them as parasitical scroungers. Most noticeably, perhaps, sheer invention and fabrication 
run through these claims. For instance, against the assertion that many people come here and 
make asylum claims specifically to access the benefits system, research indicates that most 
asylum applicants are in fact unaware of welfare support before they arrive in the UK 
(Refugee Council, 2010). We might also note how, since 1999, those going through the 
asylum process have not actually been allowed to access the mainstream welfare support 
system at all (Gower, 2015). Rather, they have to apply to the Home Office for financial 
assistance. If their application is successful, they are given £37.75 a week (Home Office, 
2019a), which is under half the amount provided to those in receipt of mainstream benefits 
(DWP, 2019) – a far cry, then, from the ‘welfare handouts’ that it has been insisted fraudulent 
asylum applicants are accessing.  
Research has also highlighted that even when asylum claimants are granted refugee 
status, and so technically become eligible to access the mainstream benefits system, a number 
of barriers make it difficult for them to do this – and, therefore, they often become homeless 
and destitute as a result (British Red Cross, 2018; Refugee Council, 2014). Moreover, against 
the recent identification of people from Eastern Europe, in particular, as ‘benefit tourists’, 
research has actually shown that the vast majority of these migrants are in work (Migration 
Observatory, 2014). At times, the concoction that runs through the narrative of the scrounger 
is accompanied by – or, perhaps, is the cause of – a complete lack of logic. Alongside the 
accusation that people from the Global South and Southern and Eastern Europe are coming to 
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the UK to enjoy an easy life and live off ‘our’ benefits system, there is often the simultaneous 
claim, in direct contradiction of this, that they also want to steal ‘our’ jobs (Rzepnikowska, 
2019; Moore and Ramsay, 2017; Philo, Briant and Donald, 2013; Garner, 2007a). 
We might also point to the fictitious, fabricated nature of the dominant narrative of 
the parasitical scrounger – and, indeed, the other racialised narratives of bordering that I trace 
in this chapter – in one further way. Critics have noted how, since 9/11 and the beginnings of 
the ‘War on Terror’, the racialised idea of an intrinsically primitive and violent Muslim 
culture has frequently been mobilised to mask the social and political causes of situations and 
events. So, for instance, Kundnani highlights how violence and conflict in the Middle East 
have often been explained as the result of an inherent Muslim rage and bloodthirstiness, 
rather than in terms of their ‘political origins’ (2014, p.58), including the neo-imperial agenda 
of the United States and its allies. Similarly, Lentin and Titley (2011) have documented how 
‘race riots’ in Europe – such as in Bradford in 2003, and in Paris in 2005 – have been framed 
as the actions of a naturally antagonistic Muslim youth, rather than as a response to and 
protest against the anti-Muslim racism that pervades Western societies. We can see a similar 
pattern of concealment playing out, I would suggest – a similar obfuscation of problematic 
societal and structural conditions by ideas of individual pathology and deficiency – through 
the deployment of racialised narratives of bordering.  
Thus, for example, as migrants who are unwelcome are essentialised and pathologised 
as freeloading spongers, the significant wealth disparities that actually exist between Western 
and non-Western countries are pushed firmly out of view. The structural condition of poverty 
and economic disadvantage becomes instead a matter of intrinsic greediness and selfishness – 
of unwanted migrants’ natural badness and deviancy. Indeed, portraying people from 
countries that were formerly colonised by Britain, in particular, as inherently grasping and 
parasitical functions not only to erase the material reality of their economic disadvantage – 
but, in fact, to cover up the historical and political reasons for this disadvantage. That is, this 
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pathologising depiction works to obscure how the British Empire stripped the countries that it 
colonised of wealth and resources, and so how colonialism was a key cause of their now 
impoverished state.  
As I highlighted earlier in the chapter, the idea of the innate deceitfulness of the 
majority of asylum claimants has been evidenced in part by the UK government by pointing 
to the high proportion of asylum applications that are rejected. Yet, the narrative of the 
inherently scheming and manipulative immigration fraudster conceals how the UK’s racist 
immigration system itself creates and produces asylum ‘cheats’, as it deliberately refuses to 
recognise as legitimate all but a minority of claims. Similarly, the erasing and invisibilising 
capabilities of racialised narratives of bordering can be traced in the narratives that I to map 
in the final section of this chapter, too. The well-established narrative of unwanted migrants’ 
criminality, for instance, obscures the social, economic and political conditions that 
contribute to their criminalisation – including the racism and wealth inequality of UK society 
broadly, as well as the institutionalised discrimination of the criminal justice system – and 
replaces these with an explanation of inherent ‘otherness’ and undesirability (see also 
Aliverti, 2018b).    
 
Making unwanted migrants desirable through class: Opening up the border to the ‘brightest 
and the best’ and those who ‘work hard and contribute to the UK’ 
There also exist contemporary representations that separate some unwanted migrants from 
the dominant narrative of the parasitical scrounger and demarcate them as acceptable to be let 
in. As with the depiction of the genuine asylum seeker, however, these are narratives of 
limited inclusion, which only permit the relaxation of the border in a very restricted way. One 
of the key narratives disseminated by successive governments in this area has accompanied 
the development of policies of ‘managed migration’, which I highlighted in Chapter One. 
Thus, it is set out in this depiction that while the vast majority of unwanted migrants want to 
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come to the UK to exploit and lazily live off ‘our’ public services and resources, a minority 
actually has something to offer ‘us’ – and these migrants, who are ‘the brightest and the best’ 
(Anderson, 2013, p.58; see also Home Office, 2018; The Independent, 2015; The Guardian, 
2011), should always be welcomed and allowed in. In this elitist formulation, then, we see a 
clear example of how, as Goldberg explains, for those ‘forced to bear [the] load’ of race 
‘class standing mitigates and mediates the load, to be sure’ (2015, p.76). Being rich and 
highly skilled effectively lifts migrants who would normally be deemed as inherently deviant 
and thus unwanted out of race; economic and class status elevates them from the confines 
and exclusions of racial undesirability.10 
Alongside this, successive governments have also marked out those who ‘work hard’, 
‘pay taxes’ and ‘contribute to the UK’ (Home Office, 2011, 2005, 2002) as another group to 
whom the border can be opened up. In one sense, this is a straightforward inversion of the 
narrative of the lazy, selfish scrounger. It marks out some unwanted migrants as good and 
desirable by emphasising that they are the exact opposite of freeloaders and spongers; so, it 
frees them of these negative traits and characteristics, it de-racialises and de-stigmatises them. 
At the same time, however, there is something else going on here, too. Although terms such 
as ‘hard-working’ and ‘tax-paying’ undoubtedly encompass people who are not economically 
well off, a classed distinction nevertheless runs through them. Those who are identified in 
this way may not be rich, but they are also clearly differentiated from the group at the very 
bottom of the class ladder – the non-working poor, or ‘underclass’. In this way, the 
demarcation of some unwanted migrants as acceptable because they ‘work hard’ and ‘pay 
taxes’ can be understood in terms of the intersection between class and race, as well. That is 
 
10 Connecting back to the discussion in Chapter One about how government and media narratives on 
immigration have come to shape and organise the public consciousness, research has demonstrated greater 
levels of public support for migrants who would normally be deemed ‘unwanted’ when they are highly skilled. 
For instance, the proportion of British respondents to the 2014 European Social Survey who agreed that ‘many’ 
unskilled labourers from India, and Poland, should be allowed into the UK was just 8% and 9% respectively. 
When respondents were asked about professionals from India and Poland, however, these percentages rose to 
20% and 21% (Migration Observatory, 2020).   
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just as in the narrative of ‘the brightest and the best’, economic and class standing is here 
mediating, and mitigating, racial ‘otherness’ and inferiority.  
Some migrants’ rights groups have, at points, tried to repurpose this narrative of 
limited inclusion in a more egalitarian and expansive manner. A poster campaign in the run-
up to the 2015 General Election, for instance, which featured people who had migrated to the 
UK alongside their job titles, emphasised that it wanted to demonstrate how ‘all immigrants 
… add value to this country’ (JCWI and MAX, 2015). Yet, the narrative of ‘hard work’ and 
‘contribution’ is, by its nature, selective and restrictive (de Noronha, 2018a). Only those who 
are deemed economically active and productive – who have attained a certain economic and 
class status – are marked out as worthy of inclusion in the UK. 
 
Narratives of immediate danger and threat: The criminal, the terrorist and the sexual 
predator 
In the final section of this chapter, I turn to some dominant narratives that present unwanted 
migrants as constituting a more immediate and overt threat. The first of the narratives that I 
trace in this area focuses on the idea of their particularly criminal proclivities. Like the 
narrative of the parasitical scrounger, this has a long history. As I explained earlier, claims of 
a propensity for criminality were attached to Jewish refugees coming from Eastern Europe at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, and to black Commonwealth citizens arriving in the 
UK following the Second World War. Unlike the narrative of the scrounger, however, in the 
present era the idea of migrants who are unwelcome as having an inherent disposition for 
crime has tended to feature less centrally within the government’s official claims – because, I 
would suggest, it is now more readily recognised as a racist trope.  
As I documented earlier in this chapter, ‘foreign criminals’ have been persistently 
demonised in government depictions as naturally abusive immigration cheats, who attempt to 
‘dodge deportation’ and frustrate the border control system. In some official portrayals, they 
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have been hinted at as intrinsically dangerous law-breakers, too, as they have been associated 
with more serious forms of offending and framed as a public protection concern (de Noronha, 
2018b; Bhui, 2007). Yet, it is noticeable that in the current period the government has not 
really assigned criminal propensities to unwanted migrants beyond this specific group. 
Conversely, certain sections of the media, as well as more right-wing – though still 
mainstream – politicians have not only insisted on the deep-rooted deviance of ‘foreign 
criminals’: they have also repeatedly portrayed unwanted migrants more broadly as 
inherently inclined towards crime. As they have done this, however, they have disseminated 
the narrative of intrinsic criminality through some of the ‘post-racial’ registers already traced 
in this chapter. Thus, these media and political depictions have worked to subdue and 
obfuscate the racism of this narrative – meaning that any accusations to this effect can be 
more easily dismissed. 
Across contemporary media depictions of unwanted migrants as inherently deviant in 
this way, the more abstract process of racialisation that I have documented throughout this 
chapter can be detected. In these depictions, then, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘migrants’ and 
‘immigrants’ have been constructed as a ‘bounded entity … with similar pathological 
characteristics and behaviours’ (Garner, 2013, pp.507–508); that is, they have been 
essentialised and homogenised as a mass of natural-born criminals. Press coverage of asylum 
issues during the early 2000s, for example, included headlines such as ‘Asylum: Tidal wave 
of crime’, ‘Asylum gangs “are to blame for a new era of crime”’ and ‘Brutal crimes of the 
asylum seekers’ (Greenslade, 2005; see also Kundnani, 2001). Such a portrayal also ran 
through much of the more recent reporting on the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’. The ‘asylum seekers’, 
‘economic migrants’ and ‘illegal immigrants’ living in the ‘Jungle’ camp in Calais, in 
particular, were frequently depicted as breaking the law, and were presented as especially 
prone to theft and violence (Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore, 2015).  
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More broadly, media reporting on ‘foreign crime’ in the UK has also often suggested 
that ‘migrants’ and ‘immigrants’ – who are almost always marked out as coming from 
countries in the Global South and Southern and Eastern Europe – are a group with a 
propensity for behaving in this way. In the search of national newspapers that I conducted, 
for instance, covering the period 6th July 2012 to 6th July 2014, a number of articles presented 
them like this. On 19th July 2012, for example, The Sun, The Telegraph and the Daily Mail 
ran reports under the following headlines: ‘1-in-5 rape and murder suspects are migrants’ 
(Parry, 2012, p.17); ‘A fifth of murder and rape suspects are immigrants’ (Alleyne, 2012); 
‘Nearly a fifth of all suspected rapists and murderers arrested last year were immigrants’ 
(Robinson, 2012). The countries of origin for these ‘rape and murder suspects’ were 
identified as including Afghanistan, Angola, Chile, Ghana, Macedonia,11 Russia and 
Zimbabwe; at no point was it clarified in any of the articles that being arrested for or charged 
with an offence did not equate to a determination of guilt. Rather, it was insisted that the 
figures showed how ‘serious and dangerous criminals’ (Parry, 2012, p.17) were routinely 
being let into the country. Thus, police statistics were misleadingly deployed to insist that 
non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants are responsible for a significant number of crimes in 
the UK – and, therefore, that their offending is particularly prolific, that they have a 
predisposition towards behaving in this way.12 We see once more, then, how, as Garner puts 
it, ‘“[r]ace” can thus be made, through racialisation, without a stable phenotypically defined 
object’ (2013, p.507), as through such reporting on ‘migrants’ and ’immigrants’, ‘a collective 
with shared characteristics emerges’ (2013, p.507). 
 
11 In 2019 the Republic of Macedonia officially changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia. 
12 Against such depictions of inherent criminality, it is worth pointing to empirical research that refutes this 
claim. In the UK context, for instance, Hindpal Singh Bhui notes that ‘in April 2008, the Association of Chief 
Police Officers … announced that an internal study had found no evidence of higher levels of offending by 
migrant communities’ (2009, p.158). In the US context, Ousey and Kubrin conclude that their review of studies 
carried out between 1994-2014 ‘call[s] into question those theories that advance a strong positive relationship 
between immigration and crime. Clearly, our findings do not support this body of theories’ (2018, p.77). They 
also note that the studies they review offer ‘some support’ for the thesis that immigration may be one of the 
factors that has contributed to the drop in crime in the US – although, as they emphasise, ‘much more research is 
needed to reach a definitive conclusion’ (2018, p.80).       
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 Even as media reports have portrayed non-white and ‘not quite white’ ‘asylum 
seekers’ and ‘migrants’ as a mass of inherently criminal undesirables, however –  and so have 
‘categorized them as an undifferentiated and racialized Other’ (Hubbard, 2005, p.63) –  
particular associations, and stratifications, simultaneously run through these depictions. I 
noted earlier that, in the coverage of the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’, articles on the camp in Calais 
were often accompanied by visual images of the ‘asylum seekers’, ‘economic migrants’ and 
‘illegal immigrants’ living there, most of whom were young men with black or brown skin. 
As Monish Bhatia (2018) has highlighted, indeed, such images were used repeatedly in media 
reporting on ‘clashes’ between the camp’s residents and French law enforcement, which 
typically overlooked the violence being inflicted by the police and focused instead on the 
allegedly criminal behaviour of the migrant men. Bhatia points, for instance, to an online 
article in the Daily Mail headlined ‘The Battle of Calais’ which, as it emphasised how 
‘migrants’ had attacked the police with ‘missiles’ and ‘objects’, was accompanied by over 20 
images of the ‘battle’, including numerous pictures of groups of young black men. Such 
images evoke, of course, the explicitly racist narratives about ‘black youth’, criminality and 
rioting that became particularly prominent during the 1970s and 80s (Connell, 2012; Gilroy, 
1987). Consequently, a specific association between violent disorder and darker skin is re-
articulated through this contemporary coverage, even as the reports themselves avoid 
obviously racial terminology and do not categorise the unwanted migrants they depict in this 
way. Again, therefore, it becomes clear how phenotypic difference matters in narratives of 
bordering – even as the overt language of race does not appear in them.13 
 
13 It is important to emphasise that fabrication and invention – which, I have suggested, make the use of the term 
‘narrative’ for present-day portrayals of unwanted migrants particularly fitting – run through the media 
depiction of the Calais camp’s residents’ violence towards the police. As Bhatia (2018) highlights, media reports 
downplayed the violence being inflicted on those living in the camp by the French authorities, as police 
harassment and abuse was rarely reported on. Thus, as in the example of ‘The Battle of Calais’ article, resistance 
to state violence by the camp’s residents comes to be presented in a quite different way; that is, as a matter of 
intrinsically deviant and violent migrants attacking the unsuspecting and well-meaning police. What we see in 
this contemporary depiction mirrors, of course, the process that played out in the earlier, explicitly racist 
portrayals also mentioned in my analysis, focused on ‘black youth’, criminality and rioting. As Gilroy has set 
out, during the 1970s and 80s the wider political context was repeatedly ignored in official and media 
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The narrative of intrinsic criminality has also been disseminated through the register 
of nationality – and, in fact, some particularly clear examples of this emerged during the 2016 
Brexit referendum campaign which, as I explained earlier, was fought overwhelmingly on the 
issue of immigration. A month before the referendum vote, for example, Vote Leave, the 
official campaign for leaving the EU, issued a statement which pointed to high rates of crime 
in Turkey. It warned that if the UK remained an EU member state and Turkey subsequently 
joined the EU, ‘the government will not be able to exclude Turkish criminals from entering 
the UK’ (Boffey and Helm, 2016). This was not an official government position, of course. 
Yet, Vote Leave was being fronted by several Conservative government ministers, including 
Michael Gove and Chris Grayling, as well as prominent Conservative backbench MPs such 
as Boris Johnson – who, in July 2019, became the British Prime Minister. Thus, the racialised 
claim of an apparent Turkish inclination for criminality can be understood as endorsed by a 
number of mainstream political figures.  
A few weeks prior to this, in fact, Vote Leave had made the same suggestion in 
relation to people from another EU candidate country, Albania. In an article for the Daily 
Mail that was published under the headline ‘Think the EU’s bad now? Wait until Albania 
joins’, Michael Gove implied that Albanians have a particular propensity for criminal 
behaviour as he pointed to their apparently disproportionate presence in ‘our’ prisons. He 
wrote: ‘As Justice Secretary, I am well aware that there are around 10,000 foreign criminals 
in our jails – and one in 20 of those is Albanian. Of all the prisoners in our jails who come 
from European countries, 10 per cent come from Albania – yet Albania comprises less than 
half of one per cent of the overall population of Europe’ (Gove, 2016). We can see here how, 
 
explanations of ‘confrontations’ between black communities and the police. The focus, instead, was on ‘crime 
rather than politics as the motivation’ (1987, p.119) – and, in this way, black political organisation and protest 
against the institutional racism of the police was transformed into a matter of an inherent disorderliness and 
violence. The type of fabrication and distortion I am tracing here, then, is that which I identified as running 
through narratives of bordering at the end of the previous section: that is, the erasure of problematic societal and 
structural conditions and their replacement by ideas of individual pathology and deficiency. I trace further 
examples of such societal and structural erasure as I continue with this section. 
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as I suggested in the previous section, the narrative of inherent criminality works to conceal 
the structural causes of unwanted migrants’ criminalisation – and, in this instance, apparent 
over-representation in the criminal justice system. As the idea of an intrinsic Albanian 
‘otherness’ and deficiency is mobilised, social, economic and political factors such as the 
wealth inequality and racism that structure UK society broadly, as well as the institutionalised 
discrimination of the criminal justice system, are pushed firmly out of view. 
Racialisation through the ‘safe mode of expression’ (Parmar, 2016a) of nationality 
can also be traced in media reporting on individual ‘foreign criminals’. Across the articles on 
individual non-citizens convicted of offences that I identified, for instance, in the search of 
national newspapers I conducted, the nationality of the person being reported on was often 
marked out in the headline, alongside the ‘type’ of offender they were. So, for instance: 
‘Romanian fraudster’ (Brown, 2012); ‘Iranian thug’ (Young, 2013); ‘Jamaican crack dealer’ 
(Cooper, 2014). In this way, the person being reported on was constructed as if the offence 
for which they had been convicted was integral to them – and this intrinsic deviance was 
framed through their nationality.  
The idea of certain nationalities as having proclivities for specific types of criminal 
behaviour also appeared to play out across the reports. Resonating with their racialisation as 
benefits scroungers through the language of nationality, which I examined in the previous 
section, articles on people from Romania, for example – which included men and women – 
tended to concentrate on individuals convicted of money and theft-related offences, including 
cashpoint theft, pick-pocketing and large-scale benefit fraud (see also Fox, Moroşanu and 
Szilassy, 2012; Light and Young, 2009). Articles on people from Jamaica, on the other hand, 
which focused exclusively on men, centred on individuals convicted of drug-related crimes, 
as well as violent offences, including murder. This was also the case, indeed, for men from 
the Caribbean more broadly, as well as for those from countries in Africa. Thus, as many of 
these reports were accompanied by pictures of the ‘foreign criminals’ on whom they were 
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reporting, they also evoked explicitly racist narratives about black men as drug dealers and 
violent offenders (Wilcox, 2005; Bowling and Phillips, 2002; Cashmore and McLaughlin, 
1991). Just as with the media coverage of the refugee ‘crisis’ and Calais, therefore, we see 
again how narratives of bordering avoid overtly racial terminology and categorisation – and 
yet, through such accompanying images, they still manage to articulate a link between 
‘serious’ criminality and somatic difference. 
Alongside the dominant narrative of a propensity for criminality, unwanted migrants 
have been framed as an immediate danger in other ways. Critics have highlighted how, for 
instance, post 9/11, ‘asylum seekers’ began to be essentialised and homogenised not simply 
as criminals, but as terrorists, too (Back, 2007; Sales, 2005; Yuval-Davis, Anthias and 
Kofman, 2005). More recently, during the refugee ‘crisis’ in 2015, this narrative was injected 
with a fresh lease of life. Following the attacks in Paris in November that year, it was alleged 
that a Syrian passport had been found in the vicinity of the bombings at the Stade de France. 
It later transpired, in fact, that the passport was fake (BBC News, 2016b). Yet, by this point, a 
link had already been made; and ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘migrants’, often identified specifically 
as ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’, were subsequently accused by media coverage of being terrorists in 
disguise and conflated with the figure of the culturally backward and violent Islamic 
extremist (De Genova, 2018; Holmes and Castañeda, 2016). 
The other narrative of overt threat that is prominent in the current era draws on the 
depictions of intrinsic criminality I documented above, but insists that migrants who are 
unwelcome are particularly prone to a specific form of criminal behaviour: sexual offending. 
This racialised depiction – like the idea of unwanted migrants’ disposition for criminality 
more broadly – goes back a long way. In the overtly racist anti-immigration narratives of the 
past, the idea of black men as having a propensity for vice offences, for instance, was 
common. Paul Gilroy has highlighted how, during the 1940s and 50s, ‘reports of black pimps 
living off the immoral earnings of white women’ (1987, p.95) not only appeared in the press 
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but were also disseminated by senior members of the government, including the Home 
Secretary. Later, notions of an abnormal black male sexuality continued to be mobilised, 
including in relation to black British men. As critics have noted, the media has repeatedly 
depicted black men as inherently sexually threatening and violent (Kalunta‐Crumpton, 2000; 
Grover and Soothill, 1996).  
In contemporary narratives of bordering, the racialised trope of innate sexual deviance 
has continued to be circulated – but, of course, in less overtly racist ways. Since the 
beginnings of mass mobility, therefore, ‘asylum seekers’ have been essentialised and 
homogenised as a group with lascivious and hypersexual tendencies, as they have often been 
described as ‘sexual predators’ and ‘rape beasts’ (Philo, Briant and Donald, 2013; Tyler, 
2013; MRCF, 2011). This more abstract process of racialisation can be detected, too, in 
coverage concerned with ‘migrants’ and ‘immigrants’. I highlighted earlier that, in the media 
search on ‘foreign crime’ that I conducted, articles on individual non-citizens convicted of 
offences focused almost entirely on men originally from countries in the Global South and 
Southern and Eastern Europe. Across this coverage, such ‘migrants’ and ‘immigrants’ were 
often suggested as a pathological collective with sexually violent propensities, as a number of 
the headlines referred to those on whom they were reporting using language such as 
‘immigrant rape thug’ (Spillett, 2013, p.2), ‘migrant child sex gang’ (Watson, 2014) and 
‘migrant sex beast’ (Mathews, 2013). Once more, though, even as this sort of coverage 
homogenises non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants as a mass of undesirable sexual 
deviants, certain associations and stratifications also run through these depictions. Thus, 
many of the articles on individual non-citizens convicted of sexual offences that I identified 
focused on men originally from countries in Africa or the Caribbean; and, alongside the 
written report, these articles often also included visual images of those on whom they were 
reporting. In this way, they evoked, and remobilised, overtly racist narratives about black 
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men as inherently sexually violent. Without ever referring to race, then, they reiterated a link 
between darker skin and sexual offending. 
Like the narrative of the terrorist, that of the sexual predator was also reinvigorated 
during the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’. At the end of 2015, mass sexual assaults were reported to 
have been perpetrated by ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘migrants’ during the New Year’s Eve 
celebrations in Cologne, Germany – a country which, compared with the rest of Western 
Europe at least, had taken a less restrictive approach to the refugees arriving across this 
period (Canning, 2017). The assaults, therefore, were presented by significant sections of the 
media in the UK as providing clear evidence of the dangers of unwanted immigration, as 
those allegedly responsible were essentialised and homogenised as a mass of inherently 
problematic sexual deviants. It was notable, too, that as well as attaching this racialised 
narrative to ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘migrants’, the alleged perpetrators were also identified 
specifically as ‘North African’, ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ men – and their innate sexual pathology 
was presented through the language of culture, in terms of their supposedly primitive 
attitudes to women and ‘backwards’ way of life. Thus, an opinion piece in the Observer, for 
instance, presented what happened as the result of ‘unreconstructed attitudes towards women 
by newly arrived young Arab men’ (Hutton, 2016). A column in The Telegraph by Allison 
Pearson (2016) began with the headline ‘Cologne assault: Cultural difference is no excuse for 
rape’, and ended by asserting ‘I fear that [this] grotesque mass attack on women … was not 
an isolated incident, but the first of many battles in a clash of civilisations’. Similarly, in the 
Daily Mail, a piece by the far-right commentator Katie Hopkins (2016) insisted: ‘These 
migrants are a cultural time-bomb, brought up in a different era, Islamic Bernard Mannings – 
incompatible with modern life.’ 
As critics have noted, the insistence upon sexual offending by Muslim men as the 
result of an essentialised and backwards culture differs sharply from media explanations of 
sexual crimes committed by white British men, where race or culture is never mentioned 
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(Tufail, 2015). Indeed, it is noticeable how, in the case of the Cologne assaults, the ‘cultural’ 
explanation offered for ‘Muslim’ and ‘Arab’ migrant men carrying out these attacks was not 
simply different. It also worked, in fact, to completely exculpate and exonerate Western 
European men – to erase and silence their participation in and infliction of sexual violence. 
That is, as sexual offending was presented as a deviant cultural characteristic of these migrant 
men – as intrinsic to, and contained solely within, the figure of the ‘other’ (Holzberg, Kolbe 
and Zaborowski, 2018) – the Cologne assaults were presented as a ‘new dimension of crime’ 
(Medien, 2016), as a type of attack that was previously unheard of in Europe. Through this 
example, therefore, we see, once more, the erasing and invisibilising capabilities of racialised 
narratives of bordering. Patriarchy and misogyny as longstanding structural features of 
Western European countries were, through this coverage, glossed over and concealed, and 
sexual violence was presented as emerging solely from the cultural deficiencies of newly-
arrived migrant men.    
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have mapped the narratives circulated by the UK government and media in 
the current era that problematise ‘unwanted’ migrants and legitimise their targeting by the 
direct activities of border enforcement; and I have demonstrated how these narratives of 
bordering can be most fully understood through the framework of race and racism. As I have 
shown, these dominant representations do not deploy the overt language of race. They do not 
categorise and stigmatise those they are depicting in terms of biological or somatic difference 
– although, as I have also drawn out, this does not mean that visible difference does not 
matter in present-day portrayals of migrants who are unwelcome. Yet, as narratives of 
bordering disparage and vilify the non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants on whom they 
focus, they do this in a distinct way. They demean and stigmatise through the specific 
processes of essentialisation and homogenisation – processes which are central to the race-
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making operation, and which characterise and distinguish the inferiorising and ‘othering’ that 
we see in racially explicit forms of classification and expression. Thus, even as narratives of 
bordering do not use the language of race, race is nonetheless made. Through the various 
coded registers that I have documented across this chapter, migrants who are unwanted are 
constituted, specifically, as racially different and deviant. 
Indeed, as narratives of bordering racialise unwanted migrants, utilising these more 
sanitised forms of expression, we see, perhaps, what Goldberg has identified as the 
‘conceptual promiscuity and lability’ (2015, p.10) of race. That is, as race is made through a 
range of seemingly raceless registers, the ‘elasticity’ and ‘lack of … fixity’ that characterises 
raciality becomes apparent – a lack of fixity which, as Goldberg explains, ‘has served the 
interests of power well by enabling an agile capacity to cement people in place’ (2015, p.11). 
As I now proceed, in Chapter Three, to consider the practice of the courts and the sentencing 
hearing, I start to think about how the racialised narratives of bordering that I have traced 
across this chapter might be seeping into the individual narratives delivered by legal 
professionals during this process. More than this, though, I also conceptualise in what way, 
specifically, they might be being put to work in the particular context of the sentencing 
hearing. So, I theorise to what end, or for what purpose, the muted racial formulations of 






Racialised Narratives of Bordering and the Practice of the Sentencing Hearing 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter One of this thesis, I set out my focus on government and media-disseminated 
narratives of bordering and in how these might be imprinting themselves on contemporary 
criminal justice processes; and in Chapter Two I demonstrated the centrality of race and 
racialisation to the functioning of these dominant narratives. In this chapter, I introduce the 
final layer of my conceptual foundations. Thus, I explore the specific aspect of the criminal 
justice system on which my research is focused, the endpoint of the court process, the 
practice of the sentencing hearing; and I consider how dominant narratives of bordering 
might be seeping into this – as well as what, more specifically, these muted racialised 
depictions might be being mobilised to do. 
There is a considerable literature on sentencing, comprising legal, sociological and 
normative perspectives on the allocation of punishment. Yet, much of this literature has 
focused on ‘sentencing practice’ in terms of the decision to impose a particular punishment 
on a defendant, and how magistrates and judges arrive – or should arrive – at this decision. 
The practice of the sentencing hearing itself, and what goes on in the courtroom during 
sentencing proceedings, has received very little attention (Mann, Menih and Smith, 2014; 
Gathings and Parrotta, 2013; Travers, 2007). Alongside this, the sentencing hearing has often 
been overlooked by ethnographies focused on the processes and practices of the criminal 
courts. While, as Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby point out, ‘the large majority of defendants who 
appear at the Crown Court do so for sentencing only, rather than for trial’, it is, as they also 
explain, the trial that has typically been understood as the ‘central event’ (2015, p.27) of the 
criminal courtroom and which has therefore commanded the most academic attention. In the 
first half of this chapter, then, I work to fill this gap in the literature by developing an 
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understanding of the process and practice of the sentencing hearing. Specifically, I suggest 
that by continuing to use the framework of narrative, and conceptualising what is said by the 
prosecution, defence and judge during the hearing as individual narratives, we can build an 
understanding of sentencing accounts as more than simply factual or representational. We can 
start to see them, instead, as plotted and purposive versions of ‘what happened’, of the 
incident that is being dealt with by the court – each of which is concerned with what I refer to 
as the defendant’s punishability. 
In the second half of the chapter I turn my attention to what the individual narratives 
delivered during the sentencing hearing might look like, and how they might be working 
towards their particular purposes and meanings. By conceptualising narratives from a 
sociological point of view and approaching them as ‘social acts’ or ‘social practices’ (Ewick 
and Silbey, 1995, pp.197, 211), we can understand how they are always governed and shaped 
by certain norms and conventions. Thus, as social acts, narratives are told in line with the 
‘local norms’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p.207) of their immediate social setting – in the case 
of sentencing narratives, then, they are delivered in line with the rules and conventions of the 
criminal court and law. But they are also shaped by wider social norms and conventions; so, 
they ‘bear the imprint of dominant cultural meanings’ and reflect and reproduce hegemonic 
or ‘master narratives’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, pp.211–212). Understanding this, therefore, 
provides the link between dominant narratives of bordering and the sentencing process. It 
helps us to see how these ideas about ‘unwanted’ migrants might be making their way into 
the practice of the sentencing hearing – how these racialised depictions might be seeping into 
the individual narratives delivered by the prosecution, defence and judge. Importantly, 
moreover, by turning to the existing literature on gendered and racialised narratives in the 
trial, we can also start thinking about what narratives of bordering might be mobilised to do 
in the specific context of the sentencing hearing. In other words, we can begin theorising how 
they might be put to work in individual narratives focused on the issue of the defendant’s 
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punishability. Ultimately, I argue that racialised narratives of bordering are likely to be 
deployed in sentencing hearings to present non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants as 
inherently deviant and problematic, and through this as punishable in themselves. That is, 
these narratives will be invoked to portray the defendants to whom they are attached as 
innately punishable people.  
 
The practice of the sentencing hearing: The story so far 
The sentencing hearing is the endpoint of the court process, taking place following a guilty 
verdict in a trial or, more often, after a defendant has pleaded guilty. As Jacobson, Hunter and 
Kirby (2015) note, there are three main elements to the hearing. The prosecution speaks first, 
giving the ‘facts of the case’, which includes an account of the offence being dealt with by 
the court and also involves highlighting any existing legal guidance on an appropriate 
sentence. The defence then speaks for the defendant, arguing for leniency through the ‘plea in 
mitigation’. Finally, the judge1 delivers their sentencing remarks and imposes the sanction 
that they have decided on. Apart from confirming their name at the beginning of proceedings, 
the defendant is not expected to speak during the hearing.2 
As I highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, relatively little research – across 
both the literature on sentencing, as well as that on the courts – has focused on what happens 
 
1 In the magistrates’ courts, of course, it is magistrates who pass sentence on the defendant. As I conducted my 
observations of sentencing hearings in the Crown Court, however, in this chapter I focus on Crown Court 
practices – unless it is specified otherwise. 
2 For some hearings, a pre-sentence report by the Probation Service will also be requested; and, as the Probation 
Inspectorate (2017) has highlighted, the use of oral pre-sentence reports – requested on the day of plea and 
sentencing and delivered by a probation officer during the hearing – is increasing. In the sentencing hearings 
that I observed, however, reports to the court by the Probation Service were predominantly written; across all 
the observations that I conducted, there was just one instance when a probation officer delivered an oral pre-
sentence report during the hearing. This was partly, I think, because a significant portion of my fieldwork took 
place before targets on increasing the number of oral reports were introduced (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 
2017). But it was also probably because I conducted observations in the Crown Court, where offences 
considered to be more serious are sentenced – and, while there is an overall emphasis now on the use of oral 
probation reports, written reports continue to be used for more serious offences. In the analysis of my empirical 
material in Chapters Five and Six, I draw out how extracts from written probation reports were sometimes 
woven into the accounts delivered by the prosecution, defence and judge during the hearings that I observed. 
However, as oral probation reports were not part of the vast majority of hearings that I saw during my fieldwork, 
I do not consider them as one of the key elements of the practice of the sentencing hearing. 
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in the courtroom during the sentencing hearing. When the practice of the sentencing hearing 
has been examined, moreover, there has been a tendency to approach what is said by legal 
professionals during this as simply factual or representational – to understand them as 
delivering neutral and objective accounts. The defence’s account, it should be acknowledged, 
has generally been identified as more of a ‘creative’ construction. McConville et al., for 
instance, describe how they observed defence solicitors trying to ‘soften the harder edges’ 
(1994, p.199) in their explanations of the incident being dealt with, in order to persuade 
magistrates to treat the defendant in a more lenient way (see also Gathings and Parrotta, 
2013). The facts of the case, however, has been described rather more straightforwardly as ‘a 
fair and impartial summary of the prosecution case’ (Shapland, 1981, p.121; see also Wasik, 
2014). Similarly, judges’ remarks – which have received the most attention in the sentencing 
literature – have often been viewed as factual exposition or record; that is, as a 
representational account of how the decision to impose a particular punishment has been 
made. 
Thus, in his observational research on sentencing hearings for young people in 
juvenile courts in Australia, for instance, Max Travers argues that the sentencing remarks 
delivered during the hearing ‘often provide an insight into how the magistrate arrived at a 
decision; they are, after all, designed to communicate what was in the magistrate’s mind to an 
“over-hearing” audience’ (2007, p.28). In line with this, Travers goes on to argue that the 
repeated references to ideas of reform and rehabilitation throughout the remarks he observed 
demonstrate how ‘welfare values’ shape sentencing decision-making in the Australian 
juvenile courts. In a more recent study involving observations of sentencing hearings in the 
Portuguese context, Andreia de Castro-Rodrigues and Ana Sacau adopt a similar view to 
Travers, identifying the oral sentencing pronouncements by judges to defendants as likely to 
‘closely reflec[t] the individual process of the sentencing decision’ (2014, p.382). Through 
their analysis of the content of these oral remarks, they argue that it can be seen how judges’ 
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personal values and attitudes exert significant influence on the final sanction imposed, even 
though in Portugal sentencing decision-making is tightly structured by specific rules and 
legislation.  
Alongside these observational studies, research that has analysed transcripts of 
sentencing hearing proceedings has also tended to conceptualise judges’ remarks in a similar 
way. In the UK context, for example, a recent study by Shona Minson and Rachel Condry 
focuses on transcripts of Crown Court sentencing hearings for women with dependent 
children who had been sent to prison, and explores the sentencing remarks in these cases as a 
way of ‘understand[ing] the thinking of judges … who sentenced mothers to imprisonment’ 
(2015, p.37). Likewise, in their analysis of transcripts of judges’ remarks delivered during 
sentencing hearings for Indigenous defendants in South Australia’s higher courts, Samantha 
Jeffries and Christine Bond examine these judicial ‘sentencing stories’ in order ‘to establish 
in what ways Indigeneity may come to exert a mitigating influence over sentencing’ (2010, 
p.223). Though they explore what takes place during the sentencing hearing, then, such 
observational and transcript studies are really more closely aligned with the research 
highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, which has dominated the literature on 
sentencing – that is, research that focuses on the sentencing decision and how this decision is 
made. Historically, empirical research on sentencing decision-making has often been 
conducted using statistical methods. By approaching judges’ sentencing remarks like this, 
therefore, scholars have worked to develop a qualitative branch to this research (Jeffries and 
Bond, 2010; Travers, 2007). 
Some sentencing theorists, however, have challenged the idea that what judges say 
during the hearing offers an uncomplicated window into their decision-making process, and 
have suggested that we need to think about sentencing remarks in a different way. Cyrus 
Tata, in particular, has argued that ‘the view that the “reason” for a decision given in court is 
a simple unmediated expression of the judge’s thinking is highly questionable’ (2002, p.416). 
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Instead, he sets out that judges’ remarks should be seen in terms of the ‘social production of 
accountability’ (2002, p.417). Thus, what the judge says in a sentencing hearing does not 
offer a ‘simple factual presentation of the linear decision process (2002, p.421). Rather, it is a 
‘constructed’, ‘mediated’ and ‘selective’ account, shaped to present a ‘defensible’ (2002, 
pp.418–419) version of how the sentencing decision has been made.  In a later article, Tata 
identifies judges’ sentencing remarks in terms of ‘reason-giving craftwork’ (2007, p.440). In 
doing so, he clarifies that he is not suggesting such judicial accounts are ‘duplicitous’ (2007, 
p.440) or that they function to obscure the ‘real’ or ‘true’ reasons underlying sentencing 
decisions. Rather, Tata explains that recognising the social nature of sentencing means 
understanding that ‘sentencing reason giving is necessarily purposive’ (2007, p.440).    
Tata’s emphasis on the social character of judges’ sentencing remarks anticipates my 
framing of the narratives delivered during the sentencing hearing specifically as social acts or 
practices, which I set out later in the chapter. As I explain, understanding prosecution, 
defence and judges’ sentencing accounts in this way has implications for what they look like 
and how they unfold. By insisting on the allocation of punishment as a social process, 
moreover, and in particular by highlighting the significance of accountability and 
defensibility for judges’ reason giving, Tata also brings to our attention the issue of audience 
in relation to sentencing. The question of audience in relation to sentencing decision-making 
has been examined by some scholars through a focus on the ‘external’ audience of the public. 
Thus, as Mike Hough and Julian Roberts (2017) highlight, some research has identified a link 
between punitive public attitudes and the sanctions that sentencers impose.  
Writing in the early 2000s, for instance, Millie, Jacobson and Hough pinpointed the 
sharp increase in England and Wales’ prison population since the early 1990s as largely the 
result of magistrates and judges’ ‘growing preparedness to use custodial sentences, and when 
they do so, to pass longer sentences’ (2003, p.370). They argued that this ‘tougher 
sentencing’ should be understood partly as the consequence of an increasingly harsh ‘climate 
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of opinion’ (2003, p.378), comprised of political pressure, media attention and public 
attitudes. Linking back to the discussion in Chapter One on the relationship between 
government and media narratives about ‘unwanted’ migrants, and hostile public views on 
immigration, it might be noted how the three elements of the harsh ‘climate of opinion’ 
around punishment that Millie, Jacobson and Hough identified are tightly interlinked. More 
recently, Carly Lightowlers and Hannah Quirk (2015) have examined the higher custody rate 
and increased length of prison sentences imposed for offences committed during the so-called 
English ‘riots’ of 2011. They connect this sentencing ‘uplift’ (2015, p.75) – which they also 
refer to as a form of ‘judicial abandon’ (2015, p.65) – in part to punitive public attitudes. 
Other scholars have considered the relationship between the ‘external’ audience of the 
public and sentencing decision-making from a normative perspective, exploring what role, if 
any, public opinion should play in shaping sentencing policy and practice (Ryberg and 
Roberts, 2014). As Roberts (2014, 2011) notes, arguments for the incorporation of public 
views into decision-making about criminal punishment have been made on several bases. 
From a consequentialist perspective, for example, it has been suggested that if sentencing 
policy and practice fails to reflect public opinion, the perceived legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system will decline. This, it has been argued, could ‘result in a number of adverse 
effects, including the prospect of people resorting to vigilantism’ (Roberts, 2011, p.111).  
Despite the often punitive nature of public opinion, some theorists have also 
advocated for public input into sentencing decision-making as a way of ensuring 
proportionate sanctioning, and so in terms of the sentencing principle of desert. Matt 
Matravers (2014), for instance, contends that ‘any plausible answer’ to how the seriousness 
and severity of an offence should be determined must be ‘context sensitive’: ‘By “context 
sensitive” I mean that judgements of seriousness and severity will reflect social conditions 
and practices such that what is deserved will be constituted by what is popularly believed to 
be – or what is implicit in current social practices as – serious, severe, and so proportionate’ 
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(2014, pp.36–37). Roberts argues for the incorporation of public views on a similar basis, 
contending that ‘the seriousness of an offense is determined in part by the societal reaction to 
the proscribed conduct’ (2011, p.105). He explains, however, that the way public attitudes 
shape sentencing should be tightly circumscribed, and that only informed public views should 
be considered – that is, views which are expressed by ‘people who have been given some 
time and information to arrive at a decision’ (2011, p.106).3 The limited incorporation of 
public opinion into sentencing decision-making for which Roberts advocates might be seen to 
have been adopted by the sentencing guidelines authorities in England and Wales. In the 
2000s the Sentencing Advisory Panel commissioned research on public attitudes towards 
offences including domestic burglary, rape, and causing death by driving, to help inform 
sentencing guidelines on these (Ashworth, 2008; Hough et al., 2008). More recently, the 
Sentencing Council4 has commissioned studies into public views on guilty plea sentence 
reductions (Dawes et al., 2011), as well as drug offences (Jacobson, Kirby and Hough, 2011), 
which were drawn upon in the development of new sentencing guidelines (Sentencing 
Council, 2017, 2012b). 
Tata’s consideration of audience not in relation to sentencing decision-making, but in 
terms of judges’ reason giving during the hearing, also identifies the external audience of the 
public as important – and, alongside this, he points to additional audiences for whom judges 
may be constructing ‘defensible’ sentencing accounts. This includes those who are actually in 
 
3 Empirical research on public attitudes to criminal justice has demonstrated that, where people are provided 
with more detailed information about the criminal justice system and how it operates, their views often become 
less punitive (see Hough and Roberts, 2017). Thus, the literature on public opinion and sentencing has often 
distinguished between ‘uninformed’ and ‘informed’ public views (Ryberg and Roberts, 2014). In relation to the 
discussion in Chapter One, then, about how the dominant ideas of the government and media orchestrate and 
shape public opinion, it might be argued that in research studies where detailed information about criminal 
justice is given to participants, such dominant, punitive ideas are to some extent cut through. 
4 The Sentencing Council, which became operational in 2010, is responsible for preparing and issuing definitive 
sentencing guidelines for England and Wales. Prior to its establishment, the arrangements for developing and 
publishing sentencing guidelines were slightly more complicated. So, during the 2000s, the Sentencing 
Advisory Panel drafted and consulted on guidelines, and then provided advice to the Sentencing Guidelines 




court for the hearing, such as the defendant, prosecution and defence representatives, and 
potentially the victim – as well as any media that may be present (Tata 2007, 2002). Beyond 
the immediate confines of the courtroom, a further audience that Tata (2020) highlights in 
addition to the public (who may hear about the sentencing remarks if they are reported by the 
media)5 is the more specialised audience of the Court of Appeal. As I indicate in the next 
section of the chapter, in relation to audiences beyond the immediate confines of the 
courtroom, many of the sentencing hearings I observed seemed to have quite low visibility. 
Often, it was only the defendant, the legal professionals involved and one or two court staff 
who were present, plus occasionally a few of the defendant’s family or friends – so the 
proceedings had a private feel. Yet, there were also a couple of occasions where judges 
appeared to be taking particular care to adhere to the legal norms and conventions of 
sentencing narratives – norms and conventions which I explore later in this chapter. The 
judges’ delivery of clearly legalistic accounts, therefore, seemed to reflect a concern with 
making their reason giving defensible to the ‘external’ audience of the Court of Appeal. I 
explore both these instances in Chapter Five, where I begin my examination of the empirical 
data that I collected during my fieldwork.       
Tata’s sociological critique from within the sentencing literature, then, warns us 
against a conception of judges’ sentencing remarks as straightforwardly factual and 
representational accounts. Alongside this, the significant body of socio-legal research on the 
process that sometimes precedes the sentencing hearing, the trial, also problematises 
approaching judges’ remarks, as well as the prosecution’s facts of the case, in this way. Jo 
Winter (2002) has set out how, according to legal positivist ideas, the criminal trial proceeds 
as follows: objective ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’ about the incident in question are put forward by 
the prosecution and defence, the jury then retires to consider this evidence – and, through 
 
5 Criminal courts are of course a public setting, and so individual members of the public may hear sentencing 
remarks if they are sitting in the public gallery in court. As I proceed to explain, however, in most of the 
sentencing hearings that I observed during my fieldwork I was the only member of the public present. 
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their deliberations, the ‘truth’ of ‘what happened’ is finally established. Yet, as Winter 
explains, socio-legal researchers have repeatedly challenged such an understanding. They 
have argued that, far from entailing an ‘objective’ and ‘factual’ presentation of the incident 
being dealt with, the trial actually involves the ‘social construction of reality’ (Winter, 2002, 
p.344) by the prosecution and defence. That is, during the trial process, ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’ 
about ‘what happened’ are, as Winter puts it, continually ‘interpreted and reinterpreted, 
shaped and reshaped’ (2002, p.344). 
Thus, in her influential study Conviction, for instance, Doreen McBarnet highlights 
how both the prosecution and defence present what is effectively ‘an edited version’ of the 
incident being dealt with by the court – in terms of it being pared-back and simplified, but 
also in terms of it being told ‘with vested interests in mind’ (1981, p.17). She explains: ‘Far 
from being “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth” a case is a biased construct, 
manipulating and editing the raw material of the witnesses’ perceptions of an incident into 
not so much an exhaustively accurate version of what happened as one which is advantageous 
to one side’ (1981, p.17). Similarly, in his well-known ethnography of Wood Green Crown 
Court, Paul Rock highlights how accounts of the incident in question presented during a trial 
are not only simplified, constructed to ‘strip away volumes of context and history’ (1993, 
p.31), but are also inflected and shaped by the prosecution and defence in very different 
ways. He states: ‘Trials supplied competing stories about the past, reconstructing all the 
indeterminacy and muddle of everyday life into what McConville once called “opposing 
distortions”’ (1993, p.36). In her research on trials for drug offences, which I explore in more 
detail later in the chapter, Anita Kalunta-Crumpton sets out that the prosecution ‘demands 
that a defendant be adjudged responsible for an alleged … offence’, whereas the defence 
‘claims that the defendant is innocent’ (1999, p.20). As she explains, therefore, during drug-
related trials, the versions of ‘what happened’ put forward by prosecution and defence 
representatives operate to ‘create or prevent the creation of a drug offence’ (1999, p.57). 
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Building on this research, Winter has argued that it is not only the prosecution and 
defence who offer selective, shaped versions of the incident being dealt with during the trial, 
slanted in favour of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. As she explains, under the legal 
positivist conception of the trial, the judge is often understood as an ‘independent arbiter 
performing a supervisory role, ensuring that applicable rules and conventions are followed’ 
(2002, p.343). Yet, Winter suggests that via the practice of ‘summing up’ to the jury, before 
the jury retires to consider its verdict, judges are also able to ‘step into the fray’ (2002, 
p.346).  That is, she contends that judges’ summing up during the trial can function as ‘a 
third, largely unacknowledged, limb of advocacy’ (2002, p.347), as the account of the 
incident that the judge presents may work to encourage the defendant’s conviction, or their 
acquittal. 
Against such socio-legal investigations into the trial, then, what we might term a legal 
positivist conception of the sentencing hearing – namely, the idea that the prosecution’s facts 
of the case and the judge’s sentencing remarks are straightforwardly objective and 
representational – begins to look less plausible. With this in mind, I want to propose a 
specific framework for thinking about the sentencing hearing that can move us beyond 
notions of factual record and representation, and which can also be deployed to understand 
all of the accounts delivered by legal professionals during this process: narrative. 
 
Narrative: A framework for understanding the practice of the sentencing hearing 
Critics writing on the criminal courts have routinely drawn comparisons between the practice 
of the courtroom and the theatre (Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby, 2015; Rock, 1993; Carlen, 
1976). The trial, in particular, has often been described in terms of the various ‘actors’ 
involved playing their specific parts in a well-rehearsed, and often dramatic, public 
performance. Such an understanding is not entirely inappropriate for the sentencing hearing. 
As Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby (2015) note, there can be moments of drama and tension 
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during this. In particular, perhaps, the moment before the judge begins their sentencing 
remarks, as the defendant waits to discover how they will be sanctioned, often feels laden 
with suspense.  
And yet, describing the criminal courts in this way can also feel rather ill-fitting. The 
processes and practices of the court are, sometimes, not well-rehearsed and choreographed 
but messy and chaotic (Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby, 2015). For lay participants, at least, they 
are also often slow and tedious: in her well-known study of the magistrates’ courts, Pat 
Carlen notes how ‘for the majority of the defendants, the court experience is characterised by 
long periods of waiting’ (1976, p.27; see also Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby, 2015; Rock, 
1993). Indeed, rather than being a place of high drama and suspense, the court is more often 
characterised by mundanity, repetition and routine (Bottoms and McClean, 1976) – an idea 
that I explore in more detail as this chapter continues. It is worth noting, too, that while the 
court is officially a public setting, and so what takes place in it might be understood in terms 
of a public ‘performance’, as I began to suggest in the previous section in practice court 
proceedings often have a much more private feel. This is in part because, in some cases that 
go through the court, the ‘deeply private details of individuals’ lives’ (Jacobson, Hunter and 
Kirby, 2015, p.73) are delved into and scrutinised. But it is also because – unless the case 
being dealt with is high profile in some way – there is rarely anyone in court beyond those 
who are immediately involved in the case. Certainly, in most of the sentencing hearings that I 
observed during my fieldwork, the only people in the courtroom were the defendant, the 
prosecution, defence and judge, and the court clerk and usher – plus sometimes one or two of 
the defendant’s family members or friends.  
Less dramatic and spectacular in its connotations – and so more fitting, I would 
suggest, in terms of the overall demeanour of the court – the idea of narrative and storytelling 
also offers us, as I indicated at the end of the last section, a useful framework for 
conceptualising all of the accounts delivered by legal professionals during the practice of the 
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sentencing hearing. Before proceeding further with this, however, it is important to highlight 
that, while the language of ‘narrative’, ‘stories’ and ‘storytelling’ has frequently been 
deployed in criminological writing on the courts – Rock’s analysis, cited above, of the trial as 
supplying ‘competing stories about the past’ provides just one example of many – the usage 
of these terms in such writing  has sometimes been vague and imprecise.6 Thus, in the 
existing literature on the courts, an idea of what stories and narratives are, or do, is not always 
set out clearly; and, concomitantly, what referring to courtroom accounts in this way means, 
or particularly draws out, is often not explored fully or examined critically. Moreover, if we 
unpack the assumptions which underpin the deployment of these terms in writing on the 
courts, it also becomes clear that they are often being used in quite different, and sometimes 
conflicting, ways. In this way, then, criminologists writing about stories and storytelling in 
the courtroom appear to bear out Mieke Bal’s observation, that ‘narrative’ is one of those 
‘very common and seemingly obvious’ concepts which ‘has been used so often it has begun 
to lead a life of its own and is understood somewhat differently by every user’ (2009, p.5). 
In his ethnography of Wood Green Crown Court, for example, Rock refers to 
accounts delivered during the trial as ‘stories’ and ‘narratives’ in part to denote their 
formulaic and generic nature. So, he writes about how, as the prosecution and defence put 
forward their cases, ‘time and again … the same plots seemed to be exposed, plots that were 
familiar to the point of being a little hackneyed to insiders’ (1993, p.78). Alongside this, 
Rock describes courtroom accounts as narratives, too, to get at how the prosecution and 
defence construct – from the complexity and confusion of ‘what happened’ – carefully 
organised and shaped accounts of the incident with which they are dealing. He explains, for 
 
6 As I highlighted in Chapter One there is now a rich literature within the criminological sub-field of narrative 
criminology, which explores ‘the role the telling and sharing of stories play in committing, upholding and 
effecting desistance from crime and other harmful acts’ (Sandberg and Ugelvik, 2016, p.129). I would like to 
emphasise, therefore, that in identifying vague and imprecise usage of the terms ‘narrative’, ‘stories’ and 




instance, how during trials the prosecution and defence worked to give ‘structure and plot’ 
(1993, p.75) to the information and details supplied by witnesses, and he also writes about 
how, in the stories that they relayed to the court, barristers ‘attempted to tie events and people 
plausibly together’ (1993, p.78).  
In his research into Crown Court trials for violent offences, on the other hand, Nigel 
Fielding (2006) appears to put forward a quite different understanding. At one point during 
his analysis he alludes to Bennett and Feldman’s (1981) idea that structurally, there are good 
and bad stories, and that a bad or weak structure can mean a story is regarded by those 
listening to it as less plausible. This suggests, perhaps, a conception of narrative that is 
centred on notions of construction, coherence and plot. Yet, Fielding also uses the idea of 
narrative and storytelling to describe how victims and witnesses in a trial often want to give 
an account of ‘what happened’ that goes beyond the limits of the questions put to them by 
barristers. That is, he deploys the term ‘narrative’ to capture how these lay participants 
sometimes attempt to recount the incident being dealt with in a much more detailed and 
embellished way. Thus, what some of the legal professionals interviewed for his research 
described as ‘go[ing] on with an unstructured response’, ‘rambl[ing] on’ and ‘blurt[ing] it all 
out’ is identified by Fielding as victims and witnesses attempting to give their evidence in ‘a 
narrative form’ and as taking ‘a narrative approach’ (2006, pp.183–185). His idea of 
storytelling as fulsome, flowing and unstructured, then, is almost in direct opposition to that 
put forward by Rock, who identifies courtroom narratives as carefully organised and 
precisely plotted. 
My conception of narrative is closer to Rock’s than Fielding’s; Rock’s identification 
of narrative’s ‘structure and plot’ is, as I now go on to argue, key. For Rock, however, who 
also cites Bennett and Feldman, structure and plot appear to be very much tied to the idea of a 
story’s credibility. Thus, structure is something that can be done well or poorly, and if a story 
or narrative has what Bennett and Feldman refer to as ‘structural ambiguities’ (1981, p.79) it 
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is less likely to be believed. I would suggest, on the other hand, that we should approach the 
plotting of stories not through the lens of goodness or badness, and in terms of supposed 
structural weakness or strength and associated levels of credibility. Rather, we should be 
concentrating on what the ‘structure and plot’ of a narrative is actually doing. That is, we 
should be thinking about what this critical ingredient of stories and storytelling is working to 
achieve. 
In his essay ‘The value of narrativity in the representation of reality’, Hayden White 
(1987) explores what narrative as a form of writing is, and what ‘narrativising’ does, by 
looking at historical narratives alongside two types of non-narrative historical writing, annals 
and chronicles. As he explains, ‘the annals form … consists only of a list of events ordered in 
chronological sequence’; there is, in this form of writing, ‘no suggestion of any necessary 
connection between one event and another’ (1987, pp.5–6). Similarly, in the chronicle we see 
the ‘perseverance’ of ‘chronology as the organizing principle’; and yet, unlike annals, there is 
also in chronicles a focus on ‘a central subject – the life of an individual, town, or region; 
some great undertaking, such as a war or crusade; or some institution, such as a monarchy, 
episcopacy, or monastery’. In this way, then, this form of writing tends towards a ‘greater 
narrative coherency’ (1987, p.16). White notes, however, that while the chronicle ‘often 
seems to wish to tell a story, aspires to narrativity’, in the end it ‘typically fails to achieve it’. 
This is because, he argues, ‘the chronicle usually is marked by a failure to achieve narrative 
closure. It does not so much conclude as simply terminate. It starts out to tell a story but 
breaks off in media res, in the chronicler’s own present; it leaves things unresolved, or rather, 
it leaves them unresolved in a storylike way’ (1987, p.5). 
Against the lack of closure and resolution that characterises the chronicle, then, and 
the chronological listing of annals – where there is no attempt to tie ‘loose ends’ (1987, p.8) 
together, or explain ‘blank years in the annalist’s account’ (1987, p.11) – White argues that 
the distinguishing feature of the narrative form emerges. Thus, he sets out, contrasted with 
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non-narrative forms of writing, ‘the extent to which narrative strains for the effect of having 
filled in the gaps’ becomes apparent; it becomes acutely clear how historical narratives work 
to impose on the events that they relay ‘an image of continuity, coherency and meaning’ 
(1987, p.11). Narratives, therefore, are defined by structure and plot – and, as they organise 
and shape ‘reality’, as they impose fullness and finality on the events that they recount, they 
convey and produce meaning. As White further explains, then: ‘The historical narrative … 
reveals to us a world that is putatively “finished”, done with, over, and yet not dissolved, not 
falling apart. In this world, reality wears the mask of a meaning, the completeness and 
fullness of which we can only imagine, never experience’ (1987, p.21; emphasis mine). 
Now, for White, the plotting and shaping of the narrative form is always focused on 
the production of moral meaning; the purpose of narratives is always to moralise. Thus he 
asks, simply, ‘Could we ever narrativize without moralizing?’ (1987, p.25). As I indicate later 
in this chapter, and as we will also see in the analysis of my empirical material, moralising is 
undoubtedly an important aspect of the narratives delivered during the sentencing hearing. 
However, I would suggest that by adopting a more sociologically-inclined perspective at this 
point we can develop a more expansive view of the possible purposes and meanings for 
which narratives might be constructed and pulled together.  
In their much-cited article ‘Subversive stories and hegemonic tales: Towards a 
sociology of narrative’, Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey identify stories and narratives as 
‘social acts’ (1995, p.197) and as ‘communicative devices in human interaction’ (1995, 
p.211).Consequently, they argue that narratives can be organised and plotted for a whole 
range of different effects and meanings. Thus, as they explain, narrators construct and relay 
their stories not simply to moralise – but, in fact, ‘to entertain or persuade, to exonerate or 
indict, to enlighten or instruct’ (1995, p.208). In a similar way, Barbara Herrnstein Smith has 
set out an understanding of narratives as a type of ‘social transaction’ (1980, p.232), and has 
explained that there are a ‘multiplicity of functions that may be performed by narratives 
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generally and by any narrative in particular’ (1980, p.235). To achieve different functions, 
she observes, narrators craft and pull together ‘what happened’ in particular ways. That is, we 
‘preserve, omit, link, isolate, and foreground different features or sets of features’ (1980, 
p.217) according to the specific purpose, or purposes, of our narratives. 
From this perspective, therefore, we can move beyond the ideas of factual record and 
representation that have often been dominant in writing on the sentencing hearing, and we 
can understand the accounts delivered by legal professionals during this process in a quite 
different way. By approaching the prosecution’s facts of the case, the defence’s plea in 
mitigation and the judge’s sentencing remarks as individual narratives, we can see them all 
as carefully plotted and shaped accounts of the incident being dealt with by the court, each of 
which has been organised and pulled together for its own distinct purpose or meaning. In the 
trial, the stories told by the different legal professionals involved can be understood as 
centred on the issue of guilt, and so as different versions of ‘what happened’ focused either 
on incriminating or exonerating the defendant (Kalunta-Crumpton, 1999; Rock, 1993; 
McBarnet, 1981). Yet, by the sentencing hearing, of course, guilt has been determined – 
either through a jury’s verdict or the entering of a guilty plea. Thus, as the focus has by this 
point shifted to the allocation of sanctions and punishment as a result of the guilt that has 
been established (Padfield, Morgan and Maguire, 2012; Tata, 2007), we might say that the 
narratives produced about the incident in question during the sentencing hearing are centred 
on the issue of the defendant’s punishability. I draw out the distinct purposes of each 
narrative – what each one is specifically doing in relation to the overarching focus of the 
sentencing hearing – in Chapters Five and Six, where I explore my empirical data. At this 
stage, however, we might say that broadly, the different narratives produced by the different 
legal professionals involved in the hearing are focused on the construction, and negotiation, 
of the defendant’s punishability. 
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‘Punishability’, it should be acknowledged, is not a term that has often been deployed 
in writing on the criminal courts, either in the legally or criminologically-focused literature. I 
use it here, in the first place, to capture how, in the sentencing hearing, the narratives 
delivered by legal professionals are concerned with the defendant as someone who is 
punishable, whom it is legitimate to sanction or punish; and how they are also concerned with 
how punishable the defendant is – whether, broadly speaking, they deserve harsher or more 
lenient treatment. Alongside this, I would contend that the term ‘punishability’ has specific 
analytic value because it focuses our attention on what the narratives in the sentencing 
hearing might look like and how they are likely to unfold. That is, it teases out how, in 
particular, the stories delivered by the prosecution, defence and judge during sentencing 
proceedings are likely to work towards their distinct purposes and meanings.  
Thus – when it has been deployed by scholars – ‘punishability’ has been utilised in a 
legal sense, to refer to an individual’s legal liability for punishment (see, for instance, 
Brudner, 2009). In this way, it reflects how defendants will be constructed and negotiated as 
deserving of punishment in legal terms, through the conventions of the criminal law – as we 
will see, then, in terms of their prohibited acts and forbidden intentions.7 At the same time, 
however, since ‘punishability’ is not a narrowly legalistic term, and does not have only 
legally-focused connotations, it also allows for how defendants in the sentencing hearing are 
likely to be made punishable in a broader way. So, it encompasses how, as social acts or 
 
7 I recognise that the production of legal guilt and liability for punishment does not rest solely on prohibited acts 
and forbidden intentions – that is, on the core legal elements of the actus reus and mens rea. In his book 
Character in the Criminal Trial, Mike Redmayne has documented how the Criminal Justice Act 2003 ‘usher[ed] 
in a much more liberal admissibility regime’ in relation to the use of ‘bad character’ evidence about a defendant 
during a trial, to demonstrate their alleged ‘propensity to offend’ (2015, pp.274–276). Redmayne also observes 
how factors relating more to the defendant than to the offence for which they are being sanctioned – for 
example, the defendant’s attitude to the offence, or some of their personal circumstances – have long been 
considered relevant in sentencing proceedings. Across Chapters Five and Six, indeed, where I explore the 
empirical data that I collected during my fieldwork, I highlight instances where legally codified factors of 
personal mitigation (Jacobson and Hough, 2011) were referred to during sentencing hearings. Nonetheless, as I 
explore in the next section of this chapter, it remains the case that the actus reus and mens rea constitute the 
overarching framework on which the criminal law rests – and so that prohibited acts and forbidden intentions 
form ‘the essential building blocks of a legally sustainable case’ (McConville, Sanders and Leng 1991, p.65).  
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practices, sentencing narratives are also likely to mobilise and tap into wider social meanings 
and hegemonic or dominant narratives. Hence, ‘punishability’ suggests how sentencing 
accounts will not simply focus on criminal acts and intentions – but, through recourse to 
dominant narratives about, for example, gender and race, will also be concerned with whether 
defendants are deserving or undeserving in themselves, with if they are good or bad people. 
Indeed, I would suggest that this aspect – the role of ideas about the defendant’s 
intrinsic nature in the production of liability for criminal punishment – is also well captured 
by identifying sentencing hearings as centred specifically on the construction and negotiation 
of the defendant’s punishability. Such a framing expands our perspective beyond the criminal 
act committed; by referring to the defendant, and their punishability, it signals how notions of 
who the defendant is – and, more specifically, about their innate goodness or deviance – are 
also likely to be utilised by legal professionals during sentencing proceedings.8 In the sections 
that follow I explore the construction and negotiation of defendants’ punishability in more 
depth, as I conceptualise how sentencing hearing narratives are likely to play out and unfold.  
     
Making defendants punishable in legal terms: Stories of prohibited acts and forbidden 
intentions 
In their investigation of narrative from a sociological point of view, Ewick and Silbey 
highlight how, as social acts and practices, narratives are always told in particular ways, that 
their content is always ‘governed by social norms and conventions’. As they explain, it is 
these norms and conventions, or ‘content rules’, which determine ‘what constitutes an 
appropriate or successful narrative’ (1995, p.207). In the first place, then, as Ewick and 
Silbey set out, narratives always adhere to the ‘local norms’ (1995, p.207) of their immediate 
social setting; so, in the case of stories delivered in the criminal courtroom, they follow and 
 
8 It is, additionally, arguable that by describing sentencing hearings as focused on the construction and 
negotiation of the defendant’s punishability, the role of, for example, legally codified personal mitigating factors 
– referred to in the footnote above – are also effectively captured. 
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are told in line with the rules and conventions of the criminal law. The existing literature on 
the courts, much of which, as I have highlighted, focuses on the trial, helps us to trace what 
this looks like in practice for narratives that are concerned with the issue of a defendant’s 
guilt. By exploring this existing literature, therefore, I would suggest that we can also start to 
develop a sense of how accounts in the sentencing hearing might play out, too; that is, we can 
begin to understand how sentencing narratives might construct and negotiate defendants as 
legally punishable. 
The conventions of the criminal law and how these govern the narratives that are 
delivered during the trial, might, perhaps, be understood in terms of what sort of information 
can be relied on in court and form part of the stories that are told. Thus, Jacobson, Hunter and 
Kirby note how, for example, under the hearsay rule, it is generally the case that ‘witnesses 
are not allowed to relay information that has been told to them by another’ (2015, p.89). 
More centrally, though, I would suggest that the construction of trial narratives in line with 
criminal law norms should be seen in terms of how accounts of ‘what happened’ are 
delivered in accordance with the overarching framework on which the criminal law rests. 
That is, they are told through the framework of the actus reus, the prohibited act, and the 
mens rea, the forbidden state of mind – as McConville, Sanders and Leng put it, ‘the essential 
building blocks of a legally sustainable case’ (1991, p.65; see also Norrie, 2014). It is 
important to note, of course, that strict liability offences, which do not require some form of 
mens rea, actually ‘substantially outnumber offences that require a mental element in English 
criminal law today’ (Lacey and Zedner, 2017, p.66). As Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy 
Horder (2013) explain, however, most strict liability crimes are summary offences and thus 
triable only in the magistrates’ courts. Hence, although ‘around half of the offences triable in 
the Crown Court have a strict liability element’ (Ashworth and Horder 2013, p.138), this 
nevertheless means that many of the offences the Crown Court deals with still require proof 
of some form of fault or intention. 
122 
 
The way in which the framework of the actus reus and mens rea shapes courtroom 
narratives from the very start of the criminal trial is evident from one of the trials that 
Fielding (2006) explores. The defendant in this case was being prosecuted for murder: he was 
accused of stabbing the victim, a friend of his, to death, following an argument between them 
in a pub earlier that day. The stabbing had been witnessed by the brother of the victim, who 
was also in the pub when the argument occurred. In his analysis of the prosecution’s opening 
speech – which, coming immediately after the jury has been sworn in, marks the beginning of 
the trial – Fielding focuses on what he identifies as the prosecution barrister’s ‘businesslike 
approach’ (2006, p.112) in relaying ‘what happened’ between the defendant and the victim 
that day. He highlights, for example, how the prosecution deployed ‘abstract constructions’ in 
their account of the incident, noting, in particular, the use of phrases such as ‘the knife having 
been used’. He observes, too, how the prosecution only described the incident’s ‘ostensible 
key features’, and how they also avoided including any ‘emotive content’, except when 
directly quoting the defendant, the victim or the victim’s brother. In this way, Fielding 
argues, the prosecution barrister worked to give their opening account an ‘authoritative air’ 
(2006, p.112), in order to insist upon on the ‘truth’ of the version of events they had relayed. 
Indeed, Fielding also sets out how this tactic was repeated later on in the trial, in the 
prosecution’s closing speech. The ‘factual circumstances’ of the incident being dealt with 
were once more ‘emphasized and exploited’, he explains, in order ‘to confirm the prosecution 
case as measured, dispassionate and authoritative’ (2006, p.113). 
What we might note alongside this, however, which receives less attention in 
Fielding’s analysis, is how the rules and conventions of the criminal law determined and 
shaped the prosecution’s opening speech. Thus, the prosecution’s narrative about ‘what 
happened’ set out that a prohibited act had been committed; that is, that following an 
argument in the pub between the defendant and the victim earlier that day, the victim had 
been stabbed and had died very shortly after this. It was also asserted that it was undoubtedly 
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the defendant who was responsible for this prohibited act. As well as describing how the 
victim’s brother had heard the victim say to the defendant, ‘Are you going to use that knife 
on me?’ shortly before he collapsed and died, the prosecution highlighted, too, that when the 
police arrived, ‘the defendant admitted he caused the injury that killed [the victim]’ (2006, 
p.112). Importantly, moreover, in relation to the specific charge of murder that was being 
pursued against the defendant, the prosecution’s narrative emphasised, as well, the 
defendant’s clear intent to kill the victim. At one point, for instance, after the prosecution had 
given some details of what the argument between them had been about, it was then 
specifically highlighted how the defendant had later been heard saying, ‘I don’t need him in 
my face, I am going to do him in’ (2006, p.112; emphasis mine). By giving a version of 
events that clearly identified the wrongful act committed, and which also insisted on the 
defendant as intentionally carrying out this act, therefore, the prosecution delivered, in their 
opening speech, a narrative of incrimination constructed firmly in accordance with the rules 
and norms of the criminal law. 
The assertion of guilt through legal norms and conventions can be seen to continue in 
the next stage of the trial, as the prosecution goes on to present its case and narrate ‘what 
happened’ by calling and questioning its witnesses. I highlighted earlier Fielding’s 
observation that, when giving evidence in court, victims and witnesses often want and 
sometimes attempt to recount ‘what happened’ in a way that goes beyond the limits of the 
questions put to them by barristers. Similarly, Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby note how the 
victims and witnesses they interviewed for their research often said that they felt restricted by 
the questions they were asked by legal professionals, and ‘that they could not say what they 
wanted to at the point at which they finally took the stand in court’ (2015, p.88). Fielding, as I 
have noted, argues that what we see happening here is victims and witnesses wanting to take 
‘a narrative approach’ – where ‘narrativising’ is understood as recounting the incident in 
question in a detailed and embellished fashion, and so delivering the ‘whole story’ rather than 
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a more succinct version that is appropriate within the confines of the criminal trial and court. 
I would suggest, however, that rather than seeing lay participants’ frustration solely in terms 
of them wanting to relay a more expansive version of events than is permitted, we might 
understand this ‘clash’ between victims and witnesses, and legal professionals, in another 
way.  
Thus, I would argue that as they recount ‘what happened’, victims and witnesses are 
also attempting to deliver plotted, purposive accounts. The functions of the story they want to 
tell, however – which might include, for example, in the case of a victim, conveying how 
awful the experience they have been through was – do not necessarily coincide with the 
purposes of the prosecution, or defence’s, narrative. Hence, legal professionals work to 
address this through their questioning; that is, they attempt to reshape the story being 
delivered in an appropriate way. What Fielding has characterised as barristers simply filtering 
out ‘irrelevant details’ (2006, p.185), therefore, might be better understood as the 
prosecution, or defence, working to reorganise and restructure lay participants’ already-
plotted accounts.  In other words, legal professionals push lay participants away from the 
tales that they want to deliver, towards stories clearly focused on incrimination, or 
exoneration – the narratives that are central to the criminal trial. 
As the trial moves to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, then, the prosecution 
attempts to ‘facilitate the development of narratives’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p.209) and 
control the story being presented to the court through their questioning (Rock, 1993; 
McBarnet, 1981) – ensuring, specifically, that it asserts the defendant’s guilt in a legally 
acceptable way. We can see how this plays out by exploring one of the trials described in 
more detail by Rock (1993), for a man who was being prosecuted for wounding with intent, 
having been accused of stabbing another man in the cheek with a knife. After the 
prosecution’s opening speech, the victim of the attack was called to give evidence – and, in 
Rock’s words, he was ‘placed under instant and continuing control’ by the prosecution 
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barrister, who took him through the details of the incident ‘stage by stage’ (1993, p.81). Thus, 
the prosecution’s questions elicited details of the injury the victim had sustained through the 
attack – a scar on his cheek, which required nine stitches. In this way, it was established that 
a prohibited act, the causing of a wound, had taken place. The prosecution then worked to 
insist that it was undoubtedly the defendant who was responsible for this act. So, he prompted 
the victim ‘to furnish a meticulous description … of the defendant’s physical appearance’ 
(1993, p.81), and he also asked questions about the identity parade the police had organised, 
at which the victim explained that he had picked out the defendant.  
Importantly, moreover, the prosecution’s questions to the victim also addressed the 
issue of intent. Following the victim’s explanation that the defendant had approached him 
while he was sitting with his girlfriend in a park, then, and that he had initially told the 
defendant to ‘go away please’, the prosecution asked him, pointedly, if the defendant had said 
‘anything in particular’ to him before the attack. The victim responded, ‘He said, “I’m going 
to stab you”’ (1993, p.81). Hence, through the questions that he asked, the prosecution 
extracted from the victim an ‘appropriate’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p.207) narrative of 
incrimination. That is, the prosecution elicited a version of ‘what happened’ which detailed 
the wrongful act committed, and the defendant’s clear intention in doing this – and thus 
which affirmed the defendant’s guilt in a legally palatable way. 
In the trial, therefore, we can see how prosecution narratives of incrimination, told in 
line with the ‘local norms’ of the criminal law and the courtroom, assert guilt by telling a 
story about the prohibited act the defendant has committed, and their clear intent in carrying 
this out. Conversely, as McConville et al.’s (1994) research suggests, defence narratives of 
exoneration often contest guilt by relaying stories that are essentially the opposite of this.  So, 
they insist that it was not the defendant who committed the wrongful act – or, alternatively, 
they emphasise that while the defendant did do it, they certainly did not intend to carry it out. 
By tracing this pattern from the literature on the trial, then, we can, as I suggested earlier, 
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begin to develop an understanding of what narratives in the sentencing hearing might look 
like, too. Thus, we should expect sentencing narratives to be similarly focused on prohibited 
acts and forbidden intentions, as they work to construct and negotiate defendants’ 
punishability in a legally appropriate way.  
In the sentencing hearing, moreover, as I have also suggested, the focus is not simply 
on the defendant as legitimately punishable, as someone whom it is justifiable to sanction or 
punish. There is a concern, too, with how punishable the defendant is, and whether they 
deserve harsher or more lenient treatment. Consequently, we should also expect sentencing 
narratives to be concerned with the specific legal elements that relate to this. Typically, these 
legal elements have been framed by the criminal law and sentencing theorists as combining to 
produce the ‘offence seriousness’ (Ashworth, 2015; Wasik, 2014). However, I would suggest 
that we might also understand them as specifying the defendant’s particular level of legal 
punishability.  
So, as sentencing accounts work to construct and negotiate just how punishable, in 
legal terms, the defendant is, we should expect them to concentrate not simply on the 
prohibited act that has been committed, but also on the particular nature of this wrongful act, 
on the ‘harm done or risked’ (Ashworth, 2015, p.157) by carrying it out. And we should 
expect sentencing narratives to focus, too, not only on the defendant’s intention, but also on 
the particular degree or level of intent they had in committing the offence – what is referred 
to, under the criminal law, as the convicted person’s culpability (Ashworth, 2015; Wasik, 
2014). As we will see in the examination of my empirical data in Chapters Five and Six, 
during many of the sentencing hearings that I observed the harm done or risked by a criminal 
act, and the defendant’s level of culpability, were often constructed and negotiated through 
reference to sentencing guidelines. While these do not exist for all criminal offences in 
England and Wales, since the formation of the Sentencing Council in 2010 definitive 
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guidelines have been introduced for offence types including assault, burglary, drugs, fraud, 
theft and sexual offences (Sentencing Council, 2021c).    
It is worth noting that, in contrast with some recent developments in sentencing 
practice, narratives in the sentencing hearing have sometimes been imagined by critics in 
terms of their individualised specificity and attention to detail. Thus, examining the 
increasing use, in the United States in particular, of numerical sentencing guidelines, Aas has 
set out that such quantitatively-focused technologies have been introduced into sentencing 
proceedings ‘at the expense of richness of language and narratives’ (2005, p.21). Similarly, in 
her research on sentencing in the Scottish courts, Jacqueline Tombs has argued that as judges 
have increasingly been presented with ‘formulaic’ information about the people they are 
sentencing, from ‘risk-based instruments’ (2008, p.102), their ‘creative abilities’ have been 
hindered and they have been prevented from telling as ‘textured’ (2008, p.85) stories as they 
used to previously. I would suggest, however, that an understanding of sentencing accounts 
as governed by local or institutional norms, and so as shaped by criminal law rules and 
conventions, should lead us to conceptualise them in a quite different way.  
Specifically, as stories about the punishability of defendants are filtered through the 
framework of the actus reus and mens rea, I would argue that sentencing narratives have 
never been individually textured and nuanced. Rather, they have always been delivered in a 
standardised and formulaic way. The increasing prevalence of sentencing guidelines in 
England and Wales, which I noted above, and their specification of key factors relating to the 
harm risked or caused by a criminal act as well as the defendant’s culpability, may of course 
have enhanced sentencing stories’ formulaic nature. However, I would contend that the effect 
of these guidelines has been very much to augment a pre-existing formulism; legal 
professionals did not, previously, have an unrestricted discretion to recount their narratives 
however they wished during sentencing proceedings. Thus, the characterisation of courtroom 
practices that I referred to earlier in the chapter, in terms of their mundanity, repetition and 
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routine, might be seen to effectively capture and reflect the nature of the stories that are told 
during the sentencing hearing. The regular telling of legally standardised sentencing 
narratives, therefore – focused on prohibited acts, and the harm risked or caused by such acts, 
as well as forbidden intentions, and the defendant’s specific degree of intent or culpability – 
might be understood as a central element of the criminal court’s repetition and routine. 
As I explained previously in this chapter, and as I will demonstrate in my analysis in 
Chapter Five, there were a couple of instances during my fieldwork where judges appeared to 
be taking particular care to deliver a clearly legalistic narrative. Such care appeared to point 
towards an awareness that there could be a future legal challenge to the punishment they were 
imposing – and so, as I have suggested, to reflect the judge’s concern with ensuring that their 
narrative was defensible to the ‘external’ audience of the Court of Appeal. Yet, the content of 
sentencing narratives is not only governed by local or institutional norms; sentencing stories 
unfold not solely through reference to the conventions of the courtroom and the criminal law. 
As Ewick and Silbey argue, as social acts and practices narratives are shaped by the 
conventions and norms of the wider social context, too. Thus, the stories that we tell ‘bear the 
imprint of dominant cultural meanings’ and reflect and reproduce hegemonic or ‘master 
narratives’ (1995, pp.211–212).  
As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, understanding this provides the link 
between dominant narratives of bordering and the practice of the sentencing hearing. From 
this perspective, we can start to see how contemporary representations of unwanted migrants 
might be seeping into the sentencing process; we can begin to understand how these 
racialised depictions might be percolating into the individual narratives about ‘what 
happened’ that are delivered by the prosecution, defence and judge. Importantly, moreover, 
by turning again to the existing literature on the courts and, specifically, to research on 
gendered and racialised narratives in the trial, we can also start thinking about what dominant 
narratives of bordering might be mobilised to do in sentencing hearings. That is, we can 
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theorise how, in particular, such hegemonic, racialised narratives might be put to work in the 
construction, and negotiation, of defendants’ punishability. Ultimately, this literature suggests 
that the repetition and routine of sentencing narratives will not simply be confined to their 
focus on defendants’ prohibited acts and forbidden intentions. Their formulaic nature will 
play out, too, through the construction of some defendants as problematic in themselves – and 
the insistence, therefore, that these defendants are inherently punishable people. 
 
Making defendants punishable through gender and race: Stories of intrinsically 
problematic people 
Central to the authority and legitimacy of the court is the idea of its neutrality and impartiality 
(Ballinger, 2012; Carlen, 1976; Sachs, 1976). In relation to the trial, this translates, in part, 
into the legal positivist conception of this process that I highlighted earlier. That is, that 
straightforward, factual accounts of the incident being dealt with are presented by the 
prosecution and defence to the jury, who then deliberate on the ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’ put 
before them in order to arrive at the ‘truth’ of ‘what happened’. Alongside this, it translates, 
too, into the idea that the accounts of ‘what happened’ delivered during the trial are not only 
‘exhaustively accurate’ (McBarnet, 1981, p.17) – that they relay the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, and are not partial, shaped or edited in any way – but that they are also 
presented entirely rationally and dispassionately. Hence, the prosecution and defence, and 
especially the judge, who supervises proceedings, are understood to be completely free from 
and unencumbered by the biases and prejudices that are found in wider society. The court, 
therefore, is conceptualised as a space apart from society-at-large; it is understood as distinct 
from, and indeed superior to, ‘the mundane world outside’ (Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby, 
2015, p.65). 
The supposed neutrality and impartiality of the courtroom is alluded to and asserted 
during court proceedings in a number of ways. The robes and wigs worn by barristers and 
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judges in the Crown Court, for instance, present them not as individual people, but 
impersonal representatives of the law. As Winter (2002) highlights in relation to judges in 
particular, moreover, the various appellations used to address them, including ‘the court’ and 
‘your honour’, do something similar. She explains how referring to the judge like this, rather 
than using their actual name, ‘not only communicates reverence, but also depersonalizes the 
judge, transforming her or him into the embodiment of “law and justice”’ (2002, p.348). We 
might note, too, that while the individual names of the prosecution and defence barristers are 
sometimes used in court – though, of course, always in the most formal form, such as ‘Ms X’ 
or ‘Mr Y’ – legal professionals also routinely refer to themselves in an abstract, 
depersonalised way; for instance, ‘the Crown/Defence says that … ’. The court’s neutrality 
and impartiality are also insisted upon by legal professionals through their demeanour and 
behaviour during proceedings. Fielding observes how judges, for instance, ‘tend to preserve 
their aplomb in the face of accounts of the plainly discreditable if not the downright 
depraved, and maintain the pragmatic tone beyond the point at which embarrassment, 
revulsion or mirth overwhelm others’ (2006, p.154; see also Mack and Roach Anleu, 2010). 
As I have highlighted, however, the accounts delivered during the trial are not 
straightforward, unedited representations of ‘what happened’ but partial, shaped versions of 
the incident in question, told with particular goals and purposes in mind. Thus, the alleged 
objectivity and impartiality of the court runs into trouble in this way. Socio-legal researchers 
and criminologists have demonstrated, moreover, how dominant ideas about, for example, 
gender, as well as race, which are prevalent in society generally, are reproduced in the 
courtroom and run through the narratives that are delivered during the criminal trial. Such 
research, then, challenges the idea of the court as a type of superior, sacred space, and bears 
out Ewick and Silbey’s assertion that narratives – including those that are told in the courts – 
are shaped not only by the norms of their immediate setting, but by hegemonic social 
meanings and dominant cultural narratives, too. More than simply documenting that 
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dominant narratives about gender and race can be detected in the court, however, researchers 
working in this area have also explored what, specifically, such narratives are doing in the 
trial. That is, they have analysed how these dominant narratives are utilised in the individual 
narratives delivered by the prosecution, defence and, indeed, the judge, to help construct, and 
contest, the defendant’s guilt. By turning to this literature, therefore, we can begin thinking 
about what the racialised narratives of bordering that are pervasive in the current era might be 
deployed to do in the particular context of the sentencing process. So, we can start 
conceptualising how, specifically, these dominant depictions might be mobilised and used in 
sentencing hearings, to help construct, and negotiate, defendants’ punishability. 
As Lizzie Seal has highlighted, ‘gendered stories’ or ‘established socio-cultural 
narratives’ (2010, p.4) about women have routinely been drawn upon in the prosecution of 
female defendants. In a recent article, Sarah Singh (2017) explores how this played out in a 
trial that she observed at Preston Crown Court, for Natalie Critchley, who was being 
prosecuted for the offence of causing or allowing the death of a child – specifically, her three-
year-old daughter Lia Green. Lia died as a result of peritonitis, which was caused, according 
to medical experts called at Critchley’s trial, by an injury that ‘could not have been 
accidental; it would have required “great force, a violent kick or punch in the stomach or 
being thrown extremely violently against a hard surface”’ (2017, p.517). As Singh explains, 
the prosecution’s case was that Lia’s father, Richard Green – who was being prosecuted for 
murder – had attacked Lia and caused the injuries that resulted in her death. While Critchley 
was not at home at the time of the alleged attack, she was deemed to have ‘allowed’ Lia’s 
death because ‘she was aware of Green’s violent tendencies due to the abuse she herself 
suffered throughout their relationship’ (2017, p.513) but had failed to protect her. The 
prosecution also asserted that, when she returned home, Critchley realised that Lia had been 
injured by Green but failed to get medical assistance straight away. Critchley’s defence set 
out, on the other hand, that ‘as far as she was aware, her daughter was never physically 
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harmed by Green’ (2017, p.513), and that when she realised how unwell Lia – who she 
thought had a stomach upset – was, she called an ambulance immediately. 
Singh observes how, during the case they made against Critchley, the prosecution 
emphasised that she had been having an affair at the time of Lia’s death. In this way, Singh 
notes, even though ‘it was established that [Critchley] had not seen her lover in the days 
preceding Lia’s death, her promiscuity became central to the trial’ (2017, p.521). Indeed, 
Singh goes on to highlight how, to shore up this portrayal of her, the prosecution also ‘drew 
the jury’s attention to the fact that Critchley, for a brief period prior to Lia’s death, had 
worked as a pole dancer’ (2017, p.521). In the presentation of their case, then, and their 
account of ‘what happened’, the prosecution tapped into established socio-cultural narratives 
about acceptable and appropriate femininity and constructed Critchley not as ‘chaste, 
appropriately feminine, and therefore innocent’ (2017, p.521). Rather, through her alleged 
promiscuity and hypersexuality, she was framed as ‘faulty’ (2017, p.519) in her femininity 
and therefore guilty. Thus, in the prosecution’s approach to Critchley we can see what 
Victoria Nagy has identified as the centrality of the ‘good/bad woman dichotomy’ (2014, 
p.214) in women’s trials. Specifically, we can see how female defendants are often 
constituted as guilty by presenting them in terms of their unacceptably unfeminine traits – 
and so by casting them in terms of their inherent ‘badness’ as women.  
Winter (2002) has identified the same approach to female defendants in two rather 
more high-profile cases. In her analysis she explores the trial of Myra Hindley who, in 1966, 
was tried and convicted alongside Ian Brady for the murders of Edward Evans and Lesley 
Ann Downey, and ‘as an accessory after the fact in the murder of John Kilbride, for whose 
murder Ian Brady was found guilty’ (2002, p.344). She also examines the trial of Rosemary 
West, who was convicted in 1995 of the murders of ten girls and young women, alleged to 
have been committed with her husband Fred West, who killed himself in prison before the 
case went to court. Winter highlights that the prosecution in Hindley’s case consistently 
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portrayed her as ‘sexually aggressive. Throughout the main body of the trial Hindley’s 
relationships were all sexualized by the prosecution, regardless of whether or not they were 
sexual in nature’ (2002, p.356). Similarly, Winter points to how the prosecution in West’s 
trial, too, constructed her in terms of her ‘aggressive and promiscuous sexuality’ – and how, 
alongside this, they also worked to present her as the ‘antithesis of “motherhood”’ (2002, 
p.359). In both trials, then, Winter argues, the prosecution deployed gendered ‘images of 
deviancy’ (2002, p.358) in the versions of ‘what happened’ that they relayed, insisting on 
Hindley and West’s intrinsic ‘badness’ as women to construct them as guilty and so to urge 
conviction. Moreover, she highlights how in West’s trial, the judge’s summing up to the jury 
was marked by ‘an almost complete acceptance of the prosecution’s versions of [her] 
sexuality and maternity’ (2002, p.358). Thus the judge, Winter explains, was also pushing the 
jury towards conviction – and he did this, like the prosecution, by relying heavily on ‘notions 
of bad womanhood’ (2002, p.355), by presenting West in terms of her supposedly unfeminine 
behaviours and thus as guilty because of her deviance as a woman. 
Conversely, as critics have noted, the construction of female defendants as not guilty 
often relies on portraying them in terms of their adherence to acceptable and appropriate 
femininity, and thus by insisting on their ‘goodness’, normality and conformity as women 
(Keenan, 2000; Kennedy, 1992). We can see how this plays out through Christine Bell and 
Marie Fox’s (1996) exploration of the 1992 trial of Susan Christie, who was accused of the 
murder of Penny McAllister, the wife of the man with whom she was having an affair. As 
Bell and Fox explain, the defence’s version of ‘what happened’ insisted upon Christie as a 
‘shy virgin’ and ‘sexually innocent’ (1996, p.476). Through this, the defence attempted not, 
in this instance, to assert Christie’s absolute innocence in relation to McAllister’s death – but 
to reduce her level of guilt and support the contention that she should only be convicted of 
manslaughter, on the basis of diminished responsibility.  
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We see something similar in Donald Nicolson’s (1995) analysis of the 1992 Court of 
Appeal judgment in the case of Kiranjit Ahluwalia, who had been convicted, a few years 
earlier, of murdering her abusive husband. As Nicolson demonstrates, in its judgment the 
Court of Appeal emphasised how Ahluwalia was a ‘caring mother’ and pointed as well as to 
her ‘sense of duty as a wife’ (1995, p.194), in order to insist upon her as a good, non-deviant 
woman, and thus to help justify allowing her appeal. Nicolson contrasts the judgment in 
Ahluwalia’s case with the way the Court of Appeal portrayed Sara Thornton, who had also 
been convicted of murdering her abusive husband – but whose first appeal, heard in 1991, 
was refused. As Nicolson notes, the judgment in Thornton’s case focused not only on details 
of ‘what happened’ that appeared to illustrate her premeditation and intent to kill. It also 
constructed her as at the ‘opposite end of the scale of appropriate femininity’ (1995, p.190) to 
Ahluwalia. Thus it was suggested that Thornton was promiscuous, that she had ‘rejected a 
woman’s allotted domestic role’ (1995, p.192) and that she was ‘uppity, rebellious and 
aggressive’ (1995, p.196) – in order to present her as a bad and deviant woman, and so to 
help justify rejecting her appeal. 
Nicolson’s examination of the different presentations of Ahluwalia and Thornton in 
the Court of Appeal judgments on their cases does not focus attention on the intersection 
between dominant narratives about gender and race. Yet, it is important to recognise how the 
idea of Ahluwalia not simply as a caring mother and dutiful wife but, moreover, as a 
stereotypically passive and submissive South Asian woman, was also mobilised to assert her 
lesser guilt. Julia Sudbury has explained, for example: ‘While early stories in the local … 
press described Kiranjit as a dangerous killer, the national media soon picked up on the image 
of a submissive woman facing constant oppression within a traditional South Asian 
community’ (2006, p.15). Thus, Ahluwalia was constructed as deserving of sympathy not 
only as a good and non-deviant woman – but also specifically as a downtrodden and 
vulnerable minority ethnic woman, who needed the civilised protection of (white) British law 
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to rescue her from ‘brutal South Asian patriarchy’ (Sudbury, 2006, p.16). As Nicolson’s 
analysis of Ahluwalia’s case indicates, the literature on the trial has not always paid full 
attention to the coalescence and overlap between the various socially constructed 
differentiations and divisions such as race, gender, and class. As I explain in more detail 
towards the end of this chapter, however, in my analysis of the sentencing hearings that I 
observed, in Chapters Five and Six, I attempt to ensure an intersectional approach (Parmar, 
2017). 
From the existing literature on the trial, therefore, we can see how the individual 
narratives delivered during women’s trials tap into dominant narratives about appropriate 
womanhood and femininity, and portray defendants in opposition to this to insist on them as 
bad, suspect, and deviant in themselves, in order to help construct them as guilty. Conversely, 
by depicting them as in line with these narratives and so as possessors of stereotypically 
feminine traits, legal professionals insist on female defendants as innately good, desirable, 
and conformist women – and present them, through this, as not guilty, or at least as less guilty 
than has been argued by the prosecution. There is, as I now proceed to explore, less research 
examining how dominant narratives about race are mobilised during the trial. From the 
literature that does exist, however, we can identify a very similar process playing out in court 
proceedings against racially minoritised defendants.  
In her important but neglected study Race and Drug Trials: The Social Construction 
of Guilt and Innocence, Kalunta-Crumpton (1999) draws out the very different way that black 
male defendants are treated during Crown Court trials for drug-related offences, compared 
with their white counterparts. As she explains, ‘racially imbued knowledge, stereotypes and 
ideologies permeate the discourses of drug trials’ (1999, p.22), and dominant narratives about 
‘blackness’ are routinely drawn upon in the prosecution of black male defendants. Thus, 
Kalunta-Crumpton notes how in the trials that she observed for black men charged with 
possession of drugs with intent to supply, the prosecution often focused on how the defendant 
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was unemployed – whereas lack of a job was ‘not made a crucial issue in the prosecution of 
cases involving unemployed white defendants’ (1999, p.92). She also explains that black 
defendants were frequently questioned about any cash they had on them at the time of their 
arrest, including very trivial amounts – in one case, a man was asked to account for £14.50 – 
and that they were also asked about how they had been able to afford any other material 
possessions they had, such as clothes, jewellery and cars. By contrast, she notes, questioning 
about material possessions in white defendants’ cases was ‘minimal’ (1999, p.92). In this 
way, then, Kalunta-Crumpton argues, the prosecution worked to secure a conviction for 
possession with intent to supply in black defendants’ cases by tapping into dominant ideas of 
‘black people, deprivation, crime and drug trafficking’ and by appealing to ‘the widely 
acknowledged image of the black community as socio-economically deprived and 
consequently criminally minded’ (1999, p.88). In other words, prosecution barristers invoked 
dominant narratives about entrenched black poverty and an associated black propensity for 
crime – that is, about people who are black as inherently criminal and undesirable – in order 
to persuade the jury to convict these defendants. 
Kalunta-Crumpton also highlights how prosecution barristers invoked other images of 
black deviance during drug trials to help secure a conviction. Thus, she notes how in one case 
that she observed the defendant was asked a series of questions about his intimate 
relationships after he had explained that some of the money that he had on him at the time of 
his arrest had been given to him by his girlfriend. The prosecution started by asking the 
defendant if it was correct that ‘you have many girlfriends’. Following this, the prosecution 
then asked him whether any of his girlfriends ever gave him money – and, more specifically, 
whether he had ever been given money by his girlfriends ‘after gratifying them sexually’. 
Eventually, the prosecution barrister put his insinuation to the defendant more explicitly: 
‘You prostitute for money. Am I right?’ (1999, p.121). We can see here, therefore, as 
Kalunta-Crumpton explains, how the prosecution appealed to the ‘myth of black sexuality’ – 
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the longstanding racist narrative about black men’s promiscuous and hypersexual tendencies, 
which I highlighted in Chapter Two – in order to ‘prejudice the mind of the judge and the 
jury against the defendant’ (1999, p.120).  
Alongside this, Kalunta-Crumpton notes how in some of the cases for black 
defendants that she observed accusations of violence were ‘lifted into visibility by the 
prosecution’, even though ‘such alleged actions were not incorporated into the official 
reason/s for prosecuting [these] defendants’ (1999, p.125). In this way, she argues, well-
known racist ideas about black men as aggressive and violent were tapped into, and so these 
defendants were portrayed as ‘typifying a danger and disruption to society’ (1999, p.125). 
That is, as Kalunta-Crumpton explains in an earlier journal article on her research, black male 
defendants were presented through the appeal to such racist ideas in terms of their ‘deviation 
from conventional societal norms’ and through the lens of ‘black incompatibility with 
normality’ (1998, pp.581–582). What we see unfolding here, then, as prosecution barristers 
framed black defendants through dominant narratives about race, is the construction of these 
defendants as recognisably and inherently deviant, the essentialising of them as suspect and 
undesirable in themselves – and, through this, the insistence that they must be guilty.  
A similar pattern has been traced, indeed, by Patrick Williams and Becky Clarke 
(2018a, 2018b, 2016) in their more recent research on Joint Enterprise trials. As they explain, 
over the past couple of decades the racialised narrative of the gang, which frames young 
black men as naturally deviant and links them with ‘violent criminal and problematic 
behaviours’ (2016, p.5), has become increasingly prominent, reaching its ‘apex’ (2018b) 
following the so-called English ‘riots’ in 2011. Williams and Clarke document how this now 
hegemonic racialised narrative is frequently mobilised as a ‘prosecution resource’ (2016, 
p.15) during Joint Enterprise trials for Black, Asian and minority ethnic defendants, to help 
secure multiple convictions for serious offences –  often murder – beyond the person who 
actually carried out the criminal act. Thus, Williams and Clarke highlight how, according to a 
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survey that they conducted of just under 250 prisoners convicted under the Joint Enterprise 
doctrine, ‘79% of minority ethnic respondents reported that “gang talk” was evoked in the 
prosecution of their court case against 39% of white respondents’ (2018b; see also Williams 
and Clarke, 2018a, 2016).  
As Williams and Clarke explain, by appealing to the racialised narrative of the gang 
prosecution barristers work to establish the legal necessities for conviction under Joint 
Enterprise. So, they aim to establish ‘common purpose’ amongst the various individuals on 
trial, meaning that these individuals are held to ‘have planned to commit crime(s) together’ 
(2018b). Following on from this, the narrative of the gang also functions to insist that 
defendants who were present for the offence but played secondary roles, as well as 
defendants who were not physically present, nonetheless had ‘foresight’ as to what the person 
who carried out the criminal act might do.9 More broadly, as Williams and Clarke observe, 
through the invocation of the hegemonic racialised narrative of the gang, ‘prosecution teams 
signal … to juries the public consciousness of minority ethnic people as the criminal Other’ 
(2018b). That is, as they are framed through this well-known racist narrative, black and other 
racially minoritised defendants are portrayed as intrinsically problematic, as naturally ‘violent 
and crime prone’ (2018a, p.329). They are presented as guilty, therefore, because of their 
undesirable nature and pathological traits – regardless of their (lack of) actions or whether 
they were even present for the offence. Williams and Clarke argue, then, that the racialised 
narrative of the gang allows for and ensures ‘collective punishment’ (2018a, 2018b, 2016). 
 
9 In February 2016 the Supreme Court ruled that the common law had ‘take[n] a wrong turning’ in its 
establishment of ‘foresight’ as central to proving criminal liability for someone who had not actually carried out 
the criminal act. It determined, instead: ‘The correct rule is that foresight is simply evidence (albeit sometimes 
strong evidence) of intent to assist or encourage, which is the proper mental element for establishing secondary 
liability’ (Supreme Court, 2016; emphasis mine). The Supreme Court went on to explain, however, that ‘This 
necessary correction to the wrong turning taken by the law does not mean that every person convicted in the past 
as a secondary party ... will have suffered an unsafe conviction ... It is for [the Court of Appeal] to enquire 
whether substantial injustice would occur in any particular case, but it is not the law that that is shown simply 
because the rules which then prevailed have now been declared to have contained a flaw’ (Supreme Court, 
2016). In 2019, it was reported that there had been only one successful Joint Enterprise appeal since the 
February 2016 ruling (Robins, 2019).  
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This is because it ‘drives the hypercriminalisation of black, mixed, Asian, and other minority 
ethnic (BAME) communities’ and ‘facilitate[s] the arrest, charging and prosecution of 
countless numbers of BAME people for offences they did not commit’ (2018b).   
Through the literature on the trial, therefore, we can see how the production, and 
contestation, of guilt is not simply a legal process, achieved through narratives focused on 
prohibited acts and forbidden intentions. It is a social process, too: that is, guilt is also 
constructed and challenged through wider social classifications and categorisations such as 
gender and race, and notions of goodness and badness, normality and deviance, that are 
inherent to these. We might expect, then, that something similar is happening in the 
sentencing hearing. So, we might anticipate that liability for criminal punishment is likely to 
be produced and negotiated in the same way: affirmed through ideas of the defendant’s 
intrinsic badness and undesirability, and lessened through ideas of their natural goodness and 
non-deviance. And this is how, I would suggest, we might see the problematising, racialising 
narratives of bordering that are prevalent in the current era being put to work by the 
prosecution, defence and judge in the practice of the sentencing hearing.  
Thus, we might expect that these dominant, racialised narratives will be appealed to 
and invoked during proceedings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants, not in order to 
justify their exclusion from the UK – but, in the specific context of the sentencing process, to 
constitute a defendant as inherently problematic and deviant, and through this as punishable. 
And, conversely, these racialised narratives might be negotiated, and negated, to insist that a 
defendant is not intrinsically undesirable and deviant but, in fact, is a good and deserving 
migrant – and consequently that they are less punishable than has been suggested, that they 
can be treated with some leniency. We might anticipate, too, that some of the narratives of 
limited inclusion that I documented in Chapter Two will also be deployed during sentencing 
hearings, as another way of insisting on the innate goodness and desirability of non-white and 
‘not quite white’ migrants and so asserting that they can be punished less severely. Hence, as 
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I suggested earlier, from the literature on the trial it seems likely that the repetition and 
routine of sentencing narratives will play out not only through their concern with the actus 
reus and mens rea of defendants, as well as the level of harm caused or risked by a 
defendant’s wrongful act and their specific degree of culpability. It will probably unfold, too, 
through a focus on some defendants as bad and problematic, or good and desirable, in 
themselves – and, therefore, through the construction and contestation of these defendants as 
inherently punishable people. 
I noted earlier that the existing literature on the trial has not always been attentive to 
the coalescence and overlap between dominant narratives on, for instance, gender and race. 
Indeed, I am conscious that, in the way I have surveyed and presented the literature on 
gendered and racialised narratives in the trial in this chapter – by looking at gender first, and 
then race – I might appear to be intimating a separation between these narratives. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter Two, however, the racialisation of unwanted migrants in 
contemporary narratives of bordering operates, at points, through interactions with other 
socially constructed differentiations and divisions – so, with dominant ideas about gender, as 
well as class. As I analyse the mobilisation of these narratives of bordering during sentencing 
hearings in my empirical chapters, therefore, I work to tease out such instances of interaction 
and overlap. In this way, I attempt to ensure a more ‘multi-dimensional’ (Parmar, 2017, p.35) 
and thus intersectional approach. 
One final issue arises from the existing literature on the trial. According to Ewick and 
Silbey’s analysis, we might expect racialised narratives of bordering simply to run through 
sentencing hearings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants; understanding legal 
professionals’ narratives as social acts and practices means that dominant or hegemonic 
narratives might seep into these at any point. Yet, in her analysis of the trials of Myra 
Hindley and Rosemary West, Winter shows how images of gendered deviancy did not, in 
fact, permeate these trials equally. Rather, she demonstrates how – while the judges in both 
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cases urged the juries towards conviction – in Hindley’s trial the judge did not repeat ‘the 
powerful construction of deviant sexuality offered by the prosecution’ (2002, p.357). 
Conversely, as I have highlighted already, in West’s trial the judge’s summing up reiterated 
the prosecution’s insistence on her problematic sexuality and maternity.  
Winter attributes this disparity in the judges’ approaches to the ‘differing levels of 
evidential strength’ (2002, p.362) in the two trials. Thus, she explains that the evidence 
presented by the prosecution during Hindley’s trial was ‘strong’ (2002, p.344); it included, 
for instance, the testimony of David Smith, Hindley’s brother-in-law, who reported Ian Brady 
and Hindley to the police after witnessing the murder of Edward Evans. In West’s case, 
however, ‘there was no evidence to link her with the bodies, or even some of the victims’ 
(2002, p.345) – and, in fact, throughout the police investigation Fred West had insisted on his 
sole responsibility. Winter argues, therefore, that the judge in West’s trial invoked dominant 
ideas about appropriate femininity and rendered her in terms of her ‘badness’ as a woman to 
make up for the lack of evidence against her – in order, as Winter puts it, to ‘bridge the 
evidential gap’ (2002, p.355). I would suggest, then, that what Winter identifies in her 
analysis should prompt us to be concerned not simply with how narratives of bordering might 
be put to work in the specific context of the sentencing hearing – but with when they might be 
deployed, too. That is, it will be important to explore if these dominant narratives are simply 
running through hearings, or if in fact their mobilisation seems more context-driven and 
specific – to determine whether there are particular circumstances that seem to especially 
prompt the utilisation of racialised narratives of bordering by legal professionals. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed and conceptualised the practice of the sentencing hearing, and 
I have considered how dominant narratives of bordering might be seeping into this process – 
and to what end, more specifically, these racialised depictions might be being mobilised and 
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used. Thus, in the first half of the chapter I used the framework of narrative to think through 
the accounts delivered by legal professionals during the sentencing hearing. By approaching 
the prosecution’s facts of the case, the defence’s plea in mitigation and the judge’s sentencing 
remarks as individual narratives, I argued that we can see how these are not straightforwardly 
factual or representational. Rather, we can understand them as plotted and purposive versions 
of the incident being dealt with by the court – each of which is concerned with constructing, 
or negotiating, the defendant’s punishability. 
In the second half of the chapter, I turned my attention to what the narratives 
delivered during the sentencing hearing might look like and how they might be working 
towards their specific purposes and meanings. I explained, then, that a sociological 
understanding of narratives as social acts or practices helps us to see how they are governed 
by the rules and conventions of their immediate social setting. In the case of sentencing 
narratives, therefore, they are told in line with the framework of the actus reus and mens rea 
– the two core elements of the criminal law. But as social acts and practices individual 
narratives are also shaped by the norms of the wider social context; thus, they reflect 
hegemonic social meanings and reproduce dominant or ‘master’ narratives. In this way, we 
can see how dominant narratives of bordering might be permeating the practice of the 
sentencing hearing. Moreover, by exploring the existing literature on gendered and racialised 
narratives in the trial, we can also start to understand what these racialised depictions might 
be deployed to do in this particular context. That is, we can theorise how they might be put to 
work in the construction, and negotiation, of defendants’ punishability. So, I argued that 
racialised narratives of bordering are likely to be appealed to and invoked in sentencing 
hearings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants, in order to constitute defendants as 
inherently bad and deviant – and, through this, to produce them as punishable. And, 
conversely, these racialised narratives are likely to be negotiated, and negated – and, as I also 
suggested, narratives of limited inclusion are likely to be deployed – in order to insist that 
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defendants are actually good and desirable in themselves. Through this, they will be 
presented as less punishable than has been suggested, and so as worthy of the court’s 
leniency.  
Sentencing proceedings for ‘unwanted’ migrant defendants, therefore, will be marked 
by the repetition and routine that characterises the criminal courts broadly. The narratives 
delivered during these hearings will, of course, repeatedly focus on defendants’ prohibited 
acts and forbidden intentions, in order to construct and negotiate them as punishable in legal 
terms. Alongside this, there is likely to be a consistent concern with ideas of these 
defendants’ intrinsic deviance, or worthiness, too – that is, with whether they are innately 
punishable, or less punishable, people. Having set out the conceptual foundations for my 
research across the past three chapters, then, I now turn to my empirical data. Thus, in the 
second part of the thesis I explore the sentencing hearings for migrants that I observed, in 

























Research Methods and Ethics: Observing Sentencing Hearings 
 
Introduction 
In this thesis, I am concerned with how dominant, racialised narratives of bordering – which 
are disseminated by the UK government and media to problematise ‘unwanted’ migrants and 
justify their targeting by the direct practices of immigration enforcement – might be seeping 
into sentencing proceedings, to help construct and negotiate defendants’ punishability. Over 
the next three chapters of the thesis I turn from the conceptual foundations for my research to 
my empirical data, the sentencing hearings that I observed in Crown Courts across a two-year 
period – and I begin, in this chapter, by giving an account of how I conducted my 
observations. On the face of it, observing court hearings may seem like a relatively 
straightforward form of criminological fieldwork. As John Baldwin notes, since the criminal 
courts are a public setting and anyone can enter them, ‘conducting research [there] need 
involve no more than turning up with a notebook, finding a convenient vantage point, and 
watching whatever takes place’ (2008, p.375). And yet, inevitably perhaps, in practice the 
research process was actually much more complicated than this. In this chapter, therefore, I 
explore the methodological, epistemological and ethical issues relevant to my fieldwork – 
some of which I had anticipated and considered before I started going to court, but others 
which emerged as I was carrying out my observations. 
 
Starting the research process (I): Why court observations? 
It seems important to begin the account of my fieldwork by explaining why I decided to 
conduct my empirical research via observations of sentencing hearings. To some extent, 
given the focus of my research on the narratives that are delivered by legal professionals 
during sentencing proceedings, the choice of court observations may seem like an obvious 
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one. Yet, there are other methods that I could have used: as I noted in Chapter Three, for 
example, some studies of sentencing hearings have relied on court transcripts to carry out 
their research. Thus, it is worth stating explicitly why I felt that attending court and observing 
sentencing hearings myself was the most useful way of investigating their possible 
permeation by dominant, racialised narratives of bordering. 
A key limitation of court observations that has been identified in the criminal justice 
research methods literature has been summarised by Baldwin in the following way: ‘[O]pen 
court proceedings present only the public face of justice. Researchers who sit in court 
commonly realize, with a sense of unease, that the really important decisions in most cases 
are being taken elsewhere’ (2008, p.383; see also Paik and Harris, 2015). As I set out in the 
previous chapter, however, whereas much sentencing research has been preoccupied with 
sentencing decision-making, and so with how magistrates and judges arrive at the decision to 
impose a specific punishment, my focus is on sentencing proceedings and how these unfold. 
As such, I am primarily concerned with what Baldwin refers to as ‘the public face of justice’; 
that is, I am interested in what goes on in the courtroom during sentencing hearings, and how 
legal professionals construct and negotiate the punishability of the defendant. For this reason, 
then, court observations seemed an appropriate choice. I also emphasised in Chapter Three 
my theorisation of sentencing proceedings not only as a legal process but a social process, 
too. I explained, therefore, that despite the myth of the criminal courts’ impartiality and 
neutrality, liability for punishment is likely to be negotiated and produced during sentencing 
hearings not simply through criminal law norms and conventions – but by tapping into wider 
social categorisations such as gender and race, as well. Leslie Paik and Alexes Harris note 
that a strength of observational court research is its ability to reveal ‘the disjuncture between 
the official “law on the books” and what happens in the courtroom, or “law in action”’ (2015, 
p.287), including legal professionals’ reliance on ideas about race, gender and class. Hence, 
from this perspective, carrying out court observations seemed a particularly useful approach 
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for investigating and uncovering the penetration of sentencing hearings by dominant, 
racialised narratives of bordering.  
There are, undoubtedly, disadvantages to observational research in the courts. 
Baldwin highlights that, in fact, ‘few criminologists have engaged in prolonged and 
systematic court observation’, and notes that one reason for this is the ‘lengthy periods of 
unrelenting tedium’ (2008, p.382) to which the criminals courts are subject. In particular, as 
he explains – and as I also indicated in Chapter Three – ‘There are frequent periods in any 
court where little seems to be happening. Delays and adjournments dog the work of the 
courts, and the consequent administrative inertia can sap the energy and enthusiasm of even 
the most committed researcher’ (2008, p.382). Indeed, across the two years that I conducted 
observations, I watched 102 hours of court proceedings. Yet, just under a third of this time, 
33 hours, was spent observing sentencing hearings – and just under a fifth, 17.5 hours, was 
spent watching sentencing hearings immediately relevant to my research, for people who had 
migrated to the UK. A central reason for this was the difficulty in identifying whether a 
hearing was relevant to my research prior to it taking place; I explain this issue in more depth 
below. But it was also a result of the messy and often delayed processes of the courts. On a 
number of occasions I turned up to a particular courtroom, expecting a sentencing hearing to 
take place – but it was hours before the hearing actually started. In some instances this did, as 
Baldwin suggests, affect my energy and enthusiasm for the research. More pressingly, 
however, as a doctoral student I am required to complete and submit my research within a 
specified period of time. Thus, the time-consuming nature of observational court research 
was challenging from a practical perspective. 
Despite this, I felt that conducting court observations was preferable to relying on 
transcripts of sentencing proceedings. In the first place, there would have been clear practical 
difficulties attached to the latter approach. For reasons which I explain in the next section of 
this chapter, in my research I decided to concentrate solely on Crown Court sentencing 
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hearings. Although, unlike in the magistrates’ courts, all Crown Court hearings are recorded, 
transcripts of these are not publicly available. Thus, to access a transcript of an individual 
sentencing hearing, a formal request has to be submitted to the relevant Crown Court (HM 
Courts and Tribunals Service). Just as with court observations, I would have encountered 
problems identifying hearings relevant to my research, for which I wanted to request the 
transcript; as I have said, I explain this issue in more depth below. Added to this, however, it 
is generally the case that Crown Courts charge for each transcript requested. As I document 
later in this chapter, in order to identify 25 sentencing hearings where it was clear that the 
defendant had migrated to the UK, I had to observe over 50 sentencing hearings in total. 
Requesting transcripts for hearings that I thought might be relevant to my research, therefore, 
as a way of finding some that definitely were, could have been a costly enterprise. As a self-
funded doctoral student, this posed a significant barrier. Moreover, it is also the case that 
Crown Courts can refuse to provide all or part of the transcript for a hearing (HM Courts and 
Tribunals Service), which presented a further potential difficulty.   
More important than the practical drawbacks to relying on transcripts, there are also 
clear limitations to what such records can tell us about court proceedings. Thus, as Paik and 
Harris explain, there are many important aspects of court hearings ‘that do not make the 
official “court record”’ (2015, p.288). The official transcript tells us nothing, for instance, 
about the quasi- or non-verbal communications and reactions of the legal professionals 
involved in a specific hearing, including the judge. As Kalunta-Crumpton (1999) notes in her 
research on the mobilisation of dominant racist narratives during trials for drug offences, such 
communications and reactions can be critical to an analysis of court proceedings. Indeed, as I 
document in Chapter Five, during one hearing that I observed the judge’s appeal to a 
racialised narrative of bordering to demean the defendant was partly effected through his 
quasi-verbal reactions to the mitigating plea, as well as the sarcastic tone with which he 
questioned the defence barrister (Hearing 22, Isleworth, 2016; see the table of observations 
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conducted, below). By relying on transcripts, therefore, rather than conducting my own 
observations, I felt that I might miss important pieces of evidence that would aid my 
understanding of sentencing hearings for ‘unwanted’ migrants and how these unfold. 
As I explore in more detail in a subsequent section of this chapter, the difficulties that 
I faced in identifying sentencing hearings relevant to my research meant that, ultimately, the 
25 hearings for people who had migrated to the UK that I observed during my fieldwork 
constituted a convenience sample (Bryman, 2008). Clearly, then, the findings of my research 
are not generalisable beyond their immediate context. Yet, I would contend that observing a 
non-representative sample of sentencing hearings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant 
defendants nonetheless enabled to me to address and answer my research questions. As I 
have explained, my research is focused on how dominant, racialised narratives of bordering 
might be put to work in sentencing proceedings. I also noted in the previous chapter that 
some of the literature on gendered and racialised narratives in the trial prompts a concern 
with when narratives of bordering might appear, too, and if there are specific circumstances 
that seem to especially result in their mobilisation in a hearing. Thus, the ‘more interpretive 
and investigative logic’ (Mason, 2012, p.29) that my research adopted, of examining 25 
hearings for people who had migrated to the UK in depth, allowed me to address these 
questions by paying attention to the ‘richness, complexity and detail’ (Mason, 2012, p.29) of 
the sentencing proceedings that I observed. Through a ‘deep exploration’ of this sample of 
hearings, I was able to develop a detailed understanding and so ‘build an explanation’ 
(Mason, 2012, p.29) of the routine practice of sentencing – and, crucially, of the functioning 






Starting the research process (II): Accessing the courts, identifying research sites, and 
‘finding foreigners’ 
I began observing sentencing hearings in August 2014, and finished just over two years later, 
in September 2016. During the course of my fieldwork, I observed hearings at three Crown 
Courts in London: Isleworth, Southwark, and Wood Green. I say more about my choice of 
these particular courts, and how I went about identifying sentencing hearings potentially 
relevant to my research to observe, below. At this stage, though, it is worth emphasising that, 
while observing in courts in London was partly a consequence of me living, working and 
studying here, it was also an obvious choice for a research project focused on the sentencing 
of ‘unwanted’ migrants. London has the highest proportion of inhabitants of any city in 
England and Wales who were born outside the UK: in 2018, 36% of London’s population had 
been born abroad (ONS, 2019). Additionally, many of its foreign-born residents come 
originally from countries in the Global South, or Southern and Eastern Europe. According to 
the 2018 figures, the ten most common countries of birth for London residents born outside 
the UK were, in this order: India, Bangladesh, Poland, Romania, Italy, Pakistan, Ireland, 
Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Jamaica (Mayor of London, 2018). Thus it seemed probable that, by 
conducting my research in the criminal courts in London, I would be able to observe 
sentencing hearings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants, whom government and 
media narratives of bordering have typically problematised and racialised and who are the 
focus of my research. 
Before beginning my fieldwork, I spent some time considering whether I should apply 
to the Courts and Tribunals Service for formal research access to the courts in which I was 
planning to observe. In the end, I decided against doing this, for several reasons. First of all, 
as I highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, the criminal courts are a public setting and 
anyone can enter them; thus, there was no real need to obtain formal permission in order to 
carry out observations. Secondly – while it seemed likely that by observing in courts in 
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London, I would come across cases relevant to my research – formal access would not 
necessarily have helped to me to establish, prior to a specific hearing, if it was for someone 
originally from a country in the Global South or Southern and Eastern Europe. I explain the 
difficulties with identifying relevant sentencing hearings, and how I dealt with this during my 
fieldwork, in detail below.  
Thirdly, I was concerned that my application to the Courts and Tribunals Service 
might be refused. This was partly because of my status as a doctoral student, rather than a 
more senior academic researcher. But it was also because of the nature of my research. 
Racism in the courts can be perceived by legal professionals and, perhaps, by judges in 
particular, as a very contentious issue. During the course of my research, in fact, Peter 
Herbert, one of the few black Crown Court judges, was found to be guilty of judicial 
misconduct for stating during a speech that ‘racism is alive and well … in the judiciary’ 
(Taylor, 2017a).  The public nature of the courts means that, even if I had been refused 
formal access for my research, I could have conducted observations anyway. However, I was 
worried that such a refusal could have an impact on my fieldwork – that it might mean, for 
instance, that I would be subject to particular scrutiny while carrying out my observations. 
Prior to starting my observations, therefore, my decision not to apply to the Courts 
and Tribunals Service was really shaped by practical considerations. As I began attending 
court, however, and I started to observe sentencing hearings where narratives of bordering 
were being mobilised, this began to feel like the right approach for other reasons. In 
particular, as I observed hearings where the defendant was being framed through a racialised 
narrative of bordering by the prosecution, or by the judge, in order to help produce them as 
punishable, maintaining a clear distance from the institution demeaning and disparaging them 
like this began to feel ethically important. I fully recognise, though, that while I was able to 
carry out my research without applying for formal access, for many other criminal justice 
research projects – including, although not limited to, those investigating more closed 
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institutions and settings – not obtaining official permission would simply mean that the 
research does not get done. 
While planning my fieldwork, I had considered observing at magistrates’ courts as 
well. A researcher to whom I spoke, however, who had previously carried out extensive court 
observations, suggested that given my focus on narrative it might be more fruitful to 
concentrate solely on the Crown Court, since the more minor matters that go through the 
lower courts tend to be dealt with very quickly. This resonated with some of the existing 
research on the courts that I had read. Kalunta-Crumpton, for instance, who conducted her 
research on the mobilisation of racist narratives during trials for drug offences in both courts, 
explained that she nonetheless prioritised Crown Court trials ‘for the principal reason that 
[they] provided more detailed and descriptive information useful to the analysis of social 
construction and claims-making’ (1999, p.67). I chose the specific Crown Courts at which I 
observed for a mixture of reasons. I began my observations at Wood Green, mainly because it 
has a reputation for being quite open towards researchers. Once I felt more confident, and 
that I had a better understanding of the workings of the court, I also started observing at 
Isleworth. I chose this court partly because it covers a port of entry, Heathrow, and so deals 
with a significant number of immigration offences (Aliverti, 2013a). Although I wanted to 
see sentencing hearings for a range of different offences, I also wanted to ensure that I 
observed some that were specifically border-related – so, that were concerned with the class 
of criminal infractions for which it is migrants who are overwhelmingly prosecuted and 
punished. In this way, then, although the hearings that I observed during my fieldwork 
ultimately constituted, as I have noted, a convenience sample, there was nonetheless 
purposiveness (Bryman, 2008) within my approach.  
I had planned to focus on just Wood Green and Isleworth; but, about ten months into 
my research, I decided to start observing at Southwark as well. I added this court partly for 
practical reasons: as I was carrying out the research part-time, alongside a job, I felt that I 
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needed to be able to observe hearings at a court closer to where I live. In line with the 
element of purposiveness within my sampling approach identified above, however, I also 
added Southwark because it tends to deal with more serious, and sometimes more high-
profile, cases. I thought, therefore, that observing sentencing hearings there would provide an 
interesting contrast with the other two courts. Indeed, the only sentencing hearing that I 
observed during my research where the public gallery was packed took place at Southwark. 
As I indicated in Chapter Three, in most of the other hearings that I saw there was only a 
handful of people, if that, watching the proceedings, and the ‘public’ setting of the court 
actually felt very private – something I touch on again later on in this chapter. During the 
two-year period that I was conducting observations I tried to go to court regularly, and at 
least once a fortnight. There were, however, times when my job and other pressures made it 
difficult to do this, and on a couple of occasions I did not observe any hearings at all for a 
period of a few months. 
I highlighted above that one of the reasons that I decided not to apply for formal 
access to the courts to conduct observations was that this would not necessarily have helped 
to me to establish, prior to a specific sentencing hearing, if it was relevant to my research or 
not. This is because, during the period that I was conducting my observations, the criminal 
courts were not routinely identifying and recording defendants’ nationalities (Aliverti, 2016). 
The requirement for defendants to state their nationality during court proceedings was, as I 
highlighted in Chapter One, legislated for by the Policing and Crime Act 2017; thus, this 
requirement was introduced after I had carried out my final court observation, in September 
2016. As I got further into my observations it did become clear that – although defendants’ 
nationalities were not being identified and recorded routinely during the period of my 
fieldwork – by the the sentencing hearing there was sometimes information in the court 
papers that identified the defendant as a migrant, and which also indicated which country 
they had migrated from. Thus, applying for official permission and gaining access to court 
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files may have made it easier for me to identify, in advance of hearings, if they were for 
someone originally from a country in the Global South or Southern and Eastern Europe. By 
the time that this had become clear to me, however, I had already got underway with my 
observations. Moreover, as I have also explained, there were other reasons that I did not 
apply to the Courts and Tribunal Service for formal research access, including the nature of 
my research.   
As such, I developed other methods to ensure that I observed sentencing hearings 
relevant to my project. So, on several occasions when I first started my fieldwork, I took the 
following approach. The day before my visit, I looked through the next day’s listings for the 
Crown Court at which I was planning to observe: these include defendants’ names, a broad 
time slot for each hearing, whether an interpreter is required – and, importantly, the type of 
hearing that is taking place is. In this way, I could identify all the sentencing hearings 
happening in a particular court on the day that I was visiting – and I would then attempt to 
observe all of these. Through this method, I thought I would undoubtedly come across 
sentencing hearings for people who had migrated to the UK from countries in the Global 
South or Southern and Eastern Europe. Moreover, such a method meant that I would be able 
to find these cases without, for instance, selecting certain hearings on the basis that the 
defendant’s name ‘sounded foreign’, or by assuming that hearings where an interpreter was 
being used must be for someone who had not been born in the UK. Thus, I hoped that this 
approach would allow me to identify hearings relevant to my research without resorting to 
racialised conceptions of belonging, which criminal justice institutions have typically relied 
upon in their efforts to ‘find foreigners’ (Kaufman, 2012, p.701; see also Parmar, 2019, 
2018a). 
This approach did work to some extent: on the occasions that I attended court and 
adopted this method, I observed some relevant hearings. However, there were also problems 
with it. Firstly, sentencing hearings that are listed for the same day are also sometimes 
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scheduled to take place at the same time as each other, in different courtrooms; so, a choice 
has to be made between hearings. Even if hearings are listed for different times, moreover, as 
I noted earlier in the chapter court proceedings often do not go ahead when they are supposed 
to. Further clashes between sentencing hearings, therefore, can happen as a result of this.  
Secondly, at times it felt like attempting to observe multiple sentencing hearings in 
one day was not necessarily conducive to careful, detailed research. After each hearing I 
always tried to spend some time going over the notes that I had taken, to make sure I could 
read and understand them; I often had to write very quickly while observing, in order to keep 
up with the proceedings. Alongside this, I also tried to spend time after each hearing 
reflecting on what I had seen, and writing up any further impressions and observations – so I 
would record, for instance, anything I might have noticed during the hearing that felt 
interesting or important, that I did not have time to write down while I was in court (see 
Johnson, 2011). When I observed several hearings in one day, however, I sometimes felt that 
the quality of my reflections was affected. In particular, if I moved straight from one hearing 
to another, I often would not have time to think over and write further about the hearing that I 
had just seen until later on in the day. I worried, therefore, that there were aspects or features 
of these hearings that I simply forgot about, and did not document when I reflected on them 
later. 
Thirdly, by conducting my research in this way, I also started to accumulate a sizeable 
amount of material on non-migrant hearings. This was undoubtedly helpful: observing a 
significant number of hearings for non-migrants and migrants alike in the earlier stages of my 
research enabled me to develop quite quickly an understanding of the practice of the 
sentencing hearing – to grasp what the individual narratives delivered by the different legal 
professionals involved were working to achieve. Additionally, although mine is not a 
comparative research project, observing hearings for non-migrants helped to me identify a 
specific approach to pressing for leniency in the sentencing proceedings for non-white and 
156 
 
‘not quite white’ migrants that I saw. That is, it helped me to see that a particular formulation 
deployed by defence barristers during ‘unwanted’ migrant hearings was similar to, but 
nonetheless distinct from, an approach often used in pleas in mitigation for people who had 
been born in the UK. I explore this in the chapter that follows. I felt, however, that if I 
continued with this approach for the duration of my fieldwork, I would end up gathering a 
vast amount of material that was not immediately relevant to my research – and that I simply 
was not going to be able to comprehend and analyse in depth.  
Finally, as the first few months of my fieldwork passed, it became clear that I had 
managed to observe a relatively small number of sentencing hearings for migrants by using 
this method. Thus, I realised that I needed to find a way of seeing more hearings relevant to 
my research more quickly, in order to be able to observe ‘enough’ – I say more about what 
this means later on – and complete my fieldwork in a reasonable period of time. In the end, 
therefore, I did resort to the problematic approach that I detailed above. So, I began trying to 
identify sentencing hearings relevant to my research by looking at defendants’ names on 
court listings, as well as whether an interpreter was required for the proceedings. Even as I 
felt I was able to maintain an important ethical distance from the courts by not applying for 
formal research access, then, I simultaneously brought myself closer to them, as I relied on 
stereotypical assumptions and conceptions in order to ‘find foreigners’ (see also Aliverti, 
2018a). 
Across the two years of my fieldwork, I observed 53 sentencing hearings – for both 
migrants and non-migrants – in total. In 25 of these hearings, it was clear from what was said 
during the proceedings that the person being sentenced had been born abroad and had 
subsequently migrated to the UK. All of these 25 sentencing hearings for migrants, moreover, 
were for people originally from countries in the Global South or Southern and Eastern 
Europe. Thus, they were all for non-white or ‘not quite white’ migrants, whom the UK 
government and media have repeatedly stigmatised and racialised through narratives of 
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bordering and who are the focus of my research. It is possible, of course, that in some of the 
sentencing hearings that I observed where there was no reference during the proceedings to 
the defendant having migrated to the UK, they nonetheless were a migrant. It is important to 
emphasise, then, that in stating that I observed 25 hearings relevant to my research during my 
fieldwork, this means that I observed 25 sentencing hearings where the defendant was 
explicitly identified as a migrant. In the table overleaf, I provide a breakdown of all the 
sentencing hearings for people who had migrated to the UK that I observed during my 
fieldwork. For each hearing, I set out details including the country of origin of the defendant, 
the court where I observed the hearing, the offence(s) for which the defendant was being 







Table 1: Sentencing hearings for people who had migrated to the UK observed during fieldwork 
Hearing 
number 



























2 months’ prison 
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1 year and 2 months’ 












1 I have listed only the year of each hearing, in order to help preserve defendants’ anonymity. 
2 For some hearings I have used the exact legal wording of the offence(s) for which the defendant was being sentenced. For other hearings, however, where the legal wording for the 
offence is difficult to understand, I have used a more generalised and lay description. Additionally, in hearings where the defendant was being sentenced for multiple counts of the 
same offence (e.g. multiple thefts) I have not indicated this in the table. I do, however, specify this in my discussion of individual hearings in Chapters Five and Six.   
3 For hearings where the defendant was being sentenced for more than one offence (for instance, Hearing 6), I have given the overall sentence imposed as a result of all the offences 
committed. In cases where the sanction imposed was a suspended sentence or a community order, I have only detailed this; I have not listed any specific requirements imposed as 
part of this (such as unpaid work). 
4 Common assault is a summary offence, so it is normally only dealt with and sentenced in the magistrates’ courts. The hearing in this case, however, was technically an appeal 
against the defendant’s conviction and sentence – hence why it was heard in the Crown Court. As the defendant’s conviction was upheld, though, and the court then re-sentenced 




























Wood Green 2015 1 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Man Rape, attempted rape and 
sexual assault 
Extended Determinate 
Sentence of 23 years; 





Isleworth 2015 1 Sri Lanka Man Related to being drunk and 
disruptive on a flight6 
 
 
6 months’ prison, 



















8 months’ prison, 
suspended for 12 months 
 
 
5 The Extended Determinate Sentence (EDS) was introduced in 2012, following the abolition of the Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) sentence. The EDS consists of a 
custodial term (in this instance 18 years) followed by an extended period on licence. There are also specific release arrangements for this type of sentence. Whereas, with normal or 
determinate prison sentences, release usually happens automatically at the halfway point of the custodial term, for most people now subject to an EDS it is only possible to apply to 
the Parole Board for release once two-thirds of the custodial term has been completed – and this will only go ahead, of course, if the Parole Board approves it (Inside Time, 2016). 




















Southwark 2015 7 5 from Poland; 1 
from Albania; 1 
from UK  
All men Drug-related offences, 
ranging from possession 
with intent to supply to 
importation (Class A and 
B) 
Ranging from 6 years to 
20 years’ prison 
11 
 
Isleworth 2015 1 Not specified, but 
probably a country 
in Northwest or 
Central Africa7 
Woman Benefit fraud, by failing to 






Isleworth 2015 1 Poland Man Theft, racially-aggravated 






Southwark 2015 3 All from Lithuania All men Handling stolen vehicles Ranging from 12 to 15 
months’ prison, 




Isleworth 2016 1 Nigeria Man Causing grievous bodily 
harm with intent 
 
 









6 months’ prison, 
suspended for 18 months 
 
 
7 As I explain in Chapter Five, when I explore this hearing, the defendant’s country of origin was not specified during the proceedings. However, for a number of reasons it seemed 




















Isleworth 2016 1 Democratic 





6 months’ prison, 




Isleworth 2016 1 Albania Woman Seeking to obtain leave to 
enter or remain by 
deception 
 
8 months’ prison, 

















14 weeks’ prison, 








7 months’ prison 
21 
 
Southwark 2016 1 Poland Man Possession of drugs with 
intent to supply  
(Class A) 
 




Isleworth 2016 1 Uganda Man Fraud, possession of 
articles for use in fraud and 
possession of a false 
identity document 































Isleworth 2016 1 Palestine Man Possession of articles for 
use in fraud and possession 
of a false identity document 
 
  









1 year prison, suspended 




As I explained earlier, during my fieldwork I observed a total of 102 hours of court 
proceedings – with 33 of these hours spent observing sentencing hearings, and 17.5 hours 
spent observing sentencing hearings immediately relevant to my research, for people who had 
migrated to the UK. The length of the individual sentencing hearings for migrants that I 
observed varied significantly. The shortest hearing that I watched, for a man originally from 
Romania who had pleaded guilty to assault occasioning actual bodily harm (Hearing 9, Wood 
Green, 2015), was just 10 minutes long. The longest hearing, for seven men – five from 
Poland, one from Albania, and one from the UK – being sentenced for drug-related offences 
ranging from possession with intent to supply to importation (Hearing 10, Southwark, 2015), 
lasted for over two hours. The longest hearing for an individual defendant that I observed 
lasted for almost one and a half hours: this was for a woman originally from Romania, who 
had been convicted of a series of non-domestic burglaries and thefts (Hearing 25, Southwark, 
2016). In total, nine of the hearings for migrants that I observed were under 30 minutes long; 
10 lasted for between 30 minutes and under an hour; and six continued for an hour or more.    
The difficulties that I faced in identifying hearings relevant to my research meant that, 
as previously stated, the 25 sentencing hearings for migrants that I observed during my 
fieldwork constituted a convenience sample. That is, I included within my research sample 
any sentencing hearing for a defendant who had migrated to the UK that I came across during 
the two-year period that I was conducting observations; I watched this group of 25 hearings 
because, quite simply, they were available to me (Bryman, 2008). Nonetheless, it is important 
to highlight that, although it was a convenience sample, there was range and variety amongst 
the sentencing hearings for migrants that I observed. Thus, I saw hearings for a mixture of 
offence types: this included border-related offences – for which, as I have noted, it is 
predominantly migrants who are prosecuted and punished – as well as offences such as 
assault, burglary, and theft, which are common amongst all defendants in the Crown Court. 
The hearings also varied in terms of offence severity. So, I saw hearings for relatively minor 
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offences, such as common assault, and possession of an unauthorised medicinal product, as 
well as for those that are more serious, such as rape. In line with this range in offence 
seriousness, moreover, I observed sentencing hearings where less punitive sanctions – such as 
a conditional discharge – were imposed, as well as those where lengthy prison sentences were 
handed down.  
There was variation within the sample, too, in terms of the defendants. For example, 
some defendants had migrated to the UK relatively recently, within the past few years, but a 
number had been in the country for over a decade. Some did not have valid immigration 
status, and so were undocumented, whereas others had leave to remain – and in some 
hearings it was made clear that the defendant had acquired legal citizenship and so had 
‘naturalised’ as a British citizen. Additionally, I watched sentencing hearings for both men 
and women – although reflecting the low proportion of women who are processed through 
the criminal justice system (Prison Reform Trust, 2019), out of a total of 33 defendants across 
the 25 relevant hearings that I observed, just four defendants were women. Through the 
sample of hearings that I saw, therefore, I was not only able to engage in a ‘deep exploration’ 
of the practice of the sentencing hearing overall; I was also able to investigate some of the 
variations that might differentially inflect and shape proceedings (Mason, 2012). In the first 
hearing I examine in Chapter Five, for instance, for a woman originally from Albania who 
had pleaded guilty to an immigration-related offence (Hearing 17, Isleworth, 2016), I 
document how at one point her defence barrister portrayed her through a narrative of limited 
inclusion, in a specifically gendered way.   
It is, however, a limitation of my research that, while I observed sentencing hearings 
both for people originally from countries in the Global South, and those from Southern and 
Eastern Europe, the 25 hearings for ‘unwanted’ migrants that I saw were quite heavily 
dominated by ‘not quite white’ defendants. As can be seen from the table of the observations 
that I conducted, out of the 33 defendants across the 25 relevant hearings that I saw, 19 
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defendants were originally from countries in Southern or Eastern Europe. Yet, despite this, I 
still managed to capture some of the nuances of narratives of bordering through the 
sentencing hearings that I observed. In Chapter Two, I documented how non-white and ‘not 
quite white’ migrants are often racialised by narratives of bordering in the same way – that 
they are collectively essentialised and pathologised as inherently abusive immigration cheats 
and parasitical scroungers, as well as natural-born criminals and sexual predators. At the 
same time, though, as I also noted, there is racial stratification within these narratives.  
Thus, I drew out how, for example, when small groups of unwanted migrants have 
been elevated to the position of ‘genuine’ asylum seekers, it is often people who are 
ostensibly white – such as, for example, refugees from Kosovo during the late 1990s – who 
have been demarcated like this. I documented, too, how media reporting has frequently used 
visual images to insist on a strong and particular link between black migrant men and certain 
forms of criminality. As I explained, then, coverage of ‘clashes’ between the French police 
and those living in the ‘Jungle’ camp in Calais during the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’ carried 
numerous pictures of groups of young black men, who were blamed for the disorder and 
violence. Similarly, ‘foreign criminal’ media reports have worked to evoke and remobilise 
older, overtly racist narratives about sexual violence and black men, by repeatedly publishing 
pictures of men originally from countries in Africa and the Caribbean who have been 
convicted of sexual offences. As we will see in the analysis of my empirical material, such 
stratification on the basis of phenotypic difference is detectable within the data that I 
collected. In Chapter Six, therefore, I explore a hearing for a man originally from Democratic 
Republic of Congo, who had been convicted of rape, attempted rape and sexual assault 
(Hearing 6, Wood Green, 2015). In this hearing, the judge portrayed the defendant through 
the racialised narrative of bordering of the sexual predator – and the defendant’s skin colour 




Data collection and analysis: Capturing ‘what happens’ in court and the impact of my 
social positioning, observing ‘enough’ sentencing hearings, and my analytic approach 
As I indicated earlier, when I highlighted that it was often quite difficult to keep up with 
proceedings, my approach to conducting observations and collecting data was, essentially, to 
try to record as much of each sentencing hearing as possible. During each hearing, then, I 
used speedwriting in order to be able to create, afterwards, effectively a transcript of the 
proceedings (Smith and Skinner, 2017). I also tried to document other aspects of the hearing 
– for instance, the way that the defendant was behaving or the judge’s non-verbal reactions, 
including facial expressions. As Singh (2017) has noted, due to the pace of proceedings it is 
often quite difficult to do this – that is, to keep a verbatim record of what is being said and 
also to document other things that are going on in court. However, although I started my 
fieldwork with a fairly clear idea of what I was researching, I also wanted to be able to 
capture aspects that I had not thought about or identified as important prior to starting my 
observations. I felt it was important, therefore, to take this relatively freeform approach. As I 
explained earlier, I always tried to spend time immediately after each hearing going over my 
notes, to make sure that I could read and understand what I had written and also to add any 
further details of or reflections on the proceedings that I had just observed. I also typed up my 
notes as soon as possible after the hearings – either on the same day, or the day afterwards. In 
this way, I hope I have been able to produce accurate and reliable accounts (Johnson, 2011). 
It is important, though, to acknowledge the limitations of my records. As I spent a lot 
of time in court looking down and writing, to try to produce a verbatim record of 
proceedings, there will, of course, be things that happened that I simply did not notice. My 
records of the verbal transactions in court are also sometimes incomplete. Like Aliverti 
(2013a), I found there were times where it was difficult to follow the technical language 
being used, or where legal professionals were speaking very quickly – or where I simply 
could not hear what was being said. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge my bias as a 
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researcher who is interested in and focused upon a specific topic, and the potential effects of 
this. As Toni Johnson explains: ‘Undoubtedly I view events through a particular lens of 
inquiry and this ultimately shapes the way in which my perception of events unfold. I write 
about what I perceive as significant and that which substantiates my own hypothesis’ (2011, 
p.64). While I hope my more freeform approach to recording court proceedings will have 
helped to counter the effects of this bias, it is likely, nevertheless, that there were ‘missed 
moments … outside the scope of my vision or interest’ (Johnson, 2011, p.65). 
The reliability and accuracy of my observations, and subsequent analysis and 
interpretation of them, must also be considered in relation to my social position: specifically, 
my position as a white, British researcher, who has never been racially minoritised or 
experienced racist discrimination, investigating racism in the courts against migrants who are 
deemed unwelcome. I raise this here not to engage, I hope, in what Claire Alexander has 
referred to as ‘reflexivity by rote … a necessary genuflection at the altars of power and 
difference’ (2004, p.138). Rather, I aim to actually contend with the impact of my positioning 
on the research that I have produced (Parmar, 2018b; Lal, 1996) – to take seriously the effects 
of my privileged racial identity on my work (Duneier, 2004). At various points during my 
research, indeed, I received important reminders about the effects of my privileged 
positioning on my investigations and analysis – about the blind spots and limitations of my 
perspective and the partiality of my view (Haraway, 1988).  
During a workshop when I presented a paper on some of my early findings, for 
instance, my ‘implicitly white perspective’ was ‘exposed’ (Phillips and Earle, 2010, p.367) to 
me as it was pointed out that I had not said anything about defendants’ presence and visibility 
in the courtroom in my analysis. Thus, it was highlighted that I had not explored the effects 
of visual and somatic difference on the way that non-white migrants were narrated and 
racialised. I hope, in my analysis across the forthcoming empirical chapters, that I have now 
gone some way to address this. Even as I draw out the similarities in the way that non-white 
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and ‘not quite white’ migrants were racialised, then, as they were framed through the 
essentialising, homogenising narratives of bordering that I mapped in Chapter Two, I have 
also worked to document the differences in their treatment. Such differences include the 
racial stratification within narratives of bordering that I referred to in the previous section, 
and the way that this appeared to unfold in one particular hearing – as well as other instances 
where it seemed that the defendant’s phenotypic difference was shaping legal professionals’ 
articulations and reactions.  By thinking about how my social position influences what I see 
and how I interpret it, and by attempting to address limitations to my research when these 
have been pointed out to me, therefore, I have aimed to approach reflexivity as more than 
mere ‘confessional or testimonial exhortation’ (Phillips and Earle, 2010, p.362). Instead, I 
have attempted to engage with it as, in Phillips and Earle’s formulation (2010), an ongoing 
practice in the collection, analysis and writing up of my data. 
In fact, a further instance where I was alerted to something that I had not seen – or, at 
least, to which I had not paid sufficient attention – led to me making changes to my overall 
project design. During a presentation of my research at a conference, I was asked about 
resistance to narratives of bordering: one question enquired whether I had ever seen defence 
barristers do anything more than just negotiate these narratives, and another asked what I had 
observed in terms of defendants’ reactions and resistance to being characterised in this way. 
In my responses, I gave examples of behaviour by defence barristers and defendants that had 
seemed to me to be more subversive. However, I think I also downplayed these as I recounted 
what had happened, concentrating more in my replies on the highly regulated nature of the 
courtroom and the difficulties, particularly for defendants, of doing anything that might be 
seen as stepping out of line.  
This, indeed, was how I was planning to frame these moments in the writing of my 
thesis. At this point, I was not intending to do more than briefly explore them, within my 
overarching analysis of how racialised narratives of bordering were being deployed. As I 
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thought about this further following the conference, however, and as I began to write up these 
instances, it became apparent to me that by approaching and portraying such moments of 
resistance in this way I was presenting a view of migrants who are deemed unwanted as only 
ever stigmatised and abjectified. That is, through my depiction of ‘what happens’ in the 
sentencing process, and the lack of attention that I was paying to defence barristers and 
defendants’ practices of contestation and subversion, I was actually reproducing and re-
inscribing the logics of ‘othering’ (Clarke, Chadwick and Williams, 2017). 
There is, of course, a risk of going too far the other way – of portraying agency and 
resistance ‘beyond what really exists’ (Clarke, Chadwick and Williams, 2017, p.273; see also 
Scraton, 2016). Yet, in reshaping my project, to include, as I have done now, a specific 
chapter on practices of resistance, I have not suggested that these moments were more 
transgressive than they actually were; I do not deny that the courtroom is a tightly controlled 
environment, where disruptions are only ever momentarily destabilising, never revolutionary 
(Johnson, 2011). Rather, through the inclusion of this chapter, I have worked to more fully 
explore defence barristers and defendants’ challenges and contestations during sentencing 
hearings, and to devote sufficient attention to their attempts – however constricted or limited 
– to subvert and resist. I have attempted to ‘write against othering’, therefore, by, as Michelle 
Fine puts it, ‘allow[ing] us to hear the uppity voices … who speak against structures, 
representations, and practices of domination’ (1994, p.78). 
Earlier, I mentioned the issue of observing ‘enough’ sentencing hearings relevant to 
my research during my fieldwork. This was something that I thought about a great deal 
during the period that I was conducting observations: specifically, what does ‘enough’ mean, 
and how many sentencing hearings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants do I need to 
see in order to be able make knowledge claims? Thus, the question of ‘how many hearings?’ 
is, in part, an epistemological matter. As I suggested previously, however, there is a practical 
dimension to it, as well. In particular, the need to complete and submit my doctoral research 
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within a specified time period meant that I could not just carry on with my fieldwork 
indefinitely. As Uwe Flick (2012) has emphasised, then – and, indeed, as my earlier 
discussion on some of the reasons for choosing court observations over transcripts of 
proceedings indicated – qualitative research is shaped not only by ‘internal’ factors, such as 
how you think you can best investigate your topic. It is often heavily influenced by ‘outside’ 
determinants, too, such as financial budgets and time constraints (see also Wincup, 2017).  
In thinking about ‘how many hearings?’, moreover, it was also important for me to 
consider the amount of data with which I could realistically deal. This was because, after 
observing the first few sentencing hearings, I knew that I wanted to examine the transcripts of 
proceedings I was producing using manual analysis. There were a number of reasons for this: 
most importantly, perhaps, it became clear to me after observing several hearings that, in 
order to understand what is happening during the process of sanctioning a defendant, you 
need to read through and view their sentencing hearing as a whole. Having a huge number of 
hearings to deal with, therefore, would have made manual analysis very difficult.  If I had 
collected a large number of sentencing transcripts, good quality and nuanced analysis of my 
data would have been hard to achieve. I give a more detailed explanation of how I actually 
conducted the manual analysis of the data that I collected later in this section.  
In a short essay responding to the age-old qualitative research question ‘How many 
interviews is enough?’, Jensen makes the following suggestion: ‘Rather than asking the 
question “how many interviews should I do”, my advice would be to ask instead: why do I 
feel like [the interviews completed already] are not enough?’ (2012, p.39). In order to 
determine if I had observed ‘enough’ sentencing hearings, I ultimately took a quite similar 
approach. Thus, by the end of September 2016, I had observed 25 hearings for people who 
had migrated to the UK from countries in the Global South or Southern and Eastern Europe. 
At this point, I decided to take a break from observations, to give myself time to read through 
and properly analyse the data that I had so far collected. My plan, at this stage, was that I 
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would start attending court again at some point in the near future, to carry out some further 
observations. Yet, as I examined the transcripts of proceedings that I had already gathered, it 
started to become less clear to me why I thought I needed to do this. That is, responding to 
Jensen’s suggested question, it was not immediately obvious to me why I felt that the 
observations I had carried out so far were not enough. 
I did not reach the qualitative research ideal of theoretical saturation (Baker and 
Edwards, 2012; Bryman, 2008) through the data I collected; I am sure that, had I gone back 
to court and observed further hearings, I would have discovered something new. Nonetheless, 
I did arrive at what Emma Wincup has referred to as ‘a “good enough” understanding’ of my 
research topic through the observations I conducted, so that ‘what was once strange ha[d] 
become familiar’ (2017, p.78). Or, to put it another way, the data that I gathered allowed me 
to identify and comprehend clear patterns, as well as nuances (Paik and Harris, 2015), in the 
mobilisation of dominant, racialised narratives of bordering during sentencing hearings for 
‘unwanted’ migrants. Thus, across the 25 sentencing hearings for non-white and ‘not quite 
white’ migrant defendants that I observed, I traced racialised narratives of bordering in 16 
hearings. The permeation of the sentencing hearings that I watched by these racialised 
narratives was not pervasive, then – but, as I detected them in just under two-thirds of the 
proceedings I saw, it is evident that their appearance was far from anomalous or a one-off. 
Moreover, from the hearings that I observed, I was able to identify a clear pattern as to how 
these dominant, racialised narratives were being deployed in the specific context of 
sentencing proceedings. That is, it was possible to see how racialised narratives of bordering 
were being put to work – or, what they were being mobilised to do – in the construction, and 
negotiation, of non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant defendants’ punishability.  
Alongside this overarching routine, I was also able to draw out smaller patterns and 
routines across the sentencing hearings that I saw. So, it was possible to see how racialised 
narratives of bordering were sometimes invoked, or negotiated, by legal professionals in 
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similar ways, using common formulations or turns of phrase. Additionally, I traced patterns 
in terms of when these dominant narratives tended to appear during hearings. Thus, as I 
document in the next chapter, racialised narratives of bordering seeped into the individual 
narratives delivered by prosecution barristers, and judges, unevenly, and when they were 
appealed to there often seemed to be specific, contextual reasons for this. The sentencing 
hearings where dominant narratives of bordering were not traceable in prosecution and 
judges’ narratives, indeed, generally tied in with this pattern. In contrast to the specificity and 
context underpinning the mobilisation of narratives of bordering in prosecution and judges’ 
narratives, however, I also saw a series of hearings where defence barristers countered the 
idea of their client as an inherently parasitical scrounger for no obvious reason. In these 
hearings, then, the spectre of the scrounger appeared to just run through mitigating pleas – 
and, therefore, a quite different pattern underlying when or in what circumstances racialised 
narratives of bordering permeated sentencing hearings seemed to unfold.  
Consequently, after reviewing the data that I had collected I felt I had developed a 
‘rich understanding’ (Paik and Harris, 2015, p.284) of sentencing proceedings for ‘unwanted’ 
migrants through the patterns I had traced. I decided, then, that I had reached a point in my 
fieldwork where I had seen ‘enough’ hearings, and that it was now possible for me to make 
credible knowledge claims. As I emphasised earlier I recognise, of course, that what I have 
identified across the 25 sentencing hearings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants that 
I observed is not generalisable. I have traced the permeation of sentencing proceedings by 
dominant narratives of bordering, and patterns in terms of how these racialised narratives are 
deployed, as well as when or in what circumstances they tend to appear, within a convenience 
sample of hearings that took place in specific Crown Courts. But I would suggest, 
nonetheless, that what I have detected within this convenience sample offers us an insight 
into the practice of sentencing hearings for ‘unwanted’ migrant defendants in England and 
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Wales. To borrow Johnson’s words, therefore, I would argue that my research can be treated 
as ‘reliably observed data, with instances which may be of importance’ (2011, p.63). 
I noted above that I used manual analysis to examine the data that I collected from my 
observations of sentencing hearings. I would describe this manual analysis as a gradual and 
ongoing process. Thus, it started with the transcription of my written notes from sentencing 
hearings; as I explained previously, I did this as soon as I could following observations – 
either on the same or the following day. Wincup explains that transcribing one’s own notes 
enables researchers ‘to become steeped in the nuances’ (2017, p.137) of the data they have 
collected. As she states, then: ‘The transcription process offers the opportunity for reflection 
on the data and attention to emerging themes and should be seen as an integral part of the 
analytic process’ (2017, p.137). Through transcription, therefore, I began the process of 
familiarising myself with, and comprehending, my data.  
The approach I subsequently took to analyse the hearings that I had observed, once 
transcription of my written notes was complete, was more structured. Thus, in the first 
instance I used what Paik and Harris refer to as ‘focused coding’ (2015, p.291), to identify 
whether the key racialised narratives of bordering that I documented in Chapter Two could be 
detected in the sentencing proceedings I had watched. So, I analysed the transcripts of 
hearings that I had produced specifically to see if the dominant narratives of the abusive 
immigration cheat, the parasitical scrounger, the criminal, the terrorist or the sexual predator 
could be detected. It could be argued, perhaps, that by taking such a focused approach, I ran 
the risk of ‘over-reading’ hearings; that is, by looking specifically for these racialised 
narratives, it seems likely that I would find them. As explained above, however, the manual 
analysis I conducted was an ongoing process – and, therefore, I spent time reflecting on and 
re-reading my data, which included interrogating identifications I had previously made of 
racialised narratives of bordering in hearings. Through this process, indeed, I ultimately 
decided that in four hearings where I had initially identified defence barristers as countering 
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their clients as parasitical scroungers, they were not, in fact, engaging with this racialised 
narrative; I explain why I came to this conclusion in more detail in Chapter Five. Originally, 
then, I identified dominant narratives of bordering as permeating 20 out of the 25 hearings for 
‘unwanted’ migrants that I observed – but, upon further reflection and scrutiny of my data, I 
excluded these four hearings and so the overall number reduced to 16.    
Alongside this focused approach, I also engaged in more ‘open-ended’ (Paik and 
Harris, 2015, p.291) analysis. So – as well as examining the hearings through the pre-
determined categories, or codes, of key narratives of bordering – I attempted to let ‘salient 
themes’ and ‘common concepts, events, processes’ (Paik and Harris, 2015, p.291) emerge 
from the data itself through reading and re-reading of the transcripts. This approach helped 
me to identify the specific patterns that seemed to be playing out in terms of when, or in what 
sort of circumstances, racialised narratives of bordering tended to appear. Thus, having 
initially become alert to these patterns through a few hearings, I was able to pinpoint them as 
potential ‘common processes’ and subsequently find further examples. Taking a more open-
ended approach also helped me to detect ideas about ‘unwanted’ migrants that were 
mobilised by legal professionals during hearings that fell outside the scope of the key 
racialised narratives of bordering. In Chapter Five, for example, I note how length of 
residence in the UK was appealed to in some hearings by defence barristers, to portray their 
client as belonging to the country and so as a good and desirable person who could be 
afforded leniency by the court.  
 Although observations of sentencing hearings were the main source of data for my 
research, I also gathered information about the courts and sentencing proceedings in other 
ways. During my fieldwork, then, I had some conversations with those working in the courts 
in which I was observing: most often court ushers and clerks, and prosecution and defence 
barristers, but also, on two separate occasions, judges. I did not actively seek out these 
conversations, but I also never passed up the opportunity to speak to someone who 
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approached me. Like Lisa Flower (2018), I felt that these informal conversations might offer 
additional information that could be useful to further understanding my research topic.  
When those who approached me discovered that I was a researcher, their next 
question, understandably, was usually ‘What are you researching?’ Typically, I kept my 
response quite simple, telling them that I was looking at the sentencing of people who had 
migrated to the UK – or, on several occasions where the person I was speaking to seemed a 
bit confused by my initial reply, explaining that I was interested in the sentencing of foreign 
nationals. It was noticeable how my social positioning, and specifically my racial identity, 
seemed to affect some responses to this information. Thus, during a conversation that I had 
with a judge quite early on in my observations, his immediate response to the brief 
explanation I gave of my research was to suggest that I should read Roger Hood’s 1992 study 
Race and Sentencing. In this way, then, the judge appeared very alert to the possibility of 
racist discrimination in the sanctioning of migrants. And yet, shortly after this, he insisted 
that there are now around a quarter of a million asylum applications made in the UK every 
year – a gross exaggeration, as the UK in fact deals with about 25,000 to 30,000 asylum 
claims annually (Home Office, 2019d). He then told me, ‘We have a system that can’t cope 
with this abuse’.  
The judge repeated claims about fraudulent asylum seekers duping the UK’s 
immigration system, therefore, without any apparent worry that as a result of this I might 
view him as racist. His seeming lack of concern must, of course, in part be seen in terms of 
the coded nature of this racism. As we will see in the chapters that follow, as I trace the 
permeation of narratives of bordering through sentencing proceedings, such racialised 
formulations were often deployed in open court – so judges, and indeed other legal 
professionals, did not seem worried about saying such things in an officially ‘public’ setting. 
Yet, I also felt that the fact that I am white and British contributed to the judge’s response. 
That is, my racial identity meant that the judge appeared to feel entirely comfortable 
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articulating such views to me, and talking unguardedly about people seeking asylum as 
‘abusers’ of the UK’s immigration system.    
As can be inferred, perhaps, from the fact that some of those working in the courts 
where I conducted observations approached me and asked what I was doing, there was often 
a curiosity about my presence (see also Aliverti, 2018a, 2013a).I In many instances, those 
who approached me ultimately seemed quite unconcerned about me being there, and were 
relaxed about talking and answering questions. At other points, however, I was treated with 
some suspicion. On several occasions, for example, I was told by court ushers that I could not 
write anything down during hearings. They only seemed to be persuaded that making notes 
was, in fact, permitted if I told them that I had observed at the same court just a few weeks 
previously and had been allowed to do this. On another occasion a judge asked me, in open 
court, who I was and what I was doing. I explore this incident more fully, and what it 
appeared to reveal about the sentencing hearing that I had just observed, in Chapter Six. 
During another visit, I was invited to speak with a judge whom I had been observing 
during a break in the proceedings. This might, of course, be interpreted as a display of 
openness and welcome towards research in the courts, rather than as an indicator of wariness 
and suspicion. Yet, as I moved from the public gallery in the courtroom to a seat in the 
judge’s chambers, my relationship to the judge noticeably changed. In the courtroom, I had 
been researching him – but in his chambers, the conversation was very much led by the judge 
and I increasingly felt like the object of scrutiny. The invitation to speak with him in his 
chambers felt, therefore, to some extent as if it was an attempt to restore the usual dynamics 
of power in the courtroom – that is, as if it functioned to demonstrate and reassert the judge’s 
authority over me (Lal, 1996).  
Overall, however, it is important to emphasise that while I was occasionally treated 
with suspicion, I generally moved around and observed in the courts that I visited with 
relative ease. Again, this should be understood in terms of my social positioning, and 
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specifically my racial identity. My whiteness meant that, on some occasions when I visited 
court, I simply was not asked to account for what I was doing or to explain who I was. My 
whiteness also noticeably informed the assumptions that some court staff made about me. At 
various points during my research I was asked, upon entering a courtroom, if I was the police 
officer in the case, or the interpreter for the hearing. At no point, however, was I asked if I 
was the defendant.  
 
The ethics of observing sentencing proceedings 
As I highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, the court is officially a public setting, which 
anyone can enter to observe what is going on. As a result, then, there is no formal ethics 
approval procedure that researchers have to go through if they are conducting court 
observations – and, indeed, criminological studies that have involved observing court 
proceedings have not often reflected on the ethics of carrying out this type of research. Yet, 
as I attended court and observed sentencing hearings, I felt that there were undoubtedly 
ethical issues to navigate. Most prominently, perhaps, I was concerned about the possible 
harm that my research might cause defendants.  
In their research on the Crown Court Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby (2015) highlight 
how some of the defendants to whom they spoke found it upsetting that the court is a public 
space, which anyone can enter – and so that anyone, effectively, might hear details of their 
case. Alongside this, going through the criminal justice system is, in itself, a distressing 
experience (Feeley, 1979). This was immediately evident in a number of the sentencing 
hearings that I saw, where the defendant was visibly anxious and upset. During such 
hearings, in particular, a sense of my own voyeurism – similar, perhaps, to what Phillips 
(2012) describes feeling during her research within prisons – was especially acute, and I had 
concerns about the potential further harm that my presence in court might be causing. That is, 
I was concerned that being watched by an unknown observer, as they were going through the 
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process of being sanctioned, might be increasing and exacerbating the defendant’s anxiety 
and distress. 
I attempted to mitigate this possible impact in different ways. Thus, like Olivia Smith 
and Tina Skinner (2017), I tried to maintain a low profile in court and be discreet in my note-
taking. Sometimes, I would find myself sitting alongside family and friends of the defendant 
in the public gallery – and, if I was ever asked who I was and what I was doing, I would 
clearly explain my research. I also emphasised that the anonymity of everyone involved in 
the hearing, including the defendant, would be preserved when I wrote up my research. Thus, 
across Chapters Five and Six, I have used pseudonyms for all the defendants in the hearings 
that I explore, and I have also changed any other potentially identifying details, such as dates 
of birth. From another perspective, however, it might be argued that while there are ethical 
risks to carrying out court observations, if this sort of research is not conducted then what 
happens in the courts will remain largely invisible. The criminal court, as I have emphasised 
throughout this chapter, is formally a public setting and in theory anyone can enter and watch 
what is taking place. In practice, however, as I have also explained, this rarely happens – and 
so court proceedings are often essentially private in nature, as the only people who are 
present for a hearing are those with an immediate involvement in the case being heard. 
The need to address the privacy and invisibility of what happens in court feels 
particularly pressing in relation to what I document in the empirical chapters that follow. 
Essentially, then, I uncover the processes of racialisation and ‘othering’ that people from the 
Global South and Southern and Eastern Europe are subjected to during sentencing 
proceedings – the harsh and racist ways in which these defendants are constructed and 
negotiated as punishable. My research might, therefore, be viewed in terms of what Clarke, 
Chadwick and Williams (2017) have identified as critical social research as a site of 
resistance. That is, it might be understood in terms of the important role that researchers have 
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to play in ‘bearing witness’ (2017, p.262) to, and communicating knowledge about, processes 
of power, marginalisation and injustice.  
It would be disingenuous to suggest that, as a PhD student, my research does not have 
other aims, as well (Phillips and Bowling, 2003). By pursuing this project I am, of course, 
hoping to attain a specific academic qualification, and potentially begin an academic career. 
At the core of my research, however, is an explicitly political commitment, and ‘decidedly 
interventionist’ (Hillyard et al., 2004, cited by Clarke, Chadwick and Williams, 2017, p.264) 
aims. In choosing this topic, I have taken as my departure point ‘the interests of those out of 
power’ (Mathiesen, 2004, cited by Clarke, Chadwick and Williams, 2017, p.266), and I have 
worked to critically examine the practice of their criminal sanctioning – to scrutinise, and 
denaturalise, the sentencing proceedings to which ‘unwanted’ migrants are subjected. 
Through investigating and interrogating this process, and uncovering the racism that runs 
through it, therefore, I believe that – despite the potential risks of carrying out court 
observations – my research is ethically justified. 
 
Writing up sentencing hearings and presenting my findings 
It is, finally, important to briefly explain how I have chosen to write up my empirical research 
and present my findings. As I noted earlier, I traced dominant, racialised narratives of 
bordering in 16 of the 25 sentencing hearings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant 
defendants that I observed. Over the subsequent two chapters of the thesis I examine all 16 of 
these hearings – and I divide them in the following way. In the next chapter, Chapter Five, I 
explore 13 sentencing hearings where the narrative of the abusive immigration cheat, and/or 
that of the parasitical scrounger, came through. I draw out how these dominant, racialised 
narratives were being put to work in the construction, and negotiation, of ‘unwanted’ 
migrants’ punishability – and I also uncover specific patterns in terms of when, or in what 
sort of circumstances, they tended to emerge. I refer, too, to some of the hearings where 
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dominant narratives of bordering did not come through in this chapter, and I consider the 
non-presence of racialised narratives in these hearings in relation to the specific patterns 
identified around when narratives of bordering typically appeared.    
In Chapter Six, I consider the remaining three sentencing hearings where dominant 
narratives of bordering could be traced. As I explain, in these hearings the same patterns that 
are documented in Chapter Five, as to how and when narratives of bordering were tapped into 
by legal professionals, could be detected. Significantly, however, it was also possible to see 
defence barristers, as well as defendants, behave in more subversive ways in these 
proceedings. I draw out, therefore, how in these three hearings the characterisation of the 
defendant through racialised narratives of bordering was not simply negotiated – but, in fact, 
resisted. In my second empirical chapter, then, I focus on defence barristers and defendants’ 
practices of resistance to racialised narratives about ‘unwanted’ migrants. 
Throughout Chapters Five and Six, I attempt to follow individual sentencing hearings 
all the way through in my analysis, rather than jumping back and forth across different 
hearings. This is important, first of all, because the narratives delivered by the prosecution, 
defence and judge during a sentencing hearing are not discrete or isolated stories, but interact 
with and speak to each other. Thus, following sentencing hearings all the way through helps 
to capture and reflect this. Related to this, keeping hearings together is also important in 
terms of tracing racialised narratives of bordering and the way that these are mobilised across 
sentencing hearings. As we will see in the chapters that follow, sometimes the formulation of 
a defendant through a narrative of bordering in a hearing was very clear. At other times, 
however, the appeal to these racialised narratives was subtle – and, in fact, sometimes it was 
not easily evident without the context of what had gone before, without seeing it in terms of 
the rest of the hearing. By keeping sentencing hearings together, therefore, and following 
them all the way through, I have worked to trace and uncover the full extent of their 








Across the first three chapters of this thesis, I theorised the mobilisation of dominant, 
racialised narratives of bordering during sentencing proceedings. I argued, then, that these 
racialised narratives – which are circulated by the UK government and media to problematise 
non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants and justify their targeting by border enforcement – 
might be tapped into in the specific context of the sentencing hearing, to help construct, and 
negotiate, defendants’ punishability. In this first empirical chapter, I explore 13 of the 
sentencing hearings for migrants from the Global South and Southern and Eastern Europe 
that I observed during my fieldwork in Crown Courts, in which racialised narratives of 
bordering could be detected. As I show, what I conceptualised across the first part of the 
thesis, about the deployment of these narratives in sentencing proceedings, was in fact 
happening.  
Thus, I uncover in this chapter the overarching pattern of how dominant, racialised 
narratives of bordering were being put to work in the construction and negotiation of non-
white and ‘not quite white’ migrant defendants’ punishability. As I demonstrate, two of the 
narratives of bordering I traced in Chapter Two, the narrative of the abusive immigration 
cheat, and that of the parasitical scrounger, could be detected across the 13 hearings that I 
explore. These racialised narratives were appealed to in the individual narratives delivered by 
legal professionals during sentencing, in order to construct defendants as inherently 
problematic, and to essentialise them as undesirable in themselves – and, through this, to 
help produce them as punishable. Conversely, the narratives of the immigration cheat and the 
parasitical scrounger were also negotiated and negated in these hearings in various ways, to 
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insist that defendants were not intrinsically suspect or deviant but, in fact, were naturally 
good and deserving migrants. Through this, defendants were constructed as less punishable 
than had been suggested – and so were portrayed as worthy of the court’s leniency. I 
demonstrate, too, how the narratives of limited inclusion that I documented in Chapter Two 
were invoked in the hearings I saw as well, as another way of constituting defendants as 
deserving of less punitive treatment. In particular, the narrative of migrants who ‘work hard’, 
‘pay taxes’ and ‘contribute to the UK’ – which, as I noted, separates some migrants who are 
usually deemed ‘unwanted’ from the figure of the inherently parasitical scrounger – was 
mobilised during several of the hearings I observed. This functioned to depict defendants as 
desirable in themselves, and thus to insist that it was not necessary to sanction them so 
severely. 
As well as drawing out this overarching pattern, I also document some smaller 
patterns and routines across the 13 sentencing hearings that I examine in this chapter. I show 
how, for instance, legal professionals sometimes invoked, or negotiated, racialised narratives 
of bordering in similar ways, utilising common formulations and turns of phrase. 
Additionally, I trace specific patterns in terms of when, or in what sort of circumstances, 
these racialised narratives tended to appear. I highlighted in Chapter Three how, in her 
analysis of the trials of Myra Hindley and Rosemary West, Winter (2002) shows that images 
of gendered deviancy did not permeate these trials equally. Rather, the judge in West’s trial 
relied much more heavily on ideas of her problematic sexuality and maternity in his summing 
up to the jury because, Winter argues, the evidence against her for the murders she was being 
prosecuted for was weak. Ideas about West’s intrinsic abnormality and badness were 
deployed by the judge, therefore, to help ‘bridge the evidential gap’ (2002, p.355). Something 
similar was detectable in the sentencing hearings that I observed. Thus, racialised narratives 
of bordering seeped into the individual narratives delivered by prosecution barristers, and 
judges, unevenly, and when they were appealed to it often appeared to be for specific, 
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contextual reasons. The sentencing hearings where dominant narratives of bordering were not 
traceable in prosecution and judges’ narratives, indeed – including those hearings where these 
racialised narratives could not be detected at all during the proceedings – generally tied in 
with this pattern. In other words, the specific, contextual factors that seemed to especially 
prompt the mobilisation of racialised narratives of bordering by prosecution barristers, or 
judges, were largely not present in these hearings.    
 In contrast to the specificity and context that apparently underpinned the appeal to 
dominant narratives of bordering in prosecution and judges’ narratives, however, I also saw a 
series of sentencing hearings where the spectre of the parasitical scrounger seemed to just run 
through defence narratives. So, defence barristers countered this racialised narrative even 
though there had been no suggestion that the defendant might be viewed like this – and it was 
not the nature of the offence, either, that appeared to motivate the defence’s insistence that 
their client was not problematic in this way. There was no obvious reason or prompt for 
defence representatives’ negation of this dominant narrative, then; and, therefore, a quite 
different routine as to when or in what circumstances racialised narratives of bordering 
permeated sentencing proceedings seemed to unfold in these hearings. As I explain, it 
seemed, from them, that distancing the defendant from the figure of the scrounger might be 
emerging as a standard feature of defence practice in non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant 
sentencing proceedings. That is, it appeared from these hearings that framing the defendant as 
someone who would never take advantage of and ‘sponge off’ the UK was developing as a 
routine defence approach to asserting their client’s good and desirable nature – and so to 






The narrative of the abusive immigration cheat in immigration offence hearings: Agnesa 
and Tomás 
I begin my analysis in this chapter by exploring the two sentencing hearings I observed 
during my fieldwork that were concerned with immigration-related offences. In these 
hearings the border touched and marked the court overtly, in the way that has been 
documented by critics within border criminology, because the defendants were being 
prosecuted for violating the immigration system. The injection of the direct practices of 
immigration enforcement into court proceedings was visible, too, in one of the hearings as it 
was mentioned by the defendant’s barrister during the plea in mitigation that, after serving 
the sentence imposed for the offence, his client was going to be removed from the UK. 
Alongside this, though, border control also permeated these sentencing proceedings in a more 
covert and subtle manner. As we will see, therefore, the racialised narrative of the abusive 
immigration cheat was tapped into, as well as countered and negated, by the legal 
professionals involved in these hearings, as part of the sentencing hearing practice of 
constructing and negotiating the defendant’s punishability. 
 The first immigration offence hearing that I examine in this section was for a woman, 
originally from Albania, whom I will call Agnesa, who had pleaded guilty to seeking to 
obtain leave to enter or remain by deception, by giving false details on an asylum claim 
(Hearing 17, Isleworth, 2016). While, as we will see, the prosecution attempted to present 
‘what happened’ as fairly straightforward, it transpired during the hearing that the 
circumstances of Agnesa’s arrest and prosecution were actually quite complicated. Thus, 
although the sentencing hearing took place in 2016, the offence itself had actually been 
committed many years earlier, in 2002, when Agnesa first arrived in the UK. The 
immigration authorities found out about what she had done a few years later, in 2005.  Yet, 
Agnesa was not prosecuted at this point but was simply told to leave the country, because the 
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asylum claim which had included the false details had been rejected and so she was in the UK 
without leave to remain.  
So, Agnesa left the country – and, as she was by now married to a British citizen, she 
then made an application to re-enter the UK as the spouse of a citizen, which was approved. 
A few years later, in 2009, she applied for British citizenship, which was also approved. It 
was only when someone linked to her offence was later investigated and prosecuted that 
criminal proceedings were subsequently started against her, around a decade after the 
authorities first became aware of what she had done. This context – that the offence was not 
prosecuted when it initially came to light, and that Agnesa was only brought to court many 
years later – is critical, I would suggest, for understanding how the hearing unfolded. As I 
argue, the very specific circumstances of Agnesa’s case help to explain why, in the 
prosecution and judge’s accounts, the racialised narrative of the inherently abusive 
immigration cheat was mobilised. 
Opening the hearing with the facts of the case, the prosecution set out ‘what 
happened’ in the following way:  
 
Prosecution:  
She arrived in the UK in 2002, in the back of a lorry, and immediately claimed 
asylum. The date of birth she put on her application was 6th November 1984, but it 










Yes. The second false detail was in relation to her parents. She claimed in her 
asylum application that her parents were deceased, so she was an orphaned minor. 
She said that her mother had died in 1995 of natural causes. After this, she said 
she continued to live with her father, who was an army officer, and her brother, 
but then on 16th March 1997 a group of ex-army officers went to the base where 
her father worked and killed him. This was untrue. Neither of her parents were 
deceased, and after she gained leave to remain in this country, her parents applied 
for visitor visas to come and see her. 
 
I said in Chapter Three that I would draw out the distinct purpose of each sentencing 
narrative – what each account is specifically doing in the construction, and negotiation, of the 
defendant’s punishability – in the analysis of my empirical material. To begin with this, then, 
we can see here, I think, how in the facts of the case the prosecution delivers an opening 
version of events that insists it is right for the defendant to be before the court. That is, at the 
very outset of the hearing, ‘what happened’ is narrated in such a way to confirm that the 
defendant is legitimately punishable. There was, potentially much more information that 
could have been included in this opening account. As was typical across many of the 
sentencing hearings that I observed during my fieldwork, however, the prosecution barrister 
relayed a sparse and truncated narrative, in which only certain ‘facts’ were included. Thus, 
the prosecution account of ‘what happened’ delivered at the start of Agnesa’s hearing 
amounted, essentially, to: ‘The defendant came to the UK in 2002, she made a claim for 
asylum, and she put details that she knew were false on her claim.’ In doing so, the 
prosecution set out a version of events that focused on the prohibited conduct in which 
Agnesa had engaged, and her clear intent in doing this. ‘What happened’ was narrated in 
terms of the actus reus and mens rea, therefore, ‘the essential building blocks of a legally 
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sustainable case’ (McConville, Sanders and Leng, 1991, p.65) – in order to present Agnesa as 
punishable in legal terms, to produce her as sanctionable through the norms of the criminal 
law. 
But we can also start to see here how rendering the defendant punishable in the facts 
of the case is not only a legal exercise. Through the inclusion of a couple of additional ‘facts’, 
the prosecution barrister appeared to be making Agnesa sanctionable in another way. It was 
noticeable, for instance, that it was specifically highlighted how Agnesa had entered the UK – 
that, when she arrived in 2002, it was ‘in the back of a lorry’. And it was also interesting that, 
after explaining Agnesa was not, as she had initially claimed, an orphaned minor, the 
prosecution then drew attention to how, once she had secured leave to remain in the UK, ‘her 
parents applied for visitor visas to come and see her’. Both of these details, I would argue, 
were doing more than helping to set out the legal case against Agnesa.  
In the first place, Agnesa’s mode of arrival in the UK was, ultimately, legally 
irrelevant to the offence for which she was being sentenced. In the other hearing for an 
immigration offence that I observed, which I explore later in this section, how the defendant 
had entered the UK was also discussed briefly by the prosecution and judge at the beginning 
of the proceedings. Yet, in this instance this information was, in fact, legally significant, as 
had there been proof that the defendant had used the false passports in his possession to enter 
the country then – according to guidance from the Court of Appeal – this should have 
aggravated his punishment. Given that Agnesa’s was an immigration offence it might, of 
course, be countered that even though how she had got into the country was not legally 
important, the inclusion of this information during her sentencing hearing should hardly be 
considered unusual. I recognise this – but I also think that, within the sparse and truncated 
narrative that is the ‘facts of the case’, the decision to include a specific piece of information 
is significant. Moreover, the particular phrasing used by the prosecution to describe how 
Agnesa had entered the UK, ‘in the back of a lorry’, is worth our attention. As Philo, Briant, 
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and Donald (2013) have highlighted, stories about unwanted migrants ‘sneaking’ into the UK 
‘in the backs of lorries’ appear often in the media and are presented as evidence of the 
determination of ‘bogus asylum seekers’ and ‘illegal immigrants’ to abuse and defraud the 
UK’s immigration system. I would suggest, therefore, that by drawing attention to Agnesa’s 
stereotypically clandestine entry, and by describing it in this specific way, the prosecution 
was beginning to insinuate her as an archetypally deceptive immigration cheat.    
 The second detail that the prosecution included, about Agnesa’s parents’ application 
for visitor visas after she had gained leave to remain in the UK, added to this portrayal. At 
first sight, it seemed that this information was relevant to making the legal case against 
Agnesa, because it evidenced that her parents were, in fact, alive; so, it appeared to be 
demonstrating that one of the details included in her asylum claim, about being an orphan, 
was false. And yet, this was not actually how the immigration authorities found out about this 
aspect of Agnesa’s case. As became clear later in the hearing, Agnesa herself told 
immigration that her parents were still alive, before she secured leave to remain in the UK 
and they applied for visas in order to visit her. By including this legally superfluous 
information, then, about how the parents whom Agnesa had previously said were dead had 
later applied to visit her, the prosecution appeared to be emphasising the scale of the 
deception that Agnesa had committed – the brazenness of her violation of the UK’s 
immigration system. Through the highlighting of this ‘fact’, therefore, as well as the 
information about how she had got into the country, the prosecution seemed to be appealing 
to the dominant narrative of the abusive immigration cheat, mobilising these additional 
details to tap into and frame Agnesa through this racialised narrative. In this way, Agnesa 
was suggested as recognisably and inherently bad and deviant – in order to help produce her 
as punishable. 
Portraying Agnesa in this way might be understood as the prosecution simply 
emphasising her punishability, by highlighting not only the legal basis for her sanctioning, 
189 
 
but insisting on her as an intrinsically undesirable person, too. And yet, there also appeared to 
be specific, contextual reasons why the idea of Agnesa as an archetypal asylum fraudster was 
deployed in this opening narrative. Firstly, invoking the racialised narrative of the abusive 
immigration cheat appeared to support the prosecution’s subsequent contention about how 
punishable Agnesa was – about her particular degree of punishability. As happened in most 
of the other sentencing hearings that I observed, after setting out an account of ‘what 
happened’ the prosecution then suggested a suitable sanction for the offence, noting, in this 
instance: ‘There are no sentencing guidelines, but these are familiar cases … they almost 
always result in a custodial sentence.’ Thus, the suggestion of Agnesa’s scheming and 
manipulative nature – that she had not simply done something problematic, but was 
problematic in herself – seemed to present her not merely as punishable but as particularly 
punishable, to justify the call for her imprisonment.  
As I suggested earlier, moreover, I also think that the very specific circumstances of 
her prosecution underpinned the appeal to this racialised narrative here. The fact that Agnesa 
was not arrested when the offence was first discovered, and that it had, in fact, been known 
about for years before any action was taken meant that simply setting out her criminal act and 
intent was not enough to justify bringing her, now, before a court, and punishing her. The 
prosecution, therefore, implied that Agnesa was an asylum scammer, a natural liar and a 
cheat, as a way of navigating this. So, she was presented as inherently deviant, and thus as 
punishable in herself, to help legitimise the pursuit of sanctions against her at all. I should be 
clear that, by exploring the specific circumstances and reasons that appeared to prompt the 
mobilisation of racialised narratives of bordering by prosecution barristers and, as we will 
also see, by judges, I do not mean to present racism in court as an occasional or exceptional 
occurrence. Rather, as I set out in the introduction to this chapter, I am trying to understand 
why these racialised ideas permeated the sentencing proceedings that I observed unevenly. 
As we will see, while the dominant narrative of the immigration cheat ran through the 
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individual narratives delivered by the prosecution, defence and judge in Agnesa’s hearing, in 
the other immigration offence hearing that I observed it was traceable only in the defence’s 
account. 
In the plea in mitigation, defence barristers generally re-told the story of ‘what 
happened’ to present their client as less punishable than the prosecution had suggested – and, 
as Agnesa’s barrister did this, he appeared attuned to how she had been portrayed in the facts 
of the case and seemed to be countering this framing. So, after acknowledging ‘it is accepted 
that age 20 she came to the UK in the back of a lorry, she was discovered at the port’, he 
explained, however, that it was not Agnesa who had come up with the false details she had 
put on her asylum claim. Rather, ‘Her story would have been prepared in advance by the 
people assisting her – a false story that she was an unaccompanied minor.’ In this way, the 
defence attempted to make Agnesa less punishable in legal terms, by insisting that her degree 
of intent in committing the offence – which, as I noted in Chapter Three, is known under the 
criminal law as her culpability – was minimal. At the same time, though, by insisting that the 
deception did not actually originate with Agnesa, he was also undoing the prosecution’s 
depiction of her as an inherently problematic asylum cheat. The defence built on this as he 
then described how Agnesa’s offence had come to the attention of the immigration authorities 
in the first place, introducing information that, notably, had been excluded from the 
prosecution’s account. After explaining that, soon after arriving in the UK, Agnesa had met 
and married her husband, the defence went on: 
 
She told her husband about her true date of birth and her position. It was her 
husband and her who decided to go to immigration in Croydon1 and seek advice. 
They told her she was here illegally, and that if she remained here she would be 
 
1 The Home Office’s immigration headquarters, Lunar House, is in Croydon. 
191 
 
doing so illegally. They told her she could return to Albania and make a fresh 
application. That is what she did. She wasn’t expelled, she wasn’t arrested, even 
though she told them what she had done.  
  
Part of what the defence was doing here was pointing out that at the time the immigration 
authorities found out about Agnesa’s offence, in 2005, it was not deemed worth prosecuting. 
Alongside this, though, he was also negotiating, and negating, the portrayal of his client as an 
inherently deviant fraudster, trying to dupe and exploit the system, by carefully relaying 
examples of Agnesa’s compliance and honesty in her dealings with immigration. Thus, he 
highlighted that not only was it Agnesa who brought her own offence to immigration’s 
attention – but, in fact, that once she had been told she was in the UK illegally and that she 
had to leave and make a fresh application to re-enter, that is precisely what she did. The 
defence inverted the racialised narrative of the abusive immigration cheat, therefore, insisting 
that far from having a propensity to defraud and deceive Agnesa was a good person who had 
made a one-off mistake – and, consequently, that she could be treated leniently. As the 
defence then explained, ‘She accepts what she did was wrong, wrong in the English 
language, and in the Albanian language’, he appeared to insist once again that Agnesa was 
not, in herself, bad. Through this formulation, however, he did not seem to be specifically 
addressing, and countering, the narrative of the immigration cheat. Rather, he seemed to be 
anticipating the possible perception of an innate Albanian criminality and immorality – to be 
engaging with the potential idea of Agnesa’s natural deviance, expressed this time through 
the coded racial register of nationality. He attempted to head off this possible perception, 
therefore, by insisting that Agnesa fully understood the problem with her actions and was 
entirely able to differentiate between right and wrong. 
In the closing section of his plea the defence emphasised that since returning to the 
UK Agnesa had become a British citizen, and added that ‘her children are British passport 
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holders, her husband is too’. As I highlighted in Chapter One, immigration status has no 
formal relevance for sentencing. Yet, as I also explained, Aliverti’s (2013b) research has 
shown how people convicted of immigration offences, who have insecure immigration status 
and so are removable from the UK, are often given custodial sentences as a way of 
facilitating their ejection from the country. Thus, we might see the defence’s insistence upon 
Agnesa’s British citizenship here as aimed at forestalling this possibility. We might also 
understand the defence’s emphasis not only on Agnesa’s, but also her family’s citizenship 
status, as drawing attention to their legal belonging to the UK – and, therefore, as a way of 
insisting on Agnesa’s deservingness because of this. In some of the other hearings for non-
white and ‘not quite white’ migrants that I saw, length of residence was similarly mobilised 
as a marker of belonging by the defence, to portray the defendant as good and desirable and 
so as worthy of less punitive treatment (see also Aliverti, 2016). Alongside this, though, I 
also think that pointing to how, upon her return to the UK, Agnesa had acquired British 
citizenship worked to underline once more her overall compliance and honesty with the 
immigration system. That is, through this the defence reiterated that Agnesa’s breach of the 
UK’s immigration controls when she first arrived was an anomaly, a one-off violation; she 
subsequently followed, and indeed was accepted through, all the proper channels and 
processes following this unfortunate incident. Once more, therefore, the defence negated and 
inverted the racialised narrative of the abusive immigration cheat – in order to portray his 
client as desirable and deserving in herself, and so to insist that she could be afforded some 
leniency. 
After affirming Agnesa’s goodness in gendered terms, depicting her as a dutiful wife 
and mother as he explained, ‘Her husband works extremely hard and she looks after their four 
children, in a traditional family picture painted for the court’, the defence then ended his 




When she was in her 20s, she did something very wrong … She committed an 
offence; I try not to brush this aside. But it is possible to focus on the positives 
with her because of her good character, her plea, and the fact that she has brought 
up a thriving family and is contributing well to our society. If a custodial sentence 
must be imposed, it can be suspended.  
 
Here, the defence highlighted legal factors reducing Agnesa’s punishability, including her 
‘good character’ or lack of previous convictions, and the fact that she had entered a guilty 
plea (Ashworth, 2015; Wasik, 2014). But he also worked, at this point, to distance her, too, 
from the narrative of the parasitical scrounger, as he emphasised that since returning to the 
UK, ‘she has brought up a thriving family and is contributing well to our society’. Thus, the 
defence framed Agnesa, in a specifically gendered way, through the related narrative of 
limited inclusion that I documented in Chapter Two: that of migrants who are acceptable 
because – instead of freeloading and taking advantage – they ‘work hard’ and ‘contribute to 
the UK’. Through this formulation, the defence reinforced his portrayal of Agnesa as an 
intrinsically good and desirable migrant, who had simply made a terrible mistake. In this 
way, therefore, he supported his contention that an immediate custodial sentence was not 
necessary – that, in spite of what the prosecution had said about the usual sanction imposed 
for this type of offence, Agnesa did not actually have to be punished with such severity. 
The plea in mitigation in the other hearing I observed that was for an immigration-
related offence played out in a very similar way. This hearing was for Tomás, originally from 
Peru, who had pleaded guilty to the possession of two false passports (Hearing 20, 
Southwark, 2016). Although the prosecution did not obviously cast him as a stereotypically 
abusive immigration cheat in the facts of the case, the defence nonetheless seemed very 
concerned to dispel any idea of his client like this. The nature of the offence, I would suggest, 
prompted his concern that Tomás might be viewed in this way. Throughout the defence’s 
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version of ‘what happened’, then, he worked to insist that Tomás was not inherently 
fraudulent or abusive but that he was, rather, a good migrant who had simply made an 
unfortunate mistake. Notably, the defence did this in ways that paralleled the tactics utilised 
by the defence barrister in Agnesa’s hearing. Thus, he highlighted at one point that, while 
Tomás had entered the UK unlawfully, he only agreed to do this after he was ‘approached by 
a third party’. As in Agnesa’s hearing, therefore, it was asserted that Tomás’ deception did 
not originate with him – that it was someone else who had suggested he should behave in this 
way. Likewise, the defence in Tomás’ hearing also emphasised that, while his client had 
breached the immigration system by committing the offence, since its discovery he had been 
entirely honest and cooperative in his dealings with the authorities. So, the defence pointed 
first of all to Tomás’ ‘very open-handed’ behaviour during the court process, explaining, ‘At 
his very first appearance in the magistrates’ court he gave his real name.’ He then set out how 
Tomás was also complying fully with immigration. Noting that Tomás was aware he was 
going to be removed from the UK following the completion of his criminal sentence, the 
defence added: ‘He has already signed the appropriate paperwork, and is happy to be 
deported.’ 
Highlighting this could, perhaps, be seen in terms of something Aliverti (2016) 
identifies in her research on foreign nationals before the courts: that defence representatives 
sometimes explained their client was going to be deported anyway, in an attempt to secure a 
less lengthy prison sentence. Thus, she documents one instance where a judge was told: ‘He 
will be whisked off by the immigration authorities … This is not to say he will get off scot 
free, but he will be out of the country quite soon’ (2016, p.78). At the same time, though, I 
would suggest that the formulation deployed by the defence in Tomás’ hearing was doing 
something else, as well. By drawing attention to how Tomás was actively – enthusiastically, 
even – cooperating with his own expulsion, the defence appeared to be inverting one of the 
formulations that I pointed to in Chapter Two, about how ‘foreign criminals’ routinely 
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attempt to ‘dodge deportation’ and ‘cheat the system’. By distancing Tomás from such 
behaviour, then, the defence worked to separate him from the racialised narrative of the 
immigration cheat, and to insist that his client’s violation of the UK’s immigration controls 
had been a one-off, isolated incident – that it was not reflective of an undesirable nature. Just 
as in Agnesa’s hearing, therefore, it was asserted that Tomás was, in himself, a good and 
deserving person – and that he could, consequently, be punished less severely. 
Unlike Agnesa, Tomás had not, ultimately, been able to regularise his immigration 
status in the UK – and, therefore, his barrister could not point to how his client was now in 
the country legally. Similar to Agnesa’s hearing, however, Tomás’ barrister did emphasise 
how his client’s family members were in the UK with official permission. So, he highlighted 
that one of Tomás’ sisters ‘is married to a British citizen, and is here on a spouse visa’, while 
the other ‘has been in the UK for 26 years, and is a British national’. In one sense, as in 
Agnesa’s hearing, this was about insisting on Tomás’ sisters’ legal belonging in the UK – in 
order, in this instance, to imbue Tomás with an associated worthiness, to help make him less 
punishable. At the same time, though – just as drawing attention to Agnesa’s acquisition of 
British citizenship had – emphasising Tomás’ sisters’ legality and identifying their specific 
immigration statuses was also about underlining their compliance with and observance of the 
UK’s immigration processes. In this way, therefore, the defence appeared to be suggesting 
that, by extension, Tomás should not be understood as an archetypal immigration cheat – to 
be insisting, once more, that his violation was an unfortunate anomaly, a regrettable one-off. 
Finally, resonating with Agnesa’s hearing again, the defence consolidated his 
portrayal of Tomás as a good and deserving migrant by distancing him, too, from the figure 
of the scrounger. So, at one point, the defence explained: ‘He has been working in a hospital 
– albeit on a false ID – as a storehouse worker, paying his taxes, for the past six years. The 
money he earned went on rent and daily living arrangements, but he also spent money each 
month on medication for his mother and sister, who are in Peru.’ Here, then – just like the 
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defence in Agnesa’s hearing – Tomás’ barrister insisted that his client was not a freeloading 
parasite by framing him through the related narrative of limited inclusion of ‘hard work’ and 
‘contribution’. In this instance, however, the class-inflected dimensions of this narrative, 
which I pointed to in Chapter Two, were more immediately apparent. In Agnesa’s hearing, as 
I have highlighted, her ‘contribution’ to the country was presented in a specifically gendered 
manner, in terms of the family that she was raising. In Tomás’ hearing, the defence followed 
the dominant depiction that has been circulated by successive governments more closely, as 
he emphasised his client’s economic input and how Tomás had been ‘paying his taxes, for the 
past six years’ in the UK.  
Alongside this, it is also possible to detect a slightly different formulation coming 
through in Tomás’ hearing – to trace how his barrister was simultaneously working to counter 
the racialised narrative of the parasitical scrounger in another way. As we have seen, in his 
mitigating plea the defence drew attention to what Tomás had been doing with his earnings, 
highlighting that – while some had gone on living expenses – he had also been paying for 
medication for his mother and sister, who were in Peru. Through this, the defence appeared to 
depict Tomás as the exact opposite of the stereotypical migrant freeloader, who grabs hold of 
money in order to selfishly enjoy an ‘easy’ life in the UK. Rather, it was emphasised that 
Tomás had used much of the money that he had earned to generously and selflessly support 
his family. The defence inverted the dominant narrative, therefore, working to insist that 
Tomás was not tainted by such negative traits and characteristics – and, thus, to de-racialise 
and de-stigmatise him through this depiction. The same formulation was, in fact, deployed by 
defence barristers across a number of the other sentencing hearings for non-white and ‘not 
quite white’ migrants that I observed during the course of my fieldwork. I explore this in 
detail in the final section of this chapter. 
There also appeared to be a moment, at the beginning of Tomás’ hearing, when 
Tomás himself worked to emphasise that he was a good and desirable migrant. While a 
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Spanish-speaking interpreter had been booked for and was present at the hearing, before the 
facts of the case got underway the defence explained to the judge: ‘The defendant is actually 
now content for the proceedings to be in English.’ After insisting that what he was about to 
say should be interpreted into Spanish for Tomás, the judge responded: ‘It is important that 
he knows the interpreter is here, and that if he doesn’t understand anything it can be 
interpreted – he just needs to raise his hand.’ At this point, Tomás replied to the judge, in 
English: ‘I understand.’ In their analysis of the role of interpreters in criminal courts in 
England and Wales, Aliverti and Seoighe observe how ‘the significance of English language 
proficiency in Britain goes beyond a mere matter of communication’ (2017, p.133). Rather, 
as it has been linked by successive governments to ‘social cohesion’ and ‘integration’, it has 
become a marker of migrants’ commitment to culturally assimilating into a supposedly 
homogenous (and therefore implicitly white) ‘British way of life’. Thus, as Tomás insisted, 
through his barrister, that he did not need an interpreter for the hearing – and as he also 
demonstrated this himself by responding to the judge in English – he appeared to separate 
himself from unintegrated and so undesirable cultural ‘others’. He presented himself, 
conversely, as having mastered the English language and accordingly assimilated into British 
society – and, therefore, as a worthy and deserving migrant, who could be punished less 
severely. 
In Agnesa’s hearing, the construction and negotiation of her as an asylum fraudster by 
the prosecution and defence was undoubtedly traceable – but it was also, as I have drawn out, 
quite subtle. As the judge delivered his sentencing remarks, however, his mobilisation of the 
racialised narrative of the abusive immigration cheat was very clear. He opened his narrative 
like this: 
 
[Full name of defendant], remain seated while I tell you the reasons for your 
sentence. I don’t think it is a very attractive argument to say the authorities should 
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have arrested you in 2005. The fact of the matter is you deliberately disobeyed the 
limitations on entering this country and applying for asylum. You told the 
probation officer you came illegally from Albania in the back of a lorry to seek a 
better life – so you are an economic migrant, as it is sometimes termed. You said 
you were informed in Belgium that if you were a minor and your parents were 
dead, you were likely to be allowed to remain in the country. You said you 
couldn’t speak English, you were unaware of the rules and regulations, so you 
followed their advice. But you are an intelligent person: you gave a false date of 
birth and said your parents were dead to be given more favourable treatment than 
you were entitled to. This has a knock-on effect on all people who don’t lie and 
claim asylum. 
 
In one sense, the judge delivered here a final, authoritative version of ‘what happened’ that 
affirmed Agnesa as punishable in legal terms. Thus, he specified her prohibited conduct and 
forbidden intent as he asserted towards the beginning of his narrative, ‘you deliberately 
disobeyed the limitations on entering this country and applying for asylum’. Agnesa’s legal 
punishability, and in particular her mens rea, was emphasised later, too, as the judge went on 
to insist that she was ‘an intelligent person’, who was fully aware that putting false details on 
her asylum claim would result in her receiving ‘more favourable treatment’. At the same 
time, however, the judge was also rendering Agnesa punishable by essentialising her as 
‘bogus’ and a cheat. He began to frame her in this way as he repeated the detail from the facts 
of the case about how she had entered the UK clandestinely, ‘in the back of a lorry’. He then 
built on this suggestion as he identified Agnesa, specifically, as an ‘economic migrant’. 
‘Economic migrant’ is not, as I noted in Chapter Two, simply a technical description. Rather, 
as it has been associated repeatedly with the alleged abuse and exploitation of the UK’s 
asylum system, it has also come to be – as Anderson has put it in relation to the term ‘asylum 
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seeker’ – ‘value laden and negative’ (2013, p.4). As I argued in Chapter Two, in fact, as 
terms such as ‘economic migrant’ – as well as ‘illegal immigrant’ and ‘foreign criminal’ – 
have been persistently tied to negative traits and inherent deviance, they might even be seen 
as connoting, on their own, racial undesirability and ‘otherness’.  
Indeed, the judge’s deployment of ‘economic migrant’ in this way – not merely as a 
technical description, but also a moral judgement of Agnesa, to help convey her suspect 
nature – became clearer with what followed. As he proceeded to roundly dismiss Agnesa’s 
professed lack of knowledge about the asylum system and to insist that she lied entirely 
knowingly, in order to secure an unfair advantage, he was partly, as I explained above, 
emphasising her legal punishability and in particular her mens rea. But the judge’s 
description here also resonated with political and media depictions of asylum ‘cheats’ who 
arrive in the UK already knowing exactly how to dupe and ‘play’ the immigration system 
(Philo, Briant and Donald, 2013). By framing Agnesa like this, then, the judge suggested her 
as a skilled scammer, a natural and savvy manipulator of the asylum system – and, as he did 
this, the more ‘value laden and negative’, and indeed essentialising and racialising 
connotations of her as an ‘economic migrant’, seemed to come through. The judge’s portrayal 
of Agnesa as a stereotypical fraudster was, finally, reinforced as he insisted that her actions in 
putting false details on her claim would have a ‘knock-on effect on all people who don’t lie 
and claim asylum’. In doing so,  he reproduced a longstanding government assertion about 
the effects of asylum ‘abuse’ by fake claimants on ‘genuine’ applicants (Philo, Briant and 
Donald, 2013; Bloch and Schuster, 2002; Home Office, 1998). Consequently, Agnesa was 
depicted squarely and unambiguously through the dominant, racialised narrative of the 
abusive immigration cheat.  
Now, in fact, the judge ultimately imposed the more lenient sanction that the defence 
had requested – a suspended prison sentence. We might ask why, therefore, did the judge 
present Agnesa as intrinsically problematic in this way? Once again, the answer lies, I would 
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suggest, in the particular circumstances of her case. Although, at the start of his remarks, the 
judge dismissed the idea that Agnesa’s presence in court was based on questionable charges, 
his depiction of her as deceptive and manipulative points to a recognition that her 
prosecution, so long after the discovery of the offence, was not entirely justified. As the judge 
delivered his narrative, then, he appeared to be working quite hard to justify the allocation of 
sanctions on her: his portrayal of Agnesa as inherently deviant and undesirable in herself 
seemed to be an attempt to insist that she was definitely legitimately punishable. 
Conversely, in Tomás’ hearing, the judge delivered a very brief and legally-focused 
final account which did not appeal to the racialised narrative of the abusive immigration cheat 
at all. After explaining that, according to previous cases in the Court of Appeal, the usual 
sentence for this type of offence, with a guilty plea, was six months’ prison, the judge then set 
out that Tomás’ possession of two false passports necessitated ‘some uplift’ – and, 
accordingly, he imposed a sentence of seven months’ custody. The very different approach 
by the judge in this instance might, perhaps, be understood in terms of factors present in 
Tomás’ hearing, but not Agnesa’s, that protected against Tomás being framed in a racialised 
way. Notably, as I highlighted earlier, Tomás had worked to portray himself as a good 
migrant by insisting that he did not need an interpreter and by speaking English at the start of 
the proceedings; this was in clear contrast with Agnesa, who relied on an Albanian-speaking 
interpreter throughout her hearing. It seems possible, therefore, that Tomás’ presentation of 
himself as culturally ‘integrated’, and not ‘other’ in terms of language proficiency, insulated 
him against a racialised depiction – that it influenced the judge’s construction of Tomás 
during his sentencing remarks. 
And yet, there were also potentially protective factors present in Agnesa’s hearing 
that were absent from Tomás’ sentencing. In particular, there was a clear difference in terms 
of their appearance. While both Agnesa and Tomás had lighter skin – I say more about the 
impact of visual and somatic difference on legal professionals’ responses to defendants in the 
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following section – Agnesa was smartly dressed, wearing a suit, whereas Tomás, who 
‘appeared’ in court via videolink from prison, was more casually attired. Thus, he was 
wearing a fleece-type top over a worn-looking T-shirt. I highlighted in Chapter Two how, as 
Goldberg (2015) puts it, class standing mitigates and mediates the load of race. We might, 
therefore, have expected Agnesa’s more polished appearance to have shielded her from a 
racialised portrayal, and Tomás’ dishevelment, on the other hand, to have facilitated his 
stigmatisation as an undesirable ‘other’. Yet, as we have seen, what happened, in fact, was 
the reverse of this. 
I would suggest, then, that why Agnesa was depicted in a racialised way, and Tomás 
was not, might be better understood in terms of what the judge in each hearing was working 
to justify. As I have set out, in Agnesa’s hearing there were real questions about why she was 
in court in the first place. The judge, therefore, rendered her as intrinsically problematic and 
deviant in herself to help navigate this – in order to insist that it was legitimate for her to be 
sanctioned. In Tomás’ hearing, by contrast, no such questions about his prosecution were 
raised; and the judge also imposed what appeared to be a fairly uncontroversial sentence, in 
line with the guidance provided by previous cases heard in the Court of Appeal. Thus, there 
was no need, in this instance, to go beyond legal justification – and, as a result, the judge 
delivered a very different narrative in this hearing.  
The evidence for the pattern that I am beginning to trace here, about when, in 
particular, racialised narratives of bordering tended to appear, and what sort of circumstances 
seemed to prompt their mobilisation by the prosecution, or the judge, in a hearing, becomes 
stronger as this chapter develops. As we will see, these racialised dominant depictions, and 
thus ideas of a defendant’s inherent badness, were also appealed to during proceedings where 
a severe sanction was being pushed for by the prosecution or imposed by the judge. 
Resonating with Agnesa’s hearing, therefore, they tended to be deployed in situations where 
it seemed that additional justification for the punishment was needed. In other words, they 
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appeared to be mobilised in instances where legal legitimation, on its own, did not seem to be 
enough. 
 
Constructing and negotiating the defendant as an abusive immigration cheat in non-
immigration offence hearings: Joseph, Farid and Gloria 
It is, perhaps, not that surprising that the narrative of the abusive immigration cheat came 
through in immigration offence hearings; or, at least, we might expect it to happen in these 
hearings more than in proceedings for non-immigration offences. But, in fact, I also saw this 
racialised narrative mobilised in hearings where the offence for which the defendant was 
being sanctioned had nothing to do with the border or enforcing immigration controls. In this 
section, therefore, I look at three further sentencing hearings: two for fraud offences and the 
other for a series of thefts. In these hearings, the defendant’s involvement with the 
immigration system, and the idea of them as a fraudulent, cheating migrant or, conversely, as 
cooperative and non-violating, was ‘lifted into visibility’ (Kalunta-Crumpton, 1999, p.125) as 
part of the process of constructing and negotiating their punishability. 
 The first hearing I examine was for Joseph, originally from Uganda, who had pleaded 
guilty to fraud and some additional fraud-related offences: two counts of possession of 
articles for use in fraud and possession of a false identity document (Hearing 22, Isleworth, 
2016). In this hearing, it did not actually become clear until later in the proceedings that 
Joseph had migrated to the UK. During the plea in mitigation, then, the defence barrister 
explained that Joseph had come here in 2004, to seek asylum, in order – unsuccessfully, as 
we will see – to secure some sympathy for him. Prior to this, however, the judge did not 
appear to be aware that Joseph was a migrant. This information may have been in the papers 
before him. As I explained in Chapter Four, it seemed from the observations I conducted that, 
by the sentencing hearing, there was sometimes information in the court papers that identified 
the defendant as a migrant, and which sometimes indicated which country they had migrated 
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from, as well. From his preliminary exchanges with the prosecution, however, it seemed that 
the judge had not looked at these papers before the start of the hearing. Thus, just after the 
hearing got underway, the prosecution began to explain that Joseph had pleaded guilty in a 
plea and case management hearing a week earlier. At this point the judge, who was staring at 
his computer, exclaimed: ‘In front of whom? I can’t get access to this case!’2  
It is worth noting, too, that no interpreter was used during this hearing. Aliverti and 
Seoighe explain that, during their research on the role of interpreters in the criminal courts, 
‘judges, probation officers, defense lawyers, and prosecutors pointed to the presence of 
interpreters as one of the strongest indications that the case involves a foreign national’ 
(2017, p.135). Yet, although the judge did not find out about Joseph’s migration history until 
later in the proceedings, it is important to recognise that, in contrast to the hearings explored 
above – which, as I highlighted, both involved defendants with lighter skin – as a black man 
Joseph was marked out racially from the start of the hearing. Indeed, throughout the first half 
of the hearing, before the information about him having come to the UK to seek asylum was 
introduced, Joseph’s visible difference and physical embodiment of race through his skin 
colour appeared to be very much shaping the judge’s reaction to him. 
The prosecution opened the hearing with what appeared to be a very legally-focused 
facts of the case. Thus, he set out the prohibited conduct Joseph had engaged in, explaining 
that he had attempted to buy a designer watch from a shop in West London using a false bank 
card. When the shop supervisor became suspicious about the card and asked Joseph to return 
with identification, he did so the next day. This time, Joseph presented another false bank 
card and a fake French passport – at which point the police were called and he was arrested. 
The prosecution also pointed to Joseph’s intent in committing the offence. So – after noting 
how, in his police interview, Joseph had explained that the plan to buy the watch had been 
 
2 Since the introduction of the Crown Court Digital Case System (DCS) most court papers are now accessed 
digitally. Two of the Crown Courts I observed in, Isleworth and Southwark, were ‘early adopters’ of this new 
system, from 2015; national rollout of the DCS took place from April 2016 (Legal Aid Agency, 2015). 
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devised by someone else and he was simply carrying it out – the prosecution also emphasised 
that in the same interview, Joseph had admitted he knew what he was doing was wrong. The 
prosecution confirmed, therefore, that Joseph was punishable in legal terms; and, following 
this, he then asserted how punishable Joseph was.  
Following the sentencing guideline for fraud offences (Sentencing Council, 2014)3 
closely, the prosecution set out, first of all, Joseph’s degree of intent in attempting to buy the 
watch – insisting that, as there was ‘clearly some planning involved’, Joseph’s culpability 
should be placed at the highest level specified by the guideline, Level A. He subsequently 
moved onto the other element which determines how punishable, legally speaking, a 
defendant is, which I also highlighted in Chapter Three: the harm done or risked by the 
prohibited conduct. In the fraud guideline, harm is categorised in terms of ‘the actual, 
intended or risked loss as may arise from the offence’ (Sentencing Council, 2014, p.7). As the 
watch Joseph had attempted to buy was said to be worth £5,400, the prosecution placed 
Joseph’s conduct in Category 4, which covers ‘loss caused or intended’ (Sentencing Council, 
2014, p.7) of £5,000 to £20,000. However, the prosecution also acknowledged that the value 
of the watch meant that the offence only just qualified as Category 4. Thus, he indicated that, 
as a result, Joseph should probably be sentenced at the lower end of the range of possible 
sentences – which the guideline set out as between 26 weeks and three years’ custody. 
It was noticeable, therefore, that at this point, the judge interjected and insisted ‘But 
he attempted to carry it through not once, but twice’ – referring here, apparently, to how, after 
the first visit to the shop, Joseph had returned the following day and attempted to purchase 
the watch once again. In this way, against the prosecution’s apparent suggestion that a prison 
sentence of a matter of months was appropriate, the judge seemed to be asserting that Joseph 
 
3 From 8th November 2018 all of the Sentencing Council’s Crown Court guidelines were made available in an 
online format, and the printed definitive guidelines were withdrawn (Sentencing Council, 2018). However, at 
the time that I was conducting my observations the printed guidelines were still in use – and, therefore, it is 
these that I reference. 
205 
 
should be punished more severely. Earlier on during the prosecution’s narrative, in fact, the 
judge had also challenged another comment which suggested that Joseph’s offence might be 
treated as less serious. Noting that the passport Joseph had used during the second visit to the 
shop was definitely false, the prosecution added, ‘though it wasn’t particularly sophisticated’. 
The judge responded to this: ‘Well, it was sophisticated enough for him to try to use it.’ 
These interjections by the judge continued as the defence barrister started to deliver 
his narrative. Thus, the defence began by picking up on the prosecution’s assertion that there 
had been ‘some planning involved’ in the attempt to buy the watch, and by challenging the 
idea that this automatically meant Joseph’s level of culpability was high. The defence 
insisted, instead, that any planning that had taken place had been carried out by the other 
person involved in the offence, to whom Joseph had referred during his police interview. The 
judge, however, resisted this attempt to minimise Joseph’s involvement. He countered, 
therefore: ‘But how many times did he go to the shop?’  
Seemingly undeterred, the defence continued to set out that Joseph’s culpability 
should not be viewed as high, as he then described exactly what the role of the other person – 
who, it transpired during the hearing, was going to stand trial for his involvement at a later 
date – was. So, the defence explained that this other person had been responsible for ‘all the 
planning and logistics’ of the offence. He added, moreover, that following the first, 
unsuccessful attempt to buy the watch, Joseph had not wanted to go back to the shop and try 
again – but the other person, and some acquaintances of his, went to Joseph’s home and 
‘pressured him into doing it. He didn’t fear for his safety, but he knows of them and he felt 
under some pressure’. The defence noted, too, that Joseph had carried out his part in the 
attempted fraud ‘for a relatively small payment, not the full £5,400’. At this point, the judge 
made it clear that he had had enough of the attempts to reduce Joseph’s culpability. He 
responded to the defence, in a dismissive tone of voice: ‘This has been well thought out: you 
have the first card, then another card, and the false passport with a picture – it’s been well 
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organised’. The judge then added, ‘You’ll be interested to know your client is nodding in 
agreement.’4 
The judge’s apparent hostility towards Joseph from the very beginning of the hearing 
might, of course, be explained in a number of ways. One explanation was offered by the 
defence barrister immediately following the hearing. Speaking to the prosecution, outside the 
courtroom, I heard him say, ‘He’s a harsh sentencer’ – so, the defence appeared to be locating 
the judge’s response to Joseph in terms of a general ‘toughness’ and to be suggesting that he 
always behaved like this. And yet, in a sentencing hearing immediately prior to Joseph’s, for 
a white British5 man who had pleaded guilty to domestic burglary, the same judge had, at one 
point, actually behaved in quite a compassionate manner. During this hearing, the defendant 
kept putting up his hand as his barrister delivered the plea in mitigation. Eventually, the judge 
said to the defence, ‘I think your client wants to give instructions.’ At this point, the 
defendant explained, ‘No, I don’t; can I just say something, judge?’ – and, in fact, the judge 
agreed, allowing the defendant to say a few words about his involvement in the offence 
before proceeding to sentence him.  
This was in direct contrast with something that happened at the end of Joseph’s 
hearing. Towards the end of the plea in mitigation, Joseph also attempted to get the attention 
of the court, by tapping on the glass screen of the dock several times. He was ignored by 
everyone, however, including the judge. Then, at the end of the judge’s sentencing remarks, 
Joseph stood up and raised his hand – and, at this point, the judge acknowledged what he was 
 
4 I looked up at this point in the hearing, to see if what the judge was describing was happening. Joseph did not 
appear to be nodding – but, of course, he may have been doing so in the moments before I looked up at him. It is 
important to note, however, that even if Joseph did start nodding as the judge made his point, this does not 
necessarily mean that he was agreeing with what the judge was saying about his high level of culpability in 
committing the offence. It could have been, for instance, that he was agreeing that the attempt to buy the watch 
had been highly planned and well thought out – not by him, but by the other man involved in the offence, whom 
Joseph had told the police about and who was going to stand trial for his involvement. Whatever actually 
happened at this point, it is interesting to note the attention that the judge paid to Joseph here, when his reaction 
appeared to support what the judge was saying – and to contrast this with how Joseph was ignored and 
dismissed by the judge later in the hearing, as my analysis also documents. 
5 It is, of course, only my assumption that he was British – because nothing was said about him having migrated 
to the UK during the hearing, and because he had a British (London, specifically) accent when he spoke. 
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doing, but dismissed him immediately, saying: ‘You can speak to your solicitor in the cells.’ 
Given the more sympathetic way that he treated the other, white defendant, I would suggest, 
then, that – rather than him simply being generally tough and a ‘harsh sentencer’ – there 
might be a different explanation for the judge’s hostility towards Joseph. I would argue, 
therefore, that the antipathy the judge displayed towards Joseph during both the prosecution 
and defence’s narratives, and his repeated insistence that Joseph should be punished more 
severely than either of them set out, should almost certainly be seen as shaped by racism. 
Thus, the judge’s reaction to Joseph during the first half of the hearing clearly illustrates how 
– even as, as I documented in Chapter Two, contemporary articulations of race have become 
increasingly coded, and explicitly racist expression has become socially unacceptable – 
somatic difference remains central to racist discrimination and treatment. 
 The judge’s racism during the first half of Joseph’s hearing was not articulated 
openly, then, and his hostility was expressed solely in legal terms. As soon as the defence 
introduced the information about Joseph’s migration history, however, and explained that 
Joseph had come to the UK to seek asylum, this immediately changed. As I suggested earlier, 
the defence mentioned this in an apparent attempt to secure some sympathy for his client. 
Somewhat predictably, though – given the judge’s clearly unsympathetic response up to this 
point – it did not have the desired effect. Rather, as soon as this information was introduced, 
the judge reacted negatively to it. He started to disparage Joseph, therefore, and to portray 
him in a racialised way, as he began to insinuate that Joseph must be an abusive asylum 
cheat.  
Thus, as the defence explained ‘He is an asylum seeker’, the judge instantly jumped in 
and demanded: ‘From where?’ The defence responded, ‘He is originally from Uganda’ – at 
which point the judge asked, incredulously: ‘Why is he seeking asylum from Uganda? I’ve 
just been there.’ The defence explained that Joseph’s asylum claim was on the basis of his 
sexuality, adding ‘his family has ostracised him completely because of it’. He then set out 
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that Joseph had come to the UK and made his asylum claim back in 2004, but that he was still 
waiting for a decision from the Home Office and that because of his immigration status he 
could not work. So, the defence seemed to be trying to explain why Joseph had become 
involved with the offence. As the defence then highlighted, ‘He is the sole carer for his 
brother, who has disabilities, the primary of which is arthritis’, he worked to make Joseph 
less punishable in legal terms. Like all Sentencing Council guidelines, the fraud guideline 
specifies that being the ‘sole or primary carer for dependent relatives’ (2014, p.10) can reduce 
the sanction imposed. We see here, then, an example of a legally-codified mitigating factor 
that is not about the criminal act or the degree of culpability in carrying this out – but, rather, 
the defendant’s personal circumstances and the possible impact of imprisonment on them and 
their family (Jacobson and Hough, 2011). The judge, however, completely ignored the point 
that the defence was trying to make. Instead, he continued with his insistence that Joseph, and 
indeed his family, must be fraudulent and abusive immigration cheats.  
 Responding to the defence’s mention of Joseph’s brother, therefore, the judge asked 
sceptically: ‘His brother is from Uganda as well, he’s also an asylum seeker?’ The defence 
replied, ‘He is from Uganda, I’m not sure if he’s an asylum seeker’. He then attempted to get 
the plea in mitigation back on track by introducing information that evidenced Joseph’s 
brother’s disabilities and the fact that Joseph was his primary carer. So, the defence explained 
that Joseph’s brother was in receipt of a disability-related benefit and that he was living with 
Joseph. The judge’s reaction to this information, however, was obviously dismissive, as he 
simply responded, ‘Uh huh’. The defence persisted with this legal factor one last time, as he 
then further explained, ‘There is no other family member who could take care of his brother. 
His sister is in Birmingham …’. Once more, though, the judge paid no attention to the point 
that the defence was trying to make. Rather, as soon as the defence mentioned Joseph’s sister, 




 What we see unfolding here, quite straightforwardly, is the racialised narrative of the 
abusive immigration cheat shaping the judge’s reaction to Joseph. Thus, from the moment 
that the defence mentioned that Joseph was an asylum seeker, the judge’s response was one 
of suspicion and disbelief. From this point on, moreover, the judge repeatedly suggested – 
through the questions he asked and his tone of voice in asking them, as well his quasi-verbal 
utterances – that not only Joseph, but Joseph’s brother and sister as well, must be deviant 
asylum fraudsters, duping and exploiting the UK’s immigration system. Indeed, as the judge 
proceeded to his sentencing remarks, he continued to mobilise the idea of Joseph as an 
immigration fraudster in the narrative that he delivered. Initially, the judge began his version 
of ‘what happened’ in a legally-focused way, as he referred twice to the ‘planning’ and ‘pre-
meditation’ involved in the attempt to buy the watch. In doing so, he rendered Joseph not 
simply as punishable in legal terms, but as particularly punishable, as he insisted – as he had 
throughout his earlier interactions with the prosecution and defence – on Joseph’s high level 
of culpability. After this legally-oriented start to his narrative, however, the judge then 
appeared to construct Joseph as punishable in another way. Thus, after setting out the range 
of possible sentences specified by the fraud sentencing guideline, he added: ‘The defendant, 
apparently, comes from Uganda. He has been in the country waiting for a determination of 
his nationality, and whether he can remain.’ 
 The judge went on, entirely correctly, to dismiss this information as legally 
irrelevant, as he noted immediately after saying it, ‘I needn’t concern myself with that’. Yet, 
it is nonetheless the case that he introduced this information into his narrative. It is notable, 
too, that what the judge said about Joseph’s immigration case was, in fact, completely 
inaccurate: it was clear from the plea in mitigation that there was no question about Joseph’s 
country of origin or nationality at all. It seemed, therefore, that by drawing attention to 
Joseph’s ongoing involvement with the immigration system, and by suggesting that Joseph’s 
asserted nationality was in some way dubious, and yet to be confirmed by the authorities, the 
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judge was intimating him as untrustworthy and a fraud. He appeared to be framing Joseph 
through the racialised narrative of the abusive immigration cheat, then, suggesting him as 
having a suspect and undesirable nature – in order to help produce him as punishable. 
In my analysis of Agnesa’s hearing, in the previous section, I suggested that she was 
constructed by the judge as an inherently duplicitous immigration cheat because there were 
questions about why she was in court at all. I argued, therefore, that more than legal 
legitimation was needed in order to justify imposing any sanctions on her. In Joseph’s 
hearing, there also appeared to be specific reasons for the judge’s mobilisation of this 
racialised narrative. Rather than reaching beyond legal legitimation and portraying Joseph as 
problematic in himself to validate punishing him in the first place, however, the judge seemed 
to be framing Joseph in this way to help authorise a severe sentence. As I highlighted earlier, 
the prosecution had indicated during the facts of the case that a prison sentence of just over 
26 weeks would be appropriate for the offences to which Joseph had pleaded guilty. It is also 
worth noting that, during the mitigating plea, the defence pointed out that the written pre-
sentence report prepared by probation for Joseph’s hearing had recommended a suspended 
prison sentence. Thus, as the judge sent Joseph to prison for one year and eight months, he 
appeared to be imposing an especially harsh sanction on him. This assessment, indeed, seems 
to be borne out by a subsequent judgment from the Court of Appeal. A few months later, 
Joseph’s prison sentence was reduced by five months.6 
The deployment of the narrative of the immigration cheat in Joseph’s hearing, then, 
adds to the pattern that I began to trace in Agnesa’s hearing, about the specificity and context 
that seemed to underpin the appeal to dominant, racialised narratives of bordering by 
prosecution barristers and judges. In a further five hearings that I examine across this chapter 
and the next, I provide additional evidence that these racialised narratives typically seemed to 
 




be mobilised by the prosecution, and/or the judge, when more justification, beyond legal 
reasons, appeared to be needed for the punishment pressed for or imposed. Alongside this, I 
also think that the way Joseph’s hearing unfolded is significant because it particularly brings 
to our attention the coded nature of the racism of dominant narratives of bordering. Thus, the 
fact that there was no racial reference during the first half of Joseph’s hearing, but then, upon 
learning that he had come to the UK to seek asylum, the judge openly stigmatised him as a 
fraudulent immigration cheat, reminds us of their sanitised and in fact ‘post-racial’ quality. 
The judge was entirely comfortable essentialising and pathologising Joseph in this way, I 
would suggest, because the narrative that he mobilised to do this is devoid of overtly racist 
expression – it does not bear ‘the stain of the racial’ (Goldberg, 2015, p.55).  
What I saw in this hearing, indeed, appears to resonate with what Parmar (2018a, 
2016a) witnessed during her research on the police and Operation Nexus. As I highlighted in 
Chapter Two, Parmar often heard police officers talking about groups of foreign nationals in 
essentialised and homogenised ways through the language of nationality. As she explains, 
they did this openly, without any apparent concern that they might be perceived as racist. By 
contrast, she notes that the police officers she observed demonstrated more restraint when 
speaking explicitly in terms of race. The judge’s avoidance of any racial terminology in the 
first half of Joseph’s hearing, therefore, but then enthusiastic disparaging of him as an asylum 
seeker when this possibility became available, appeared to parallel this. 
 Information about the defendant’s involvement with the immigration system, and a 
portrayal of them as an abusive cheat or, conversely, as compliant and cooperating, came 
through in a further two non-immigration offence hearings that I saw. One of these was for 
Farid, originally from Algeria, who had pleaded guilty to 12 thefts, predominantly bags and 
laptops taken from people in public places (Hearing 23, Isleworth, 2016). In this hearing, 
Farid’s immigration history was brought into view from the very start of the proceedings, by 
the prosecution. Thus, the prosecution barrister opened the facts of the case by saying: ‘The 
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defendant has a long history of offending for similar matters. He was eventually removed 
from the country, but he returned illegally, and committed this series of theft matters. He was 
committing the offences for a long period of time – from August 2014 to May 2016.’  
Farid’s immigration history was, in part, referred to here to help explain that he had a 
longer history of theft offences beyond those for which he was being sentenced during this 
hearing. Sentencing legislation sets out that recent and relevant convictions are an 
aggravating factor, which should result in defendants being sentenced more severely 
(Ashworth, 2015; Roberts, 2008) – and, later on, the prosecution specified exactly how many 
previous convictions for theft Farid had. At the same time, though, the inclusion of this 
immigration-related information was also doing more than this. By emphasising how Farid 
had previously been ejected from the UK, but had then ‘returned illegally’, without official 
permission, it seemed that the prosecution was tapping into the racialised narrative of the 
immigration cheat and insinuating Farid as an inherently problematic immigration ‘abuser’. 
The prosecution not only specified Farid’s criminal conduct in his opening narrative, 
therefore, but also appeared to be essentialising Farid as suspect in himself – in order, it 
seemed, to help justify the assertion made later in the facts of the case, that a fairly lengthy 
prison sentence was appropriate.  
The defence, indeed, appeared to recognise and respond directly to the prosecution’s 
depiction of his client as problematic in this way. So, at one point during the plea in 
mitigation the defence emphasised that, although Farid had returned to the UK illegally, he 
now ‘actively wants to be deported back to Algeria, this is going to happen’. Using almost 
exactly the same formulation that Tomás’ defence barrister deployed, then, the defence here 
distanced Farid from the prosecution’s racialised framing of him as an exploitative 
immigration cheat – insisting that, despite his earlier infraction, he was now cooperating fully 
with immigration and assisting enthusiastically with his own expulsion. Thus, the defence 
asserted that Farid was not an intrinsically bad and manipulative immigration abuser, but that 
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he had simply made some unfortunate mistakes – and, as a consequence, that it was possible 
to afford him some leniency. 
As the judge delivered his sentencing remarks, he opened his version of ‘what 
happened’ not by giving an account of Farid’s criminal conduct, the series of thefts to which 
he had pleaded guilty. Rather, the judge began his narrative by repeating the detail from the 
facts of the case, about how Farid had carried out these offences after returning illegally to 
the UK. Thus, he stated: ‘Had you obeyed the orders that were made, you would not have 
come back to this country. You came back illegally, whether an order was made or not.’ 
Here, then – just as the prosecution had – the judge appeared to be insinuating Farid as a 
stereotypical immigration abuser. As he drew attention to how Farid had re-entered the 
country without official permission, and in spite of his earlier expulsion, the judge seemed to 
be framing Farid through the racialised narrative of the immigration cheat – in order to depict 
him as suspect and undesirable in himself.This portrayal of Farid as inherently problematic 
appeared to emerge for a reason similar to that in Joseph’s hearing, where, as I noted, the 
dominant narrative of the immigration cheat seemed to be tapped into by the judge to help 
justify the severe punishment that he imposed. As I have explained, then, in the facts of the 
case the prosecution had suggested that a fairly lengthy custodial term was appropriate for 
Farid. Specifically, the prosecution stated that the sentencing guideline for theft offences 
(Sentencing Council, 2015) pointed towards a prison sentence of between one and three and a 
half years The judge, however, passed a sentence well in excess of this range. Thus, he sent 
Farid to prison for four years and eight months.7  
 
7 The severity of Farid’s punishment becomes particularly apparent when it is considered that four years and 
eight months was the prison sentence imposed following a discount of a third for Farid’s early guilty plea. The 
judge set out during his sentencing remarks that his starting point had actually been seven years in prison – 
which is double the maximum sentence recommended by the theft sentencing guideline for Level A culpability, 
Category 2 harm offences, which during the hearing Farid’s thefts had been agreed to be. It is important to 
acknowledge that the guideline also sets out that the sentence lengths it proposes are based on cases involving 
single thefts – and, of course, Farid was being sentenced for twelve offences. And yet, Farid’s offending had 
been placed in Category 2 harm based on the estimated value of all the items he stole across the twelve separate 




Towards the end of his remarks, as he explicitly acknowledged that the sentence he 
was imposing was more punitive than what the guideline recommended, the judge actually 
referred to Farid’s immigration history again. It was noticeable, however, that this time the 
judge did not appear to be deploying this information to stigmatise and racialise Farid. 
Rather, he attempted to utilise it in a quite different way. After explaining ‘I am going to 
depart considerably from the guidelines’, therefore, the judge referred to Farid’s previous 
convictions as one factor justifying this. He also emphasised how Farid’s offences were 
‘committed over a sustained period of time’; this is another aggravating factor listed by the 
theft guideline. Then, following this, the judge said: ‘If I am right in saying an order was 
made preventing you from coming back – was it? I think it was, I hope it was – then you 
failed to comply with a court order from this country.’  
Under the theft guideline – and, indeed, all guidelines issued by the Sentencing 
Council – ‘failure to comply with current court orders’ (Sentencing Council, 2015, p.7) is 
also specified as an aggravating factor. And yet, this refers to orders made by the criminal 
courts; the only ‘order’ that could have been made preventing Farid from returning to the UK 
would have been a deportation order, which is imposed by the Home Office.8 The judge, 
however, must have been aware of the possibility of an appeal against Farid’s sentence, 
because the punishment that he imposed was much more severe than what the theft guideline 
recommended.9 Hence, at the point that he specifically listed the factors that he said justified 
the sanction he was passing, the judge attempted to turn his reference to Farid’s immigration 
history into a legally relevant factor – that is, he tried to make it legally defensible. This was 
one of the instances, therefore, that I referred to in Chapter Three, where it seemed that – 
 
8 As I highlighted in Chapter One, the imposition of a deportation order means that the person concerned is 
banned from returning to the UK while the order is in force. As I also explained, the revocation of a deportation 
order is entirely at the discretion of the Home Office – and, therefore, such an order effectively constitutes an 
indefinite ban on re-entering the UK. 
9 I have conducted several online searches since this hearing to see if an appeal against Farid’s sentence was 
ever lodged; I have not been able to find any evidence that one was. 
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certainly towards the end of his narrative – the judge was particularly attuned to the ‘external’ 
audience of the Court of Appeal. I consider the other instance where this appeared to be the 
case towards the end of this section.    
Farid was not actually present in court for his sentencing hearing, but appeared – just 
as Tomás had – via videolink from prison: the use of videolink for remanded defendants’ 
appearances in court is increasingly common and happens at every stage, excluding trials, of 
proceedings (Gibbs, 2017). Research on the use of videolink for defendants’ appearances in 
court has raised concerns about how it affects their already limited participation in 
proceedings, marginalising and disenfranchising them still further. I touch on this issue in 
more detail in the next chapter, as I consider defence barristers and defendants’ practices of 
resistance. At this point, however, we might think about how the appearance of the defendant 
in court via a screen potentially links to their portrayal by legal professionals in a disparaging 
and racialised way. That is, it is worth considering how the use of videolink might enable the 
sort of narrative delivered by the prosecution, and the judge, in Farid’s hearing, both of whom 
made him punishable in part by essentialising and stigmatising him as an abusive and 
exploitative immigration cheat. In her research on Operation Nexus, Parmar notes how, in 
police custody, the use of CCTV to monitor detainees in cells resulted in a ‘sense of distance 
and disconnection between suspects and the police’, and she describes how, at times, ‘this 
allowed stereotypes and everyday racism to circulate’ (2019, p.949). I would suggest that, in 
the context of the courts, the use of videolink might have a similar effect. In other words, the 
appearance of some defendants via videolink during court proceedings might contribute to 
their racialised representation by legal professionals – including the mobilisation of racialised 
narratives of bordering to aid the construction of ‘unwanted’ migrant defendants as 
punishable. 
It is important to note, of course, that in some of the sentencing hearings I observed 
where the defendant was portrayed through a racialised narrative of bordering – Agnesa’s, for 
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instance, and also Joseph’s – they were actually physically present in court. Conversely, as I 
have explained, Tomás had his hearing by videolink – and yet, as I set out in my earlier 
analysis, he was not depicted in a racialised manner by the prosecution or the judge during 
their narratives. My argument is not, however, that the use of videolink will automatically 
result in the problematisation and dehumanisation of the defendant. As I have drawn out, 
there are other factors at work: specifically, what the prosecution or the judge is working to 
justify in a hearing – whether more than legal legitimation is needed to validate, for example, 
the defendant’s presence in court, or the imposition of a harsh sanction on them. What I am 
suggesting, rather, is that the use of videolink might facilitate racialisation. That is, in 
sentencing hearings for migrants originally from countries in the Global South or Southern 
and Eastern Europe, their appearance in court via a screen might encourage the appeal to 
racialised narratives of bordering; it might lubricate the cogs of legal professionals rendering 
them punishable in this way. 
The final hearing that I look at in this section, for Gloria, who was originally from a 
country in Northwest or Central Africa,10 provides an interesting counterpoint to Joseph and 
Farid’s hearings. Gloria had been convicted following a trial of a benefit fraud offence: 
namely, failing to notify a change in circumstances which affected her entitlement to 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (Hearing 11, Isleworth, 2015). Given the nature of her offence, it 
might be assumed that the narrative of the parasitical scrounger, who takes advantage of the 
welfare benefits system and ‘sponges off’ the UK, was mobilised during this hearing. In fact, 
however, the judge, who seemed to have presided over Gloria’s trial, as well, appeared very 
sympathetic towards her during the proceedings and imposed a lenient sentence – and he 
justified this by portraying Gloria in a positive way. Specifically, in his sentencing remarks 
he took the opposite approach to the judges in Joseph and Farid’s hearings. While Joseph and 
 
10 Gloria’s country of birth was not specified during the hearing. However, she was black and the judge went on 
to specify that she had been granted asylum in the UK. She also had a French-speaking interpreter for the 
hearing. Thus, it seems likely that she was originally from a country in Northwest or Central Africa.    
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Farid had their harsh sanctions legitimated by emphasising their non-compliance with the 
immigration system, then, and insisting on them as abusive cheats, Gloria was constructed as 
relatively unpunishable by highlighting her positive immigration history and framing her 
through the narrative of limited inclusion of the ‘genuine’ refugee. 
In his narrative, the judge placed Gloria’s culpability for the offence of which she had 
been convicted as medium – so, what the fraud sentencing guideline (2014) refers to as Level 
B. The harm caused by the offence was deemed to be in the lowest category, Category 6, 
because under £2,500 had been obtained: the amount that Gloria had been convicted of 
receiving by failing to notify her change in circumstances was a little over £1,600. 
Consequently, the range of possible sentences specified by the guideline went from a Band A 
fine11 to a ‘medium level’ (2014, p.29) community order – with a suggested starting point of 
a ‘low level’ community order for an offence where £1,000 had been obtained. Yet, the judge 
departed from the guideline and passed a more lenient sentence than was recommended. 
Thus, Gloria was given one of the least punitive criminal sanctions available: a conditional 
discharge.  
The judge justified this, in part, by emphasising Gloria’s goodness in gendered terms. 
Similar to the defence in Agnesa’s hearing, then, at one point the judge praised Gloria’s 
apparent feminine conformity as he stated, ‘You are an exceptionally good mother, and have 
provided exceptionally good leadership and guidance for your sons.’ Before presenting her in 
this way, however, the judge also constructed Gloria as less punishable in herself by bringing 
her compliance with the UK’s immigration system into view. Nothing had been said about 
Gloria’s migration history by the prosecution or defence during their narratives. As I noted 
above, though, the judge appeared to have presided over Gloria’s trial – so, it seems possible 
that the information he deployed may have surfaced during these earlier proceedings. 
 
11 Sentencing Council guidelines refer to three levels of fines: Bands A, B and C. Band A is the lowest level of 
fine: according to Sentencing Council (2021a) guidance, a Band A fine can range from 25% to 75% of a 
defendant’s ‘relevant weekly income’, with a starting point of 50%. 
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Towards the beginning of his sentencing remarks, therefore, the judge stated: ‘You came to 
this country 15 years ago with two young children, as an asylum seeker. You were granted 
asylum and became a British citizen, as are your sons.’ 
 In one sense, the judge here appeared to be constructing Gloria as desirable, and thus 
less punishable, by adopting a strategy that, as we saw, was also deployed by the defence 
barrister in Agnesa’s hearing.  As he drew attention to how Gloria’s asylum application had 
been successful, then, and how following this she had ‘naturalised’ as a British citizen, the 
judge was emphasising that, in legal terms, Gloria now belonged. At the same time, though, 
by highlighting, in particular, that Gloria had come to the UK ‘as an asylum seeker’, and by 
noting that her claim for protection had subsequently been approved by the immigration 
authorities, the judge also appeared to be doing something slightly different. Thus, he seemed 
to be mobilising the narrative of limited inclusion that I documented in Chapter Two which 
relates specifically to the narrative of the abusive immigration cheat: that of the ‘genuine’ 
refugee. As I explained in Chapter Two, against the allegedly widespread abuse of the 
immigration system by false asylum claimants, ‘genuine’ refugees are said to be conveniently 
small in number – and the UK, it is often asserted, has a ‘proud history’ of offering sanctuary 
to such desirable migrants (Kushner, 2003). By framing Gloria through this narrative of 
limited inclusion, therefore, the judge presented her as an intrinsically good and deserving 
person who, in committing her offence, had simply made a terrible mistake. Consequently, 
she was portrayed as worthy of the court’s significant leniency.  
As I have suggested, Gloria’s hearing offers an interesting contrast to Joseph and 
Farid – and, indeed, Agnesa’s – hearings, because the judge constructed her in the opposite 
way: not as an inherently bad and deviant migrant, then, but as naturally good and deserving. 
Yet, it is important to emphasise that what unfolded in Gloria’s hearing nonetheless fits with 
and consolidates the pattern I have been tracing across this chapter, about when or in what 
sort of circumstances dominant ideas about ‘unwanted’ migrants tended to be deployed by 
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the prosecution and/or the judge. As I have argued, racialised narratives of bordering seemed 
to be appealed to during proceedings when additional justification, beyond legal reasons, was 
needed to validate the punishment being pressed for or imposed. In Agnesa’s hearing, 
therefore, as we have seen, the extra-legal justification of her as an abusive immigration cheat 
was mobilised to help overcome the questions about her prosecution in the first place, and 
whether she should be subject to criminal sanctioning so long after the commission of her 
offence. In Joseph and Farid’s hearings, ideas about their inherently duplicitous natures were 
utilised alongside descriptions of their criminal conduct to help justify the especially harsh 
sentences that the judges handed down.  
In Gloria’s hearing, conversely, the judge reached beyond legal reasons and tapped 
into ideas about what sort of migrant she was not to help justify her prosecution, or authorise 
a harsh sanction – but, rather, to help validate a much more moderate punishment than the 
sentencing guideline recommended. Thus, the extra-legal justification of Gloria as a 
‘genuine’ refugee was mobilised to help navigate the fact that, although she had been 
convicted of the offence, and the legal features of this pointed towards a certain range of 
sanctions, the judge deemed such punishments inappropriate for her case. It might be said, 
therefore, that in Agnesa, Joseph and Farid’s hearings, racialised narratives of bordering were 
mobilised to add to and supplement the defendants’ legal punishability. In Gloria’s hearing, 
on the other hand, a narrative of limited inclusion was deployed to mitigate, and even 
counter, how legally punishable she was. 
Across the final section of this chapter and in Chapter Six, I examine three further 
sentencing hearings where racialised narratives of bordering were tapped into by judges 
because it seemed that additional justification, beyond legal reasons, were needed for the 
punishments that they imposed. In two of these hearings, ideas of the defendant’s intrinsic 
badness appeared to be mobilised for reasons similar to that in Joseph and Farid’s hearings – 
not to validate an especially harsh sentence, then, but to authorise sanctions that were 
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nonetheless severe. In the other hearing, the judge seemed to be framing the defendant as 
inherently deviant for the same reason that Agnesa was – because there appeared to be 
questions about why the defendant was in court and being punished at all. Alongside this, 
though, there were also many hearings for ‘unwanted’ migrants that I observed during my 
fieldwork where racialised narratives of bordering were not tapped into by the prosecution or 
the judge. So, there were hearings such as Tomás’, as well as most of the hearings that I 
explore in the final section of this chapter, where the defence countered narratives of 
bordering in their mitigating plea – but such narratives did not appear in the facts of the case 
or sentencing remarks. As I explained in Chapter Four, moreover, there were also nine 
hearings that I saw during my observations in which racialised narratives of bordering could 
not be detected during the proceedings at all. 
As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, however, it was generally the case 
that hearings where narratives of bordering were not detectable in the prosecution or judges’ 
narratives tied in with the pattern I have traced, about the specific factors that seemed to 
prompt these racialised narratives’ mobilisation. In most of these hearings, then, such specific 
factors were not present; that is, there appeared to be no real reason in these proceedings for 
the prosecution, or the judge, to reach beyond legal legitimation to help justify the 
punishment being pressed for or imposed. Thus, in all but three of these hearings, the 
sanctions pushed for and handed to the defendant were at the less severe end of the criminal 
punishment spectrum: non-custodial sanctions such as community orders and suspended 
sentence orders, therefore, as well as, on a few occasions, shorter prison sentences.12 
Moreover, in all of the hearings where racialised narratives of bordering could not be 
detected in the facts of the case or the sentencing remarks, there was nothing obviously 
controversial or unusual about the punishment that the prosecution urged, or the judge 
 
12 I do not mean to suggest, of course, that these sanctions are not punitive; I fully recognise that community 
orders, suspended sentence orders and shorter prison sentences inflict pain on those who are subjected to them. 
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passed. There were no hearings, for example, like Agnesa’s, where there appeared to be 
doubts about whether the defendant should be in court and subject to criminal sanctions. Nor 
were there any hearings like Joseph and Farid’s, where the judge appeared to impose an 
excessive sentence – or, indeed, like Gloria’s, where the punishment handed down was much 
more lenient than recommended.   
I noted above that in all but three of the hearings where racialised narratives of 
bordering could not be detected in the prosecution or judges’ narratives, the sentences pushed 
for or imposed were at the less severe end of the criminal punishment spectrum. There were 
three hearings, then, where – although the sentence handed to the defendant was not 
obviously controversial or unusual – it was nonetheless more punitive than in the other 
proceedings. Thus, in these three hearings the defendants were given significant custodial 
terms. It might have been expected, therefore, that the judges would tap into racialised 
narratives of bordering during their sentencing remarks in these proceedings – in order to 
construct the defendants as inherently bad and deviant and so to help justify sanctioning them 
in a harsh way. Indeed, as I have indicated, I saw hearings where this did happen: where 
racialised ideas about ‘unwanted’ migrants were deployed by the judge not to help authorise a 
clearly excessive sentence, but to aid the legitimation of a punishment that was nonetheless 
severe. I explore the hearings where this unfolded in the final section of this chapter and in 
Chapter Six. 
Hence, it might be argued that the three hearings I observed where a long prison 
sentence was passed, but no narrative of bordering was mobilised to help justify this sanction, 
disrupt the pattern of the specific circumstances in which the prosecution or judge tended to 
appeal to these racialised narratives. Yet, at the same time, it also appeared that in two of 
these hearings, there might be an explanation for the ostensibly anomalous way that they 
played out. That is, in these hearings, there seemed to be factors militating against the judges 
utilising ideas of the defendants’ intrinsic badness, alongside legal reasons, to help validate 
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the severe punishments that they imposed. One of these hearings, then, was for seven men – 
five from Poland, one from Albania and one from the UK – who were being sentenced for 
drug-related offences, ranging from possession with intent to supply to importation (Hearing 
10, Southwark, 2015). As I noted in Chapter Four, this was the longest sentencing hearing 
that I observed during my fieldwork, as it lasted for over two hours. This was also the hearing 
that I referred to in the same chapter, which was unusual compared with most of my 
observations, because the public gallery in the courtroom was packed. As such, it had a far 
less ‘private’ feel than most of the sentencing hearings that I watched.  
The judge certainly seemed to be sensitive to the hearing’s higher-than-normal degree 
of visibility – including its potential visibility to the ‘external’ audience of the Court of 
Appeal. Thus, unusually amongst the hearings that I observed, the judge left court following 
the prosecution and defence narratives, in order to prepare her sentencing remarks. During 
this break in proceedings, in fact, I heard one of the defence barristers tell a defendant’s 
family member that the judge was taking this step, and writing her remarks down, because of 
the likelihood of appeal. When the judge returned to court, she sentenced the seven 
defendants to prison terms ranging from six to 20 years – and, as she did this, she appeared to 
be taking particular care to deliver an explicitly legalistic narrative, which relied heavily on 
the sentencing guideline for drug offences (Sentencing Council, 2012b). One explanation for 
the judge not tapping into narratives of bordering during her sentencing remarks, therefore, 
even though she imposed severe punishments on the defendants, was the hearing’s possible 
visibility beyond the confines of the courtroom, and so the judge’s apparent concern with 
ensuring that her narrative was legally defensible.  
In the other hearing where a long prison sentence was passed, but no narrative of 
bordering was deployed to help justify this punishment, there seemed to be a different 
possible explanation as to why the judge did not reach beyond legal reasons and portray the 
defendant in a racialised way. This hearing was for Jakub, originally from Poland, who had 
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been convicted of possession with intent to supply of Class A drugs (Hearing 21, Southwark, 
2016). The judge imposed a custodial term of three and a half years on Jakub, which is of 
course a considerable sanction. Yet, as his culpability had been judged as ‘significant’, and 
the harm of his offence had been deemed to be Category 3, because he was apparently 
involved in ‘street dealing’ (Sentencing Council, 2012b, p.11), this was also the lowest 
possible sentence set out by the drugs sentencing guideline. The judge, indeed, seemed at 
pains to emphasise this in his sentencing remarks. At one point, therefore, he stated, ‘This is 
the least sentence I can impose’, before later adding, ‘This, in all the circumstances, is the 
best that I can do’. The ‘official’ leniency of the long prison sentence that the judge passed, 
then – and his insistence, moreover, that it should be viewed like this – meant that there 
appeared to be little reason for him to construct Jakub as intrinsically bad, in order to add to 
or supplement his legal punishability.  
I recognise, of course, that the explanations I have offered for why racialised 
narratives of bordering did not appear in these two hearings cannot be considered definitive. 
As I have also indicated, in fact, there was a third hearing where a severe punishment was 
imposed, but no narrative of bordering was mobilised by the judge. This hearing was for 
Olufemi, originally from Nigeria, who had been convicted of grievous bodily harm with 
intent and was sentenced to eight years in prison (Hearing 14, Isleworth, 2016). There did not 
appear to be any specific factors militating against the judge appealing to a racialised 
narrative of bordering in his sentencing remarks to help justify this long sentence. As such, 
Olufemi’s hearing appeared to be an anomaly, and out of kilter with the overarching pattern 
that I have traced. Yet, despite this, it does seem significant that the majority of the hearings 
where narratives of bordering were not mobilised by the prosecution or the judge appeared to 
fit with the general pattern of these racialised narratives typically being tapped into for 
specific, contextual reasons. Thus, in most of the sentencing hearings where racialised ideas 
about ‘unwanted’ migrants did not surface in the facts of the case or the sentencing remarks, 
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there did not seem to be a clear need for the prosecution or the judge to reach beyond legal 
legitimation in their narratives. 
 
The narrative of the parasitical scrounger in non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant 
sentencing hearings: Marek, and many others 
In the final section of this chapter, I explore a series of sentencing hearings where the 
narrative of the parasitical scrounger came through. I have, of course, already looked at two 
hearings, Agnesa and Tomás’, in which the defence barristers not only insisted that their 
clients were not immigration cheats, but emphasised they were not scroungers, too, to aid the 
portrayal of them as good, less punishable people. As we will see, the formulations that they 
deployed to do this played out across a number of other hearings; defence barristers, then, 
often countered their clients as inherently lazy freeloaders in very similar ways. In the first 
hearing I look at in this section, moreover, the pattern that I have documented across this 
chapter, of racialised narratives of bordering typically being deployed by prosecution 
barristers, or judges, for specific, contextual reasons, can also be traced. In this hearing, the 
judge appeared to essentialise the defendant as a deviant scrounger to help legitimise the 
imposition of a long prison sentence on him. Just as in Agnesa, Joseph and Farid’s hearings, 
therefore, this seemed to be another instance where ideas of the defendant’s intrinsic badness 
were mobilised in order to supplement his legal punishability – and so because justifying the 
significant punishment passed solely in legal terms did not appear to be doing enough.  
And yet, alongside this, I also draw out a very different pattern as to when or in what 
sort of circumstances racialised narratives of bordering typically emerged in sentencing 
hearings for ‘unwanted’ migrants in this final section. Across a number of hearings that I 
saw, defence barristers distanced their client from the figure of the parasitical scrounger 
during the plea in mitigation – even though there was no obvious reason or prompt for their 
countering of this dominant narrative. Thus, there had been no suggestion during the hearing 
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that the defendant might be seen like this, nor did the nature of the offence appear to motivate 
the defence’s concern that their client might be viewed as problematic in this way. Against 
the pattern of narratives of bordering being mobilised by the prosecution, and/or the judge, 
for specific reasons, then, a very different routine came to light across these hearings. 
Contesting their clients as inherently parasitical scroungers seemed to simply run through 
these defence narratives – and so appeared to be emerging as a standard defence approach to 
constructing non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant defendants as less punishable. 
The first hearing that I look at was for Marek, originally from Poland, who had 
pleaded guilty to importing a Class A drug, specifically cocaine, into the UK (Hearing 8, 
Isleworth, 2015). As I indicated above, this hearing went on to resonate with some of the 
previous hearings that I have examined, as the judge seemed to frame Marek through a 
racialised narrative of bordering in his sentencing remarks to help justify a long prison 
sentence. At the beginning of the proceedings, however, Marek’s hearing actually played out 
quite distinctly. The prosecution started his version of events in a very legally-oriented 
manner, firstly specifying Marek’s prohibited conduct, that he had brought cocaine back to 
the UK from Peru, and then setting out the alleged harm of this conduct. According to the 
drugs sentencing guideline (Sentencing Council, 2012b), therefore, the weight of drugs that 
Marek had imported, 216g, placed his offence in a lower category of harm, Category 3. 
Following this, the prosecution moved onto Marek’s degree of intent in committing the 
offence At this point, though, the prosecution did not refer to any of the factors listed in the 
sentencing guideline to support his contention that Marek’s culpability should be seen as 
‘significant’. Rather, diverging from his earlier legal focus, he constructed Marek’s elevated 
intent in another way. Thus, the prosecution told the judge: ‘It’s not as if he is from some 
third world country, and he’s not aware of the rules. He is an EU national. He is aware of our 
laws and also the danger of going to Peru.’  
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On the face of it, the prosecution’s argument here was about Marek’s assumed 
familiarity with UK law as an EU national; that is, that he must have been fully aware that 
what he was doing was illegal, and so should be assigned a significant level of culpability. 
But there was also a racialised element to the prosecution’s assertion. As he emphasised, 
specifically, ‘It’s not as if he is from some third world country’, the derogatory term that he 
deployed suggested an essentialised ignorance and backwardness to people from the Global 
South, against Marek’s supposedly more advanced understanding as a European. In contrast 
with some of the previous hearings that I have looked at, then, the prosecution did not 
mobilise a racialised dominant depiction to demean and disparage Marek, and render him 
punishable in this way. Instead, in this instance, what happened was the exact opposite. 
Marek was positioned as superior to racial ‘others’ in order to argue for his obvious 
awareness of what he was doing in importing the drugs – and thus to insist that he should be 
treated with some severity. We see a clear example here, therefore, of how ‘not quite white’ 
migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, though often racialised and stigmatised, can also 
be depicted quite differently. In other words, we see here how, as I explained in Chapter One, 
these migrants can at points be lifted out of their supposed racial undesirability, and elevated 
into whiteness (Anderson, 2013; Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2012). 
Marek was not demeaned and racialised in the facts of the case, then. Yet, as the 
defence delivered the plea in mitigation, he seemed keen to emphasise that his client was not 
an intrinsically lazy freeloader, who had imported the drugs as a way of making money 
without having to do any ‘real’ work. Similar to Tomás’ hearing, it appeared to be the nature 
of the offence that prompted the defence’s concern that his client might be seen as deviant 
like this – specifically, the fact that, as was explained later on, Marek had been paid for 
bringing the drugs into the UK. Thus, as the defence began his mitigating narrative, he 
seemed to insist first of all that hard work ran through Marek’s family, as he noted ‘His 
mother is a librarian, his father is working’. The defence then drew attention to Marek’s own 
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industrious nature. He set out, therefore, that since arriving in the UK, Marek had been 
employed in construction – before explaining that, however, in recent months work had been 
quiet, and as a result Marek had fallen into debt.  
At this point the judge asked ‘How long has he been in the country?’ The defence 
replied ‘Three years’ – and he then repeated the information about Marek’s employment that 
he had just given, though this time with a slightly different inflection. So, he explained: ‘He 
has worked for the bulk of his time here, paying taxes, but he is now desperate for money, 
there’s not much work about.’ Here, then – just as had also happened in Agnesa and Tomás’ 
hearings – the defence framed Marek explicitly through the narrative of limited inclusion of 
‘hard work’ and ‘contribution’. Thus, in this way, he worked to emphasise that his client was 
not a naturally lazy sponger, who had turned to crime because he just could not be bothered 
to get a job. Rather, the defence insisted that Marek was a good and hard-working migrant, 
who had fallen on hard times and so who had been forced into behaving like this. – and, 
consequently, that he was worthy of the court’s leniency. 
Similar to Joseph’s hearing, the judge in this hearing was quite vocal prior to 
delivering his sentencing remarks. In particular, as soon as the defence set out that Marek had 
committed the offence because work had become scarce and he was ‘desperate for money’, 
the judge began to ask a series of questions about this. As he did this, it became apparent that 
he simply did not believe that poverty was the real reason Marek had turned to importing 
drugs. Thus, the judge asked initially, ‘Why wasn’t he claiming benefits? Does he have a 
National Insurance number?’ The defence responded, somewhat uncertainly, ‘I think he 
didn’t want to claim benefits’ – before then trying to move on from this as he began to point 
to some of the legal factors reducing Marek’s punishability. The judge, however, persisted 
with his line of enquiry, insisting that the defence should take instructions ‘on why the 
defendant thought it was preferable to smuggle drugs rather than claim benefits’. After 
speaking with Marek, then, the defence returned to his position in court and explained to the 
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judge, ‘He says he wasn’t really aware of how the benefits system works’ – to which the 
judge replied, ‘I find that difficult to accept, he’s been here for three years.’  
The defence did not really offer any response to this. Instead, he simply trailed off 
‘Yes …’, before turning, once more, to legal factors as a way of making Marek less 
punishable, emphasising that he had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity and that he had 
no previous convictions for this type of offence. Following this, the judge proceeded to 
sentence Marek. At this point, the idea that had been lurking behind his questions and 
interjections – that Marek had not smuggled the drugs because he was facing financial 
difficulties but, rather, because he was naturally grasping and greedy – was explicitly 
mobilised in his sentencing remarks, to help affirm Marek’s punishability. Initially, the judge 
constructed Marek as sanctionable in legal terms, emphasising his intent and thus culpability 
as he asserted ‘you left to collect the drugs with your eyes open’. Following this, however, 
the judge portrayed him in a more racialised way. Thus, he appeared to assign deviant gold-
digging tendencies to Marek as he said: ‘I am told you were desperate for money, but having 
worked here for three years – you weren’t aware of benefits? I don’t accept this. The allure of 
drug smuggling money was more attractive to you than benefits.’ 
In Joseph and Farid’s hearings, I suggested that the judges invoked racialised 
narratives of bordering, and thus appealed to ideas of the defendant’s inherent badness, to 
help justify sanctions that were much harsher than the relevant sentencing guidelines 
recommended. This did not appear to be what was happening here. After setting out that 
Marek’s culpability was between ‘lesser’ and ‘significant’, and confirming that the amount of 
cocaine involved placed the harm of his conduct, as the prosecution had suggested, in 
Category 3, the judge passed a sentence broadly in keeping with what the drug offences 
guideline advised. Yet – as I noted in my consideration of Jakub’s case, in the previous 
section, in which the same length of custodial sentence was passed – the punishment imposed 
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on Marek, of three and a half years’ prison,13 was nonetheless considerable. The introduction 
of the drug offences guideline by the Sentencing Council, in 2012, saw a significant reduction 
in sentences for so-called drug ‘mules’ – those who are pressured or coerced into bringing 
drugs into the country (Sentencing Council, 2012a). For those who are not recognised as 
having been exploited, however, it is still the case that drug importation is punished more 
severely than many other criminal offences (Ashworth, 2015). The judge’s invocation of the 
racialised narrative of the parasitical scrounger, therefore, seemed to reflect this. That is, as 
he rejected the idea of Marek as actually impoverished and framed him, instead, in terms of 
his money-grabbing propensities – as he insisted that Marek was, in fact, simply inherently 
grasping and greedy – the judge appeared to be working to justify the significant prison 
sentence that he imposed.  
It also seemed that the judge’s mobilisation of the racialised narrative of the 
parasitical scrounger might be doing something else in Marek’s hearing. As we have seen, the 
direct practices of border enforcement were visible in some of the sentencing hearings for 
‘unwanted’ migrants that I observed. Both Agnesa and Tomás, of course, were being 
sanctioned for immigration offences; in Tomás’ hearing, moreover, it was highlighted by the 
defence that following his prison sentence Tomás would be removed from the UK – and, 
indeed, in Farid’s hearing the defence emphasised this about his client as well. Yet, it was 
simultaneously the case that I saw very few hearings in which it was specified by the judge as 
they sentenced the defendant that, as a consequence of the criminal sanction they were 
imposing, deportation proceedings would be initiated. In both Joseph and Farid’s hearings, 
then, the prison sentences passed meant that the threshold for automatic deportation was 
actually crossed – yet neither of the judges mentioned this in their sentencing remarks. In 
Marek’s hearing, conversely, the judge did explicitly state that, because of the sentence he 
 
13 The judge’s starting point for the sentence was, in fact, five years and three months, but this was reduced by a 
third because of Marek’s early guilty plea. 
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was handing out, the automatic deportation provision had been triggered – and so that Marek 
was facing expulsion from the UK.  
After explaining this, the judge immediately added that any immigration action was, 
ultimately, a decision for the Home Office. This, then, was the hearing to which I referred in 
Chapter One, where the judge asserted, ‘The sentence I have passed means that you are 
subject to the deportation provision of the UK Borders Act, but what actually happens is a 
matter for you and the immigration authorities’14. And yet, in spite of the judge’s insistence 
on the strict separation between criminal punishment and border enforcement, we might, 
nevertheless, understand his appeal to a racialised narrative of bordering in his sentencing 
remarks as working to depict Marek not simply as punishable – but also as deportable. That 
is, by portraying Marek as inherently undesirable and deviant, it might be seen that the judge 
was not only working to legitimise the imposition of a long prison sentence on him. The 
judge might also, in fact, be understood as tapping into ideas of Marek’s suspect nature as a 
way of constructing him as deserving of permanent exclusion from the UK. 
The insistence by Marek’s barrister that his client was not an intrinsically lazy 
scrounger but, rather, that he was a good and hard-working migrant, was something that 
played out across a number of other hearings I observed. One of these was the hearing to 
which I referred to in the previous section, for seven men – five from Poland, one from 
Albania, and one from the UK – who were being sentenced for a range of drug-related 
offences, including, like Marek, importation (Hearing 10, Southwark, 2015). The importation 
aspect had allegedly involved some of the men hiding heroin, cocaine and cannabis in the 
spare tyres of lorries coming to the UK from Europe. In this hearing, the defence barrister for 
 
14 As I explained in Chapter One, EEA nationals are not actually subject to automatic deportation – so, what the 
judge stated in Marek’s hearing was technically incorrect. Despite this inaccuracy, however, he was right to say 
that Marek was facing deportation as a result of the sentence imposed on him. As I also set out in Chapter One, 
from April 2009 Home Office policy was to consider deportation where an EEA national received one year or 
more in prison for a sexual, violent or drug-related offence, and in January 2014 this one-year threshold was 
broadened out and applied to all convictions. Thus, the sentence of three years and six months’ prison that 
Marek received meant that he comfortably crossed the deportation threshold.  
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one of the men, Lukasz, originally from Poland, appeared to be countering the narrative of 
the scrounger for the same reason as the defence in Marek’s hearing; so, because of the 
nature of the offence. Resonating with Marek’s hearing, therefore, Lukasz’s barrister 
emphasised during his plea in mitigation that while his client had become involved with the 
operation as a way of making money, he was not a workshy gold-digger who had smuggled 
drugs because he could not be bothered to get a job. Rather, the defence insisted that Lukasz 
was an industrious and deserving migrant, who had fallen into financial difficulties and so 
had been forced into behaving in this way:  
 
He has been in this country for eight to nine years, all along he has been working 
hard and diligently in a warehouse in Heathrow. But the costs of living in Slough 
were high, so he moved to Dover. Then he became unemployed and fell into 
hardship, and was having difficulty providing for his family, so he got involved 
with [name of another defendant, alleged organiser of the operation]. 
 
Alongside this, though, I also saw something different in this hearing. So, during the 
mitigating plea he delivered, the defence barrister for another of the defendants, Pawel, also 
from Poland, similarly emphasised that his client was not a lazy scrounger but, rather, was 
good and hard-working. Unlike Marek or Lukasz’s barristers, however, he did not appear to 
be asserting this as a result of the nature of the offence committed; that is, because Pawel had 
also made money through his involvement with the operation. Rather, Pawel’s barrister 
seemed to be raising it completely independently of this, simply to portray his client as a 
desirable and deserving migrant who, instead of sponging and taking advantage, had worked 
hard during the time he had been in the UK. Thus, he said of Pawel at one point: ‘He came to 
the UK in 2005, he found work in the Crewe area, and he returned to Poland in 2008, having 
earned money and assisted with his parents’ renovation of their property.’ Here, the defence 
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distanced Pawel from the spectre of the parasitical scrounger not only by emphasising his 
industrious nature, but by deploying, too, one of the formulations that we saw in Tomás’ 
hearing. Thus, like Tomás’ barrister, he drew attention to what Pawel had done with the 
money he earned in this country – emphasising how, rather than spending it all on himself to 
enjoy an ‘easy’ life, he had used it more altruistically and helped his family. In this way, 
Pawel’s barrister depicted his client as the exact opposite of a selfish parasite, inverting the 
dominant narrative of the scrounger in order to de-stigmatise and de-racialise him. 
The approach taken by Pawel’s barrister in this hearing, of distancing his client from 
the figure of the parasitical scrounger not because of the offence for which he was being 
sentenced, but quite independently of this, simply as a matter of course, played out, in fact, 
across six more hearings. In four of these, defence barristers insisted that their client was not 
an inherently lazy freeloader in the same way as in the mitigating plea for Pawel. So, they 
emphasised not only that their client had been working hard in the UK, but also that they had 
been using their earnings entirely selflessly, to take care of their families. Thus, in a hearing 
for a man originally from Romania, Nicolae, who had pleaded guilty to non-domestic 
burglary – specifically, stealing some tools from a garden shed – the defence set out: ‘He has 
been using his time here well, working and earning money. His parents in Romania are both 
blind, and he regularly sends money to them’ (Hearing 5, Wood Green, 2015). Likewise, in 
the hearing for Suntaraj, originally from Sri Lanka, who had been convicted of an offence 
related to being drunk and disruptive on a flight back to the UK,15 the defence explained: ‘His 
partner and unborn child are in Sri Lanka. He works five days a week to support them and 
sends them money, £500 per month’ (Hearing 7, Isleworth, 2015).  
In a hearing I touched on briefly at the end of the previous section, for Olufemi, 
originally from Nigeria, who had been convicted of grievous bodily harm with intent, the 
 
15 The exact offence for which Suntaraj had been convicted was not specified during this hearing. However, 
during the facts of the case the prosecution specified that he had been drunk during the flight, and had behaved 
in a ‘disorderly’ way, so it seems likely that the offence was in the area I have suggested. 
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defence explained that prior to being remanded in prison he was ‘someone who was very 
hard-working, working very long hours’. Moreover, it was highlighted, too, that Olufemi had 
been ‘sending money back to Nigeria. He has an extended family there, and has been paying 
for their education. He was supporting seven family members’ (Hearing 14, Isleworth, 2016). 
The fourth hearing in which this formulation was detectable was for a group of men 
originally from Lithuania, who had been convicted of handling stolen cars. In this hearing, 
two of the three defendants were portrayed by their barristers in this way. Thus, the defence 
for one of the men, Evaldas, said: ‘He came to this country in 2010, he has worked almost all 
the time he has been here. His family is in Lithuania, he has essentially been supporting 
them.’ Echoing this in the mitigating plea that he delivered, the barrister for another of the 
defendants, Gintaras, explained: ‘He has been working in a variety of professions, earning 
£200 to £300 per week … He has been striving to do better for himself while in this country, 
and for the family he is supporting in Lithuania, his daughter and granddaughter’ (Hearing 
13, Southwark, 2015). 
Additionally, in two further hearings, defence barristers worked to distance their 
clients from the spectre of the scrounger as a matter of course via a slightly different 
approach: not by inverting this racialised narrative, then, but by mobilising related narratives 
of limited inclusion. So, in the hearing for Maryam, originally from Somalia, who had 
pleaded guilty to importing khat16 into the UK (Hearing 19, Isleworth, 2016), the defence 
insisted on her as a good and deserving migrant initially by drawing attention to how ‘she has 
been resident in the country for the last twelve years’. As the defence then added, ‘and she 
works as a carer’, she appeared to allude subtly to the narrative of ‘hard work’ and 
‘contribution’, too – an allusion the judge seemed to recognise as, imposing a suspended 
prison sentence, she noted during her sentencing remarks ‘You perform a very valuable job’. 
 
16 Khat was banned and classified as an illegal Class C drug on 24th June 2014 – just a few weeks before I began 
my court observations. 
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In another hearing, for Asif, originally from Pakistan, who had been convicted of common 
assault17 (Hearing 4, Wood Green, 2015), the other, even more selective narrative of limited 
inclusion that I documented in Chapter Two, that of ‘the brightest and the best’, was 
deployed to render him less punishable. So, after highlighting, as in Maryam’s hearing, Asif’s 
long residence in the UK, explaining ‘He has an 18-year history in this country’, the defence 
then added: ‘He is not only law abiding, but a productive wealth creator.’ Here, the classed 
dimensions of this narrative came through clearly. As Asif’s barrister insisted on his client as 
a ‘wealth creator’, Asif’s superior economic status was mobilised to lift him out of any 
perceived racial undesirability.  
In the case of Maryam’s and – even more clearly perhaps – Asif’s hearings, the 
phrasing deployed by their barristers made it apparent that they were appealing to narratives 
of limited inclusion, in order to distance their clients from the figure of the parasitical 
scrounger. In the other hearings, however, where the formulation I have identified focused on 
the defendant as working hard in the UK and using the money that they earned to help their 
family members, the interpretation I have offered might, potentially, be questioned. Thus, it 
could be asked: is this formulation necessarily about inverting, and distancing the defendant 
from, the racialised narrative of the selfish migrant freeloader? Might it be possible to 
understand what the defence barristers were doing in these hearings in a different way? I 
highlighted in the previous chapter that, because there was no clear way of ascertaining prior 
to a hearing if it was relevant to my research, I ended up observing many sentencing hearings 
where it seemed that the defendant had not migrated to the UK. And, in fact, across these 
non-migrant hearings, I saw a number of pleas in mitigation where defence barristers 
 
17 As I highlighted in a footnote in Chapter Four, common assault is a summary offence and so is normally only 
dealt with and sentenced in the magistrates’ courts. Technically, however, Asif’s hearing was an appeal against 
his conviction and sentence – and, consequently, it was being heard in the Crown Court. Following the appeal 
section of the hearing, Asif’s conviction was upheld and he was then re-sentenced. Thus, I consider this part of 




constructed their clients as less punishable through formulations that seemed quite similar to 
what I observed in proceedings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants. 
Thus, I saw several non-migrant mitigating pleas where it was emphasised by the 
defence that their client was currently working. In one hearing, for example, the defence said, 
‘He went straight into work after leaving school’, and in another, it was stated ‘He is a man of 
some promise, he has continued working’. In a further hearing, the defence explained: ‘He is 
working in a local shop, earning £80 per week … He is a productive member of society.’ I 
also saw non-migrant hearings where the defence drew attention to how their client was 
financially supporting, or trying to support, their family. In one hearing, for instance, the 
defence highlighted: ‘He is a hard-working, family man … If he passes the qualification he is 
currently undertaking, he will have a permanent job which he can utilise to support his 
girlfriend and daughters.’ In these hearings, defence barristers’ emphasis on their clients’ 
working status seemed to be about portraying them as economically productive citizens, and 
thus about making them desirable and deserving in terms of class. Alongside this, references 
to how male defendants, in particular, were supporting their family members – about how 
they were acting as reliable providers and caretakers – worked to make them good in 
gendered terms (see also Gathings and Parrotta, 2013). We might ask, therefore: is it not the 
case that what I have documented in non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant hearings was 
simply the same as this? That is, by emphasising that their clients were working hard in the 
UK and that they were using the money they earned to help their families, were not defence 
barristers in these hearings simply constructing defendants as good, and thus less punishable, 
through classed and gendered norms?  
Indeed, I explained in Chapter Four that in four hearings for ‘unwanted’ migrants that 
I observed where I initially traced the narrative of the parasitical scrounger being countered 
by defence barristers, I ultimately decided that this was not the case. In three of these 
hearings, this was because it became clear that the defence’s emphasis on how their client 
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was earning money in the UK and using this to support family members was not being 
mobilised, primarily, to negate them as inherently deviant – but, rather, for more practical 
reasons. So, this information was deployed to persuade the judge not to send the defendant to 
prison, because it would mean he could not continue supporting his parents (Hearing 2, Wood 
Green, 2014); to argue for lower costs than had been requested by the prosecution (Hearing 9, 
Wood Green, 2015); and to explain how much the defendant could pay in compensation 
(Hearing 12, Isleworth, 2015). In the fourth hearing, however, although the defence 
undoubtedly highlighted that her client was employed and supporting his family financially to 
insist that he was not an undesirable person, I eventually concluded that the way she 
presented this information was not obviously different to the formulations I traced in non-
migrant hearings. The defence barrister stated of her client, then, who was originally from 
Poland: ‘He has worked all his life as a painter and decorator. He wants to carry on 
supporting his daughter’ (Hearing 3, Wood Green, 2014). This could, perhaps, be understood 
as an attempt to head off the racialised narrative of the lazy and selfish migrant freeloader. 
Yet, after several readings I felt less convinced, and it seemed more accurate to interpret it as 
the defendant being framed as an economically productive worker and reliable father – so, as 
deserving of leniency because of his classed and gendered conformity. 
Ideas of classed and gendered conformity certainly ran through the formulation 
deployed by defence barristers in the mitigating pleas for Pawel, Nicolae, Suntaraj, Olufemi, 
Evaldas, Gintaras and, of course, Tomás, as it was emphasised that they had been working 
hard in the UK and using their earnings to support their family. And yet, in these hearings, 
the presentation of this information also had particular inflections and nuances, which 
indicated that the defence was specifically engaging with, and countering, the racialised 
figure of the lazy, selfish scrounger. In the first place, then, it was noticeable in these hearings 
that when defence barristers set out that their client had been working while they had been 
living in the UK, they rarely just stated this. Rather, they sometimes emphasised how their 
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client had been working for most of their time since arriving in the country – for instance, 
‘He came to this country in 2010, he has worked almost all the time he has been here.’ Or 
they explained how much their client had been working in the UK: ‘He works five days a 
week’, ‘[He was] working very long hours’. Or they introduced additional detail, and insisted 
on their client’s particularly productive nature, in some other way – for example, ‘He has 
been using his time here well’, ‘He has been striving to do better for himself while in this 
country’. Through these specific inflections and additions, therefore, defence barristers were 
directly addressing and dispelling the racist trope of their clients as inherently lazy and 
indolent. They presented them not simply as working, but in terms of an ongoing, relentless 
even, industriousness and activity – in order to insist that they were anything but naturally 
parasitical and dependent.  
Alongside this, it was striking in these hearings that it was highlighted not only how 
male defendants were providing financial support to partners and children. It was 
foregrounded, too, when they were using their earnings to help their parents, for instance, and 
indeed other members of their family. In part, of course, the inclusion of this information 
simply reflected the realities of these defendants’ lives, and the fact that many people – often 
men – who migrate to the UK from less economically well-off countries provide financial 
help to family members who have remained in their country of origin. And yet, the decision 
to specifically draw attention to this, to ‘lif[t] into visibility’ (Kalunta-Crumpton, 1999, 
p.125) how defendants were providing financial support to family members including those 
who are often not considered to be immediate dependants, is important. The focus on this by 
defence barristers was very much about insisting that their clients were not greedy, selfish 
parasites, who were only concerned with looking after themselves and enjoying an ‘easy’ life. 
The emphasis on the generous and altruistic way in which defendants were using their 
earnings, therefore, worked to invert, and so directly counter, this racist stereotype.  
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 Overall, the practice of defence barristers countering their clients as parasitical 
scroungers – either by inverting this racialised narrative, or by mobilising a related narrative 
of limited inclusion – unfolded across 11 of the sentencing hearings for ‘unwanted’ migrants 
that I saw, and could be traced in relation to 13 defendants. In seven of these hearings, and 
for eight defendants, there was no obvious prompt or reason for the defence insisting that 
their client should not be viewed as an inherently lazy freeloader. From this series of seven 
hearings, then, a consistent pattern of defence barristers working to distance their clients from 
the figure of the scrounger simply as a matter of course seemed to emerge. Thus, it appeared 
that adopting such an approach might be developing as a standard element of defence practice 
in non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant sentencing hearings. That is, it seemed that 
heading off this racialised narrative might be becoming a staple, and specific way, of 
presenting ‘unwanted’ migrant defendants as intrinsically good people, who had simply made 
a mistake – and of insisting, therefore, that they could be punished less severely. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how two of the dominant, racialised narratives of bordering that 
I traced in Chapter Two, the narrative of the abusive immigration cheat, and that of the 
parasitical scrounger, could be detected in some of the sentencing hearings for ‘unwanted’ 
migrants that I observed. As I have demonstrated, these racialised narratives were being put 
to work in the specific context of sentencing proceedings to help construct, and negotiate, 
non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant defendants’ punishability. Thus, I have uncovered 
how these racialised narratives were mobilised and tapped into in order to constitute 
defendants as intrinsically undesirable and deviant, to portray them not simply as having done 
something problematic but as problematic in themselves – and, therefore, to help produce 
them as punishable. Conversely, I have also shown how these narratives were negotiated and 
negated in various ways, in order to contest defendants as inherently bad and deviant and 
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depict them, in fact, as naturally good and deserving migrants – and, through this, to insist 
that they were worthy of the court’s leniency. I have documented, too, how, at points, the 
narratives of limited inclusion I identified in Chapter Two were tapped into as well, as 
another way of rendering defendants as desirable in themselves, and so of portraying them as 
deserving of less punitive treatment.  
Alongside the overarching pattern of how narratives of bordering were being put to 
work in sentencing hearings, moreover, I have documented some of the smaller patterns and 
routines that could be detected – including when, or in what sort of circumstances, these 
racialised narratives tended to be deployed. So, I have shown how racialised ideas about 
‘unwanted’ migrants were often appealed to by the prosecution, or the judge, in specific 
contexts: for example, when a defendant’s presence in court seemed to be based on 
questionable charges, or when a severe sanction was being pushed for or imposed. Thus, 
ideas of inherent deviance often seemed to be tapped into by the prosecution or judge on 
occasions when more than legal legitimation was needed – when a solely legal justification 
for criminal punishment did not appear to be enough. As I have explained, indeed, the 
hearings where dominant narratives of bordering were not traceable in prosecution and 
judges’ narratives – including those hearings where these racialised narratives could not be 
detected at all during the proceedings – generally tied in with this pattern. In other words, the 
specific factors that seemed to especially prompt the mobilisation of racialised narratives of 
bordering by prosecution barristers, or judges, were largely not present in these hearings.    
At the same time, however, as I have also documented, against the pattern of 
narratives of bordering being mobilised by the prosecution or judge in specific contexts, 
distancing the defendant from the figure of the parasitical scrounger seemed to simply run 
through some defence narratives. From the seven hearings where I observed this unfolding, 
therefore, a quite different pattern as to when or in what sort of circumstances racialised ideas 
about ‘unwanted’ migrants permeated sentencing proceedings seemed to emerge. In this 
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series of hearings, the lack of an obvious prompt or reason for defence barristers heading off 
the narrative of the scrounger appeared to suggest that such an approach might be emerging 
as a standard feature of pleas in mitigation in non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant 
sentencing proceedings. That is, it seemed from these hearings that insisting that the 
defendant is not an inherently lazy freeloader might be developing as a regular way of 
making ‘unwanted’ migrant defendants less punishable, and so pressing for them to be treated 
less severely. 
It is important to emphasise, though, that even as defence barristers countered and 
contested the idea of their individual clients as inherently undesirable and deviant migrants, 
they did not work to question or challenge the framework of racialised narratives of bordering 
overall. Rather, the formulations that they deployed actually inadvertently reinforced this 
framework. So, as defence barristers framed their particular clients as good and deserving 
migrants, they implicitly upheld the ‘problem’ of intrinsically bad and undeserving migrants 
as legitimate – and insisted, therefore, that while the defendants they were representing 
should not be seen like this, abusive immigration cheats and freeloading scroungers 
undoubtedly exist. In identifying defence representatives’ adherence to this racist framework, 
it is important to recognise that their reluctance to narrate outside of it and render their clients 
as less punishable in more resistant ways is, in part, a consequence of the institutional context 
within which they are operating. I explore this issue further in the chapter that follows. And 
yet, as I also explain in Chapter Six, during my fieldwork I did, in fact, observe a small 
number of sentencing hearings in which more disruptive behaviour was traceable. Thus, I 
saw three hearings where defence barristers, as well as defendants themselves, contested the 
mobilisation of racialised narratives of bordering through the use of more subversive and 
oppositional formulations. In my second empirical chapter, therefore, I turn my attention to 
the more radical tactics of these hearings, and focus on defence barristers and defendants’ 




Challenging Racialised Narratives of Bordering: Defence Barristers and Defendants’ 
Practices of Resistance 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter Five I documented how, as defence barristers contested the framing of defendants 
as abusive immigration cheats or parasitical scroungers, they typically did this by negating or 
inverting these racialised narratives, or by mobilising narratives of limited inclusion. Through 
this, they insisted that their clients were in fact good and deserving migrants – and so that 
they could be punished less severely. In doing so, as I argued in the chapter’s conclusion, 
defence representatives implicitly upheld the legitimacy of the ‘problem’ of inherently bad 
and deviant migrants, and rearticulated the idea that – while their individual clients should 
not be seen in this way – immigration fraudsters and freeloading spongers definitely exist. 
Thus, through the formulations that they deployed, defence barristers adhered to and actually 
inadvertently reinforced the racist framework of narratives of bordering.  
In this chapter, however, I trace something different. So, I highlight moments in three 
sentencing hearings that I observed where defence barristers, as well as defendants 
themselves, appeared to challenge the mobilisation of racialised narratives of bordering in 
more resistant ways. I recognise, as I set out in Chapter Four, the danger of over-reading and 
romanticising these moments, of over-assigning the possibilities for disruption in the 
courtroom, which is a highly regulated environment. As I explore them, then, it is very much 
within this context; I document how such practices of resistance transgressed, ultimately, in a 
limited way. Yet, despite this, it is still important to analyse them fully. Paying these 
moments of contestation proper attention is, as I also explained in Chapter Four, critical to a 
research practice of ‘writing against othering’ (Fine, 1994, p.75). That is, it is crucial to 
ensuring that I do not ignore and silence the ‘uppity voices’ (Fine, 1994, p.78) that emerged 
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at points during sentencing hearings – and so, in the version of ‘what happened’ that I put 
forward, that I do not portray ‘unwanted’ migrant defendants as only ever stigmatised and 
abjectified. 
In the first section of this chapter, I look at defence barristers’ practices of resistance. 
In the existing literature, the practice of defence lawyers and barristers has usually been 
explored in terms of their adherence to courtroom norms and conventions. As I have 
indicated, indeed, my research bears this focus out, as the defence barristers I observed 
generally appeared to deliver their mitigating narratives in conformist and conventional ways. 
In two of the sentencing hearings that I saw, however, the defence barristers seemed at points 
to be taking a more oppositional approach, as they challenged the construction of their client 
through a racialised narrative of bordering more radically and subversively than I witnessed 
during other proceedings. As I explore these two hearings, then, I analyse how the defence’s 
contestation of their client as inherently bad and deviant was more resistant, and I also draw 
out what effects their more questioning approach had on the proceedings. I consider, too, why 
such resistance might have emerged. 
In the second section, I turn to defendants’ resistance. As critics writing on the 
criminal courts have noted, though formally central to proceedings, defendants are practically 
marginalised throughout the court process: the most obvious marker of this during the 
sentencing hearing is that they are not allowed any opportunity to speak. In some of the 
hearings that I observed defendants did, despite this, attempt to say something and to insert 
themselves into the proceedings in this way, although they were typically silenced very 
quickly. Yet, there were other, more subtle forms of ‘communicative expression’ (Johnson, 
2011, p.59) also deployed by defendants during hearings; sometimes, these seemed to convey 
resignation and acceptance – but at other points, they appeared to express resistance. By 
focusing on one hearing I saw, therefore, I show how the defendant, through his reactions and 
behaviour during the proceedings, almost seemed to be challenging legal professionals’ 
243 
 
portrayal of him through a racialised narrative of bordering. I demonstrate, moreover, how he 
appeared to be articulating that he was not an inherently deviant migrant in a more resistant 
manner; that is, how his reactions and behaviour during the hearing seemed to be invoking a 
much more complicated, and thus subversive, version of events. 
 
Telling subversive stories and refusing to accept racialised depictions: Defence barristers’ 
practices of resistance 
As I suggested above, research on the practice of defence lawyers and barristers has typically 
drawn out how they follow courtroom convention; the question of their possible resistance 
has, in fact, rarely been raised. Often, the conformist behaviour of defence representatives has 
been explained in terms of a straightforwardly positive view of them and their work. Thus, 
some studies emphasise how they operate tactically, within the range of practices that are 
deemed appropriate in court, simply in order to secure the best possible outcome for their 
client (Flower, 2018; Gathings and Parrotta, 2013). For other critics, however, the 
conventional practices of defence representatives are also generated in other ways. In their 
study of defence lawyers, McConville et al. argue that we also need to understand defence 
practices of mitigation in terms of, for example, their dependence on legal aid. So, there is a 
‘need to generate volume business and to turn cases around quickly so that other cases can be 
handled in the interests of achieving economic viability’ (1994, p.201). Sticking to 
‘acceptable behaviour’, then, might be seen as having a more practical aspect to it – as ‘going 
through the motions’ in order to get through as many cases as quickly as possible. 
McConville et al. highlight, too, that since defence representatives appear regularly in court, 
they also ‘need to retain credibility with the court itself in order to continue as effective 
workers in the daily business of processing defendants’ (1994, p.201). Behaving as expected, 
and not ‘rocking the boat’, therefore, might also be seen as a matter of professional survival 
and career prospects. 
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My research, to a significant extent, bears out the emphasis on defence 
representatives’ conformity in the existing literature. And yet, in a couple of the hearings that 
I observed, I did witness some more subversive behaviour by defence barristers, as they 
challenged the depiction of their clients through racialised narratives of bordering. In the first 
hearing that I look at, the defence negotiated the idea of his client as an inherently lazy and 
selfish scrounger in all the usual ways that we saw in the previous chapter. Alongside this, 
though, at one point the defence also contested this racialised depiction of his client not 
simply by constructing him, conversely, as hard-working and deserving – but, in fact, by 
going outside the framework of the good/bad migrant altogether and by looking beyond ideas 
of individual deficiency or desirability. In the second hearing that I explore, the defence 
countered the depiction of his client through a racialised narrative of bordering in 
conventional terms, by inverting it. Yet he also did this forcefully and repeatedly, pushing 
back against the judge’s insistence that his client was intrinsically deviant in a way that I 
simply did not see in other hearings. As a result, his approach felt very different to the 
negotiations by defence barristers that I documented in the previous chapter. The type of 
resistance displayed by the defence representatives in each of these hearings was different, 
therefore – yet both approaches, as we will see, had the clear effect of destabilising the 
process of punishing the defendants. 
 
Narrating outside the framework of racialised narratives of bordering: Tamir’s hearing 
The first hearing that I explore was for Tamir, originally from Palestine (Hearing 24, 
Isleworth, 2016). Similar to Joseph, whose case I explored in the previous chapter, Tamir had 
pleaded guilty to possession of articles for use in fraud – specifically, 13 false bank cards in 
someone else’s name – and possession of a false identity document. Unlike Joseph, however, 
Tamir had not also been charged with actually attempting fraud with these items. Opening the 
hearing with the facts of the case, the prosecution barrister delivered a typically concise 
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version of events that rendered Tamir punishable, of course, in legal terms. The prosecution’s 
narrative about ‘what happened’ unfolded in the following way:     
 
Prosecution:  
The circumstances are that the defendant was seen at Next in Westfield Shopping 
Centre. He was recognised by a member of staff as someone who had frequented 
the store previously and used fraudulent cards to make purchases. 
 
Judge:  
But there were no charges, so I mustn’t take this into account? 
 
Prosecution:  
No, there were no charges. The police were called, the officers spoke to him and 
asked him if he had anything that he shouldn’t have. He told the police he had 
fake cards, he was searched and found in possession of the bank cards, and also a 
Belgian ID card. He has pleaded guilty to all of these matters today. 
 
He was interviewed by the police, he admitted the ID card was fake and that he 
had made it because he had no other form of ID. In terms of the bank cards, he 
said someone gave them to him, he said he was aware of their illegality but he 
needed the money. He referred to a man he had met in a coffee shop, Ali; he said 
he would buy things on Ali’s behalf and would be given around £150 to £200 for 
these purchases. He accepts that what he has done is wrong.   
 
We can see here how the prosecution specified Tamir’s prohibited conduct as she 
explained that the police had searched him and found the bank cards and fake ID on him. She 
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pointed to his clear intent, too, as she described how during his police interview Tamir had 
confirmed that he was ‘aware of [the] illegality’ of the bank cards, and had acknowledged 
that what he had done was wrong. On the face of it, then, the prosecution’s account appeared 
to be straightforwardly legalistic. Yet, it was noticeable that the prosecution also included 
some additional details, that did not appear to be strictly relevant to the specific offences for 
which Tamir was being sentenced. Thus, the prosecution highlighted at the start of her 
narrative that the police had been called to the shopping centre by a shop worker there, who 
had recognised Tamir ‘as someone who had frequented the store previously and used 
fraudulent cards to make purchases’. This partly functioned to explain why Tamir had been 
approached and searched by the police in the first place. But it also brought into view how 
Tamir had apparently been using the fake bank cards in his possession to actually commit 
fraud – despite the fact, as I explained above, that he was not being sentenced for this. As the 
prosecution then included the detail from Tamir’s police interview about the man, Ali, he said 
he had met, for whom he would buy items in return for cash, it was not only re-asserted that 
Tamir had been committing fraud with the cards. It was also implied, in fact, that Tamir had 
been making fraudulent purchases regularly, over a sustained period of time. Alongside this, 
it was interesting, moreover, that the prosecution included a further detail from Tamir’s 
police interview, his explanation that he got hold of the fake bank cards in the first place 
because ‘he needed the money’. Yet, having asserted this, the prosecution did not then go on 
to say anything more about this, or elaborate on why Tamir had said that this was the case. 
What I am tracing here is less tangible than, for instance, what I documented in 
Agnesa’s hearing, in the previous chapter, where the prosecution barrister mobilised legally 
irrelevant details in his opening account to frame Agnesa through the racialised narrative of 
the abusive immigration cheat. And yet, as the prosecution in Tamir’s hearing portrayed 
Tamir as repeatedly using the fake bank cards found on him to commit fraud, apparently in 
order to generate an income, there nonetheless seemed to be a suggestion of a racialised 
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narrative of bordering. Specifically, the prosecution appeared to be hinting at Tamir as a lazy 
foreign scrounger, who had turned to crime as an ‘easy’ way of making money. The defence 
certainly seemed to be worried that his client might be perceived like this. He may, then, have 
been picking up on the prosecution’s insinuations – although it seems possible too that, as in 
Marek’s hearing, which I also explored in Chapter Five, the money-related nature of the 
offence prompted the defence’s concern. As the defence began the plea in mitigation, 
therefore, he immediately worked to emphasise that Tamir was not a workshy freeloader, 
who used false bank cards because he just could not be bothered to get a job. Rather, the 
defence insisted that his client was actually a good and hard-working migrant, who had been 
forced into behaving in this way. The defence began his version of ‘what happened’ like this: 
 
This type of offence is often committed by a man in his current situation. He is 
Palestinian, he was living in Lebanon; he came to the UK in the hope of a new 
life, potentially via some sort of asylum application. He met and married a Czech 
national, they have been married for three years; he does have a work permit1 but, 
by some sort of lacuna, he doesn’t have a National Insurance number, this is to do 
with restricting access to benefits – quite reasonably, of course, for people new to 
the country. This is the background to how he is in this predicament. His mother 
is in Lebanon, she suffers from significant ill health and has significant medical 
bills. He tries to help her pay, and this drew him into criminality. 
 
 
1 Citizens of the Czech Republic are EEA nationals – and, therefore, by marrying a Czech national Tamir would 
have acquired rights of residence in the UK. He would have also acquired the right to work, as the defence 
barrister indicated – although it is not the case, as the barrister suggested, that a specific ‘work permit’ would 
have been issued. Rather, as the family member of an EEA national Tamir would have been issued with a 
residence permit, on which it would have been indicated that he had permission to work in the UK (Home 
Office, 2015a).      
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In one sense, the defence was working here to make Tamir less punishable in legal 
terms. Thus, as he documented the broader circumstances of Tamir’s life, he seemed to be 
pointing to his client’s reduced level of choice, and so lesser intent, in committing the 
offence. The defence attempted to reduce Tamir’s culpability through this, though, in a 
careful way, without violating the norms of the criminal law. So, as he referred to the 
impossible situation in which Tamir had found himself as, somewhat understatedly, ‘the 
background to how he is in this predicament’, the defence avoided the suggestion that his 
client did not have any choice in how he had behaved. In other words, the defence worked to 
ensure that the judge did not think he was suggesting Tamir was not ultimately individually 
responsible or accountable for his wrongful actions. I saw this type of approach in several of 
the non-migrant sentencing hearings that I observed, as well. Defence barristers, then, 
sometimes alluded to the social disadvantage defendants had experienced, to help explain the 
limited choices before them and so to point towards a reduced level of mens rea. Yet, they 
typically introduced this information very cautiously, presenting factors such as poverty, for 
instance, as the ‘background’ or ‘context’ to the offences for which their clients were being 
sentenced, in order to avoid the suggestion that the defendant did not have any choice at all.2 
At the same time, however, as Tamir’s barrister narrated ‘what happened’ in this way, 
he was also making Tamir less punishable by insisting that he was not an inherently lazy 
scrounger, using tactics similar to those deployed by defence representatives in the hearings 
that I explored in the previous chapter. Hence, the defence set out first of all that, while Tamir 
had the right to work in the UK, he had been prevented from actually doing this by an 
administrative loophole, related to restricting access to the welfare benefits system for newly-
 
2 In one of the non-migrant hearings that I observed the defence barrister did not introduce information about the 
social disadvantage and hardship that her client had faced in this more careful way. Rather, she presented it very 
clearly as having significantly constrained the choices available to him; thus, her presentation was more in line 
with Barbara Hudson’s (1999) idea of a ‘hardship defence’. The judge, predictably perhaps, reacted badly to 
this. In her sentencing remarks, she dismissed the attempt to minimise the defendant’s culpability in this way as 
the defence putting forward ‘a pathetic excuse’. 
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arrived migrants. Similar to in Marek’s hearing, then, the defence emphasised that Tamir’s 
lack of employment – which had resulted in him using the fake bank cards – was not his own 
fault. As the defence relayed this information, moreover, it was noticeable how he quickly 
added that, despite the adverse impact of the loophole in Tamir’s case, he was not suggesting 
that immigration-related restrictions on benefits should not be in place. He made it clear to 
the judge, therefore, that neither he nor his client were saying that migrants should be able to 
come to the UK and instantly claim any benefit they want. Thus, the defence continued to 
emphasise Tamir as a hard-working migrant, who would never take advantage in this way.  
As he also drew attention to what Tamir had been doing with any cash he made from 
using the bank cards, the defence deployed a formulation that we saw in a number of the 
hearings in the previous chapter. He highlighted, then that – rather than spending it all on 
himself, in order to enjoy an ‘easy’ life – Tamir had been sending any money that he had 
obtained to his mother in Lebanon, to help her pay her medical bills. Through this detail, the 
defence depicted his client as the exact opposite of an inherently greedy and selfish sponger. 
He reinforced his ‘good migrant’ portrayal, therefore – and, consequently, Tamir was 
presented as less punishable than the prosecution had suggested, and as a deserving recipient 
of the court’s leniency. 
The defence continued to insist that his client was not a scamming scrounger as he 
then emphasised Tamir’s ‘sheer transparency’ in his dealings with the police. He evidenced 
this ‘transparency’ by explaining that, when the police approached Tamir initially and asked 
if he was in possession of anything illegal, ‘he said the bank cards were in his pocket and the 
false ID was on him’. At this point, however, the judge – who was, in fact, the same judge 
who had presided over Farid’s hearing – interjected, and started to push back against how 
Tamir was being portrayed. Thus the judge insisted, first of all, against the defence’s 
assertion of Tamir’s ‘sheer transparency’ by telling the police about the items he had on him: 
‘I don’t want to sound curmudgeonly, but he had to tell them, didn’t he? Otherwise he would 
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have been searched and they would have been discovered anyway.’ The defence did not reply 
to this directly, but instead continued to emphasise Tamir’s honesty, setting out how he had 
also made ‘full admissions’ in his subsequent interview with the police. The judge then 
interjected again, noting that Tamir did not have any previous convictions, and also stating 
that he would get ‘full credit for his guilty pleas’ – before adding, ‘though it is a mercy he 
pleaded guilty given the state of the evidence’. Once more, therefore, the judge appeared to 
be contesting the defence’s assertion of Tamir’s non-fraudulence and honesty, as he 
insinuated that entering a guilty plea was, in fact, the only option that was realistically 
available to him. 
The defence immediately responded: ‘But it is right to mention his concern about 
sending money home and his frustration at not earning money in one of the most affluent 
countries in the world.’ As he emphasised again that Tamir had been using the money that he 
had obtained from the use of the bank cards to help his mother, the defence re-asserted him as 
the direct opposite of a selfish, greedy gold-digger. Against the judge’s insinuations, then, the 
defence insisted that his client was a good and deserving person – that Tamir’s wrongdoing 
was not reflective of a deviant or undesirable nature, but simply a terrible mistake. Following 
this, however, the defence started to do something quite different. As he highlighted Tamir’s 
‘frustration at not earning money in one of the most affluent countries in the world’, he 
appeared to move beyond the framework of inherently deviant parasites versus hard-working 
migrants altogether – so, beyond ideas of individual deficiency and desirability. Instead, the 
defence seemed to be to pointing towards the unjust structural conditions that had resulted in 
his client’s current situation.  
Thus, through this intervention, the defence gestured again to the immigration-related 
restrictions that had stopped Tamir from accessing employment. Yet, this time, he did not 
downplay them by insisting that such measures are, in fact, perfectly reasonable. Rather, he 
alluded more clearly to their problematic nature as he noted Tamir’s ‘frustration’ at being 
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prevented from earning money in the UK. As the defence also emphasised the UK’s status as 
‘one of the most affluent countries in the world’, he drew attention, moreover, to the vast 
wealth disparity between the Global North and South. Consequently, he signalled towards the 
very real poverty and economic inequity from which Tamir had migrated – an economic 
inequity which, as I explained in Chapter Two, the racialised narrative of ‘unwanted’ 
migrants as innately greedy and grasping serves to obscure. In this way, therefore, the 
defence seemed to underline the injustice of his client’s situation still further. That is, as he 
pointed towards Tamir’s clear economic disadvantage, he appeared to more obviously 
question the immigration-related restrictions to which Tamir had been subjected since 
arriving in the UK.  
Hence, as the defence foregrounded the political and economic conditions that had 
forced his client into criminal activity, he started to shift away from a narrative that was 
accepting of Tamir as sanctionable, himself, for the offence, and which was working simply 
to make his punishment less severe. Rather, the defence seemed to be moving towards an 
account that was disrupting and unsettling Tamir’s individual responsibility for ‘what 
happened’ – and so which appeared to be questioning the fairness and legitimacy of his 
criminalisation, and subjection to punishment, at all. The approach by the defence at this 
point, therefore, clearly underlines the dependence of the criminal justice system on the 
doctrine of individual responsibility and accountability. This doctrine is enshrined in the 
criminal process, of course, through the ‘essential building block’ (McConville, Sanders and 
Leng, 1991, p.65) of mens rea and so the focus on defendants’ autonomous choice and 
intention – a focus that Alan Norrie identifies as the criminal law’s ‘repressive individualism 
… which obscures the social realities beneath the legal appearances’ (2014, p.29). As we 
have seen throughout this thesis, moreover, individual responsibility is also insisted upon via 
social categorisations such as gender and race – and, in the sentencing hearings that I have 
explored, through racialised ideas about ‘unwanted’ migrants which characterise defendants 
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as innately, and so individually, either good or bad. Tamir’s barrister reached outside of this 
simplified framework, then, and uncovered problematic social conditions that racialised 
narratives of bordering function to conceal and silence. In doing so, he delivered a more 
complex and multi-dimensional version of events – which started to destabilise and undercut 
the practice of his client’s punishment.  
 This intervention by Tamir’s barrister was the most radical display of resistance by a 
defence representative that I saw across the hearings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ 
migrant defendants observed during my fieldwork. I did not see any other defence barristers 
narrate beyond the idea of individually good and bad migrants, and visibilise and 
problematise structural conditions, in this way. The defence appeared to continue with this 
more resistant approach, indeed, as he then highlighted to the judge that – apart from a short 
conversation immediately prior to the hearing – Tamir had not spoken with his legal 
representatives at all during the two months he had been remanded in prison. This, 
apparently, had been because of problems with booking an interpreter to assist with a legal 
visit. Consequently, the uneasy space that had already opened up in the hearing, as a result of 
the defence’s questioning of Tamir’s individual responsibility for his offence, seemed to 
extend a little wider. That is, the process of punishing Tamir started to move even less 
assuredly, as the defence unsettled not only the legitimacy of his client’s presence in court in 
the first place – but also drew attention to the distinct lack of due process that he had 
experienced following his arrest. 
The judge certainly seemed to sense the destabilisation of the hearing at this point, 
and acted quickly to minimise this disruption. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, he did not respond 
directly to the defence’s point about Tamir’s ‘frustration at not earning money in one of the 
most affluent countries in the world’. He did, however, address the fact that Tamir had not 
received any legal advice prior to the hearing. Thus, he initially expressed concern by saying 
‘That is unsettling, I have real sympathy for him’ – before then working to step past this and 
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keep the process of punishment moving as he told the defence, ‘but your care today will have 
compensated for this’. The judge’s efforts seemed to be effective. So, following this 
response, the defence did not persist any further with the issues that he had just raised, but 
instead turned to the sentencing guideline for fraud and began to suggest where Tamir’s 
offence should be placed in relation to this. The defence dropped his more resistant stance at 
this point, therefore, and returned to the conventional defence practice of negotiating and 
lessening his client’s punishability. 
Following this, the judge moved straight into his sentencing remarks, justifying the 
18-month prison term he imposed on Tamir with a brief and entirely legally-focused account. 
An optimistic reading of this narrative might be that the defence’s insistence that his client 
was not an inherently deviant scrounger had made an impression on the judge. That is, the 
judge delivered a version of events that did not portray Tamir in a racialised way because of 
what the defence had said previously – including, perhaps, the attention the defence had 
drawn to the structural conditions that had forced Tamir into criminal activity. Yet, it also 
seems possible that the judge did not go beyond legal justification because this simply was 
not needed. The sanction that the judge imposed, then, was broadly in line with what the 
sentencing guideline recommended – and, moreover, while 18 months is by no means an 
insignificant prison term, it is perhaps short enough to be seen as not that severe, either. 
Hence, in keeping with the pattern that I traced across Chapter Five, as to when racialised 
narratives of bordering were typically mobilised by judges, it seems possible that the sentence 
passed meant there was no pressing reason to construct Tamir as inherently deviant – and so 
to supplement his legal punishability. 
 The more subversive behaviour by Tamir’s barrister in this hearing, therefore, 
seemed only to cause a momentary disruption – a minor destabilisation that the judge was 
able to smooth over and move past quickly. And yet, it is interesting to note something that 
happened shortly after the judge had finished delivering his sentencing remarks, which might 
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be read as indicating that the defence’s resistance actually had a more significant effect. Just 
as Tamir’s hearing came to an end, and the barristers involved in the next hearing started to 
move into place, the judge looked at me and said: ‘There is a lady in the public gallery taking 
notes. Can you tell us who you are?’ I explained that I was a PhD student, researching 
sentencing hearings; the judge responded by checking that I would be ensuring the anonymity 
of everyone involved in the hearings I observed when I wrote up my research. I confirmed 
that I would. The judge then said: ‘There is no prohibition on taking notes in court, as you 
know, but I like to know who is in court.’ He asked me one further question, what institution 
I was studying at, before then moving onto the business of presiding over the next hearing. 
I explained in Chapter Four that, although I generally moved around the courts in 
which I conducted observations with relative ease, I was at points treated with suspicion by 
some court staff. Within the range of suspicious responses directed towards me, however, 
being asked who I was, in open court, by the judge, was unusual: this was the only time that 
this happened to me during my two-year period of observations. It is worth emphasising, too, 
that I had actually observed this judge previously, on two separate occasions – and yet he did 
not ask me on either of these occasions who I was. It could be, of course, that Tamir’s 
hearing was the first time that he had noticed me and saw that I was taking notes. On one of 
the previous occasions that I had observed this judge, though, I had specifically written in my 
fieldnotes how visible I had felt during the hearings I watched. This was because the 
courtroom that he worked in was quite small, and there had only been two other people sat 
alongside me in the public gallery, which was close to the judge’s bench. It seems unlikely, 
therefore, that the judge would not have noticed me, and what I was doing, on this occasion. 
Why, then, did he only ask me who I was following Tamir’s hearing?  
I highlighted earlier that the judge who sentenced Tamir had also presided over 
Farid’s hearing; in fact, Tamir was sentenced on the same day, immediately after Farid. Thus, 
it seems possible that it was the harsh sentence imposed in Farid’s hearing – as I explained in 
255 
 
the previous chapter, it was well outside what the sentencing guideline recommended – that 
prompted the judge’s concern about who I was and why I was taking notes in court. But it 
also seems possible that the more resistant approach adopted by Tamir’s barrister actually 
had a more significant effect than it first appeared from the relatively effortless way that the 
judge seemed to move past the issues raised by the defence during the proceedings. In other 
words, during the hearing, the judge ignored the suggestion that Tamir’s criminalisation was 
questionable, and also glossed over the lack of due process that he had experienced following 
his arrest. Yet, the defence’s problematisation of Tamir’s treatment was nonetheless the 
reason for the judge’s anxiety following the end of the proceedings about who was observing 
from the public gallery – because he was worried about potentially negative perceptions of 
the case. 
 
Refusing to accept a judge’s racialised depiction: Daniela’s hearing 
The other hearing that I explore in this section, for Daniela, originally from Romania 
(Hearing 25, Southwark, 2016), also involved a defence barrister whose more resistant 
approach to a narrative of bordering opened up an uneasy space in the proceedings, where it 
started to become unclear why the defendant was being punished. As we will see, however, 
the way the defence resisted the racialised narrative mobilised in this hearing, and unsettled 
Daniela’s punishment, was different to the defence’s approach in Tamir’s hearing. Moreover, 
as well as opening up this uneasy space, the defence’s subversive behaviour in Daniela’s 
hearing also seemed to have another, more tangible effect. As he contested the depiction of 
Daniela through a racialised narrative of bordering, the defence appeared to make it 
impossible for the judge to impose as harsh a sentence as he seemed to be considering at the 
beginning of the hearing. Thus, through his more challenging approach, the defence seemed 
to push the judge, reluctantly, to punish Daniela less severely. 
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Daniela was being sentenced for three non-domestic burglaries and seven thefts. She 
had been convicted of two burglaries and six thefts following a trial in the magistrates’ courts 
three months previously, and had been sent to the Crown Court to be sentenced for these 
offences, along with the ‘other matters’ of a further burglary and a theft. It was not clear from 
the hearing whether these ‘other matters’ had been adjudicated through a trial or guilty pleas. 
Despite being classified in different ways, most of the offences were actually very similar in 
nature: they had apparently involved taking mobile phones, and sometimes cash, from staff 
and customers in various shops. In three of the offences, however, ‘staff only’ areas of shops 
had been entered in order to take the items – and, therefore, they had been prosecuted as non-
domestic burglary. During the hearing it emerged that all of the offences had been committed 
around two and a half years previously, while Daniela was 16, and thus legally a child. By the 
time of her trial and sentencing, though, she was 19 – and so she was dealt with by the courts 
as an adult. It transpired during the hearing, too, that another defendant had also been 
convicted of committing these offences, along with Daniela. This other defendant was two 
years younger than Daniela, however. Therefore – although this was not stated explicitly 
during the proceedings – the fact that the other defendant was still under 18 probably meant 
that she was being sentenced in the youth court.  
As highlighted above, Daniela was originally from Romania; this information seemed 
to be contained in the court papers, which the judge appeared to have looked at prior to the 
hearing. Thus, at the start of the facts of the case, he told the prosecution that he had been 
working on an Excel spreadsheet of Daniela’s offences, to try to ‘put them in order’. 
Presumably, therefore, the judge was aware of Daniela’s nationality from the outset of the 
hearing. It is worth noting, too, that Daniela had a Romanian-speaking interpreter for the 
proceedings; so, even if the judge had not picked up on her nationality from reading the court 
papers, he may have assumed it as a consequence of this (Aliverti and Seoighe, 2017). It is, 
additionally, important to draw attention to Daniela’s physical appearance: specifically, that 
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she was wearing what appeared to be traditional Roma dress, including a long skirt and a 
headscarf. It was striking, then, that while the prosecution opened the hearing with a very 
legally-focused facts of the case, the judge interrupted this narrative a couple of times, 
apparently to portray Daniela in a more racialised way. Specifically, the judge seemed 
determined that Daniela should be depicted as an inherently criminal Romanian or Roma 
thief. After the prosecution had finished specifying what items Daniela had stolen, therefore, 
as well as, for the three non-domestic burglaries, which ‘staff only’ areas of the shop she had 
entered to take them, he then began to consider a further legal factor affecting how 
punishable she was, her previous convictions. At this point, the judge interrupted as follows: 
 
Prosecution: 




She had her first findings of guilt when she was 14, she was offending at a 
phenomenal rate then – she was still 15 at the time of offence six. They’re all theft 





I highlighted in Chapter Two that, when operating through the register of nationality, the 
narrative of bordering of intrinsic criminality has often set out a particular association 
between people from Romania and theft-related offences, including cashpoint theft and pick-
pocketing (Light and Young, 2009; see also Aliverti, 2018a). It is important to highlight, too, 
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how Roma from Eastern European countries have often been depicted, like Romanians, as 
having an innate propensity for theft-related crime; usually, this racialised characteristic has 
been presented in cultural terms (Yuval-Davis et al., 2017; Guy, 2003; Clark and Campbell, 
2000). Thus, as the judge drew attention to how Daniela had first been convicted of an 
offence when she was 14 and emphasised that, even at this age, ‘she was offending at a 
phenomenal rate’, he seemed to be framing her through these dominant depictions. That is, 
he seemed to be insisting that Daniela was an archetypal Romanian or Roma thief, with a 
natural disposition for behaving in this way – an insistence which strengthened as he also 
specifically checked with the prosecution that all Daniela’s previous convictions were for 
theft from the person and shoplifting.  
 A few moments later, in fact, the judge appeared to bolster his portrayal of Daniela 
through this racialised frame, as the prosecution started to situate her offences in relation to 
the relevant sentencing guidelines. As the prosecution set out that Daniela’s culpability 
should be seen as high because she committed the offences with another person, and thus ‘she 
was part of a group’, the judge commented: ‘They’ve got a little system going, and it’s very 
simple for them to do because they’re practised at it.’ Albeit more subtly than in the earlier 
interruption, the judge nonetheless appeared to be insisting on a racialised conception of 
Daniela here. So, as he emphasised the allegedly organised and skilful way that Daniela and 
the other defendant had carried out their offences, he seemed to be portraying them both as 
natural-born Romanian thieves. 
While the prosecution did not present Daniela in a racialised way during the opening 
version of ‘what happened’, then, the judge, through his interjections, did. As the defence 
began his mitigating narrative, he appeared to be alert to this and responding directly to it. 
Thus, the defence started his version of events as follows: ‘She was 16 at the time the 
offences were committed, this is a very important consideration. I say that because Your 
Honour will see in the main pre-sentence report it is stated that the police, probation and 
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children’s services believe she is a trafficked child, brought specifically to the UK to commit 
crime.’ In one sense, as the defence barrister drew attention to this information, he was 
working to make Daniela less punishable in legal terms. The sentencing guidelines for theft 
and burglary offences both set out that involvement through exploitation or coercion reduces 
a defendant’s culpability (Sentencing Council, 2015, 2011).3 At the same time, however, the 
defence was also countering the judge’s presentation of Daniela as an inherently problematic 
Romanian thief. So, by foregrounding the opinion of a number of agencies that ‘she is a 
trafficked child, brought specifically to the UK to commit crime’, the defence immediately 
worked to insist that Daniela was not a deviant criminal but, in fact, the opposite of this: a 
vulnerable young person, who had been targeted and exploited by undesirable criminals.  
This aspect of the defence’s depiction became even clearer just a few moments later, 
as he explained: ‘These are young people, being used like something from the nineteenth 
century, in Charles Dickens’ stories, being couriered from one place to another.’ As he 
referred to Daniela as ‘being used like something from the nineteenth century’ by the people 
who had brought her to this country – who, he explained later, were older members of her 
family – the defence’s portrayal resonated with media stories about how ‘barbaric’ Romanian 
mafias and gangsters operating in the UK ruthlessly exploit women and children (Light and 
Young, 2009). His depiction of Daniela’s exploitation resonated, too, with the ‘focus on 
victimhood’ (Tonkiss, 2018, p.127) that has been identified in the messaging of some 
migrants’ rights organisations. That is, it chimed with the way that some advocacy groups 
have attempted to mark out particular groups of migrants as acceptable and deserving by 
 
3 Following the introduction of the 2015 Modern Slavery Act, there is now a legal defence for people who 
commit offences as a direct result of being a victim of trafficking. This defence could not have been used in 
Daniela’s case, however, as it only applies to offences committed after 31st July 2015, when the legislation was 
brought in; Daniela’s offences were carried out in 2013-14. Crown Prosecution Service guidance (2019) sets out 
that, in cases where it appears that the defendant may have been trafficked but a defence under the Modern 
Slavery Act is not possible, prosecutors should still consider if there is a defence of duress – and, if not, if it is in 
the public interest to prosecute. It was not clear from Daniela’s sentencing hearing, however, whether the 
opinion that she had been trafficked had been raised before, and if this information had been put forward by her 
defence representative during her trial. 
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emphasising their suffering and vulnerability (see also de Noronha, 2015; Anderson, 2008). 
By mobilising the information about her trafficking from the pre-sentence report, therefore, 
and by foregrounding her ‘victim’ status, the defence contested the portrayal of Daniela 
through a racialised narrative of bordering in a conventional way. He distanced her from the 
stigmatising representation insisted upon by the judge through straightforward inversion: by 
asserting that, rather than innately bad and criminal, Daniela was in fact suffering and 
exploited – and, consequently, she could be afforded leniency.4 
Even as the defence challenged the judge’s portrayal of Daniela through a standard 
approach, however, he simultaneously behaved more subversively. As soon as the defence 
introduced the information about how Daniela had been trafficked to the UK, then, the judge 
actually rejected it – and yet, the defence refused to accept this. Thus, after the defence 
initially referred to the pre-sentence report and explained how the police, probation and 
children’s services believed that Daniela had been ‘brought specifically to the UK to commit 
crime’, the judge interrupted him, saying, ‘She doesn’t accept this.’ The defence immediately 
pushed back against this, responding ‘But being realistic … ’ – at which point the judge cut 
him off again, demanding: ‘What are your instructions?’ The defence did not answer this 
question directly. Rather, he pointed to the young age of Daniela and the other defendant at 
the time of committing the offences, and explained how this indicated that they were 
trafficked children – to which the judge replied: ‘Are these her instructions?’ The defence 
said that Daniela had not told him herself that she had been trafficked, to which the judge 
responded, ‘You should advance her instructions.’ The defence persisted, however, directing 
the judge’s attention towards ‘the mechanics of how the offences were committed. You have 
 
4 It is important to emphasise that, in drawing out the approach that the defence barrister took to render Daniela 
less punishable, I am not suggesting that she had not been exploited and victimised by those who had forced her 
into criminal activity. My point, rather, is that by focusing on this information, and framing Daniela solely 
through the lens of vulnerability and victimhood, the defence was working to present her in a particular way.      
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a 16-year-old child in an area of London that she wouldn’t normally frequent’ – before the 
judge interrupted him again, insisting once more: ‘You need instructions.’ 
Yet, the defence still did not relent. Rather, he returned to the pre-sentence report, 
highlighting again that agencies including the police and children’s services believed that 
Daniela had been trafficked – before then asking the judge directly: ‘If you are asking a 16-
year-old, “Were you coerced or forced by older relations”, what answer do you expect her to 
give? She was probably told in advance to say “no comment”.’ Yet again, the judge 
dismissed the narrative that the defence was trying to deliver, responding, ‘Including to her 
barrister, her lawyers? I’m a bit old fashioned, I don’t simply not take instructions.’ The 
defence replied by insisting on his version of events one more time, asserting that the 
‘inference’ that Daniela had been trafficked ‘has been drawn by authorities far more 
experienced than me’. Thus, during this exchange, the defence repeatedly resisted the judge’s 
attempts to silence the version of ‘what happened’ that he was attempting to relay. Indeed, 
the defence went on to insist at two later points that Daniela had been trafficked to the UK 
and forced into committing the offences – despite the fact that the judge had made it very 
clear that he simply did not accept what had been written in the pre-sentence report. 
While I certainly observed defence representatives pushing back against judges during 
some of the other hearings that I observed, I did not see any of them challenge in the way that 
Daniela’s barrister did. Usually, when judges made it clear that they were not sympathetic to 
the point being raised, defence barristers backed down fairly quickly. So, for instance, in one 
of the non-migrant hearings that I observed, for a man who had pleaded guilty to actual 
bodily harm, the defence tried to persuade the judge that the offence was less serious, 
according to the sentencing guideline, than the prosecution had suggested. The judge, 
however, challenged this – at which point the defence repeated the justification he had just 
delivered, but then added ‘I don’t seek to labour the point. If you are not with me, I won’t try 
to persuade you.’ Something similar happened in one of the hearings that I referred to in 
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Chapter Five, in which I initially detected the defence countering his client as a parasitical 
scrounger – but subsequently decided that details about the defendant earning money and 
supporting his family were being mobilised for more practical reasons. This hearing was for a 
man originally from Romania, who had also pleaded guilty to actual bodily harm (Hearing 9, 
Wood Green, 2015). During the mitigating plea, the defence attempted to place his client’s 
offence in a less serious sentencing guideline category than had been suggested by the 
prosecution. The judge rejected this, however – at which point the defence backed down 
quickly, responding simply, ‘I’m not going to persuade you’.  
In another hearing, for a man originally from Poland, who had pleaded guilty to 
exposure (Hearing 1, Wood Green, 2014), the judge interjected during the facts of the case to 
say that he thought the offence was more serious than the prosecution had set out. He 
explained that this was because of the vulnerability of the women to whom the defendant had 
exposed himself. During the mitigating plea there was then an exchange between the judge 
and the defence about this issue – and the defence pushed back against the judge’s 
assessment of the women’s vulnerability twice. When the judge insisted for a third time, 
however, that the women involved should be viewed as particularly vulnerable, the defence 
stopped pressing on this point and moved on. Although Daniela’s barrister was not radical in 
terms of the actual narrative he was delivering, then, he nonetheless challenged the judge’s 
depiction of Daniela as intrinsically problematic and deviant in a way that was firmly against 
the conventions of the court. Compared with the approach taken by defence representatives in 
the other hearings that I saw, he displayed a resistance to judicial authority that was unusual. 
Indeed, as Daniela’s barrister refused to be silenced on the issue of her trafficking and 
exploitation, his narrative seemed to move past a straightforward plea for leniency. Rather, as 
he repeatedly drew attention to his client’s victimisation and vulnerability, it started to appear 
questionable that Daniela was in court, and being punished, at all. As in Tamir’s hearing, the 
judge seemed to sense, and respond to, the disruption effected by the defence’s more resistant 
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approach. As he proceeded to deliver his sentencing remarks, the judge opened his account of 
‘what happened’ as follows: 
 
Can you stand up, please. You fall to be sentenced for seven thefts and two – 
sorry, three – burglaries. These are two series of offences albeit closely related. 
One of the offences was shoplifting, otherwise what you have done is with 
someone else, I understand a member of your family, gone into shops, places 
where people are working, people who have jobs and are earning money honestly, 
and very skilfully distracted them and taken the opportunity to steal their property 
– often phones, sometimes money from their handbags.   
 
As the judge drew attention to how Daniela had ‘very skilfully distracted’ the people from 
whom she had stolen, he once again portrayed her as an inherently criminal Romanian thief, 
for whom it came naturally to behave like this. He seemed to hint at her as a lazy migrant 
freeloader, too, as he contrasted her behaviour with that of her victims, depicting the shop 
workers from whom she had stolen as ‘people who have jobs and are earning money 
honestly’. In particular, his phrasing here resonated with the media reports that I highlighted 
in Chapter Two, about how – following the end of transitional controls in 2013 – Romanian 
scroungers and beggars were planning to come to the UK to abuse the benefits system and to 
‘fleece’ ‘rich’ and ‘generous’ British people (Flynn, 2013; The Sun, 2013). Notably, 
however, although the judge constructed Daniela as innately bad and deviant in this way, he 
actually went on to impose a lighter sanction than the relevant sentencing guidelines seemed 
to recommend: a suspended prison sentence, rather than an immediate custodial term of 
several years. His appeal to these racialised dominant narratives in his remarks, therefore, 
appeared to be functioning in a similar manner to the judge’s invocation of the narrative of 
the abusive immigration cheat in Agnesa’s hearing, which I explored in the previous chapter. 
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That is, the judge essentialised and pathologised Daniela as a freeloader and a thief not to 
validate a severe sanction but, rather, to insist that she definitely was punishable – to justify 
her presence in court at all.  
As I have suggested, the defence’s repeated insistence that Daniela had been 
trafficked to the UK and forced to carry out her offences meant that serious questions about 
the legitimacy of sanctioning her had been raised. Consequently, the judge depicted Daniela 
as intrinsically undesirable in order to address this – to quell this disruption, and get on with 
the business of punishing her. Daniela’s hearing, then, seemed to fit with the pattern traced 
across the previous chapter and this one, about the specific circumstances in which narratives 
of bordering tended to be appealed to by judges. Thus, it appeared that in his sentencing 
remarks the judge portrayed Daniela through this racialised frame because – as a result of the 
defence barrister’s interventions – legal reasons for punishing her, on their own, were not 
enough.   
 At the beginning of this section I explained that, alongside destabilising, 
momentarily, the process of sanctioning Daniela, the defence’s more resistant approach in 
this hearing also appeared to have another, slightly more tangible effect. As highlighted 
above, the judge ultimately imposed what seemed to be a more lenient sentence than the 
relevant sentencing guidelines recommended – despite the fact that he had exhibited clear 
hostility towards Daniela throughout the hearing. It is worth noting, too, that at the beginning 
of the proceedings the judge had actually indicated that he was going to pass a much more 
severe sentence. In the facts of the case, then, the prosecution barrister had specified that the 
recommended sentence range for the burglaries was, according to the category in which he 
had placed Daniela’s offences, a prison term of between one and five years. He subsequently 
moved onto the thefts, placing Daniela’s offences in a category for which the sentence range 
was a low-level community order to 36 weeks’ custody. The judge, however, challenged this, 
stating that the thefts Daniela had committed should, in fact, be placed in a higher category. 
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He justified this assertion by trying to turn his depiction of her as an inherently deviant thief 
into a legally relevant factor.  
Thus, picking up on the point he had made earlier about how Daniela and the other 
defendant had ‘a little system going, and it’s very simple for them to do because they’re 
practised at it’, the judge said: ‘If it is simple for them to commit offences, with the routine 
all worked out, it could lead you to say that it is sophisticated.’ Here, the judge was alluding 
to a factor in the theft guideline, ‘Sophisticated nature of offence/significant planning’ 
(Sentencing Council, 2015, p.4), which is listed as indicating a higher level of culpability. He 
insisted, therefore, that the sentence range for Daniela’s theft offences was actually 26 weeks 
to two years’ custody. Hence, it seemed at this point that the judge very much had a custodial 
sentence in mind.  
It is worth asking why, then, against this earlier indication, the judge finally passed a 
much more lenient sentence: 12 months’ custody, suspended for two years. He justified doing 
this in his sentencing remarks in the following way: ‘The question is, should it be suspended 
or not? With some regret, I am driven to conclude that it should. I do not think it is really 
what you deserve, but I do have to bear in the mind the age you were when the offences were 
committed.’ The fact that Daniela was legally a child at the time of carrying out the offences 
may well, of course, have had an effect on the judge’s decision. Alongside this, though, I 
would also suggest that the defence’s repeated emphasis on her victimisation and exploitation 
during the hearing contributed to the judge ultimately passing a lesser sanction. That is, the 
defence’s refusal to be silenced on the issue of Daniela’s trafficking, and the questions that 
accordingly arose about why she was in court at all, made it impossible for the judge to be as 
punitive as he initially indicated he was planning. Therefore, the judge suspended the prison 
sentence that he imposed. Consequently, it appeared that the defence’s more oppositional 
approach resulted not only in a sense of disruption, an uneasy few moments during Daniela’s 
sentencing hearing. It also seemed to effect a much more concrete outcome: through his 
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interventions, the defence appeared to ensure that the judge was not able to sanction his client 
in a more severe way. 
 
Understanding the emergence of resistance to narratives of bordering in sentencing hearings 
As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, it is important not to overplay the 
disruptions that were traceable in Tamir and Daniela’s hearings. Ultimately, the resistance 
effected by their defence barristers was limited. As I have highlighted, there were moments 
during both sets of proceedings where the punishment of the defendants started to seem 
questionable, and in Daniela’s hearing it also appeared that the judge was forced to pass a 
less severe sentence than he had originally wanted. Yet, both defendants were, in the end, 
sanctioned; thus, despite the defence barristers’ interventions, at no point did the process of 
punishing the defendants stop. As I have also emphasised, however, the more subversive 
behaviour displayed by the defence representatives in these hearings was unusual. It is worth 
considering, then, why resistance to racialised narratives of bordering emerged during these 
proceedings, and to explore what might underpin defence barristers behaving in this more 
resistant way. 
I suggested earlier in the chapter that defence barristers might not resist, and instead 
adhere to the conventional practices of the courtroom, for a number of reasons. So, it might 
be that they are operating tactically, within the range of practices deemed acceptable in court, 
in order to secure the best possible outcome for their client. Additionally, though, we might 
also understand defence barristers’ conformist behaviour in terms of the need to get through 
cases as quickly as possible, in order to earn a living. It is worth considering, too, how the 
need to ‘retain credibility with the court’ (McConville et al., 1994, p.201) discourages a more 
subversive approach, as defence representatives are concerned with acquiring and 
maintaining professional respect. One factor I did not consider, however, is how adherence to 
the framework of racialised narratives of bordering, in particular, and the failure of most 
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defence barristers to narrate outside of this and constitute their clients as less punishable in 
more resistant ways, might be a consequence of not recognising it as racist. That is – even as 
they are keen to insist that their clients should not be viewed as ‘bad’ migrants – most 
defence representatives do not recognise ideas about, for instance, abusive immigration 
cheats and parasitical scroungers specifically as racist depictions. They are, therefore, 
comfortable operating within this overarching framework, and do not feel the need to 
question or challenge it at all.   
The non-recognition of narratives of bordering as racist by defence barristers is, of 
course, partly a result of their coded and muted nature. But it should also be understood in 
terms of the continuing whiteness of the legal profession. While the representation of people 
from racially minoritised groups amongst barristers in England and Wales has increased in 
recent years, the Bar remains very white-dominated. Statistics from the Bar Standards Board 
(2019) highlight that, currently, around 80% of practising barristers are white – and just under 
75% identify themselves as having a white British background. These figures were borne out 
by the sentencing hearings that I saw. The vast majority of defence barristers whom I 
observed – as well as prosecution barristers and, of course, judges5 – were white, with British 
accents.6  
In their exploration of narrative, Ewick and Silbey highlight that while hegemonic 
representations are often adhered to and reproduced in individual narratives, more 
‘subversive stories’ (1995, p.217), which undercut or challenge dominant depictions, can be 
told. As they explain, however, these more resistant tales are more likely to be delivered by 
people in socially marginalised positions – because their social positioning means that they 
 
5 The judiciary is even more white-dominated than the Bar. In 2019, just 3.6% of Circuit Judges (who are full-
time judges) and 7% of Recorders (practising barristers or solicitors who sit part-time as judges) were from 
black, Asian or minority ethnic backgrounds (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2019; see also Lammy, 2017). 
6 I recognise, of course, that someone with a British accent may have acquired this after migrating to the UK – 
and, therefore, that amongst the white defence barristers I saw it is possible that some may have come originally 
from countries in Southern or Eastern Europe.  
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are more able to recognise the misrepresentations and falsifications of hegemonic narratives. 
It is unsurprising, then, that the framework of narratives of bordering was adhered to by 
defence barristers in most of the hearings that I saw, and that more oppositional ways of 
making defendants less punishable were, generally, not deployed. Those who have 
experience of being targeted and vilified by racist depictions – who, as a result, are more 
likely to recognise the distortion and pathologising of dominant narratives about ‘unwanted’ 
migrants, and so perhaps question or challenge them – constitute a minority of the legal 
professionals working in the criminal courts.  
Ewick and Silbey’s analysis points us, therefore, towards another factor that aids an 
understanding of the non-resistance of defence barristers. At the same time, it also helps us to 
see why subversion and opposition might emerge in a sentencing hearing. That is, it suggests 
that defence representatives might be more resistant to the mobilisation of narratives of 
bordering because of their own experience of social marginalisation – and, specifically, their 
own experience of racism. In Tamir’s hearing, it was not obvious that this might underpin the 
defence barrister’s more questioning approach; Tamir’s legal representative was a white man, 
who spoke with a middle-class British accent. In the case of Daniela’s hearing, however, 
Ewick and Silbey’s identification of why, in particular, resistance to dominant depictions 
might appear seemed to offer a compelling way to understand the defence barrister’s 
behaviour during these proceedings. As I have highlighted, the defence barrister in Daniela’s 
hearing did not actually challenge the framework of narratives of bordering. Rather, he 
insisted that his client was not inherently criminal by portraying her, conversely, as a 
criminally exploited victim of trafficking; thus, he inverted the judge’s racialised depiction of 
her and rendered her less punishable in conventional terms. Yet, as I have also explained, he 
fought very hard to get his own portrayal recognised, and to dislodge the judge’s presentation 
of Daniela as an intrinsically undesirable Romanian thief. He contested the racialising and 
‘othering’ of her, then, in a way that I simply did not see in any other hearing.  
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Daniela’s barrister was a black British man, who I would guess was probably in his 
50s. He approached me before the start of Daniela’s hearing, outside the courtroom, and 
asked me what I was doing – and the conversation that we subsequently had might be seen as 
offering an insight into why his approach was so different. After I gave a brief explanation of 
my research, we began discussing racism in the courts, and during this conversation he talked 
about the racist treatment he had experienced when he had first started working as a barrister 
in the mid-1980s. So, he told me that when he first started appearing in court, ‘ushers would 
check if you were the defendant when you came in, and judges would just stare at you, and 
would look surprised when you spoke English’. He then added, half-jokingly, ‘and then when 
you’d left, they’d probably call the Bar Council!’ He said that he thought the way he was 
treated now was different, and that he did not feel he was subjected to racism in court 
anymore. However, he was also very clear about the continuing institutional racism of the 
criminal justice system towards those going through it as defendants.  
I would suggest, therefore, that we might connect his earlier experiences of racism 
within the courts to his particular resistance against this on behalf of his client – that it helps 
us to understand the robust way that he contested the judge’s characterisation of Daniela as 
an intrinsically deviant Romanian thief. It was notable, indeed, that during a second 
conversation I had with him, very briefly at the end of Daniela’s hearing, he did not explicitly 
describe the judge’s treatment of Daniela as racist – and yet he nonetheless implied that what 
had just unfolded in court might be seen like this. Thus, following the hearing I told him that 
for much of the proceedings I had thought the judge was going sentence Daniela more 
severely than he eventually did. Daniela’s barrister responded that, following the Brexit 
referendum and the anti-immigration sentiments that had been mobilised during this, he felt 
that defendants from Eastern Europe were getting ‘hammered’ in the way they were punished 




‘The mute always speak’: The communication of resistance by defendants during 
sentencing proceedings 
Research on the criminal courts has often drawn attention to how, although they are formally 
central to proceedings, defendants are practically marginalised during the court process. As 
critics have noted, this happens in a number of ways. The legal and technical language used 
during proceedings, for instance, can make it difficult for defendants to follow what is 
happening (Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby, 2015). Unlike in other jurisdictions, moreover, 
defendants in England and Wales are physically separated from their legal representative 
during court hearings, through the use of the dock. This can further impede defendants’ 
ability to understand and indeed participate in what is going on around them (Mulcahy, 
2013). The use of ‘secure docks’ – found now in most courts in England and Wales – might 
also be seen as having increased the difficulties faced by defendants in engaging with 
proceedings. As the law reform organisation Justice has put it, ‘the secure dock resembles a 
large glass box, with high walls made of glass panels’ (2015, p.1). A legal challenge heard in 
the mid-1990s by the European Court of Human Rights found that ‘only minimal loss of 
sound was caused by the presence of the glass screens used in English docks’ (Mulcahy, 
2013, p.1145). Yet, during one hearing I observed, where I sat immediately behind the dock, 
I found it almost impossible to hear what was being said. I imagine that the defendant’s 
experience could only have been marginally better. Research has identified, too, the problems 
caused for defendants by the increasing use of videolink during proceedings. The sound 
quality on videolinks has often been found to be poor, and – even more starkly than the use of 
the dock – appearing in court remotely effects a physical separation between defendants and 
their legal representative, making communication during a hearing very difficult (Gibbs, 
2017; Plotnikoff and Woolfson, 2000). 
Research has also pointed to specific, additional ways that people who have migrated 
to the UK may be sidelined and rendered passive during court hearings. In her research on 
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immigration-related offences, Aliverti (2013a) notes how the particular strangeness of court 
proceedings for people who have only recently arrived in the country can affect 
understanding and participation. Language can act as significant barrier, as well. Defendants 
who do not speak English as their first language can request an interpreter for court hearings. 
Yet, in their research on the use of interpreters in criminal proceedings, Aliverti and Seoighe 
observe that ‘court participants such as lawyers and probation staff frequently seemed to 
forget the presence of the interpreter in the courtroom and failed to allow sufficient pause in 
their contributions to allow for interpretation’ (2017, pp.145–146).  
 Aliverti and Seoighe note, too, how – particularly since the restructuring of court 
interpretation services in 2012, and the provision now of interpreters via a contract with a 
single private company – non-attendance of interpreters at court hearings has become a 
significant problem. As they explain, sometimes the interpreter’s non-attendance means that 
the hearing is adjourned. But it can also result in the hearing going ahead using an interpreter 
who speaks a different language; they document, for instance, a case involving a defendant 
who required a Hindi interpreter, where in the end a Panjabi-speaking interpreter was used. It 
can even mean proceeding with no interpreter at all, with magistrates and judges taking a 
‘let’s see how we get on’ approach. Aliverti and Seoighe’s research also documents concerns 
about the quality of court interpretation under the post-2012 arrangements, as pay for 
interpreters reduced under the single provider contract. Many qualified and experienced 
interpreters, therefore, have now stopped working in the courts. 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which defendants are marginalised, even excluded, 
during the sentencing hearing, however, which applies to all defendants, is that they are not 
given any opportunity to speak. Unlike in the trial, where they are allowed to give evidence in 
their defence, during sentencing defendants are not permitted to speak at all, apart from 
confirming their name at the beginning of proceedings. Thus, Carlen’s memorable 
characterisation of the defendant as the inert ‘dummy player’ (1976, p.81) in the court 
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process might seem to particularly play out in the sentencing hearing. Across many of the 
hearings that I observed, indeed, defendants often seemed to be, as Aliverti puts it, ‘spectators 
in their own case’ (2013a, p.101). Yet, this was not always so: on a couple of occasions I saw 
defendants behave in a more resistant way, to attempt to speak up and insert themselves into 
the proceedings.  
During one of the hearings that I touched on in the final section of Chapter Five, for 
example, for the three men originally from Lithuania who had been convicted of handling 
stolen vehicles, the judge asked one of them, Gintaras, ‘Do you understand?’ after imposing a 
suspended sentence on him. Gintaras responded in Lithuanian with what was obviously more 
than a simple ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Although the interpreter did not interpret what he was saying – 
thus providing an interesting example of how they can attempt to police defendants’ 
behaviour – Gintaras kept speaking for some time. Eventually, the judge cut him off by 
beginning to sentence one of his co-defendants. I highlighted too in the previous chapter how, 
during the mitigating plea in his hearing, Joseph tapped on the glass screen of the dock 
several times to try to get the court’s attention. Thus – although he was ignored by everyone 
and so did not get to say anything – he nonetheless attempted to insert himself into the 
proceedings in this way. Indeed, as I also noted, he tried once again later on in the hearing: as 
the judge finished his sentencing remarks, Joseph stood up in the dock and raised his hand. 
This time the judge verbally dismissed him, telling him that he could talk to his solicitor after 
the hearing. Even though Joseph was not actually able to speak in court, however, he 
nevertheless challenged the silence expected of him in this way. 
Alongside the overt tactics through which Gintaras and Joseph tried to make 
themselves heard, it is important to think as well about the more subtle ways that defendants 
might express themselves during proceedings. In her exploration of asylum appeal hearings, 
Johnson reads what she identifies as the ‘restive silence’ (2011, p.58) of the claimants she 
observed – their impatient, animated quietness during proceedings – as an alternate form of 
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communication, and articulation of resistance to the formalism and formulism of the asylum 
court. Her analysis demonstrates, therefore, that by decentralising what is spoken, and paying 
attention to other modes of communication ‘such as body language and gestures’ (2011, 
p.59), people who are apparently saying nothing become far more expressive than they 
initially appeared. Nthabiseng Motsemme, whom Johnson cites, puts this idea clearly: 
‘[W]hen we reject dominant western oppositional hierarchies of silence and speech, and 
instead adopt frameworks where words, silence, dreams, gestures, tears all exist 
interdependently and within the same interpretive field, we find that the mute always speak’ 
(2004, p.910). 
In some of the hearings that I observed, defendants’ bodily articulations and gestures 
seemed to be unambiguously conveying passivity and abjection. Tamir, for instance – who 
was not physically present for his hearing, but appeared via videolink from prison – sat for 
most of the proceedings with his head bowed downwards, holding it in his hands. At the end 
of the hearing, as the judge finished his sentencing remarks, he spoke directly to Tamir, via 
the interpreter, asking him to get the prison officer who was in the room with him (but who 
was not visible on the videolink) so that he could give him some instructions. Tamir did as he 
was asked – but, at the point that the judge spoke to him and Tamir looked up into the 
videolink, he had a bewildered look on his face, as if he was not really sure what had just 
happened to him. Sometimes, however, defendants’ non-verbal expressions seemed to have a 
more resistant quality to them. In one hearing in particular I was struck by the defendant’s 
tears. Tears and crying might, of course, be understood as communicating resignation and 
abjection – and, as I will to document, I certainly saw hearings where this appeared to be the 
case. Yet, in this hearing, the defendant’s loud sobbing seemed distinct; it had a more 
unsettling nature to it. Indeed, as he cried without restraint at two separate points during the 
proceedings, he almost seemed to be challenging the portrayal of him through a racialised 
narrative of bordering. Moreover, the defendant appeared to be doing this in a more 
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oppositional manner, as his tears seemed to allude to and animate a much more complicated, 
and thus subversive, version of events. 
The hearing was for Fabrice, originally from Democratic Republic of Congo (Hearing 
6, Wood Green, 2015). He had been convicted of rape, attempted rape and sexual assault. 
Because his case had been adjudicated through a trial, and the judge sentencing him had also 
presided over these earlier proceedings, the prosecution did not provide an initial account of 
Fabrice’s offences in the facts of the case. Rather, the prosecution went straight to the 
sentencing guideline for sexual offences (Sentencing Council, 2013) – and, as he set out how 
punishable Fabrice was in legal terms, it transpired that Fabrice had been convicted of 
attacking two women, on separate occasions. In his narrative, the prosecution pointed to 
factors in the guideline that he said increased the harm of Fabrice’s offences, specifically the 
use of abduction and threats of violence. The prosecution then insisted that Fabrice’s 
culpability was at the highest level, although he did not give any reason for this. It was later 
described, however, how the rape of one of the women, and the attempted rape and sexual 
assault of the other, had taken place in both instances after Fabrice had pretended to be a taxi 
driver and had offered to drive them home, following a night out with their friends. It seemed 
possible, therefore, that the prosecution was asserting Fabrice’s higher culpability on the 
basis that a ‘[s]ignificant degree of planning’ (Sentencing Council, 2013, p.10) might be said 
to have been involved in the commission of the offences. 
After the prosecution had pointed to some additional aggravating factors specified by 
the guideline, including the location and timing of the offences, the judge interjected to 
explain that she was considering passing an Extended Determinate Sentence.7 At this point, a 
 
7 The Extended Determinate Sentence (EDS) was introduced in 2012, following the abolition of the 
Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) sentence. The EDS consists of a custodial term and an extended period 
on licence. There are also specific release arrangements for this type of sentence. So, whereas release usually 
happens automatically at the halfway point with a normal or determinate prison sentence, for most people now 
subject to an EDS it is only possible to apply to the Parole Board for release once two-thirds of the custodial 
term has been completed – and this will only go ahead, of course, if the Parole Board approves it (Inside Time, 
2016). As I go on to highlight, for an EDS to be imposed there are certain conditions that must be met. These 
include that the defendant has been convicted of a specified offence (i.e. a sexual or violent offence listed in 
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more racialised element to the narration of ‘what happened’ appeared to come through. One 
of the conditions for the imposition of this type of sentence is that there is deemed to be 
‘significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by 
the offender of a further specified offence’8 (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012, s.124). As the judge noted that probation’s pre-sentence report had 
identified Fabrice as ‘dangerous’, she set out that this condition was fulfilled. The defence, 
however, immediately responded to the judge on this, clarifying that the pre-sentence report 
actually showed that the OASys risk assessment9 had determined Fabrice as posing ‘a 
medium risk of sexual offending’. But, as the defence explained, the probation officer who 
had completed the pre-sentence report had questioned this, on the basis that Fabrice had 
threatened one of the women he had attacked with a gun. Consequently, the OASys risk 
classification had been overridden – and the probation officer had replaced it with their own 
assessment that Fabrice was in fact dangerous.  
Yet, as the defence then set out, there was actually no evidence that Fabrice had made 
threats with a gun. Rather, during his trial one of the women had said that she thought he had 
one, because during the attack she had noticed him looking at the glovebox in his car. So, the 
defence explained, it was the woman’s ‘intuition’ that Fabrice might threaten her in this way 
– but not something that had actually happened. I would suggest, therefore, that in the 
portrayal of Fabrice in the pre-sentence report, we see the framing of him through a racist 
dominant depiction. That is, as the probation officer inaccurately deployed the evidence that 
had been given during his trial and insisted that he had used a gun to threaten one of the 
 
Schedule 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003), and that the court considers that the defendant presents a 
significant risk of causing serious harm by committing a further specified offence (Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s.124). 
8 As highlighted in Footnote 7, above, a specified offence is a sexual or violent offence that is listed in Schedule 
15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  
9 The Offender Assessment System, or OASys, is a risk assessment and management tool that has been used by 
the Probation and Prison Services since 2001 (HM Prison and Probation Service, 2019). 
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women, Fabrice appeared to be constituted through longstanding racist ideas about 
intrinsically violent and dangerous black men (Connell, 2012; Wilcox, 2005; Gilroy, 1987). 
Fabrice was suggested in a racialised way by the pre-sentence report, then, although 
he was not framed specifically through a narrative of bordering. As the defence began to 
deliver her plea in mitigation, however, she nonetheless seemed to be working to counter the 
idea of her client as an inherently bad and deviant migrant. Thus – after emphasising again 
that the information in the pre-sentence report did not support the conclusion that Fabrice was 
‘dangerous’, but also telling the judge that she acknowledged his offences constituted ‘some 
of the worst of their kind’ – the defence then continued her version of ‘what happened’ as 
follows:   
 
He has a tragic and disturbing history. He came to the UK aged 16 or 17, from 
Democratic Republic of Congo. He lived with his father, mother and sister in 
DRC, and had his education there. 
 
His father was a politician and university teacher. During the 1997 uprising, his 
father as a politician was a target and his family was a target, too. His life changed 
when his family was targeted. He was forced to behead his father in front of his 
mother and sister. He was then forced to join the army and fight for them. He 
eventually escaped and ended up in the UK – a family friend helped with this. His 
mother and sister were still in DRC. His mother became ill, and later died, his 
sister had cholera and also died.  
 
He has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. A psychiatrist gave 
evidence at his trial and said that he is depressive. He is on medication, and has 
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been receiving treatment in prison. They are looking at whether he should be in 
hospital. 
 
As the defence relayed the horrific experiences of Fabrice and his family during the civil war 
in Democratic Republic of Congo, the structural conditions of political violence, which might 
be seen to widen our understanding of the violence that Fabrice later inflicted on the women 
he attacked, came into view. And yet, even as the defence alluded to these conditions, she did 
not mobilise them in this way. So, she did not deploy details about the broader context of 
Fabrice’s life for the same purpose that the defence in Tamir’s hearing had pointed towards 
problematic political and economic conditions – in order to trouble the idea of the defendant 
as solely and individually responsible for ‘what happened’. Rather, Fabrice’s barrister 
referred to his experiences before he came to the UK in order to present him as individually 
suffering and traumatised – and so to assert that, while he was undoubtedly accountable, 
himself, for the offences, and should be punished for them, he could be afforded some 
leniency. It was noticeable, therefore, that the defence initially introduced what Fabrice had 
experienced in his country of origin through a firmly individualised lens, explaining ‘He has 
a tragic and disturbing history.’ After describing what Fabrice and his family had been 
subjected to during the civil war, moreover, the defence then framed the significance of this 
solely in terms of Fabrice’s status now as a traumatised and mentally unwell individual. Thus, 
she explained that Fabrice had been diagnosed with both post-traumatic stress disorder and 
depression, and that he had been prescribed medication and was receiving treatment for these 
conditions.  
By presenting him as individually vulnerable and disordered, the defence was in part 
making Fabrice less punishable in legal terms. Like all the guidelines published by the 
Sentencing Council, the guideline on sexual offences includes ‘mental disorder’ (2013, p.11) 
as a personal mitigating factor: that is, even where mental ill health is not seen to reduce the 
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defendant’s culpability, it can be taken into account in terms of their personal welfare (see 
also Ashworth, 2015; Jacobson and Hough, 2011). At the same time, though, the defence was 
also working to head off any idea of Fabrice as an intrinsically criminal and deviant migrant – 
by presenting him, instead, as the opposite of this. So, by referring to Fabrice’s previous 
experiences and framing them like this, the defence mobilised – similar to the defence in 
Daniela’s hearing – images of migrant suffering and victimhood, in order to insist that while 
Fabrice had done something terrible he was not terrible in himself, and consequently could be 
treated less punitively. The defence invoked Fabrice’s previous experiences in her mitigating 
narrative, therefore, in order to portray him as less punishable in wholly conventional terms. 
At the points that I looked up from writing during the delivery of the facts of the case, 
and the plea in mitigation, Fabrice – who was physically present in court – was sat in the 
dock silently, with his head bowed downwards, staring at the ground. When the defence 
described how he had been forced to kill his father, however, Fabrice began to cry, and in fact 
he then sobbed loudly for what seemed like a number of seconds. Tears might, of course, be 
understood as communicating passivity and abjection; and, indeed, in most of the hearings 
that I observed where defendants cried, this appeared to be what was happening. Gloria, for 
instance, whose hearing I explored in Chapter Five, sat with her head bowed for much of the 
proceedings, and at points seemed to be crying quietly: she made slight noises, as if she was 
trying to hold in her tears, and occasionally dabbed her face with a tissue. Daniela, who 
stared at the floor as the judge sentenced her, also appeared to have been crying silently 
during her hearing. As she looked up at the end of the judge’s sentencing remarks, her quiet 
distress became visible as she used her hand to wipe tears away from her face. In the hearing 
for the three men from Lithuania convicted of handling stolen vehicles, one of the defendants, 
Evaldas, stared straight ahead and displayed little obvious emotion as he was being 
sentenced. Yet, as soon as the judge finished his remarks, Evaldas sat down dejectedly and 
began to rub his eyes, before then bowing his head and holding it in his hands. 
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Fabrice’s tears seemed different, however. As with Gloria, Daniela and Evaldas, his 
crying undoubtedly conveyed pain and distress. Yet, unlike these defendants, he did not 
appear to be trying to quieten his sobbing at all or to suppress his tears in any way. Even as 
Fabrice’s sobs expressed his suffering, then, they also felt resistant; as he cried audibly and 
without inhibition, he seemed to refuse to regulate himself according to the norms of 
emotional expression deemed acceptable within the court (Roach Anleu, Bergman Blix and 
Mack, 2015). Moreover, as the defence explained what had happened to Fabrice’s father, and 
at this point Fabrice began to release his tears unrestrainedly, his crying appeared to express 
something about what he had lived through before he arrived in the UK. The wrenching, 
almost guttural nature of Fabrice’s sobs seemed to communicate the violence and brutality to 
which he had been subjected. That is, they appeared to evoke and animate the horror and 
terror of violent conflict and civil war. 
Thus, although in one sense Fabrice’s crying might be seen as upholding the 
defence’s depiction of him in terms of individual trauma and abject migrant victimhood, at 
the same time it seemed to go beyond the conventional framework of vulnerable versus 
deviant migrants, and deliver a more subversive story. As Fabrice sobbed loudly for those 
several seconds, the structural conditions of political violence, which the defence’s 
individually-focused narrative had sidelined and understated, appeared to materialise within 
the courtroom more prominently. Consequently, a more complicated version of ‘what 
happened’ seemed to emerge, in which the harm that Fabrice had inflicted on the women he 
had attacked was not simply reducible solely to him. Instead – similar to the mitigating plea 
in Tamir’s hearing, where the defence barrister uncovered problematic social conditions to 
offer a more multi-dimensional account of his client’s offence – Fabrice’s loud and anguished 




I recognise, however, that even as I put forward such an interpretation of Fabrice’s 
crying during the hearing, the partiality of my view and limitations of my perspective, which 
I emphasised in Chapter Four, must be considered. Taking seriously the effects of my social 
positioning on the research I have produced (Duneier, 2004), then, means recognising that as 
a white, middle-class British woman, who has never experienced violence and trauma like 
that to which Fabrice was subjected, my understanding of his tears may be very far from his 
own. It might be argued, indeed, that my particular perspective means not simply a lack of 
understanding of what Fabrice was communicating during the proceedings. The way that I 
may have ‘distort[ed] and ‘misrepresent[ed]’ (Phillips and Earle, 2010, p.374) ‘what 
happened’ as a result of my social position, and in particular my whiteness, extends to how I 
may, in fact, have constructed a version of events that feels more palatable to me. In other 
words, it is arguable that by interpreting Fabrice’s tears through the lens of resistance and 
subversion, I have been able to mitigate my feelings of discomfort at what I witnessed during 
this hearing: the criminal justice system’s denunciation, and punishment, of an acutely 
traumatised black man. In drawing attention to how race and positionality matters (Parmar, 
2018b) to the analysis I engage in here, I do not attempt to ‘solve’ the problem of my partial 
perspective. Rather, I aim to accept and embed it as an ongoing possibility: by making the 
potential effects of my social position explicit, and also through the tentative language 
utilised in the interpretation I offer, which acknowledges that this is how the hearing seemed 
or appeared to unfold to me.  
As the judge began to deliver her sentencing remarks, following the end of the 
defence’s mitigating narrative, the larger context to Fabrice’s violence, which had seemed to 
emerge through his loud sobs, was predictably relegated to the background once more. Thus, 
the judge narrated a version of events which clearly demonstrated the centrality of individual 
responsibility to the criminal justice process – and its concomitant inability to recognise and 
deal with problematic structural conditions and ‘bitter social realities’ (Norrie, 2014, p.27). In 
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the first place, then, although the judge did allude to Fabrice’s experiences in his country of 
origin in her sentencing narrative, she minimised – trivialised, even – what Fabrice had 
actually been subjected to. So, she described being forced to kill his father, and then being 
used as a child soldier, as ‘your life experience’ and ‘all the problems that you have faced’. 
The judge insisted on these experiences as barely relevant, moreover, as she also stated: ‘I 
take [them] into account insofar as I can’. 
Alongside this, the political conditions of the civil war that Fabrice had been 
subjected to were also erased as the judge presented the violence that he had inflicted on the 
two women he attacked as coming solely from within him. She depicted him, therefore, 
through a racialised narrative of bordering – and, specifically, as an intrinsically sexually 
aggressive migrant man. Hence, at the point in her sentencing remarks where she described 
‘what happened’ in the rape offence, the judge said: ‘You saw her at a bus stop. You 
pretended to be a friendly taxi driver offering a lift, but you were no such thing. As the 
evidence shows, you are a predator.’ Later, narrating the attempted rape and sexual assault of 
the other woman, the judge set out how, just a few months after the first attack, ‘you were on 
the prowl again’. Then, after giving further details of how Fabrice had assaulted this woman, 
the judge reiterated ‘you are a dangerous sex predator’ (emphases mine). 
It might be argued, of course, that by portraying Fabrice in this way, the judge was 
simply demonising him as a deviant sex offender. Terms such as ‘predator’, for example, are 
often used in media coverage to vilify people who are suspected or have been convicted of 
sexual offences (Soothill and Walby, 1991). I would suggest, however, that as the judge 
continued with her narrative, the racialised nature of her portrayal became clearer. Thus, as 
the judge referred to Fabrice specifically as being ‘on the prowl’, her description resonated, in 
the first place, with longstanding depictions of the ‘bestial’ (Grover and Soothill, 1996, 
p.567) sexuality of black men. We see here how, though, in the ‘post-raciality’ of the 
contemporary era, such animalised imagery is stripped of any explicitly racial reference or 
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terminology –  meaning that its racist articulation becomes deniable (Goldberg, 2015; see 
also Parmar, 2019). Simultaneously, deploying this animalised turn of phrase, and then 
insisting on Fabrice as a ‘dangerous sex predator’, also evoked some of the media 
representations that I documented in Chapter Two, in which unwanted ‘migrants’ and 
‘immigrants’ have been repeatedly essentialised and homogenised as ‘sex predators’, ‘rape 
thugs’ and ‘sex beasts’. That is, the judge’s depiction also seemed to tap into this racialised 
narrative of bordering, which has constituted non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant men as 
an undifferentiated and pathological collective with hypersexual tendencies.  
It is important to emphasise, however, that – even as present-day media depictions 
have homogenised non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant men in this way – the 
contemporary narrative of the migrant sexual predator has also intimated a clear and specific 
association between sexual offending and black migrant men. As I highlighted in Chapter 
Two, in the press reporting on individual ‘foreign criminals’ that I examined, articles on men 
originally from countries in Africa or the Caribbean who had been convicted of sexual 
offences frequently carried visual images of those on whom they were reporting. The use of 
such accompanying images accomplishes particular racial work; thus, even as race was never 
referred to in any of the articles, the overtly racist narrative about black men as inherently 
sexually violent was nonetheless alluded to and remobilised.  It seemed, therefore, in this 
hearing, that Fabrice’s somatic difference especially facilitated the judge’s portrayal of him 
through the dominant narrative of the sexual predator and so the insinuation of him as a 
naturally sexually violent migrant. We see here, then, I would suggest, an example of the 
racial stratification within narratives of bordering that I documented in Chapter Two 
unfolding in a sentencing hearing. That is, the way that the judge portrayed Fabrice during 
her remarks appeared to reflect how – even as they never utilise the language of race – 
physical appearance matters in dominant narratives about ‘unwanted’ migrants. 
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By presenting Fabrice through this racialised frame, and so by insisting on him as 
intrinsically undesirable and deviant, the judge worked to justify the significant punishment 
that she imposed: an Extended Determinate Sentence of 23 years, with an 18-year custodial 
term.10 Hence, Fabrice’s hearing provides yet another instance of a judge appealing to a 
racialised narrative of bordering in order to help legitimise a severe sanction. Yet, even as the 
judge obscured the structural conditions that might be seen to help explain Fabrice’s actions – 
even as she insisted that Fabrice, himself, was the problem, and downplayed his previous 
experiences of violent conflict and civil war – the more complicated version of ‘what 
happened’ seemed to surface again. As I highlighted previously, Fabrice’s loud sobbing, 
which had started as the defence barrister had explained during her mitigating plea what had 
happened to his father, continued at this point for a number of seconds. After this, however, 
Fabrice’s crying became less audible – and, by the time that the defence’s narrative was over, 
and the judge began to deliver her sentencing remarks, the court was almost silent. Yet, soon 
after the judge started her narrative, Fabrice began to cry loudly again. This time, moreover, 
his sobbing continued for much longer. Although, at some points, it became slightly quieter, 
Fabrice could be heard for the entire time that the judge was sentencing him. 
 I would suggest, once more, that Fabrice’s loud, constant sobbing articulated a 
version of events that reached beyond the idea of him as an intrinsically deviant and sexually 
predatory migrant. That is, as Fabrice communicated his pain like this, the horror of the 
political violence to which he had been subjected was animated to some extent in the 
courtroom – and, therefore, the structural conditions that the judge’s narrative was working to 
 
10 As highlighted earlier, there are specific release arrangements for Extended Determinate Sentences. In 
contrast to those sentenced to normal or determinate prison sentences, then, who are usually automatically 
released at the halfway point of their custodial term, Fabrice will only be able to apply for release to the Parole 
Board once he has reached the two-thirds point of his sentence. It is possible, therefore, that he will serve the 
full custodial term, 18 years, in prison; the Parole Board is only required to authorise someone’s release if they 
consider that any identified risks can be safely managed in the community. The scale of the punishment imposed 
on Fabrice becomes clearer still, moreover, when it is considered that even if he serves the full 18-year custodial 
term, he will then be on licence in the community (and thus subject to potential recall to prison) for a further 
five years – this is the ‘extended licence’ element of the EDS.  
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conceal and silence nonetheless seemed to be expressed. As Fabrice continued to cry, then, 
an uneasy space – similar to that effected by the defence barrister in Tamir’s hearing – 
appeared to open up in the proceedings. As the wider context of the extreme violence that 
Fabrice had experienced seemed to impress itself more firmly upon the hearing, his sole and 
individual accountability for his actions felt undermined – and so the punishment being 
imposed upon him started to appear questionable.  
In identifying this, I should be clear that I do not mean to question or trivialise the 
harms that Fabrice inflicted on the women he attacked. I recognise, of course, that within 
England and Wales’ criminal justice system and indeed British society more broadly, there 
exists a long history of minimising sexual and other forms of gendered violence (Jordan, 
2012; Stern, 2010). I also recognise that the harms of Fabrice’s actions were far more severe 
than those of Tamir’s. As a result, it may, to some, seem more problematic to interrogate 
Fabrice’s sole responsibility for ‘what happened’, and his deservingness for punishment, in 
this way. In uncovering how Fabrice’s sobs seemed to articulate a wider and less 
individualised history to the violence that he inflicted, however, I am not working to deny the 
impact of his actions. Rather I am seeking to illustrate how this more multi-dimensional 
version of events unsettled the adequacy, and apparent inevitability, of individually 
criminalising and punishing him as a response. Fabrice’s unrestrained tears, then, appeared to 
disrupt the judge’s narrative about his individual badness and pathology, and – in a similar 
way to the more radical narrative delivered at one point by the defence barrister in Tamir’s 
hearing – seemed to destabilise, momentarily, the process of his punishment. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have documented and analysed defence barristers and defendants’ practices 
of resistance to racialised narratives of bordering. As I have explained, it is important not to 
over-read or romanticise these practices of resistance – to overplay the possibilities for 
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disruption in the courtroom, which is a tightly controlled environment. At the same time, 
however, it can be seen from the sentencing hearings that I have explored that – even within 
the highly regulated setting of the courtroom – defence barristers and defendants do 
sometimes question and assert themselves against racialised representations of unwanted 
migrants. So, they do contest these pathologising and ‘othering’ depictions in more radical 
and subversive ways. In taking a more resistant approach, as I have explained, they open up 
moments in the sentencing hearing where the process of punishment seems to move less 
easily and assuredly. That is, as a consequence of such interventions, the imposition of 
sanctions on defendants appears less inevitable and justified. Resistance to these racialised 
dominant narratives, moreover – the challenge to their reproduction and re-articulation during 
the practice of punishing non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants – might also be seen as 
having wider consequences and effects, to have a significance beyond the confines of the 
courtroom and the sentencing hearing. As I now proceed to the conclusion of the thesis, this 





In this thesis I have investigated how dominant, racialised narratives of bordering, which are 
disseminated by the UK government and media to problematise non-white and ‘not quite 
white’ migrants and justify their targeting by actual immigration enforcement, are being put 
to work in the specific context of the sentencing hearing. Specifically, I have theorised and 
demonstrated how these racialised narratives are being tapped into and mobilised, as well as 
navigated and negated by legal professionals, in order to help construct and negotiate 
‘unwanted’ migrant defendants’ punishability. In this Conclusion, as I bring my research 
project to a close, I ask the question: what is the significance of what I have conceptualised 
and traced across the past six chapters? Or, to put it another way: what are the implications of 
racialised narratives of bordering being mobilised during sentencing proceedings for non-
white and ‘not quite white’ migrants? More simply still, perhaps, the question that this 
concluding section poses, and seeks to answer, might be summarised as follows: what do the 
findings of my research actually mean? 
I begin by returning to some of the developments that have been traced by border 
criminologists thus far, which I documented in Chapter One, and I examine what I have 
identified across this thesis in relation to these. I suggest, then, first of all, that Turnbull and 
Hasselberg’s analysis of ‘double punishment’ (2017, p.143) offers us a useful starting point 
from which to think through the mobilisation of racist dominant depictions of ‘unwanted’ 
migrants during sentencing proceedings. As I explained in Chapter One, Turnbull and 
Hasselberg demonstrate how, as direct activities of immigration enforcement have been 
inserted into the criminal justice system, and so have coalesced with criminal penalties, a 
harsher form of sanctioning – which they define as ‘double punishment’ – has emerged. 
Understanding the aggravation and exacerbation of criminal sanctioning that results from its 
melding with border control practices can, I contend, help us to further unpack the effects of 
287 
 
racialised narratives of bordering seeping into sentencing hearings. That is, it focuses our 
attention on how the deployment of harsh and exclusionary ideas about unwanted migrants, 
in order to help construct defendants as punishable, might be seen as adding to and 
intensifying the pain and distress inflicted on defendants by an already punitive sentencing 
process. Thus, the use of these racist dominant depictions during sentencing proceedings 
might be understood as a further, and more subtle example, of how bordering practices can 
aggravate and heighten criminal punishment.           
At the same time, I suggest that we might also connect the mobilisation of racialised 
narratives of bordering during sentencing proceedings to the other key development that has 
been identified by border criminologists in the current period: the increasing shift of criminal 
justice agencies and institutions towards immigration control. As I set out in Chapter Five, I 
saw several hearings during my fieldwork where the direct activities of immigration 
enforcement were visible – and so where criminal justice’s overt shift towards regulating the 
border, which has been documented by the literature on border criminology, could be 
detected. Yet, I also saw many hearings for migrants and non-citizens where literal border 
control practices did not appear at all. Even in hearings where direct practices of border 
enforcement were not detectable, however, it might be argued that legal professionals’ appeal 
to racialised ideas about unwanted migrants meant that criminal justice’s growing focus on 
managing the border could still be traced. As I have explained, these racist depictions were 
tapped into in order to help construct defendants as punishable. Simultaneously, though, the 
appeal to narratives of bordering also functioned to undermine the belonging and inclusion of 
non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant defendants. So, it demarcated them as out of place 
and excludable from the UK. By uncovering the presence of these exclusionary narratives in 
sentencing hearings, therefore, I can be seen to have put forward a textured account of 
criminal justice’s increasing preoccupation with border control, as my research has 
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documented not simply the overt but also the covert means through which this preoccupation 
unfolds.   
 Hence, in terms of the literature on border criminology, I suggest that my research 
contributes to our understanding of the ways in which the present-day fixation with 
immigration enforcement is marking and permeating England and Wales’ criminal justice 
system.  Following this, I move on to suggest that my research might be situated in relation to 
another strand of criminological literature, which I have touched on at points during this 
thesis: the literature on racism and the criminal justice system – and, specifically, on racist 
discrimination in the courts and sentencing. As I explain, although criminology has often 
marginalised race and racism, some empirical research into racism in sentencing has been 
carried out – primarily quantitative analyses of judges’ decision-making. The mixed nature of 
the available statistical evidence in this area has led some to conclude that compelling 
‘objective’ evidence of racism in sentencing does not exist.  
My research, however, might be seen as moving beyond an understanding of racism 
in sentencing as solely detectable through its quantitative measurement in final outcomes. 
That is, through critical qualitative enquiry (Phillips and Webster, 2014), and a focus on 
sentencing proceedings, I have explored and uncovered the presence of racism in sentencing 
in a different way. I recognise, of course, that the permeation of the sentencing hearings that I 
observed during my fieldwork by racialised narratives of bordering was not pervasive. Thus, 
it might be argued that across the hearings for non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant 
defendants that I watched, racism played a fairly understated role. Yet, as I explain, my 
research also demonstrates that in the hearings where these racialised narratives were 
detectable, they were tapped into, and countered, in order to help facilitate the proceedings. 
In this way, therefore, racist depictions of ‘unwanted’ migrants might be understood as 
having a significant function in the sentencing hearings where they could be traced.  
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 In the final section of the Conclusion, I consider how the mobilisation of racialised 
narratives of bordering during sentencing hearings has consequences beyond the criminal 
justice system, and why what I have traced in my research is significant more broadly. As I 
explain, as narratives of bordering are deployed during sentencing proceedings, what is 
unfolding is more than simply the court’s reproduction and repetition of these racialised 
ideas. Rather, through this the court has become part of ‘the constitution of its own context’ 
(Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p.211). That is, criminal courts can be understood as sites where 
notions of the racial difference and inferiority of non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants are 
being produced and sustained – and, therefore, courts can be seen as participating in the 
wider normalisation and naturalisation of the racist border. Yet, as I have also explained, 
resistance to racialised ideas about unwanted migrants can sometimes be detected in 
sentencing proceedings. It is here, then, I suggest – that is, in relation to the broader 
consequences of what I have traced – that we see the real importance of these moments of 
resistance. As defence barristers and defendants challenge narratives of bordering, they do 
not simply disrupt the practice of the sentencing hearing. They also dispute the reality of 
racially different ‘unwanted’ migrants, and refuse the inevitability of the racist border. In 
doing so, they point towards the possibility of a world in which such oppression and 
exclusion does not exist. 
 
The significance of my findings to border criminology 
I began this thesis, in Chapter One, by surveying the literature produced by scholars within 
border criminology thus far on the changing contours of the established criminal justice 
system in England and Wales under conditions of mass migration and its control. As I 
explained, two broad developments have been traced. In the first place, it has been 
documented how, as the overt practices of immigration control have been injected into the 
traditional criminal justice system, the police, courts and prisons have increasingly shifted 
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away from conventional imperatives in their dealings with non-British citizens and been 
geared instead towards border enforcement. Thus, they have increasingly begun to look like 
agencies and institutions concerned with immigration regulation.  
At the same time, however, it has also been emphasised by some scholars how – even 
as immigration measures have made their way into the contemporary criminal justice system 
– the traditional functions of criminal justice still apply to non-citizens. In the case of the 
prison, in particular, Turnbull and Hasselberg (2017) have explained how – even as 
imprisonment works now to facilitate the ejection of foreign nationals – the punishment of 
these prisoners nonetheless continues; non-citizens continue to serve the sentences handed to 
them by the courts. Importantly, though, as Turnbull and Hasselberg also explain, as 
immigration practices have been inserted into the prison, the sanctioning inflicted on non-
citizens has started to look very different. Specifically, as measures such as post-sentence 
detention and deportation have coalesced and merged with the criminal penalty, a harsher, 
aggravated form of sanctioning, which they identify as ‘double punishment’ (2017, p.143), 
has been produced.      
 I would suggest that what I have documented across this thesis might be examined in 
relation to both of the trends described above. Firstly, then, I would contend that Turnbull and 
Hasselberg’s uncovering of the aggravation and exacerbation of criminal sanctioning as a 
result of its melding with border control practices provides a useful frame for understanding 
the permeation of sentencing proceedings by racialised narratives of bordering. 
Criminologists have highlighted the punitive effects upon defendants not only of actual 
criminal penalties, such as imprisonment – but also the criminal justice process, in itself. 
Most well-known, perhaps, is Malcolm Feeley’s examination of this in The Process is the 
Punishment, which emphasises the ‘costly’ (1979, p.15) impact on defendants of pre-trial 
processes such as detention and bail, and repeated court appearances – as well as the painful 
and distressing effects of going through a trial. Feeley explains, therefore, that many people 
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plead guilty not simply to secure a reduction in the sentence that is finally imposed on them, 
but also to avoid the humiliation and anxiety that trial proceedings can cause.  
In a similar way, David Tait has underlined how, in sentencing hearings, 
‘punishment’ is not simply something that is handed down by the judge – but is in fact 
inflicted, to some extent, by the proceedings themselves. Thus, as he conceptualises this stage 
of the criminal process as ‘the violence-invoking performance, the official ritual of 
denunciation or forgiveness’ (2002, p.470; emphasis mine), he suggests the potential 
humiliation and degradation of defendants as they are adjudicated and designated as 
deserving of a criminal penalty in court. Indeed, I gestured towards this in Chapters Four and 
Five, as I noted how some of the defendants whom I observed appeared distressed during 
their hearings. The visible upset of some defendants might be seen as one, although not the 
only indicator, of the punitive nature of sentencing proceedings.         
Hence, from this perspective – of sentencing proceedings as punitive in themselves – 
it might be argued that, as racialised narratives of bordering are tapped into by legal 
professionals, the discomfort and distress inflicted on defendants by an already painful 
criminal process are being added to and intensified. The mobilisation of racist depictions of 
unwanted migrants during sentencing hearings means that some defendants are being 
rendered punishable in an especially harsh and exclusionary way. In the hearings for Agnesa, 
Joseph, Farid, Marek, Daniela and Fabrice, then, these defendants were designated as 
deserving of punishment by pathologising them, by essentialising them as inherently 
problematic and deviant – by demeaning and disparaging them as racially undesirable 
‘others’. As I explained in Chapter One, Turnbull and Hasselberg’s analysis of ‘double 
punishment’ notes that immigration control practices such as post-sentence detention and 
deportation are not ‘official penal sanctions’ (2017, p.147). Yet, they are experienced as 
punitive by those who are subjected to them; so, as these bordering practices meld with the 
criminal penalty, a particularly severe form of sanctioning nonetheless emerges. This helps us 
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to understand, therefore, how – although not formally criminal punishment themselves – the 
unforgiving narratives about unwanted migrants that were occasionally deployed by 
prosecution barristers, and more often by judges, during sentencing hearings, might 
nevertheless be seen to aggravate the punitive character of this stage of the criminal process.   
Thus, building on Turnbull and Hasselberg’s analysis, it might be argued that the use 
of racialised depictions of non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrants during sentencing 
proceedings provides a further example of how bordering practices can heighten and intensify 
criminal punishment. In framing what I have documented in this way I recognise, however, 
that there are significant differences between the type of aggravated criminal sanctioning that 
Turnbull and Hasselberg identify, and the harsh process of sentencing that I have uncovered. 
In their analysis of ‘double punishment’, Turnbull and Hasselberg point to the ‘serious and 
life-shattering’ (2017, p.136) consequences that result as post-sentence detention and 
deportation blend and merge with non-UK nationals’ prison sentences. They document, 
therefore, the intensely painful effects of lengthy, seemingly indefinite periods of 
imprisonment and confinement on the men to whom they spoke for their research. They also 
highlight the acute distress caused to their interviewees by the threat of ejection from the 
country – which would mean, effectively, permanent separation from their family and 
friends, and exile from the lives they had established in the UK.  
The ‘life-shattering’ consequences when ‘double punishment’ through deportation is 
actually enacted, indeed, received some media attention in February 2020, as the Home 
Office scheduled a charter flight to deport around 50 men who had been convicted of 
criminal offences to Jamaica. The anticipated publication of the Windrush Lessons Learned 
Review1 in the period leading up to this charter flight meant that it received much more press 
 
1 In late 2017, reports started to emerge in the media about the Home Office’s treatment of the ‘Windrush 
generation’ – people who had come to the UK between 1948 and 1973, from Caribbean countries. Under the 
Immigration Act 1971 people from the Windrush generation had the right of abode in the UK and thus were in 
the country legally. Yet, as they were never provided with official documentation to prove their status, nor did 
the Home Office consistently keep records confirming this, many were subsequently targeted by the ‘hostile 
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coverage than previous mass expulsions. As part of this coverage, some – primarily left-
leaning – publications conducted interviews with men who had already been deported to 
Jamaica from the UK. In one of these interviews, published in the Guardian, 23-year-old 
Chevon Brown described the effects of his double punishment as follows: ‘What has 
happened has caused me grave pain and depression; I feel like I have been ripped apart from 
my family’ (Gentleman, 2020). 
What I have traced unfolding in the sentencing hearing, then, is clearly different to 
this. Being rendered punishable in a harsh and exclusionary way is less obviously violent, and 
painful, than being locked up in prison indefinitely and then ‘ripped apart’ from everything 
that you know. Yet, the more subtly harmful nature of the aggravated process of sanctioning 
that I have identified, as racialised narratives of bordering are mobilised during sentencing 
proceedings, does not equate to an absence of harm. Acknowledging that the literal practices 
of border control are undoubtedly more violent, and have a more punitive effect, does not 
mean that the pain caused by these stigmatising, pathologising narratives should be ignored. 
In terms of understanding the nature of this pain, it is, certainly, a limitation of my research 
that I did not speak to any of the defendants whose sentencing hearings I observed – that I did 
not seek to explore their experience of being constructed as punishable in this severe way. 
Other research on the experience of racism in the criminal justice system, however, might be 
seen as offering an insight into the harms effected by the racist and exclusionary sentencing 
process that I have documented.  
In The Multicultural Prison, Phillips (2012) documents the spectrum of racist 
practices that minority ethnic prisoners experience from prison officers, ranging from violent 
 
environment’ measures that I documented in Chapter One – with some eventually detained and deported from 
the UK. The Windrush Lessons Learned Review, commissioned in July 2018, was published in March 2020. It 
stopped short of identifying the Home Office as institutionally racist, but argued that the ‘failings’ that the 
review had identified ‘demonstrate an institutional ignorance and thoughtlessness towards the issue of race and 
the history of the Windrush generation within the department, which are consistent with some elements of the 
definition of institutional racism’ (Williams, 2020, p.7). 
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attacks to racist comments. Drawing on Fanon’s work on the psychological effects of 
colonialism, she explores the impact of being subjected to such practices and identifies how 
the experience of racism in prison – including verbal articulations of racist hostility – can be 
‘painful, humiliating, and a diminution of the self’ (2012, p.169). The effects of being 
targeted by racist expression come out particularly through her interview with one man, 
Manu, originally from a country in Central Africa, who ‘talked of being called a “monkey” in 
the prison he was held in before’. As Phillips explains, Manu ‘emotionally recalled it “getting 
to him”, the being “treated as an animal”’ (2012, p.185). Her exploration evidences, 
therefore, the very real harms for prisoners of being subjected to verbal articulations and 
expressions of racism. Thus, Phillips’ research points towards a similar ‘hurt and humiliation’ 
(2012, p.185) for defendants who are racially ‘othered’ and demeaned as they are processed 
and rendered punishable by the courts. 
Alongside viewing the mobilisation of racialised narratives about unwanted migrants 
during sentencing hearings as providing a further, more subtle example of how bordering 
practices can aggravate criminal punishment, we might also examine it in terms of the other 
trend to which border criminologists have pointed. So, we might understand what I have 
documented as connecting to the increasing concern of criminal justice agencies and 
institutions with immigration enforcement, and their growing shift towards regulating and 
upholding the border. As I highlighted in the exploration of my empirical data, the literal 
practices of immigration control were visible in a number of the sentencing hearings that I 
observed. Tomás, then, had been prosecuted for and had pleaded guilty to an immigration-
related offence, the possession of two false passports. It was also stated by his barrister 
during the proceedings that – as Tomás was in the UK without leave to remain – he was 
going to be removed from the country following the completion of his prison sentence. In 
Farid’s hearing, the defence barrister made a very similar statement. In Marek’s hearing, the 
judge explained during his sentencing remarks that, as a result of the length of the prison 
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sentence he had passed, it was likely that Marek’s deportation would be pursued. In these 
hearings, therefore, criminal justice’s overt shift towards enforcing the border, which has 
been documented by the literature on border criminology, could be detected.   
Yet, I also saw many hearings for migrants and non-citizens where direct border 
enforcement activities did not appear during the proceedings – so, where the actual practices 
of immigration control, which border criminologists have concentrated on in their 
examination of the changing contours of established criminal justice, did not come through. 
Sometimes, the non-appearance of literal border control measures in a hearing seemed to be 
the result of a lack of knowledge and awareness amongst the legal professionals involved 
about relevant immigration provisions. As I explained in Chapter Five, then, in Joseph’s 
hearing, for instance, the sentence imposed by the judge crossed the threshold for automatic 
deportation – but this simply was not mentioned by the judge during his sentencing remarks. 
This also happened in Tamir’s hearing, which I explored in Chapter Six. The 18-month 
prison sentence passed by the judge meant that the automatic deportation provision would 
have been triggered – but the judge did not specify this as he sentenced Tamir. 
In several hearings, however, the absence of direct practices of immigration 
enforcement was not the consequence of a lack of knowledge – but, rather, because border-
focused policies and legislation did not apply. Thus, as the table included in Chapter Four 
demonstrates, in many of the hearings that I observed short prison sentences, or community 
or suspended sentence orders, were imposed – meaning that the sanction passed by the judge 
was not severe enough for deportation to be an issue. In other hearings, immigration action 
against the defendant was not possible because, although they had migrated to the UK, they 
had subsequently become a British citizen. Agnesa, for example, had been prosecuted for and 
pleaded guilty to an immigration-related offence, seeking to obtain leave to enter or remain 
by deception – and thus the literal activities of border control were present in her hearing in 
this way. Yet, the possibility of any further immigration enforcement action against her 
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disappeared during the course of the hearing as it became clear that, following the 
commission of the offence, she had applied for and been granted British citizenship. So, there 
was no possibility of removing or deporting Agnesa from the country, even if she had been 
given a custodial sentence of a year or more.  
Even in hearings where direct practices of immigration enforcement were not present, 
however – or, as in Agnesa’s, where they surfaced initially but then disappeared – it might be 
argued that the mobilisation of racialised narratives of bordering during proceedings meant 
that criminal justice’s increasing concern with border control was nonetheless detectable. As 
I have explained, these racist representations were tapped into in the specific context of 
sentencing hearings to help construct defendants as deserving of punishment. At the same 
time, though, the appeal to these harsh and exclusionary narratives by prosecution barristers, 
and more often by judges, also functioned to undermine the belonging of non-white and ‘not 
quite white’ migrant defendants. That is, as defendants were framed like this, they were 
simultaneously presented as excludable from the UK. The effect of these dominant depictions 
in materialising the border during sentencing proceedings, even when the direct practices of 
immigration control were not detectable, can, perhaps, be most clearly illustrated through 
Agnesa’s hearing. As I noted above, actual border enforcement was initially visible in this 
hearing because Agnesa was being prosecuted for an immigration offence. Yet, later it 
became clear that no further immigration action could be taken against her, because following 
her commission of the offence Agnesa had naturalised as a British citizen.  
Even as the border faded from view in this way, though, it nevertheless remained 
present, as Agnesa was portrayed throughout the hearing as an inherently duplicitous and 
manipulative immigration cheat. As I explained in Chapter Five, the prosecution barrister, 
and then the judge, seemed to depict Agnesa as deviant like this because her presence in court 
appeared to be based on questionable criminal charges – so, more than legal reasons seemed 
to be needed to help authorise her punishment. Simultaneously, however, portraying Agnesa 
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through a racialised narrative of bordering, and pathologising her as intrinsically suspect and 
undesirable, demarcated her as unwanted and not belonging to the UK. Her formal legal 
inclusion through her British citizenship, therefore, and so her apparent non-susceptibility to 
bordering practices, were undercut and unsettled as she was framed through this racist and 
exclusionary dominant narrative. 
 The materialisation of border control during sentencing proceedings, despite the non-
presence of actual immigration enforcement activities, can also be traced clearly by looking 
at Daniela’s hearing. As I explained in my analysis of this hearing in Chapter Six, although 
the judge appeared to want to pass a more severe sentence at the beginning of the 
proceedings, ultimately he imposed a suspended sentence order on Daniela. Consequently, 
the punishment that the judge passed was not severe enough for the possibility of deportation 
to be raised.2 Yet, as the judge insisted on Daniela as a natural-born Romanian and Roma 
thief, and as he also later hinted at her as an inherently lazy migrant scrounger, he not only 
constituted her as punishable. So, he not only justified the allocation of sanctions on her, in 
spite of her barrister’s insistence that she had been forced to commit her offences. The 
judge’s portrayal simultaneously worked to circumscribe the border around Daniela. That is, 
as he tapped into these racist and pathologising depictions, and presented her as an intrinsic 
thief and scrounger, he also demarcated Daniela as out of place and excludable from the UK.  
I would suggest, therefore, that by uncovering the presence of racialised narratives of 
bordering in sentencing hearings, I can be seen to have put forward a textured account of 
criminal justice’s increasing preoccupation with immigration control. In other words, as well 
as pointing to the overt means through which the concern with border enforcement surfaces 
 
2 In fact, by the time of Daniela’s hearing Home Office policy was that all EEA nationals convicted of a 
criminal offence – whether they received an immediate custodial sentence or not – should be referred for 
consideration of deportation (see Footnote 3 in Chapter One). However, none of the legal professionals involved 
in the hearing appeared to be aware of this, and so the possibility of deportation was not mentioned during the 
proceedings.     
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in this stage of the criminal justice process, I have also drawn attention to the more covert 
and subtle ways in which it materialises. 
 
The significance of my findings to research on racism in the criminal justice system 
Thus far, I have situated my thesis primarily in relation to border criminology: so, as starting 
from, and contributing to, this relatively recently established and rapidly expanding 
criminological sub-field. Yet, research on the deployment of racialised narratives of 
bordering during sentencing hearings might also be viewed in terms of another strand of 
criminological literature. Specifically, it might be examined in relation to the literature on 
racism in the criminal justice system – and, in particular, to research on racist discrimination 
in the courts and sentencing.   
As I highlighted at the very start of this thesis, criminology as a discipline has 
marginalised and neglected race and racism. There is a body of literature, however, on the 
racist discrimination of criminal justice agencies and institutions – including some empirical 
research that has explored this at the stage of sentencing. Most of the studies in this area have 
been quantitative analyses of sentencing decision-making. Typically, then, they have 
compared sentencing outcomes for people who are racially minoritised with those for their 
white counterparts, to ascertain if the former are subject to harsher criminal penalties. Pina-
Sánchez, Roberts and Sferopoulos note that, while ‘hundreds of such studies have been 
conducted in the United States’, in the UK context statistical research into racism in 
sentencing decision-making has been more ‘intermittent’ (2019, pp.718–719). Moreover, it 
remains the case that, as Kalunta-Crumpton observed just over twenty years ago, the findings 
of UK-based quantitative studies have been ‘mixed’ (1999, p.16).  
A series of investigations conducted during the 1980s, for example, found ‘no 
evidence of direct, systematic bias on racial lines in sentencing in the crown court’ 
(McConville and Baldwin, 1982, p.658; see also Moxon, 1988; Crow and Cove, 1984). 
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Hood’s ‘landmark study’ (Bowling and Phillips, 2002, p.183) Race and Sentencing (1992), 
however, which employed the technique of regression modelling – which is generally 
recognised as methodologically sophisticated, since legally relevant sentencing factors are 
controlled for to determine if disparities in outcomes can be attributed to these –  challenged 
the findings of this earlier research. Thus, Hood’s examination of sentencing outcomes for 
defendants appearing in Crown Courts in the West Midlands identified that there was ‘a 5 per 
cent greater probability of a male black defendant being sentenced to custody than a white 
male’ (1992, p.198). He also found that ‘the average length of the prison sentences imposed 
on Asians who pleaded not guilty was 9 months longer, and for blacks 3.4 months longer, 
than for whites who pleaded not guilty’ (1992, p.202).   
A Home Office study of sentencing in the magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court, 
which was published in the late 1990s, found that Asian men were ‘significantly more likely 
to be sentenced to custody than would have been expected on the basis of their offence and 
other factors.’ However, it also found that in the Crown Court, ‘ethnic minority males were 
not significantly more likely to receive a custodial sentence than white males when other 
factors were taken into account’ (Flood-Page and Mackie, 1998, cited by Shute, Hood and 
Seemungal, 2005, p.9). More recently, Pina-Sánchez, Roberts and Sferopoulos have 
investigated possible discrimination in Crown Court sentencing decision-making against 
people with ‘traditional Muslim names’ (2019, p.718). Their analysis found that defendants 
who are ‘Muslim-named … received on average sentences 9.8 per cent longer than other 
offenders’ – but that once legally relevant factors were controlled for, the ‘Muslim-name 
effect’ (2019, p.726) disappeared. They conclude, therefore, that their research identified ‘no 
evidence of discrimination’ in sentencing outcomes– although they are also careful to 
emphasise that their findings ‘should not be taken as conclusive proof of a lack of 
discrimination’ (2019, p.729).     
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 Citing Shallice and Gordon (1990), Phillips and Bowling have underlined ‘the 
disjuncture between empirical research findings on sentencing practices which show no “race 
effect” and “the large numbers of people who readily assert the opposite, largely (though not 
unimportantly) on the basis of anecdotal, personal and collective experience”’ (2003, p.270). 
This ‘disjuncture’ has prompted some to make the argument that, although the available 
statistical findings are mixed and so compelling ‘objective’ evidence of racism in sentencing 
does not exist, racially minoritised defendants’ perceptions of racism should nonetheless be a 
focus of concern (Shute, Hood and Seemungal, 2005; see also Pina-Sánchez, Roberts and 
Sferopoulos, 2019). Such a response might almost be seen as having a ‘post-racial’ quality to 
it, manifesting what Goldberg identifies as post-raciality’s ‘assertive deniability’ (2015, 
p.38), as it seemingly downplays the issue of actual racism in the courts. An alternative 
approach might be not to shift to a primary focus on defendants’ perceptions of racism – but, 
rather, to stop thinking about racism in sentencing as solely detectable through its quantitative 
measurement in final outcomes. That is, by moving beyond an understanding of racist 
discrimination as only ‘objectively’ evident in sentencing when it can be identified in judges’ 
decision-making, and ‘pinned down using sophisticated statistical techniques’ (Phillips et al., 
2019, p.6), it might be possible to uncover racism at this stage of the criminal process in other 
ways.  
My research might be understood as adopting such an alternative approach. In other 
words, through critical qualitative enquiry (Phillips and Webster, 2014), and a focus on 
sentencing proceedings, I have explored and revealed the presence of racism in sentencing 
from a different angle. It might be argued, however, that while dominant, racist depictions of 
unwanted migrants could certainly be detected in the sentencing hearings that I observed 
during my fieldwork, the findings of my research nevertheless point towards them playing a 
relatively understated role. As I set out in Chapter Four, the mobilisation and navigation of 
narratives of bordering by legal professionals, to help construct and negotiate defendants’ 
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punishability, was not pervasive across the hearings that I saw. Thus, these racialised 
narratives were tapped into, and countered, in 16 of the 25 sentencing hearings for non-white 
and ‘not quite white’ migrant defendants that I watched. Moreover, as I explained in Chapters 
Five and Six, it was also the case that racist representations of unwanted migrants tended to 
surface in prosecution and judges’ accounts only in specific circumstances. As I 
demonstrated, then, these pathologising depictions were typically only appealed to in the 
facts of the case, and more often in the sentencing remarks, when it seemed that legal reasons 
for the punishment being pressed for or imposed were not doing enough.  
I recognise why, therefore, my research might be interpreted as demonstrating a fairly 
limited function for narratives of bordering in sentencing proceedings. Yet, at the same time, 
I would emphasise, again, that since I traced these racialised narratives in just under two-
thirds of the hearings for ‘unwanted’ migrant defendants that I observed, their appearance – 
though not pervasive – was very far from atypical or anomalous. Additionally, in uncovering 
the presence of these racist depictions, it is important to attend not only to the number of 
sentencing hearings in which they could be detected. It is crucial to consider, as well, how 
they were being put to work and utilised in the hearings where they could be identified. I 
would argue, then, that through a critical qualitative approach, my research has revealed how 
when narratives of bordering were tapped into, they played a significant role in the 
facilitation of sentencing proceedings. As I have shown, in hearings where these racialised 
narratives were detectable, they were being mobilised, and navigated, in order to help 
construct and negotiate non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant defendants’ punishability. 
Thus, it can be seen that racial demarcation, and racist expression, were being deployed by 
legal professionals to facilitate and enable the practice of these sentencing hearings. Or, to 
put it another way, depictions of racial undesirability and ‘otherness’ ‘lubricate[d] the cogs of 
the system’ (Bosworth, Parmar and Vázquez, 2018, p.8), and worked to keep the proceedings 
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moving, in hearings where narratives of bordering were appealed to and countered by the 
prosecution, defence, and/or the judge.  
In highlighting the important role that racist depictions of unwanted migrants played 
in the sentencing hearings where they were tapped into, my thesis might be seen to link to 
critiques which have identified the criminal justice system as ‘inherently unjust’ (Moore, 
2016, p.51). J.M. Moore, for instance, has put forward an alternative genealogy for criminal 
justice, challenging histories that have traced the emergence of policing and the prison to 
‘modernity and the rise of capitalism’ (2016, p.39) and arguing instead that Western systems 
of punishment have their origins in slavery and colonialism. He sets out, therefore, that the 
tendency of contemporary criminal justice ‘to reinforce inequality and oppress the “other”’ – 
which can be seen, as he explains, through its disproportionate targeting of racially 
minoritised groups – should be understood not as ‘an aberration’ but rather ‘a natural 
consequence of its genealogy’ (2016, p.38). I would argue that what I have traced in this 
thesis, and the functioning of racialised narratives of bordering in lubricating and facilitating 
sentencing proceedings, might also be seen as in line with this genealogy. The mobilisation 
of these racialised  narratives, then, to help construct defendants as punishable, and the 
recourse to this exclusionary framework, too, in attempts to make defendants less punishable, 
resonates with Moore’s account of the criminal justice system as ‘built for inequality … an 
instrument designed for oppression rather than liberation’ (2016, pp.50–51).  
Importantly, recognising the oppressive dispositions of criminal justice and the way 
that in some sentencing hearings racist depictions of unwanted migrants were used to keep 
the proceedings moving has consequences for imagining and proposing ‘solutions’ to what I 
have identified. As I explained in Chapter Four, although it would be disingenuous to 
downplay my academic aspirations, I also embarked upon this research project with an 
explicitly political commitment and ‘decidedly interventionist’ (Hillyard et al., 2004, cited by 
Clarke, Chadwick and Williams, 2017, p.264) aims. The identification of racism in 
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sentencing has, indeed, previously prompted the introduction of measures aimed at tackling 
this issue. Following the publication of Hood’s 1992 study, for instance, which identified 
racist discrimination as influencing judges’ decision-making, a compulsory programme of 
‘ethnic awareness training’ was implemented for members of the judiciary. The Judicial 
Studies Board also published the Handbook on Ethnic Minority Issues, ‘designed specifically 
to guide judges in their handling of cases involving minority ethnic persons’ (Shute, Hood 
and Seemungal, 2005, p.8).  
Yet, such reformist interventions emerge from an understanding of racism as an 
anomalous intrusion into sentencing. That is, the attempt to excise and eliminate racist 
discrimination through guidance and training rests on the identification of racism in 
sentencing as an uncharacteristic ‘weakness’ or ‘failure’ in the process – an unfortunate flaw 
which is compromising and tarnishing an otherwise equitable and just system. Understanding 
how racialised narratives of bordering were functioning in sentencing proceedings, then, 
would appear to compel a different approach. So, recognising that these racist depictions 
were deployed in some hearings to keep the proceedings moving, and thus were part of 
ensuring that this stage of the criminal justice system worked, should shift us away from 
corrective or reformist measures, aimed at improving the system and making it ‘better’. 
Rather, as Moore (2016) argues, an understanding of criminal justice’s racist and oppressive 
dispositions should point us towards more radical and transformative interventions and 
solutions. 
 
The significance of my findings more broadly 
I would argue, finally, that the deployment of racialised narratives of bordering during 
sentencing hearings, and their mobilisation as part of the construction, and negotiation, of 
non-white and ‘not quite white’ migrant defendants’ punishability, has consequences beyond 
the confines of the contemporary criminal justice system. In Chapters Three and Four, I 
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explained how the vast majority of the sentencing hearings that I observed felt very private, 
as it was often only the legal professionals involved and the defendant – as well as possibly a 
couple of the defendant’s family members or friends – who were present. Yet, despite the 
private feel of these proceedings, and the absence of members of the wider public as they 
took place, it is important to remember that the court nonetheless remains a social space. That 
is, the court is located within, and makes up part of, society (Kalunta-Crumpton, 1999; Eaton, 
1986).  
As we have seen, the significance of this, in part, is that the narratives delivered in the 
courtroom are permeated and shaped by hegemonic social meanings – they ‘bear the imprint’ 
(Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p.211) of dominant cultural narratives. But, as Ewick and Silbey 
explain, it also means that the stories relayed during courtroom proceedings become ‘part of 
the constitution of their own context’ (1995, p.211). Thus, to put this another way, it is not 
simply the case that narratives delivered during legal proceedings are ‘reflective of or 
determined by … dominant meanings and power relations’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p.211). 
Rather, through their telling courtroom narratives become constitutive of these – they become 
‘implicated in the very production of those meanings and power relations’ (Ewick and Silbey, 
1995, p.211).  
From this vantage point, therefore, it becomes apparent that, as dominant narratives of 
bordering are tapped into during sentencing hearings, it is not simply the case that the 
sentencing narratives delivered are reflecting and repeating these racialised depictions. More 
than this, the sentencing narratives relayed by legal professionals have become part of the 
process of producing these racialised ideas. The criminal courts, then, can be understood as 
sites where notions of the racial difference and inferiority of non-white and ‘not quite white’ 
migrants are being articulated and sustained. In her research on Operation Nexus, Parmar 
explains that the criminal justice system should be understood ‘not only as a site of racism’, 
but also as a space ‘where race is made, reproduced and embedded through mundane 
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repetition and quotidian activities’ (2019, p.938; see also Aliverti, 2018b). This, I would 
argue, is precisely what I am tracing here. As I emphasised in the previous section, the 
mobilisation of racialised narratives of bordering was not pervasive across the sentencing 
hearings that I saw.  Nonetheless, the utilisation of these depictions across a significant 
proportion of the hearings indicates how the criminal courts have become involved in the 
project of making and maintaining racially undesirable ‘unwanted’ migrants. Concomitantly, 
it can be seen how the deployment of narratives of bordering during sentencing hearings 
affects more than just those ‘unwanted’ migrant defendants being processed by the courts 
(see also Eaton, 1986), as this stage of the criminal process is now participating in the wider 
normalisation and naturalisation of the racist border.   
Yet, as I explored in Chapter Six, there are also, occasionally, moments in sentencing 
hearings when something different appears to happen. So, I observed some instances where 
narratives of bordering were not re-articulated and sustained but, in fact, challenged and 
subverted – and, therefore, where ideas about racially different unwanted migrants were 
unsettled and unmade. In Tamir’s hearing, then, as I explained, at one point the defence 
barrister refuted Tamir as an inherently lazy and parasitical migrant scrounger not by 
inverting this racialised narrative of bordering, and insisting that – while freeloading spongers 
definitely exist – Tamir was actually hard-working and selfless. Rather, the defence barrister 
narrated outside ideas of individual deficiency and desirability altogether. Thus, as he pointed 
to Tamir’s clear economic disadvantage, as well as the harsh immigration restrictions to 
which Tamir had been subject since arriving in the UK, the defence uncovered the 
problematic structural conditions that helped to explain his client’s involvement in criminal 
activity.  
In Fabrice’s hearing, Fabrice’s barrister portrayed him as less punishable in 
conventional terms as she insisted that he was not intrinsically deviant and criminal but, in 
fact, the converse of this: an individually vulnerable and traumatised migrant. Yet, Fabrice 
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himself seemed to set out a more expansive and complicated narrative. So, as he sobbed 
loudly at points during his hearing, he seemed to animate the civil war and political violence 
that he had experienced in his country of origin – to evoke the horror and terror to which he 
had been subjected before he came to the UK. In this way, Fabrice appeared to gesture 
towards a larger context of harm and violence surrounding his offences – to point towards the 
problematic social conditions which seemed to underpin the violence that he had 
subsequently inflicted on the two women he attacked. Thus, Fabrice appeared to explain that 
the harm he had perpetrated was not solely and individually reducible to him – that he was 
not, simply, a pathologically bad and deviant migrant.  
Within the confines of the sentencing hearing, such challenges worked to destabilise 
the process of imposing punishment on these defendants. As stories about individually good 
and bad migrants were pushed to one side, and supplanted by narratives about the ‘bitter 
social realities’ (Norrie, 2014, p.27) underpinning the criminal offences being dealt with in 
these hearings, Tamir and Fabrice’s individual criminalisation and punishment for ‘what 
happened’ began to seem less inevitable and justified. Ultimately, however, the disruption 
effected was fairly limited. The sentencing proceedings for Tamir and Fabrice certainly 
started to move less assuredly and smoothly as a result of these more resistant interventions – 
but at no point did they actually stop. Yet, as the wider context to their offences was 
excavated and visibilised, the interventions in these hearings were also doing more than 
simply destabilising the practice of punishing these defendants. As Tamir’s barrister, and 
Fabrice, narrated outside of the dominant framework of narratives of bordering, they worked 
to disrupt the court’s articulation and reinforcement of these racialised ideas. Thus, their 
interventions destabilised and interrupted the criminal courts’ participation in making and 
maintaining racially different ‘unwanted’ migrants. 
It is, then, in relation to the wider consequences of what I have traced – in terms of the 
criminal courts’ endeavours in producing and sustaining race, and so helping to naturalise and 
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normalise the racist border – that we see the real importance of the moments of resistance that 
emerged. Through such resistance, the reality of racially inferior ‘unwanted’ migrants was 
unsettled and disputed – and, simultaneously, the necessity and inevitability of the racist 
border was challenged and undone. By delivering such subversive stories, therefore – by 
refusing to ‘partake of and reproduce collective narratives’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p.222) – 
Tamir’s barrister, and Fabrice, ‘provide[d] openings for creativity and invention in reshaping 
the social world’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p.222). That is, the tales that Tamir’s barrister and 
Fabrice told engaged in the work of imagining and re-making the world in a different way. 
By narrating outside of racialised narratives of bordering, their individual stories pointed to 
the possibility of a world without such racist categorisations and depictions – and so a world 
without the forms of exclusion and oppression that these dominant representations function to 
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